CHILD LABOUR THEORIES AND ITS IMPLICATION IN BANGLADESH

By

Tahsina Akter

THESIS

Submitted to
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Professor KIM, Tae Jong

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ABSTRACT

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The magnitude of the 'child labor' problem is large in Bangladesh, with around 5.4–7.9 million, or about one-fifth of all Bangladeshi children between the ages of 5 and 14 years, being classified as child workers in 2000. Most of these child workers work in the agricultural sector and industrial sectors in township and in urban areas. The theories of child labor are more of truism for almost all the countries of the world. Bangladesh is not any exception to that. Having put the Bangladeshi problems in to these theories an appalling scenario of child labor in Bangladesh has been resulted. The research finds support for the widely-held hypothesis that poverty compels children to work. The lack of education and poor economic conditions on the other hand have kept these huge teens suffer bad effects of unemployment. Children are lucrative low waged workers to the employers which lured the parents to abandon even compulsory education and put them into work for money. Education, well sized family, implementation of child right, social motivation

and a congenial employer-worker relation are possibly the best means to reduce child labor in Bangladesh if not the only way to eradicate fully.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my personal appreciation to KDI School who rightfully chose the subject for me. I think research on child labor in Bangladesh is a call of the time. I would like to express my deep appreciation to my supervisor, Prof. Tae - Jong, KIM who inspired, advised and guided me in doing research on the subject. The rich KDI library and learned faculties of KDI who educated me for a long year are at my heart.

National Academy for Educational Management (NAEM), Bangladesh and all it research tentacles have great contribution in my research work. I am equally indebted to Bangladesh Institute of Development Strategy (BIDS) Library, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) Library and my friend, Ms. Anisa Jaman, an eminent researcher who made significant contribution to my research. My good wishes will always remain by the sides of the children who volunteered in giving me their secrets of child labor and sufferings of their lives.

Last but not the least I wish to acknowledge my husband and two tiny daughters who assisted me by not missing me while working day long for the research work.

I dedicate this research work to all the children who are the worst victims of

bad impact of poverty and child labor there of.

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CHILD LABOR THEORIES: IT'S IMPLICATION IN BANGLADESH

Chapter – 1

INTRODUCTION

The globalization, industrialization and free trade introduced the demographic transition and urbanization into the traditional south countries, and the phenomenon of child labor, which the most intolerable is among the consequences, and is getting worse than before. Although child labor is an age-old phenomenon and of enormous importance in the contemporary world, there has been a little formal analysis of this issue. While the existence of child labor is frequently condemned as odious and immoral, the real issue is to better understand the cause of child labor so as to eliminate it. From the society child labor is simply the most severe form of child exploitation and child abuse in the world today. In any society, working children, as a socio-economic group, happens to be the most disadvantaged of all since "they are forced to work for a living, sacrificing their childhood as well as their future for bare survival of self and family" (Mecum 1999).Today, as individual well being increasingly depends on literacy, numeric and individual competence, a child working is in fact a future denied.

Child has the right to be children: "to be loved, cherished, and educated nourished, clothed, pampered, and fostered as children when they are children"

(Hasnat 1996, quoted from Natoli 1992). Child labor is then, a denial of the right to enjoy childhood and achieve full physical and psychological development. The overwhelming majority of working children is found in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Child labor is also exist in many industrialized countries and is emerging in a number of East European countries that are now in transition to a free market economy.

The situation of child labor in Bangladesh is not very congenial. Poverty, poor socio-politico-economic condition etc affected the country with the burden of child labor. The factors that generate child labour in Bangladesh are, one, extreme forms of poverty play a crucial role. Two, there is a direct link between child labour and education. Three, the level of awareness on the issue of child labour is still low.

Child labour is part of a vicious cycle in Bangladesh, with poverty as a main cause as well as a main consequence. This does not allow it to be addressed in isolation. Among factors contributing to child labour are rapid population growth, adult unemployment, bad working conditions, lack of minimum wages, exploitation of workers, low standard of living, low quality of education, lack of legal provisions and enforcement, low capacity of institutions, gender discrimination, conceptual thinking about childhood, etc. One or more of the above contribute to the large numbers of children working under exploitative or hazardous conditions. On the other hand,

nearly 50 per cent of primary school students drop out before they complete grade 5, and then gravitate towards work, swelling the number of child laborers. The high drop-out rates are correlated with the low quality of public primary education, low adult literacy, low awareness of the importance of education, teacher-student ratio (sometimes this goes up to 1 per 100), non-availability of instructive and learning materials, and the cost of education. Basic primary education is free as far as direct costs and school books are concerned. But many indirect costs are involved as well, such as transport, uniforms, pens, pencils, and paper/notebooks. Bangladesh has only limited provision for pre-vocational/vocational skills training and there are related constraints such as the quality of the skills training, market and employment linkages and certification. While this could be an attractive option to working/disadvantaged children and their families, neither the Government of Bangladesh nor many of the non-governmental organizations have the institutional capacity and technical expertise required to deliver skills training facilities effectively; Society in general has a rather indifferent attitude towards the problem. In many cases, it is not realized that the children who are employed in, for example, domestic service, often have no access to education or medical care.

Various organizations and agencies including the government undertook program in to identify good strategies and workable models to combat child labour

and to build the capacity. NGOs and other social partners also joined the venture at a later stage to deal with the problems and its gradual elimination from society. The specific objective was the creation of a congenial socio-economic environment in the country. This was in line with the ILO country objectives in Bangladesh, i.e. to protect working people by promoting and realizing fundamental principles and rights at work and to eliminate child labour from the country. The interventions initiated to achieve this included first of all an analysis of the child labour situation in Bangladesh. Based on this, IPEC also developed strategies and models to determine what interventions could contribute to combating child labour effectively. Interventions varied from preventing children from entering the labour market to withdrawing children from hazardous work and finding ways to rehabilitate them; monitoring of workplaces; raising awareness and capacity building of the partner organizations. Successful measures in tackling child labour in one hazardous occupation are likely to have a multiplier effect that will ultimately benefit children working in other dangerous work.

Although Bangladesh accounts for less than 2 percent of the world population, it is the home of 6.6 million working children, accounting for more than 5 percent of the world's working child population numbering 120 million. In Bangladesh children are found working in almost all the sectors of the economy except mining, quarrying, electricity, gas and water. Many of them work 48 hours a week on an average,

earning less than 500 taka per month. A large number of children work in occupations and industries, which are plainly dangerous and hazardous.

The situation regarding child labour in Bangladesh had been fairly understood during the 1990s by both the Government and civil society as more research studies were done and disseminated; most importantly, several initiatives to combat the problem were taken by the Government of Bangladesh. In 1990, Bangladesh became one of the signatories to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the ensuing Summit Declaration and Plan of Action. In 1990, Bangladesh passed the Primary Education Act and, in 1993, it established the compulsory primary education system for children aged 6 years and above.

Early involvement of children in work leads to serious health and developmental consequences. Working children suffer significant growth deficits as compared with school children. They grow up shorter and lighter, and their body size continues to be smaller even in adulthood. Many of them work under conditions that leave them alarmingly vulnerable to chemical and biological hazards. Child workers tend to develop muscular, chest and abdominal pain, headaches, dizziness, respiratory infections, diarrhea and worm infection. Poor working conditions make them more susceptible than their adult colleagues to infectious diseases, injuries and other workplace-related ailments. Many even experience amputations or loss of body parts.

Moreover, children in certain occupations experience particular types of abuse. Child domestic workers are often found to be victims of verbal and sexual abuse, beating or punishment by starvation. Children, engaged in scavenging, rag-picking or marginal economic activities in the streets, are exposed to drugs, violence, and criminal activities, physical and sexual abuse in many parts of the country.

Worse still, many hundreds of children are trapped in forced labor, debt bondage, prostitution and other kinds of jobs that cause lasting and devastating damage. Obviously the formulation of a National Plan Action for the elimination of child labor in the country is a need of the hour. A critical evaluation of the nature and magnitude of the problem should, however, precede such an exercise.

There is a growing theoretical and empirical literature concerning the cause and consequences of child labor. It is widely accepted that child labor declines as per capita income rises. However, the process of economic development is a slow one, and many developing countries have lost ground over the last decade both in terms of their standard of living and progress made in reducing child labor distinct from poverty and the policy remedies that theory suggests.

I want to begin with some of the theoretical arguments concerning family decision-making and the determinants of child labor.

Chapter - 2

THEORIES OF CHILD LABOR: MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD DECISIONS

The purpose of this section is to touch briefly on theories of household decision-making with regard to the employment of children. Greater emphasis will be placed on the more recent literature that addresses the role of market failure, particularly in the capital market and its relationship to poverty. The ultimate objective of this section is to identify the household characteristics that ought to emerge in empirical analysis as statistically significant determinants of child labor. Sylvain Dessy and Stephane Pallage[1] applying "Nash Equilibrium Theory" have shown that child labor may arise because of the lack of a coordination mechanism between parental decisions of sending their children to school and firms' decisions to invest in the adoption of skill intensive technology. Their argument relies on the following facts. First, in an environment in which children's time has an economic value, educating children presents the parents with an opportunity cost. Second, the reward from children's education will arise in the long term provided firms have invested in technology that requires high-skill workers in the meantime. Third, investing in an economy with low human capital is a risky venture.

The simple one-shot game depicted in Figure 1 between a firm and parents

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1 Child Labor and Coordination Failure by Sylvain Dessy and Stephane Pallage on March 2000 at http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/CREFE/cahiers/cah109.pdf

captures the above facts and may be used to guide our argument. In each box, the first and second numbers are respectively the payoffs of parents and the firm. We should think of them as utils.

Figure 1:

		Firm: Invests	Firm: Does not
Parents	Child labor	2,-20	2,0
	Education	5,100	-1,0

In this game, there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies.[2] In the first one, parents choose not to invest in human capital and the firm not to invest in skill-intensive technology. The second, which Pareto dominates the first, has both parents and the firm invest. Although both equilibria are trembling-hand perfect in the sense of Selten (1975), reaching the Pareto superior equilibrium is no easy matter. In addition to the usual assumptions on the rationality of agents and the common knowledge of that rationality,[3] it requires no less than the following propositions:

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[2] Note that there is also a Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the firm invests with probability ½ and parents send their children to work with probability with 5/6.

[3] A proposition is common knowledge among players if it is known to all players, it is known to all player that all players know it, and so on *ad infinitum.*

1. The firm believes that parents are investing in the education of children.

2. Parents believe that the firm is willing to invest.

3. Both the firm and parents think that the other thinks that they think the above, etc.

Short of any of these requirements, the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium may not be attained. In particular, it is sufficient that parents do not quite trust the firm for a socially bad outcome to arise. Each player would want the other to move first, yet investment in physical or human capital requires substantial time to-build. For these reasons, coordination may be at fault. Governmental intervention may be necessary to help coordinate expectations. By establishing mandatory education programs, for example, the government will send a signal to firms that investments in human capital are being made. Without such coordination mechanism, parents and firms may never choose the socially optimal actions.

Naturally, this simple game is hardly a good representation of the actual game between parents and entrepreneurs. Yet it provides a good illustration of the coordination problem. The necessary coincidence of beliefs and iterations such as "I-think-that-he-thinks-that-I-think-that" to reach the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium may simply be too much to ask, especially if the costs of foregone child labor are

large for parents in the short-run.[4]

Pointing to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium as a focal point in the sense of Schelling (1960) is not sufficient for it to be reached. For many African countries, for example, the status quo is the "bad" Nash equilibrium. In 1980 the average years of schooling among individuals aged 25 and up was 1.5 in Sub-Saharan Africa, compared to 9.1 in industrialized countries. Ten years later, in 1990, the gap in average years of schooling between these regions has increased from 7.6 in 1980 to 8.4 in 1990.[5] On the other hand, according to the World Bank (see World Development Report 1999/2000), during the period 1980-1990, average annual growth of industrial value added was a dismal 0.9% in Sub-Saharan Africa, compared to 9.5% in East Asia and the Pacific for the same period, suggesting a lack of technological change in the former. Finally, the International Labor Organization (1998) reports that child labor is mostly a rural phenomenon: 70% of all child laborers are involved in agricultural production, in regions where firms are typically non-existent. All these reasons support our argument that the status quo in African countries is equilibrium with child labor and no investment in skill-biased technology.

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[4] The Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium is even more difficult to achieve if we consider the need for coordination among parents. Indeed, parents may face free riding incentives in the following sense: removing your child from the labor market, *ceteris paribus*, has a positive effect on the wage of children remaining on the job.

[5] Source: UNDP annual report, 1991, 1992, 1993.

Seeking the "good" Nash equilibrium implies a change of behavior by all players. The good equilibrium will only be reached if all players have the proper expectations about the behavior and the expectations of the others. Since the cost involved in the transition from the first to the second equilibrium is substantial, it may act as a deterrent for some or all of the players. The weight of past behaviors and the risk involved in changing behavior may make the status quo a much better focal point than the Pareto optimum, in this particular case.

For parents to find it optimal to choose education in the game of Figure 1, it is necessary that they assign a subjective probability to the firm investing, higher than one half. This is the only range of beliefs consistent with a choice of sending children to school in this game. Reasons why beliefs could be different abound.

First, since in most African countries there isn't a past history of firms investing in technologies that require skilled labor, parents may be inclined to consider this event a low-likelihood event. Moreover, since the firm itself is able to infer that, for education to be a rational decision, parents need to assign a subjective probability of at least one half to its choice of investing, the firm may itself put a low subjective probability on this possibility given the history behind the game. In such case, given its beliefs, and its beliefs of the others' beliefs, the firm may find it optimal not to invest in the economy. Parents are able to infer the reasoning of firms,

which pushes further down the subjective probability that the firm will invest. Given their beliefs parents may find it optimal to stick to child labor. We have thus illustrated a way the coordination of expectations may take place, leading to the Nash equilibrium with low human capital and no investment.

Second, parents in the game of Figure 1 are able to observe that investment on behalf of the firm is far more risky than no investment. Parents' assessment of the subjective probability that the firm will invest will reflect this observation. Similarly, the firm is able to observe that child labor for parents is a less risky choice than education. Again, the firm's subjective probability that parents will send their children to school will reflect this observation. Now the firm knows that parents know that investing is risky. Parents know that the firm knows that education is risky. If anyone has any reason to suspect the others to be quite risk-averse, the former's subjective probability that the latter will take a risky decision will be downplayed substantially. As a consequence, they themselves will make the low risk decision as a best response to their belief of the others' behavior.

Child labor arises in this environment, not necessarily because of a failure to coordinate expectations and actions, but rather because of either a coordination of players to the Pareto dominated equilibrium, or an inability of players to coordinate towards the Pareto superior equilibrium.

Their argument relies on the assumption that education is only worthwhile if there is a market for high-skill labor at the exit. This market, however, will only develop if firms invest in technology that requires skilled labor. That an economy's deficiency in skill-intensive technologies may be related to deficiencies in individuals' investment in human capital has long been recognized. Works by Lucas (1988, 1990) lend substantial support to this fact. Because of the interdependence in the incentives for both forms of investment, an economy can become trapped in a low-skill, child-labor equilibrium, due to the market failure to coordinate agents' complementary investment decisions.

How economic agents coordinate their choices and their beliefs so as to converge to one outcome rather than others is a very difficult question. A large body of research has focused on this issue. Bicchieri (1993) provides a thorough survey of that field and establishes the necessary requirements for a given Nash equilibrium to be reached. Beliefs have center stage in the process of coordination.

Neoclassical models of household decision-making are commonly employed in the analysis of child labor and are typically derivative of Becker (1964). Models of household bargaining fall into two broad categories: those in which children have no bargaining power and those in which children have some intrinsic value in the family. In models in which children have no bargaining power in the household, parents make

decisions that serve their own interests, without regard for the impact on the child. This class of models lends analytical support for public policies that constrain the choices that parents are allowed to make for their children, e.g. compulsory schooling, minimum age of work, a ban on bonded child labor, etc. Findings of different analysts in this regards are illustrated in subsequent paragraphs.

2.1 Children as Household Assets

In this context, children are viewed strictly in terms of their value as assets. Parents first must choose the number of children they will have. They then weigh whether to invest in the quality of the child or to extract a current stream of services. Becker and Lewis (1973) argue that in the quality-quantity tradeoff, parents who choose a large number of children are less likely to invest in quality schooling. That is, the number of children and investment in the human capital of children are substitutes. Or, parents may choose to have a large number of children in order to diversify risk, formally educating some and putting the others to work.

Initial empirical analysis was quite supportive of both the quality-quantity trade-off and the diversification hypothesis. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) find that an exogenous increase in fertility lowers child quality, and Hanushek (1992) finds a trade-off between family size and educational attainment in the United States. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that, on average, children in larger families in both

developed and developing countries receive less schooling, perform more poorly on intelligence tests, and are less well nourished (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1997). Closely-spaced children receive the least investment (Powell and Steelman, 1993). However, Montgomery, Kouame and Oliver (1995) find contradictory evidence forGhana and Cote d'Ivoire. Further, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995) do not find that the number of siblings of Paraguayan children affect the level of enrollment. Nor is there a strong sibling effect in Brazil (Psacharopoulos and Arrigada, 1989; Levison, 1991). Chernichovsky (1985), studying schooling choice in rural Botswana, actually finds that family size raises educational attainment. Levison (1991) suggests that the positive correlation between family size and schooling may occur because there are decreasing returns in household production. With a large number of children available to engage in household work, the opportunity cost of education for any one child may be quite low. Not only are child assets viewed in relation to one another, the labor of children may also be seen as a complementary input to other household capital. For example, the investment in physical capital to launch a family enterprise may be optimizing only if it can be combined with the labor of the household's children. In fact, exploiting a household's assets may frequently require the inputs of child labor. One of the most well documented cases of complementarily concerns the work and school habits of girls whose mothers have marketable skills. Tapping the mother's

human capital in the formal labor market may require her daughters to replace her contribution to home work. Thus, human capital embodied in a mother is complementary with more home work and less education for her daughters.

2.2 The Poverty Hypothesis

Although parental selfishness may play a role, it is a very commonly held view that child labor is fundamentally a by-product of poverty; strongly suggesting that policy should focus on economic development and increasing income (Nardinelli, 1990). Krueger (1996) notes a steep cross-country negative correlation between GDP per capita and the employment rate of 10-14 year olds in 1995. An important implication of the poverty hypothesis is that policies that focus5 on compelling parents to deviate from their optimizing choices may, in fact, make children worse-off.

Although the poverty/child-labor link may seem obvious, Baland [6] and Robinson (2000) formalize this idea, thus helping to isolate the precise nature of the mechanism. They take as a point of departure that all families make child-labor decisions to maximize the present discounted value of the household's income. In making child-employment decisions, parents weigh the present discounted value of the future income of an educated child against the foregone income while the child is in school. Child labor is only chosen if the return to education is not high enough to

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[6] Baland, Jean-Marie and James A. Robinson (2000) "Is Child Labor Ineffective?" *Journal of Political Economy*. 108(4), August, pp. 663-679.

compensate families for the lost income of their children.

The obvious question then becomes "what is it about being poor that lowers the present discounted value of an education relative to current work?" In a world with perfectly functioning capital markets there are two possibilities: (1) poor people are impatient; that is, they discount the future more heavily than other families; and (2) the return to education for a poor child is lower than for children generally. A low return to education for poor children will occur if schools are far away, inadequately staffed, lack educational supplies and materials, etc. The return to education may also simply be unappreciated if the parents themselves are not educated.

A third possibility emerges when the parent's initial endowment is low relative to their child's future income (whether or not they are educated). In this case, parents would like to engage in consumption smoothing. That is, they would like to borrow against the household's future wealth to increase current consumption while lowering future consumption, thereby evening out the consumption profile of the family over time. Parents are particularly highly motivated to engage in consumption smoothing when the household's survival is threatened by a period of unemployment, drought, etc.

In such a case, parents could offer the child a deal whereby the parent borrows on behalf of the current household, expecting the child to provide the funds

to repay the loan out of the income they will earn as an educated adult. The problem is that a child cannot pre-commit to compensate the parents from future income. Thus, the only option parents have for increasing current household consumption at the expense of the future is to put the child to work.

Baland and Robinson note that this type of bargaining failure occurs when the optimal bequest is negative. That is, over time, it is optimal (from some point of view) to transfer resources back in time from the future of the household to the present, rather than from the present to the future. Implicit in the Baland-Robinson analysis is the fact that child labor is a device for transferring income from the future into the present. A child who works today at the expense of acquiring an education will contribute to family income today at the expense of future productivity.

Evidence of intra-household bargaining problems of the sort raised by Baland and Robinson (2000) are found by Parsons and Goldin (1989) and Andvig (1997), both studies find that children leave the household after receiving an education, making it difficult for parents to internalize the benefits of investing in their children. Further, and perhaps more to the point, Parsons and Goldin (1989) find from their analysis of the U.S. 1900 Census, that working children received little of their earnings in the form of bequests. Child wages only raised current household consumption. One way to interpret this result is that working children were transferring income back to their

parents. That is, the optimal bequest was negative, which is precisely the situation in which Baland and Robinson expect to observe working children.

It is important to note that while Baland and Robinson find an analytical role for poverty as a source of child labor; their analysis does not suggest that we should rely exclusively on economic development as a strategy for eradicating child labor. Rather, as we will see below, government policy can play a significant role in solving the intra-household bargaining problem.

2.3 Market Failure and Multiple Equilibrium

A second wave of models assumes that parents are altruistic and focuses on the interaction between market characteristics and child labor that point to certain market manipulations as a remedy. For example, Basu[7] (1999) examines the case in which rigidities in the market for adult labor drive child labor. He considers a market in which the adult wage is downward rigid, giving rise to adult unemployment. For those families with an unemployed adult, children must work. A policy aimed at restoring wage flexibility and improving labor market function might lower child labor, as would a subsidy to the household during a period of unemployment.

Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) focus attention on the external benefit of an educated

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[7] Basu, Kaushik (1999) "Child Labor: Causes, Consequence and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 37(3), September, pp. 1083 – 1119.

child on the general population. In this case, an education subsidy will help internalize the externality and may have the added benefit of reducing child labor.

Basu and Van (1998) analyze the case in which benevolent parents withdraw their children from the labor market once the adult wage reaches a critical level. Such a labor market may have two equilibriums: one in which child and adults work, giving rise to a large labor supply and low wages, and one in which only parents work, giving rise to a low labor supply and a high adult wage. A ban on child labor may have the effect of helping the high-wage, no-child labor equilibrium emerge, thus redistributing income towards the supplying families and away from owners of other factors. Hirshman[8] also suggests the possibility of multiple equilibriums emerging when parents who put their children to work suffer a social stigma for doing so. The stigma is greater, the smaller the number of other children in the community who are working. Thus, as with Basu and Van, there may be two equilibriums: one with many children working and a low social stigma attached to work and one with few children working and a high social stigma. Hirshman's analysis also suggests that a policy banning child labor might bring about the low child-labor/high social stigma equilibrium.

The most recent developments focus on capital market failure. Baland and

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8 "*Child Labour: Theory, Evidence and Policy*", Drisilla K. Brown and Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M Stern, University of Michigan, August 2001.

Robinson (2000) extend their approach discussed above, introducing the possibility that households might be liquidity constrained. Thus, they emphasize the importance of capital-market failure as a contributing factor to inefficient child labor.

Capital-market failure can emerge in several different guises. Consider first the case in which the present discounted value of an education is greater than the current value of a child's labor. In this case, it is clearly optimal for a family to borrow against the child's future income to finance the child's education. Or, to be more specific, it is in the interest of the child to make any requisite contribution to household income by borrowing against future income, thus freeing the child to attend school rather than work. Baland and Robinson note that the inability of the child to access the capital markets, or the inability of the child to pre-commit to repay education loans obtained by the parents on the child's behalf, may give rise to inefficiently low educational attainment.

To the extent that such intra-family bargaining failure is contributing to inefficient educational attainment, it is possible for government policy to correct the failure with properly configured educational loans to poor families. A government loan that is tied to the child's educational performance and becomes the liability of the child, rather than the parent, allows the child to access the capital markets to meet required contributions to the family. Such a loan is Pareto improving provided there is

some reason to believe that the child would have voluntarily undertaken the loan if he/she had the cognitive ability to analyze the choices like an adult.

However, if parents treat their child's future as a contributing factor to their own sense of well-being, they may be willing to borrow against their own assets or future income in order to finance their child's education. In this case, a lack of collateral will prevent parents from accessing the capital markets, thus again giving rise to an inefficiently low level of education.

The dynamic implications of capital market failure have been studied by Ranjan (2001), with similar conclusions reached by Basu (1999). Ranjan considers, in particular, very poor families who would choose to educate their children if they had access to a capital market, but fail (See Basu (1999)) to do so due to capital-market failure. Such families produce poor, uneducated children who repeat the cycle for the next generation. In this model, a concerted effort to educate one generation of such children will pull the family away from the income level at which they depend on the labor of their children for survival. Thus, subsequent generations of the family will be able to educate their children, permanently enjoying a higher standard of living and educational attainment.

The central policy lesson of the Ranjan and Basu models is that government intervention is required for only one generation of children. For, once an educated

child's future income is raised above a threshold level, the newly created parent will be able to choose education rather than child labor for the next generation.

Chapter – 3

THE DETERMINANTS OF CHILD LABOR

1. Parental education plays a persistent and significant role in lowering the incidence of child labor, above and beyond the impact on family income. The results presented on this are quite robust, as reviewed by Strauss and Thomas (1995). In some cases, such as Cote d'Ivoire, the parent's level of education overwhelms all other family characteristics.

Several theoretical contributions on the determinants of child labor emphasize the importance of educating a single generation of parents and its long-term implications for decision-making for future generations. The theoretical mechanism draws attention to the impact that an education has on the parent's human capital and income. That is, educated parents earn enough income to afford to educate their own children.

However, the empirical evidence very strongly suggests that a parent's education affects future generations above and beyond the impact on household wealth. There are several possible explanations. For example, educated parents have

a greater appreciation for the value of an education or uneducated parents may simply want to believe that the human-capital decisions made by their own parents were correct. In any event, cost-benefit analysis of programs that concentrate on educational attainment must look beyond the impact that an education has on a future parent's income stream and incorporate the implications for human-capital formation by subsequent generations.

2. Several studies point to the importance of school quality as an important determinant of schooling and work. However, school quality is virtually never measured directly in any of the studies discussed. It is quite possibly the case that when a family poised to move children out of the work force and into school fails to do so, the culprit is poor schools. Poor school quality is found to be weakly important in rural Ghana (Lavy, 1996) and very important for Africa generally (Bonnet, 1993). It should be noted though that even if poor school quality lowers the value of formal education, there is an abundance of empirical evidence across Latin America, Africa and Asia that the return to education is still quite high and more than offsets the foregone income of children in school.

3. The role of household income in determining child-labor decisions needs further study. Clearly, there is a very strong cross-country negative correlation between child labor and per capita GDP. However, the role of family income is not so

predominant in explaining variations within a community. We did observe, for some but not all countries, that household expenditures play a central role in child labor decisions. This evidence suggests that there are some external effects across families that make it difficult to put children in school even as income rises or, equally, difficult to put children to work when income is critically low. In particular, none of the studies does a very good job of measuring school quality. The role of cost of schooling, when this is measured, suggests that it may be acting as a proxy for quality. In this case, parents who have the financial ability to forgo the income from the children may still not choose schooling if the quality of schools is very poor.

It is also the case that regional dummies and cultural characteristics such as religion or caste have some significance, suggesting a nontrivial role for cultural factors.

Finally, it is important to reconsider when economic theory tells us to expect poor parents to put their children to work. Recall that, as argued by Baland and Robinson, child labor is a device for transferring resources from the future into the present. Children who work do not invest in human capital that will make them more productive in the future. A family will choose to make this inter-temporal shift in household resources when current income is low *relative* to future income. Thus, it is not the absolute level of family income that matters for the child labor decision but,

rather, the current level *relative* to future income. There may be families that are quite poor and do not have any reason to expect any change in the future. Such families have no reason to attempt to consumption-smooth by putting their children to work.

4. Household assets play an important role in the child-labor decision. One might expect that more assets a family have, the lower the probability of child labor. How ever, there are a number of assets that require a complementary input of labor, and families may expect to get that labor from their children. Tapping the human capital of mothers in the family also requires an increase in child-labor inputs in home production. Thus, a strategy of increasing access to capital markets may not always lower child labor, at least in the short run.

Nevertheless, the significant role of household assets lends some evidence to the possibility that incomplete credit markets give rise to inefficiently high levels of child labor. For example, the presence of older children in the home considerably reduces the probability of child labor. Note that there is a measurable impact *above and beyond* the contribution that older siblings make to family income. This is particularly the case for older brothers, who embody the greatest human capital. In addition, a parent's education reduces child labor for reasons other than the impact of education on the parent's productivity. It is possible that a parent's education is

viewed as a marketable asset, or it may be a reflection of the informational externalities associated with the value of formal education.

What is not clear is why family assets matter. On the one hand, households with assets can more readily weather adverse events. That is, these assets provide the household with the ability to manage uncertainty and, as a consequence, child labor is not required for this purpose. However, families with assets may also have more access to capital markets or can, themselves, fund a child's education without a formal loan. That is, household assets help families transfer household income intertemporally.

In either case, expanding access to formal capital markets to families who otherwise lack collateral may lead to a reduction in LFP rates for children. However, it is also the case that placing constraints on household decision-making, such as mandatory schooling, may at least inhibit the family from turning to internal assets that can be accessed only if children work more. Providing working mothers with firm-level child care may also help reduce the reliance on older daughters to care for their younger siblings.

5. It is clear that older children are more likely to work than younger children. As children grow older and acquire skills, the opportunity cost of schooling rises. This is particularly the case for adolescent boys, who are increasingly able to

perform physically demanding tasks as they approach maturity. Thus, it appears to be the case that it will be more challenging and costly from a policy point of view to induce older male children to remain in school.

6. The role of siblings in the household does not appear to be a major deterrent to schooling once we control for other household characteristics. The only exception is that there is some evidence that in some cases, mid-aged children are caring for younger siblings. When evidence that older children are caring for younger children is combined with the fact that the presence of an older sibling in the house generally raises the probability of schooling, it is possible to make a case that parents are diversifying their human-capital investments in their child assets. The oldest children acquire human capital in the form of on-the-job training and the youngest children receive formal education. However, this interpretation of the evidence does not accord well with the other significant result: the presence of siblings in the same age range tends to *raise* the probability of school and lower the probability of work.

Rather it seems more natural to, first, view children in the middle age range, 10-14, as complements, sharing housework and schooling opportunities. Second, when we observe older children making schooling possible for their younger siblings, this is likely evidence that older siblings help relax the liquidity constraint in the presence of capital-market failure. Third, when we observe mid-aged children caring

for younger siblings, it is to help the family make optimal use of the mother's human capital in the form of marketable skills. Thus, policies that focus on lowering fertility may not be particularly effective in reducing child labor.

To the extent that parents diversify their child assets, this appears to occur along gender lines. In Latin America, parents are more likely to engage in the formal schooling of their daughters whereas in Africa parents are more likely to school their sons.

7. Finally, we see little evidence that child labor is driven by the needs of industry. Children are far more likely to be working in a rural setting rather than an urban setting where factories are located. In addition, LFP rates raise with a child's age, strongly suggesting that the productivity of child increases, the larger and stronger the child is. If child workers were valued for their small stature and tiny fingers, we should have observed the opposite. To the extent that child labor is a demand-side phenomenon, it appears to occur primarily within the household. Families with a household enterprise or a large tract of land tend to want to put their children to work. That is, the household's physical assets are most efficiently employed when the child's time is used as a complementary input.

Chapter – 4

TRADITIONAL POLICIES TARGETING CHILD LABOR AND EDUCATION – HOME AND ABROAD

We now turn to an examination of some traditional strategies for reducing child labor and increasing school attendance. As discussed in Engerman (2001) in this colloquium, the initial strategies for circumscribing child labor in industrial England included limits on hazardous work, hours of work, minimum age of work, a prohibition against night work and minimum educational attainment for working children, and strategies to promote general economic growth.

4.1 Promotion of Economic Growth

Given the strong correlation between economic growth and the decline in child labor, some have argued that policies targeted explicitly on child labor are ill-conceived. There is certainly an abundance of evidence both that household income is an important determinant of whether and how much children work in developing countries, as well as a strong negative correlation between per capita GDP and income growth both across countries and across time. However, while economic growth undoubtedly offers the greatest promise for helping children in the long run, the well-being of today's children and perhaps even economic growth itself may

depend on getting children out of jobs and into schools today.

4.2 Minimum Age and Compulsory Education

In the international arena, child-labor practices are also regulated by ILO Convention that calls for the abolition of forced labor and Convention 138 that provides for a minimum age of employment. According to the language of Convention 138, children should not enter the labor market before having completed compulsory education or having reached the age of 15.Additional provisions allow for light work beginning at age 13 and hazardous work beginning at age 18. Furthermore, developing countries may permit light work at the age of 12 and non hazardous work at age 14. Indeed, regulating minimum age and compulsory education has become the most common strategy globally for limiting child labor. Typically, children are required to attend school until the age of between 14 and 16 and are permitted to begin working at the age of 14.

There are several theoretical justifications for compulsory schooling and minimum age of work laws. Certainly if there is evidence that parents are overly selfish when making decisions concerning investing in the human capital of their children or if there is an external effect of education of the sort argued by Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), then requiring parents to provide for more education than they would freely choose can be justified on both equity and efficiency grounds. We might

also be able to justify constraining family choice if parents are making school/work decisions to diversify the human-capital investment in their children. It may be legitimate to prevent parents from schooling some of their children and putting others to work on equity grounds if on-the-job training is less valuable than formal schooling once the child grows to adulthood.

In addition, Basu and Van's (1998) multiple-equilibrium argument in support of a ban on child labor can be implemented by establishing laws regulating minimum age of work with monitoring by examining school-attendance records. Finally, to the extent that labor standards in the international arena require countries to control child labor, presumably all countries attempting to be in compliance with international standards would pass and attempt to enforce compulsory schooling and minimum age-of-work laws.

Minimum age of employment and years of compulsory education are reported for a selection of countries in Table. We also report labor force participation rates for children covered by the legislation. Needless to say, many families in developing countries do not comply with the law. In Latin America, the LFP rate for children aged 5-14 is 17 percent even though in nearly all countries children are not legally permitted to work until the age of 14. A similar situation exists throughout Asia, in which the LFP rate for children aged 5-15 is 21 percent. In Africa, over 40 percent of

5-14 year olds are working even though the minimum age of employment is typically 14 years or even higher. Although these age ranges overlap somewhat with the ages of legal work, these numbers nonetheless indicate a good deal of illegal child employment.

Similarly, Krueger (1996) presents evidence from the 1990-91 waves of the World Values Survey in which respondents are asked for the age at which they completed (or will complete) full-time education. His results are reported in table bellow which reveals individuals born between 1959 and 1974 for a select group of countries[9]:

TABLE - 1

PERCENT OF CHILDREN LEAVING ACHOOL BY AGE FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES 1959 – 74 BIRTH COHORT						
School Leaving Age	Mexico	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	India	USA
12 or younger	25.2	6.6	80.2	2.4	40.5	0.6
13	1.3	5.9	5.8	2.0	4.2	0.2
14	1.8	5.9	3.7	2.7	5.1	0.0
15	5.1	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.2	1.8
16	4.0	4.5	2.1	5.2	3.6	2.6

9 "*Working Paper 2001*", Department of Economics, Tufts University, Medford, Table 6.

17	3.8	10.8	2.1	12.3	4.3	15.0
18	7.8	16.0	1.0	21.9	6.5	29.7
19	5.3	8.0	o.7	10.4	4.9	4.4
20	6.5	4.2	0.4	8.1	4.5	4.9
21 or older	39.1	34.5	0.4	31.3	23.3	40.8
Adapted from Krueger (1997)						

These results clearly indicate that while compliance is the norm in high-income countries, compulsory-education laws have little discernible effect in low-income countries.

In the United Kingdom, the law was changed in 1947, raising the age from 14 to 15, and then again in 1973, raising the age from 15 to 16. For each cohort, the modal age at which children left school coincided with the legal requirement and no more than 5 percent of children left school before the legal age.

However, when the law is somehow inconsistent with the equilibrium level of education, there is little effect. For example, Brazil increased the compulsory school age from 11 to 14 in 1971. Yet 85 percent of children still left the work force before reaching the age of 14 whether or not they were covered by the revised regulation.

Furthermore, the evidence of compliance is corroborated with evidence from earnings, at least in the United States in the period 1960-1980. Angrist and Krueger

(1991) and Harmon and Walker (1995) find that the earnings payoff to years of compulsory school is higher than for years of optional schooling.

Clearly, the casual empirical evidence does not suggest that laws regulating compulsory education and minimum age of work are very effective in controlling child labor in those settings in which child labor is problematic. In order to gain a sense of how laws regulating minimum age of work and compulsory education might operate in a developing country, it is instructive to analyze the effects of such laws during the period in which child labor was declining rapidly in industrialized countries.

Several studies look at the historical events surrounding the decline in child labor in Western Europe and North America throughout the 19th and into the 20th centuries. Scholliers (1995) studied child labor in Ghent, Belgium and concluded that the incidence of working children under the age of 12 declined substantially by the middle of the 19th century *without* legal intervention. Brown, Christiansen and Philips (1992) draw similar conclusions for the U.S. fruit and vegetable canning industry between 1880 and 1920. While legislation played some role, economic forces dominated the decision to remove children from this sector. By contrast, Bolin-Hort (1989) argues that legal restrictions played a substantial role in the removal of child workers from the cotton mills in Manchester, England.

Thus, it is useful to consider some of the more careful statistical analysis of

the impact of laws regulating entrance to the labor market and compulsory schooling. Angrist and Krueger (1991) develop a "natural experiment" type statistical technique for evaluating the impact of compulsory schooling laws on school attendance. The 1960-1980 U.S. censuses collected information on the "quarter of birth" and "school attendance as of April 1." Angrist and Krueger argue that if compulsory school laws are effective, teenagers who are 16 years old as of April 1 and live in a state that requires students to remain in school only until they are 16 are less likely to be attending school at the time of the census than 16 year old teenagers who live in states with a mandatory school age of 17 or 18. They find a statistically significant effect of compulsory schooling laws for 1960 and 1970, thus supporting the hypothesis that laws affect schooling behavior.

Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) perform similar analysis on the same data looking for the impact of child labor laws on school attendance. They find, for example, that boys born in states that required 9 years of school before entering the work force spent 0.26 more years in school than boys born in states requiring 6 or fewer years of schooling.

The Angrist-Krueger technique was then applied to earlier periods in U.S. history. Margo and Finegan (1996) analyze the schooling choices of 14 year-olds reported in the1900 federal census. In this study, 14 year-olds are broken into two

groups: (1) those teenagers who are already 14 at the beginning of the 1900 school year; and (2) those who are not yet 14 at the beginning of the school year. Margo and Finegan hypothesize that if mandatory school laws are effective, the younger 14 year-olds living in a state with a compulsory schooling law should be more likely to be in school than older 14 year-olds. However, no such difference should exist for 14 year-olds in states without compulsory schooling laws. Margo and Finegan find that compulsory school laws have a positive and statistically significant impact on the decision to obtain *some* schooling for younger 14 year-olds. However, the laws have no discernible effect on the probability of full-time school attendance.

They then consider the impact of compulsory school laws combined with laws that regulate the minimum age of work. The addition of child-labor restrictions is likely to have an additional effect on school attendance because child labor laws were more aggressively enforced than mandatory education laws at that time. In this case, the combination of laws has a statistically significant impact on school choice. Young 14 year-olds were 18 to 21 percent more likely to obtain *some* schooling if their access to the labor market was legally restricted. However, the laws did not significantly increase the probability of being in school full-time.

The statistical evidence presented here has been criticized, most notably by Moehling (1999). She argues that the laws mandating school attendance are

themselves endogenous and tend to follow the decline in child labor rather than precipitate it. That is, cross-state differences in technology, immigration and real wages are driving both the change in educational attainment and the laws regulating school attendance. Thus, despite the fact that compulsory education laws, child labor laws and school attendance are correlated, it is not a causal relationship.

Moehling looks at occupation rates – the proportions of youth who identify some form of employment as their main use of time, as opposed to school. Then, in order to control for differences in the economic conditions across states that might be driving both the legislative process and schooling choice, she first looks at the difference in occupation rates for 13 and 14 year-olds in each state prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling laws. This gives a baseline against which to compare the difference in occupation rates for 13 and 14 year-olds after some states passed compulsory education laws. Moehling also included a number of other economic and demographic variables that have been shown to play a significant role in child labor decisions, as discussed above.

Moehling finds that the probability a 14 year-old boy would be working fell substantially between 1890 and 1900 in states with newly enacted compulsory education laws. However, she observes a statistically similar decline in labor force participation in states without such laws. Similarly, the labor force participation rates

for 13 and 14 year-old girls in states that did pass compulsory education laws also fell between 1880 and 1990. By contrast, 13 and 14 year-old girls in states that did not pass compulsory education laws had increased labor-force participation (LFP) during the decade. Thus, for girls, there is a negative correlation between the passage of laws and the LFP rates for girls.

However, there is no differential effect on girls covered and not covered by the law. That is, the employment choices by 13 year-old girls covered by compulsory education laws is mirrored by 14 year-old girls in the same state not covered by the law. From this, Moehling infers that the failure of some states to pass laws requiring 13 year old-girls to attend school, and the increase in the employment of 13 year-old girls in these same states, are being simultaneously driven by other economic factors.

Moehling then goes on to consider Margo and Finegan's hypothesis that schooling is affected by the combination of child labor and compulsory education laws. Once again, the laws do not seem to be driving behavior. The only case in which 13 year-olds behave differently than 14 year-olds occurs for boys in states with no legislative change. In states with no laws regulating either compulsory education or minimum age of employment, the LFP rate for 14 year-old boys rose between 1890 and 1900, whereas the LFP rate for 13 year-old boys declined during the same period. Thus, the results are running precisely counter to the expectation that laws

affect behavior!

In response to the rising LFP rates for girls in the last decade of the 19th century, there was a burst of legislative activity shortly after 1900. In 1900, 24 states had laws regulating minimum age of employment. By 1910, 43 states had such laws. Perhaps more importantly, by 1909, 34 states had enacted legislation providing for inspectors assigned to enforce child labor laws.

Moehling then applied her statistical technique to the 1900 and 1910 censuses. In this case, the estimated effect of legal restrictions on school attendance, at least, appears to be positive but statistically insignificant for some groups. However, the impact is small relative to the time-series change.

What can we conclude from this evidence? First, the more carefully executed the statistical analysis, the weaker is the evident effect of legal restrictions on child schooling and labor decisions. Second, it does appear that for carefully crafted laws, such as those enacted in the last quarter of the 20th century in England, there is some impact of legislation on behavior at the margin. However, when the age limits specified by the laws are substantially at odds with optimizing decisions by households, they have little effect. For example, the laws written in the United States around 1900 tended to specify 14 years as the cut-off between schooling and work. However, Moehling's evidence clearly suggests that 14 years of age was not viewed

as a significant work-school boundary for many U.S. households at that time. Similarly, recently enacted laws regulating work in Brazil have had no effect on household decisions. Thus mandatory school laws and minimum age of employment are at best, a complement to other policies designed to alter the family's perception of the appropriate age at which children should begin working.

Finally, the results of Margo and Finegan on the one hand, and Moehling, on the other, are not as inconsistent as they may at first seem. Margo and Finegan focus on the 1900 census because it not only asks whether a child views school as the main occupation but also whether the child is in school at all. Moehling, by contrast, looks at several decades of data and, so, is only able consider whether the laws are affecting a child's perception as to whether school is the main occupation. Either study finds an impact of compulsory schooling laws or child-labor laws on the child's perception of his/her main occupation. That is, neither study finds that the legal restrictions increase the probability of full-time schooling.

4.3 *National Legislation and Policies against Child Labour in Bangladesh*

Legislation

Existing legislation is antiquated and fragmented and deals only with children working in the formal sector. There is no single code or law dealing with this area. Cooperation between the Ministry of Labour and Employment and the ILO's

International Program on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) will include a review of existing child labour laws with a view to removing anomalies, fixing a uniform minimum age for admission to work at 14 years (18 years for hazardous occupations), and prohibiting the employment of children in hazardous operations in shops and other establishments.

4.3.1 *Minimum age for admission to employment in the formal sector*:

There are a number of statutes, which stipulate the minimum age at which children can legally work in certain sectors. These are:

(a) Mines (Mines Act 1923) - 15 years (with medical certificate of fitness);

(b) Shops and other commercial establishments (Shops and Establishments Act, 1965): 12 years;

(c) Factories (Factories Act, 1965): 14 years (with medical certificate of fitness);

(d) Railways and ports (Employment of Children Act, 1938): 15 years;

(e) Workshops where hazardous work is performed (Employment of Children Act, 1938): 12 years;

(f) Tea gardens (Tea Plantation Labour Ordinance, 1962): 15 years.

4.3.2 *Regulation of hours and conditions of employment*:

Broadly speaking, the existing legislation requires that non-prohibited work

by children in factories, on the railways, in ports, shops, commercial and industrial establishments, and mines take place between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The Factories Act additionally imposes a limit of five hours' work per day for children and prohibits work in more than one factory on a given day.

Hazardous work:

The Employment of Children Act, 1938, prohibits children less than 12 years from working in workshops where any of a number of listed processes is carried on. Though not explicitly described as such, these processes are all hazardous. They include weaving, tanning and the manufacture of bidis, soap, carpets, matches, explosives and fireworks. However, an important exemption to this prohibition is made in the case of family owned and family run workshops not using outside hired labour. The Factories Act, 1965, prevents children under 18 years of age from working on dangerous machines without proper instruction on the dangers, and necessary precautions, in addition to training or supervision. All forms of forced labour are prohibited under the Constitution. Unlawful compulsory labour is also an offence under the Penal Code 1860.

4.3.3 *Bangladesh is a signatory to the*[10]:

a. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182);

b. ILO Forced Labour Convention (No. 29);

c. ILO Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No. 105);

d. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

4.3.4 *Government policies and programs*:

In collaboration with the World Food Program (WFP), the Government started the Food for Education program in 1993 with an aim to attract poor children and their families towards primary education. With the setting-up of the Primary and Mass Education Division in 1992 and the Directorate of Non-Formal Education in 1996, the Government introduced another remedy to tackle the high dropout and low attendance rates in the formal school system. This trend provided a sustainable solution to the primary education problem and made a substantial impact on solving the child labour issue.

In March 2001, the Government of Bangladesh ratified the ILO Convention No. 182 and, in December 2001, the Ministry of Labour and Employment took the initiative to begin developing a national policy on child labour that would constitute a

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10 "National Legislation and Policies Against Child Labour in Bangladesh" at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/newdelhi/ipec/responses/bangladesh/national.htm

policy foundation for the IPEC Time-Bound Programme (TBP) and contribute to the implementation of Bangladesh's obligations under the ILO Convention No. 182. A draft policy developed in consultation with national stakeholders is being examined by the Ministry.

On a more practical level, the Ministry of Labour and Employment is currently implementing a USAID funded project titled and aimed at Eradication of Hazardous Child Labour in Bangladesh. Interventions under this "demonstration" project, which covers areas in Dhaka and Chittagong Municipal Corporations, include non-formal education and skills training for working children and micro credit support for their guardians/parents.

Chapter - 5

RECENT POLICY INITIATIVES IN THE ADDRESSING CHILD LABOR

Although the empirical results discussed above are by no means conclusive, they are certainly suggestive of the types of policies that might be effective in reducing the incidence of child labor. We turn now to consider some of the policy initiatives that have recently been undertaken in some developing countries.

Recently, several governments have implemented a range of positive strategies designed to improve compliance. For a more thorough description see U.S. DOL (1998) and World Bank (2001), from which much of this section draws. See also

Anker and Melkas (1996) for an overview of programs relying on economic incentives, worldwide. The programs include improvements in educational infrastructure, programs targeted at children who have fallen or are likely to fall behind in school, financial incentives and sector-specific programs. We discuss some of these below.

5.1 Educational Infrastructure

Increased spending on books, supplies, buildings, and teacher training have been pursued by several governments. Brazil has been one of the most aggressive in this regard. Beginning in 1997, the *Livro Didactico* project has provided $142.5 million for textbooks. The TV program *TV Escola* is targeted at raising the skill levels of teachers in rural areas. The program also includes the distribution of kits that contain instructional materials. Funds have also been made available to raise the wages of extremely low paid teachers and to build and improve public school facilities.

The Mexican government also uses telecommunications to improve education quality for rural communities. By virtue of the Telesecundaria program, rural seventh, eighth and ninth graders can view educational programs broadcast by the Mexican Ministry of Education. The central government provides a teacher, television set, satellite dish, decoder, instructional material and books for qualified schools.

Some poorer countries have had to rely on the one-room schoolhouse model in order to extend educational opportunities to all children. For example, The Ministry

of Education in Egypt built 8,500 new one-classroom schools in rural communities during the mid-1990s and increased investment in teacher training. Similarly, the government of the Philippines established 1880 "incomplete" elementary schools, along with 900 elementary schools, thereby halving the proportion of *barangays* (political divisions of municipalities or cities) without a primary school.

The Turkish Ministry of Education has built 670 new primary schools and appointed 1,930 new teachers in order to implement a new compulsory school law requiring eight years of schooling. Nevertheless, many communities in Turkey still lack most of the items essential to a school, such as chalk, blackboards, teachers, books, etc.

5.2 Remedial Teaching and Flexible Schedules

Working children, given the competing work and school demands on their time, are particularly likely to fail to complete each grade with their cohort. Some empirical evidence discussed above suggests that greater flexibility in school schedules would help working children remain in school. Nicaragua's remedial education program, Extra Edad, targets older children who have failed to complete the primary grades by the age of 14. Classes are offered after work in order to allow the child to continue to earn an income while pursuing an elementary education. Guatemala has also introduced a strategy of flexible schedules to keep working

children in school. Classes begin after market work is completed and students make up missed schoolwork with independent study. Children of migrant workers are also offered a more flexible school calendar, allowing students to resume school attendance as soon as they are able. Mexico provides flexibility by allowing the children of migrants to attend school in whichever district they happen to be currently residing. Peru offers classes in three shifts throughout the day. This school schedule allows each student to combine work and school in a manner consistent with the requirements of the employer. Lapu-Lapu City in the Philippines offers a work-study program in which children attend school in the morning and then report for work in the afternoon. Child workers are directed toward less dangerous work and monitoring of working conditions is intensified in hazardous occupations such as firecracker assembly.

The state of Andhra Pradesh in India launched a program in 1997 targeting children who have left school or were never enrolled with two-month school camps. Typically eligible children are bonded child laborers, domestic servants and those from lower castes. Camps are comprised of 100 children and 5 teachers each. The pilot program was particularly successful as a stepping-stone to formal education. Of those children enrolled in the first year of the program, 74 percent subsequently enrolled in formal school. The Andhra Pradesh program is particularly attractive in

light of the fact that 60 percent of children aged five to 14 never attend school.

5.3 *Financial Incentives*

Governments rely on a wide array of financial incentives either to make school more attractive or even to make school attendance feasible for families. Among the most popular are school meal programs. Such aid programs are distinctive because they tie the aid to school attendance. Brazil launched Marenda Escolar in 1997, spending $453.4 million on breakfast and lunch. Urban Brazilian families who are likely to put their children to work also receive food baskets from the Foundation of Childhood and Adolescence. Like food distributed at school, the food baskets are contingent on school attendance. Mexico provides approximately 4 million breakfasts a day to poor children attending school. All Egyptian children are also given one meal/day in school. Similarly, the government of South Africa provides meals for five million children who attend school.

While food aid may make school more attractive, it may not be a sufficiently strong incentive to induce families to give up the income earned by children. As a consequence, some governments have instituted cash stipends or in-kind gifts for children attending schools. For example, the poor families in Bangladesh receive 15 to 20 kg of wheat per month if their children are attending school. In 1996, the program reached 1.14 million families. ILO-IPEC (1998a) finds that the program has a

significant impact on enrollment, attendance and drop-out rates.

In Brazil, Bolsa Escola pays a monthly stipend to each family with an unemployed adult in the Federal District that keeps all of its children aged 7 to 14 attending school. In addition, the program makes a deposit equivalent to one month's salary into a savings account after each year of completed school through the eleventh grade. Funds are forfeited if the child fails to advance to the next grade.

Mexico introduced a similar, though not identical, program in 1997. The Program for Education, Health and Nutrition (PROGRESA) targets over 2.5 million families whose children are not attending school. The program pays a bimonthly stipend to the families of children who maintain an 85 percent attendance record. The stipend ranges from $7 to $63, depending on the age and gender of the child. The program also provides families with funds to purchase school materials and supplies, a basic package of primary health-care services, and food supplements for children and mothers. The health-care provisions of the program are tied to routine visits to medical facilities.

Although the Mexican and Brazilian programs appear similar, some key aspects are likely to make the Mexican program more effective at lowering child labor. The Brazilian subsidy to families with an unemployed adult has features that repair some of the effects of capital-market failure. In the absence of the program,

families without access to capital markets are forced to turn to the labor of their children in order to survive periods of economic adversity, such as an unemployed adult. Thus, this program must be seen primarily as a program to deter child labor that occurs as a form of family insurance against income uncertainty. Children who work as a consequence of poverty proper may not be affected.

The educational savings account is even more deceptive. The family can access the account only after the child has successfully completed eleven years of education. Therefore, the savings account cannot serve as collateral for education loans, nor can the family access the account to pay ongoing expenses. In addition, the child cannot pre-commit to surrender the proceeds to repay their parents even if the parent could access the capital markets on behalf of the child. As a consequence, none of the problems with capital market failure are remedied with the Brazilian savings-account program.

The only impact the loan has is to raise the present discounted value of an education relative to current income. The increased return to education may affect the calculus in a family that is able to borrow in order attend school, but it cannot help families without access to capital markets.

By contrast, the Mexican program buys out the labor contract of the child from the parent. Participating children receive a stipend that partially replaces the

income the child could earn by working in exchange for school attendance. Thus, all of the problems with capital-market failure and their implications for inefficient child work are sidestepped. Issues of collateral and intra-family bargaining are no longer relevant. Nor do policy-makers need to be concerned that providing access to capital markets will lead families to purchase assets that they intend to combine with the labor of their children.

Subsidy programs that replace the child's income boast some of the highest success rates. Between 1995 and 1996, the official dropout rate in the Brazilian Federal District fell from 11 percent to 0.4 percent, although the extent to which this should be attributed to any particular program is unknown. Similarly remarkable success is reported for the Brazilian Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI). Begun in 1996, PETI targets nearly 900,000 Brazilian children aged 7 to 14 working in the most harmful conditions in rural areas. Under the program, mothers in families earning half the minimum wage per capita receive a monthly stipend equal to US$13.50 per month for each child attending school and after-school programs full-time. Children in school also receive three meals per day. An equal amount of money per child in the program is paid to the local municipality to finance salaries, materials and meals. In return, the municipality must pay 10 percent of the cost of the schools' infrastructure. Monitoring of school attendance is undertaken by teachers. The total

cost of the program through 2006 is estimated to be on the order of $2 billion.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that PETI is profoundly successful. The town of Conceicao do Coite, a Brazilian sisal-producing community located in Bahia, provides a striking example. Children working in sisal harvesting are commonly permanently injured by both the sharp sisal stalks and the tools used for cutting. Evaluation of PETI undertaken by UNICEF suggests that child labor in Conceicao do Coite has been virtually eliminated.

One of the distinctive features of the PETI program is that it combines stipends to families that replace the child's earnings with financial support to develop and fund educational opportunities, all of which are embedded in a vigorously active local community committed to eradicating child labor. In addition, PETI, like Bolsa Escola, is a means-tested program targeting the very poor. Finally, the educational subsidy is quite large in comparison to the family's income. Although the size of the benefit and the income cut-off has varied over the life of the program, the educational subsidy has in some cases been equal to the income earned by the parents.

However, it is difficult to judge the quality of the reported evidence. The teacher's report on school attendance is required to receive the subsidy and also serves as the basis for school attendance statistics. Teachers may have an incentive to misreport, either because of bribes or concern for the welfare of the child.

Both Brazil and Mexico have designed additional income-support programs targeted at specific sectors. The Mexican government targets children working in the fruit and vegetable sector in the northeastern state of Somalia. Aid is paid in the form of food packages worth about 30 percent of an adult's monthly salary. As with the income supplement, families are required to demonstrate a substantial school-attendance record of their children. Local growers are required to contribute 30 percent of the cost of the food. Growers may also construct and furnish local schools. In such cases, the government provides teachers and supplies.

The ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) furnished seed funding to start a program sponsored by the Union of Rural Workers in Etirolandia in Brazil to provide families with assets that they could use to support their children in school rather than send them to work. The Goat-to-School program provides each eligible family with a goat and information on tending and rearing goats. Beneficiary families are required to use the milk to feed their children and to repay the program in goats without interest. This unique program provides families with the assets they need to find safer alternative employment for their children that do not interfere with schooling.

The *Goats-to-School* program is not very significant, however, in terms of the number of children covered. Between 1996, when the program was begun, and

1998, 60 goats were distributed to 30 families affecting 100 children. The incentives and constraints built into the program are quite sensitive and responsive to the evidence currently available as to why children work and in what occupations. Clearly the program provides families with an asset that produces an income stream that the family can rely on rather than on the labor services of their children. That is, poor families are able to acquire capital that allows them to fund current education for their children, thus eliminating inefficient child labor associated with incomplete capital markets. In addition, the loan can be repaid through the efforts of the children tending the goats since the loan is repaid simply by returning one baby goat to the program for each adult goat received. Thus, the intra-family bargaining problem that arises because children cannot pre-commit to repay loans taken out on their behalf is eliminated because the children, through their efforts tending the animals, are able to repay the loan on their own.

Furthermore, the children tend the goats, thereby continuing to make some current contribution to the family. However, the times at which the goats need tending do not conflict with schooling, thus providing each child with sufficient flexibility in their work schedule to combine school and work. Nor is the work so onerous that the children are too exhausted to complete their schoolwork. Finally, receiving the benefit is contingent upon school attendance.

As a consequence, the program provides a strong incentive to substitute education for work even if the family is far from the income level that would place them near the work-school margin. Thus, it is not necessary to wait until income reaches some critical level at which parents start withdrawing children from school and the implicit subsidy does not have to be so large as to raise income to the poverty line to be effective.

To the extent that *Goats-to-School* has a design weakness, it is the absence of time consistency. Families receive the asset based on a commitment to place their children in school. However, there is no mechanism for enforcing ongoing compliance other than the social pressure that might be brought to bear by the union implementing the program. The income subsidies described above that make a payment only after the teacher certifies attendance may prove to be more effective in lowering the level of child labor for a given level of expenditure.

Another interesting feature of the *Goats-to-School* program is that it is self-sustaining. Animals repaid become assets for new families entering the program. Although IPEC provided the original funding, the program is now self-financing.

Some programs that provide financial support are specifically targeted at replacing the contribution that the working children make to household income. Others are targeted at helping families defray the cost of education. For example, the Egyptian

government pays a grant equal in value to about US$4.17 to cover uniforms, books and supplies for families earning less than about US$29.41 per month.

5.4 *Programs to Reduce Child Labor in Targeted Sectors*

Conditions for working children in some sectors are sufficiently hazardous that programs have been tailored to the specifics of the relevant sector. Cultural factors may be sufficiently complex that simply relying on financial incentives may be ineffective. Examples include the Vale dos Sinus Project initiated in 1996 to reduce the employment of children in the Brazilian footwear industry and the HABITAT project initiated in 1998 to reduce child labor in the stone quarries of Guatemala. Both projects have a public-education component designed to sensitize parents, employers and the community to the risks to children employed in these sectors. Program objectives also include improved working conditions, medical services and flexible school options. The government of Peru has also targeted children who work turning bricks in the Huachipa brick fields outside of Lima. In addition to mentoring and tutoring young children, the program provides health care and small business loans to start a family enterprise.

Providing alternative employment opportunities has also been used as a strategy to draw children out of the quarries of Carabayllo, Peru. Mothers who agree to keep their children out of work receive financial and other help in establishing a

micro-enterprise making plastic bags. Families are provided with equipment, raw materials and technical advice on beginning the business.

A similar program has been developed in Turkey. It is a common practice in the mountain villages of the Duragan district of Sinop to auction off male children aged nine to 15 to help during the harvest season on the farms of affluent families. The Development Foundation of Turkey has launched a program to train families in small-scale agricultural projects, such as beekeeping and turkey-breeding, that allows the child to work productively while remaining at home. Children can, in some cases, earn more in these newly-created family enterprises than as rented labor.

Several programs are targeted at raising awareness of the negative effects of work on children. For example, the African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect on the tobacco and tea plantations in Tanzania uses drama and theatre to mobilize communities and educate. Teachers report increased attendance and some employers have begun to provide financial help to schools for the purchase of supplies and school meals.

Children who have been formerly bonded frequently perform poorly in a formal education setting. In Nepal, rehabilitation is undertaken by the Informal Sector Service Center, providing nine months of remedial training in language and arithmetic. Children are then channeled into elementary schools.

In Bangladesh several communities have reached formal agreements with employers not to employ children and to return currently employed children to school. For example, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers Association (BGMEA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1995, which provides for removing children currently working if they can be placed in school. In addition, no under-age children should be newly employed. Children presenting themselves for employment shall be directed to NGO-run schools where they can receive a monthly stipend equal in value to about US$6.88 for attending school.

The program appears to have been fairly successful. In 1995, 10,546 children were working in BGMEA factories. About 43 percent of member factories employed children. This figure fell to 32 percent in 1997 and 13 percent in 1998 (ILO-IPEC, 1998).

Several U.S. importers of soccer balls have signed the Partners' Agreement to Eliminate Child Labor in the Soccer Ball Industry in Sialkot, Pakistan. The program aims to provide children removed from employment and their younger siblings with informal education, alternative income-generating opportunities, formal schooling and awareness training for parents.

The weakness of this program occurs in the monitoring component. It is commonly the case in Sialkot for women and their children to stitch soccer balls in

between other household chores. In order to prevent families from putting their children to work stitching soccer balls, work has been moved from homes to stitching centers. However, as has been noted in a previous section, mothers who work outside of the home place their daughters at risk for full-time homework. However, when mothers work in a household enterprise, such as soccer ball stitching, daughters can more readily combine home-work with schooling. As a consequence, this program has the potential to undermine the efforts that Pakistani families are making to educate their daughters.

A rescue and rehabilitation program was initiated in 1995 by the National Society for Protection of Environment and Children in the Nepalese carpet industry. The program attempts to provide informal education for children removed from work but also conducts classes for children in the carpet factories. Children removed from work are either returned to their family or placed in youth hostels where they receive other skills training.

5.5 Empirical Evidence on Program Effectiveness

Although programs that provide incentives to replace work with schooling seem like they ought to be effective, there is very little careful empirical analysis of these programs. Anker and Melkas (1996) surveyed administrators of 68 income-replacement and substitution activities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Respondents generally thought that their programs were effective. However, the authors doubted the value of such self-reporting and noted that none of the programs had evaluated the impact on the incidence of child labor either short-term or long-term.

Nevertheless, the survey provided some useful insights[11].

1. A package of school-based incentives, remedial education, income-generating activities for families, and awareness training for parents is more effective than any one of these components individually.

2. School-lunch programs themselves do not provide a sufficient incentive to draw children out of work and into school. As a consequence of the low financial value of the meal combined with the poor quality of schools, school-lunch programs do not generally alter the parents' calculation of the value of school relative to work. Children covered by the survey typically contributed 20-25% of the family's income, an amount that is far in excess of the value of a single mid-day meal.

3. Many respondents were concerned that cash grants could be misused and so preferred aid in-kind. However, it is also the case that cash provides families with flexibility that is sometimes essential to the effectiveness of the program. Most respondents preferred programs that had elements of both.

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11 *Child Labor*: Drusilla K. Brown, Tufts University, August 2001, p - 44

4. Programs that provided apprenticeships, school-work combinations, or "safe work" alternatives and other informal education were particularly effective in helping children leave dangerous or onerous occupations. This is partly a reflection of the very poor quality of schools that families frequently regard as irrelevant to their situation.

5. Several respondents raised concern with dependency and the role that incentive might play in luring children into work in order to qualify for benefits.

Although the survey evidence cited above is of some value, some programs have been carefully evaluated using statistical techniques. Ravaillion and Wodon (1999) evaluate the Food for- Education (FFE) program in rural Bangladesh. Participating households receive a food ration of rice as long as their children attend school. In 1995-96, 2.2 million Bangladeshi children benefited from the FFE program. The national government targets economically underdeveloped areas for benefits. Local community groups then select participants based on idiosyncratic local information. Children are required to maintain an 85% attendance rate. Monitoring and food distribution are handled by each school's headmaster.

Based on the 1995-96, Household Expenditure Survey undertaken by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, the typical participating household received 114 kg of rice per year. Using information on the local cost of rice, average family size, and

local wages, Ravaillion and Wodon calculate that the FFE stipend is the equivalent of 13 percent of the average monthly earnings of boys and 20 percent of that for girls.

Ravaillion and Wodon estimate the determinants of the probability of work and school. A working child is one who regarded work as his/her "normal activity" in the previous week. The level of education is measured by the reported educational status for children 5 to 16 who have not completed primary school. Explanatory variables include distance to school, the type of- school, school-quality variables, parental education, community religion, household demographics, land ownership, the child's age, and the size of the FFE stipend.

Ravaillon and Wodon find that the stipend has a strong and statistically significant impact on both the probability of work and the probability of schooling. In particular, they find that a FFE stipend of 100 kilos of rice increases the probability that a boy will be in school by percent and that a girl will be in school by 16 percent. Thus, there is some evidence from household survey data that corroborates the enrollment data provided by school administrators on the impact of education subsidies on school attendance.

However, the impact on child labor is much smaller. An extra 100 kg of rice lowers the probability of working as the main activity by 4 percent for boys and only 2 percent for girls. Therefore, of the children newly in school, only a quarter of the

boys and one-eighth of the girls are switching from work as the primary activity to school as the primary activity.

Of course, it may be the case that some children newly in school were formerly working only part-time, in which case the subsidy has had a positive impact on school attendance. Thus, the subsidy appears primarily to increase school attendance at the expense of the child's leisure rather than work. These results strongly suggest that school quality or a failure to appreciate the value of school, rather than each family's need for their child's income, are deterring formal schooling. By contrast, for those children who are making a financial contribution to the family, a stipend that replaces less than 20 percent of the child's earnings is not sufficient to alter the family's calculation of the value of school relative to work.

Children nevertheless benefit from the program. On average, the total impact of the subsidy raises family income. The average loss in child wages as a consequence of the subsidy is only 19 percent of the average value of the subsidy. Furthermore, Wodon (1999) finds that completing primary school in rural Bangladesh increases per capita consumption by nine percent.

Nevertheless, these results point more to school quality, an under-appreciation of the value of education, or direct school costs as the most important deterrents to schooling, rather than poverty and child labor.

Similar evidence has emerged for Thailand. Tzannatos (1996) finds that Thai children under the age of 12 do not initially leave school in order to work. Rather the direct cost of schooling, such as uniforms and supplies, relative to its value deters parents from keeping children in school. Uneducated Thai children do not begin to enter the labor force until they are 12 to 15 years old.

The importance of the physical presence of school buildings in a community in raising each family's perception of the value of education is further supported by Duflo (2000). Between 1973 and 1978, the Indonesian Government built over 61,000 primary schools at a cost of US$5 billion. She finds that children aged 2 to 6 in 1974 received 0.12 to 0.19 more years of schooling for each school constructed per 1,000 children. Duflo also finds a measurable impact on wages. Each school built per 1,000 children also raised wages by 1.5 to 2.7 percent.

PROGRESA, a school subsidy program operated in Mexico, was specifically implemented with the purpose of providing data that can be used to rigorously analyze the program's effectiveness. Design and implementation of the analysis was executed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, 2000). At the inception of the program in 1997, households in seven states3 were randomly assigned to control and treatment groups. Of the 506 communities initially targeted, 320 were designated for treatment and 186 as control communities.

Before the program was implemented, PROGRESA surveyed rural households in the targeted states in order to determine their socio-economic status. Employing the program's selection criteria, 78 percent of households were deemed eligible for benefits. Households were then surveyed in March 1998 before benefits were received and then again in October 1998, June 1999 and November 1999. Families were queried on their family background, assets brought to marriage, schooling, health status, parental attitudes, aspirations for their children, food and nonfood consumption, and time allocation for all household members and self-employment activities. Schools provided supplemental survey evidence on student achievement test scores.

In Mexico, completion of primary school is fairly comprehensive. The enrollment rate for primary school is about 93 percent. However, rural children typically leave school after completing the sixth grade, at which point the national enrollment rate drops to 55 percent. A second decline in enrollment occurs at the tenth grade at which point only 58 percent of those qualified to continue do so.

Benefits under the program are paid to the mother every two months. The size of the stipend varies with the age of the child and the child's gender, with higher stipends for girls. In addition, financial aid for school supplies is paid twice each year.

Enrollment rates for treatment and control groups were then compared,

controlling for family and community factors. The impact of the program was found to be positive and statistically significant. At the primary level, at which enrollment rates are already 90 to 94 percent, PROGRESA stipends increase attendance for boys by between 0.74 to 1.07 percent and for girls by 0.96 to 1.45 percentage points.

The impact on secondary enrollment, however, is much more distinctive. Prior to the beginning of the program, the enrollment rate in secondary school was 67 percent for girls and 73 percent for boys. Considering children in grades one through nine, the PROGRESA subsidy increased the enrollment rate for girls by between 7.2 to 9.3 percentage points and by 3.5 to 5.8 percentage points for boys, as found by Schultz (2001). These preliminary results suggest that PROGRESA will increase overall educational attainment for poor rural children in Mexico by about ten percent, thereby raising adult income by eight percent.

The impact of PROGRESA is largest for children making the transition to junior secondary school. Enrollment rates for girls of this age receiving the education subsidy are 20 percent higher for girls and 10 percent higher for boys as compared to the control group.

As a byproduct of the empirical analysis, which examined other determinants of child labor, the study also produced estimates of the effect of increasing the density of schools. In the sample, 12 percent of children travel more than four

kilometers to a junior secondary school. If enough schools were built so that all children traveled less than four kilometers to their junior secondary school, secondary-school enrollment for boys would rise by less than one-half of one percent and enrollment for girls would rise by about one-third of one percent.

While PROGRESA has a substantial impact on most indicators of child welfare including food consumption, physical stature, illness, school attendance and future income, the impact on child labor is disappointing. There is only a modest decline in labor force participation rates for children in the program, falling primarily on unpaid activities (Parker and Skoufias, 2000). Neither do enrolled children in the program spend more time on schoolwork at home nor exhibit higher achievement test scores than similar children who do not receive the stipend.

The efforts being made on behalf of children in the programs reviewed here are impressive and encouraging, even if the results are sometimes mixed. For the most, however, little has been done to compare the benefits from these programs to their costs. An exception is Schultz (2001), who calculates the rate of return on the resources put into the PROGRESA program. He finds a rate of return of 8% that is above and beyond both the role of the program in reducing current poverty and any consumption benefits from education.

Chapter - 6

CAUSES AND FORMS OF CHILD LABOR IN BANGLADESH

Supply Factors: Poverty is the single most important factor responsible for prevalence of child labor in the country. About 55 million people live below the poverty line in Bangladesh. Poor households badly need the money that their children earn. They commonly contribute around 20-25 percent of family income. Since poor households spend the bulk of their income on food, the earnings of working children are critical to their survival.

For instance, 13 year-old electrical assistant Jainal takes care half of the expenses of his family of six, with his daily earnings of US $1.5."My father is ill and can't work. My mother works as a domestic help and my younger brother has joined me," he says.

A significant number of children are working as prostitutes, helpers in auto, paining or engineering workshop, black smiths, brick of stone crushers, construction workers, saw mill workers, tannery factory workers, public transport workers, as well as in hazardous professions like welding. Around 500 children working in 140 tanneries in Dhaka and Chittagong have been provided with alternative jobs like tailoring shop keeping, bookbinding and TV/fridge repairing. These children came into close contact with chemicals like sulfuric acid, sodium sulfide and chromium in

tanneries.

"I often suffer from cold, fever and skin diseases and have to make frequent rips to doctor. But I do not get any medical facility from my employer," rues 15year old Hiru, a tannery employee[12]. He can not stop working because he has to support his family.

6.1 *Child Labor in Garment Industries*:

Until recently the garment industry was the biggest source of employment for child workers in the formal sector. A 1991 study entitled "The Conditions of Garment Workers in Bangladesh" found 13 percent of the workers to be working children. About a third of the child workers were in fact school dropouts. Child workers were mostly employed as sewing helpers (66 percent) and finishing helpers (15 percent). These were the lowest paid jobs in the garment factories. The monthly wage averaged 500 taka for sewing helpers and 585 taka for finishing helpers. Finishing helpers worked 13 hours a day and sewing helpers 11 hours a day. During peak seasons child workers had to work even during weekly holidays.

6.2 *Child Domestic Workers*:

Child domestic service is a widespread practice in Bangladesh. Although children are employed as domestics throughout the country, they have

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[12] Interview with Hiru, a Tannery employee at Dhaka.

overwhelmingly high concentration in the cities. "The Rapid Assessment of Child Labour Situation in Bangladesh" (1996) estimated that in the city of Dhaka alone there were about 300,000 child domestics[13]. In one semi-residential, typical city area with markets and roadside workshops, namely Moghbazar, Dhaka, out of 1181 child workers, domestic helpers numbered 770.

Employers in the urban areas usually recruit children from their village homes through family, friends or contacts. Most of the child domestic workers come from the most vulnerable families, many of them being orphans or abandoned children. A good number of them are from the single-parent families. Many poor parents consider themselves extremely fortunate for having been able to send their children to work for urban families.

The majority of child domestics tend to be between 12 and 17 years old, but children as young as 5 or 6 years old can also be found working. A survey of child domestic workers found that 38 percent were 11 to 13 years old and nearly 24 percent were 5 to 10 years old.

Child domestics work very long hours, getting up well before their employers and going to bed long after them. On an average 50 percent of the child domestic workers work 15-18 hours a day. Irrespective of their gender, child domestics carry

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[13] http://www.empereur.com/DOC/Child_labor.html

out all sorts of household work. In addition, boys often perform tasks like going to the grocery, cleaning the drain, taking the garbage to roadside bins, escorting the children to school and washing the car. Girls, on the other hand, have to iron the clothes, attend phone calls and serve the guests.

The domestics are usually given the same type of food as the employers, but they are given much less. Their employers usually take care of their daily necessities like clothes, oil, soap, comb, towel, bedding and sleeping materials. Education for child domestics, stood at 31 percent for girls and 37 percent for boys. The child domestic workers are often the least paid in the society, their remuneration ranging from 80 taka to 400 taka per month. In most of the cases they hand over all their earnings to their parents, leaving nothing for themselves.

6.3 *Trafficking of Children*:

Bangladeshi children are smuggled across the border by the traffickers and then sold to buyers in the neighboring countries of the sub continent or the Middle East. In different locations of the city of Karachi in Pakistan, such as Marimba and Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Bangladeshi girls are sold and bought in the name of marriage or under the cover of religion and morality. They move from one lord to another and end up as slaves for life. Bangladeshi boys are sent to Dubai and other destinations in the Gulf to be used as jockeys in the camel race. Though there is restriction on using

children less than 10 years of age in the camel race, children as young as 4 or 5 years old are exploited. Sometimes poor families do not hesitate to give away their children on an advance payment of only about US$ 500 and an assurance of future employment for their children in the Middle East.

"Millions of girls are trapped in poorly paid jobs as domestic servants," says UNICEF executive director Carol Bellamy, adding, "Not only are these children forced to work long, hard hours but they are at increased risk of sexual abuse and of being trafficked within and across borders."

Parents' perceptions greatly influence their children's participation in the labor force. The education system of the country in general does not provide poor, disadvantaged children with any immediate prospects of better jobs or higher levels of income. The curriculum, followed in schools, is hardly perceived to be capable of meeting the practical needs of poor families. Naturally, poor parents fail to appreciate the long-term value of education, and instead opt for the short-term economic gains of child labor. In many cases, the male children of the household are expected to help the father in the field and the female children the mother with the household work. Moreover, parents consider their children's employment in certain occupations like in the engineering workshop as a rare opportunity to learn employable skills. To them, it is an alternative education with much more practical value than the traditional primary

education.

Even though the government launched the Compulsory Primary Education Program all over the country since January 1993, education remains very expensive for a poor family, which is expected to bear the costs of uniform and transportation. In some areas of the country the expenditure on primary level students represents one-third of the entire income of a typical poor family, though most families have more than one child of the school-going age. Many children are, therefore, forced to work to pay for their own education.

Emergencies often contribute to an increase in the supply of child labor. Bangladesh happens to be a land of chronic natural calamities. Floods, cyclones and riverbank erosion render many people homeless and helpless every year. Low-income families have little margin to cope with any such disaster. They also find it very difficult to deal with the distress resulting from abandonment or divorce, or the injury and illness of an adult member of the household. As a result, trapped early in the world of work, children of such families become the worst victims of any kind of disaster, natural or man-made.

6.4 *Demand Factors*[14]:

The lower cost of employing child workers and the irreplaceable skills

[14] Mohammad Zulfiqar Hossain, Child Labor in Bangladesh: Magnitude, Trends and Features, http://www.cwa.tnet.co.th/booklet/Bangladesh.htm

provided by them are often cited to explain the demand for child labor. Although there is validity in the first argument, the second does not hold water. In all the industries that rely heavily on child labor, adults working side by side with them also perform most of the tasks performed by children. Clearly, children do not have irreplaceable skills. The other factors, responsible for the demand for child labor, seem to be non-economic. Employers are tempted to hire child labor because children are much less aware of their rights and most unlikely to get organised in trade unions. They are also more trustworthy, more willing to take orders and do monotonous work, and less likely to be absent from work. Children's lower absentee rate is immensely valuable to employers in the informal sector where workers are employed on a daily basis and the employers must ensure the presence of a full contingent of workers each day.

6.5 *Magnitude of Child Labor in Bangladesh*:

Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) in the "National Sample Survey of Child Labor in Bangladesh: 1995-96" defined child laborers as children in the age group of 5-14 years who were found to be working during the survey reference period (preceding 12 months of the day of survey). A child was said to work if he or she was found either working one or more hours for pay or profit or working without pay in a family farm or enterprise during the reference period, or was found not working but had a job or business from which he or she was temporarily absent

during the reference period. According to BBS the number of child laborers was 6.6 million in 1995-96. 19 percent of the total child population (5-14 years) was found to be economically active. 11.6 percent of the child labor force belonged to the 5-9 age group and the rest to the 10-14 age group. 95.6 percent of the child labor force was employed. Of the employed child workers, males constituted 59.8 percent and females 40.2 percent. Child workers were scattered all over the country. 17 percent of the child labor force lived in the urban areas and the rest in the rural areas. Child workers were present in almost all the sectors of the economy with the exception of mining and utilities. Agriculture accounted for 65.4 percent of the child workers, followed by services (10.3 percent), manufacturing (8.2 percent) and transport and communication (1.8 percent). Other activities including household work accounted for 14.3 percent of working children.

6.6 *Key Statistics of Child Labor Survey, 1995-96 (as on January 1996)*[15]

Table - 2

SL	Characteristics	Total	Male	Female
1	Child population, 5-14 years (000)	34455	17862	16593

[15] http://www.cwa.tnet.co.th/booklet/Bangladesh.htm

2	**Child labor force (000)**		6584	3919	2665
3	**Child labour force by age group**				
	5-9 years	Number (000)	767	434	333
	10-14 years	Percent (percent)	11.6	11.1	12.3
		Number (000)	5817	3485	2332
		Percent (percent)	88.4	88.9	87.5
4	**Child labour force by residence (000)**		6584	3919	2665
	Urban		1136	637	499
	Rural		5448	3282	2166
5	**Working child (employed) labour (000)**		6298	3769	2529
	Bangladesh				
	Urban		1059	597	462
	Rural		5239	3172	2067
7	**Wage employed child labour as percent of total child labour**				
	Number (000)		562	303	259
	Percent (percent)		8.5	7.7	9.5

8	**Child workers by major occupation (percent)**			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Technical, admin. And managerial services	2.7	2.5	3.0
	Production & transport laborers	4.9	4.3	5.9
	Clerical workers	0.3	0.4	0.0
	Sales workers	6.1	9.6	6.8
	Service workers	8.6	3.8	2.9
	Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries	71.2	70.2	72.8
	Not adequately defined (NAD)	6.2	9.2	1.6
9	**Child workers by major industry (percent)**			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Agriculture	65.4	67.1	63.0
	Manufacturing	8.2	9.7	7.0
	Transports/communication	1.8	3.0	6.1
	Other services	10.3	14.4	4.2
	Other activities including household services	14.3	6.8	25.7
10	**Child workers by type and sector of employment (percent)**			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

	Private (formal)	6.0	6.9	4.5
	Private (informal)	94.0	93.1	95.5
11	**Employment status of child workers (percent)**			
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Employee	16.3	14.8	18.6
	Self-employed	4.7	6.1	2.5
	Unpaid family workers	63.5	58.4	71.2
	Apprentices	2.0	2.9	0.5
	Day laborer/casual laborers	13.5	17.8	7.2
12	**Average weekly hours worked (all working children)**	25.6	26.9	23.8
13	**Average weekly hours worked (regular working children)**	48.0	45.0	51.0
14	**Average daily wage rates (Tk.)**	16.0	17.0	14.0
15	**Average monthly income (paid workers in Tk.)**	478.2	507.5	448.1

Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). National Sample Survey of Child Labor in Bangladesh: 1995-96

The number of Child Labor workers in the country increased from 2.5 million in 1974 to 6.6million in 1995-96. in 1983-84 urban child labor force accounted for

only 9percent for the total child labor force, but this figure rose to 17 percent in 1995-96. Child labor participation rate remains stable at around 19 percent since 1989.

Chapter - 7

RESEARCH RESULT / FINDINGS

Brief Overview:

A summary of research on Child labor in Bangladesh and exclusively in Dhaka city with in corporation of some original research. Despite its extensive length, new information is revealed. The attached questionnaire given in Annex A has been used for such research.

Objectives:

a. To outline the nature and extent of child labor in Dhaka city and the work environment.

b. To examine the adherence of child right by the employers.

c. To examine the parental awareness towards their children, education vis-à-vis child labor.

Methodology:

Literature review: 4 Zones from Dhaka City Corporation were selected and 4 types of work were selected for the survey: workshop workers (35%), garbage

pickers (24%), industry/ mill worker (28%) and domestic workers (13%). 60 child workers, 20 guardian/ parents, 10 guardian of school going children and 15 employers were interacted through the questionnaires. Besides these respondents, a number of university teacher, NGO executives, health specialists and political personalities were also interviewed informally. This also includes my personal experiences and observations.

Child is defined as boys and girls under the age of 14 for the purposes of this study 'Child labor' refers to children involved in economic activities. There is a lack of focus on children's health in relation to child labor work is often a major barrier to education, which is vital for personal and national development Poverty is a major cause of child labor and in turn, child labor is a major cause of poverty.

It is found in general that poor salary, unhygienic working and living conditions, bad health and nutrition condition and lack of educational and recreational facilities are common of the everyday life of child laborers in Dhaka city.

The study presents historical geographical details of Dhaka. It describes the city as extremely overcrowded and full of short-term and long- term problems. It is difficult to quantify the extent of child labor, but estimates are in the region of 7.7% of the city's population (50'00000 children). The study outlines national and international laws Conventions relating to child labor that have been ratified by

Bangladesh as well as the international conferences on child labor 20% of working children surveyed were without one or both parents. Only 47% of the children were found to be living with both parents. 63.4% of the children reported that their mothers were involved in economic activities. 20.5% were domestic workers. Housing and living conditions are very poor, unhygienic and highly temporary The responders reported that they were working for their own survival (34%), to supplement the family income (53%) and because a parent was dead (4%). 29% reported that they were not happy with their job,57% were only moderately happy Problems faced by working children include long hours of work and employment 6 or 7 days each week, lack of recreation and medical facilities It is argued that child domestic work can be viewed as slavery/servitude, but with certain terms and conditions, and the provision of education, it is not entirely bad. As the child is isolated and 'invisible', and many risk are associated with the work Garbage pickers suffer due to their low social status and their vulnerability to diseases 85% of the children surveyed did not have access to primary health care facilities. 19% of the children had to incur health costs themselves, 56% had expenses paid by their parents and 18% by their employers. The majority of the children had not had appropriate vaccinations and 41% of the children could access pure drinking water.

A Dhaka Community Hospital survey in 2000 indicates that 50% of the city's

working children were underweight, this is attributed to hard work, an unhygienic work place, poor sanitation and poor level of nutrition Wages were the highest for industrial/mill workers and workshop workers. Domestic workers received the least and in some cases just accommodation and food Child laborers have no bargaining power as there is an excess of workers available for a limited number of paid employment opportunities 80% of the children had no knowledge of child rights or the laws related to child labor. A significant proportion of working children do not attend school. However child laborer's level of education was found to be than that of their parents. Children were found to be interested in the prospect of education on a part time basis. No- formal education run by NGOs could fill this gap. Child workers had less recreation, relaxation and sleeping time than school going children covered in the study.

Suggestions:

a. More statistics are needed on the context of child labor in Bangladesh.

b. Poverty alleviation programs are necessary to tackle the root cause.

c. Collective bargaining under trade unions for the children may help put pressure on the employers to abide by the laws.

d. Birth registration and population control would help the situation.

e. A need for large scale health and nutritional programs and non-formal education.

Strengths and weaknesses:

Despite an extensive study, a very superficial understanding of child labor has presented huge generalizations of its own. Benefits of children's work not discussed. The original data that is presented is questionable as it is from a small unrepresentative sample. As 4 quite different occupations are covered without equal weighting we cannot draw conclusions from individual occupations.

Extent of Children's involvement:

60 working children surveyed.

Chapter - 8

CHILD LABOR ELIMINATION PROGRAM IN BANGLADESH: IMPLICATION OF THEORIES

Child labor in Bangladesh came into the lime light in the mid 1990 when a US senator, Tom Herkin, lobbied for a bill to restrict the import of Bangladesh Garments that used child labor. Following the introduction of the child labor Deterrence Act in 1992 by US Senator, a US bill threat to ban imports of goods made by Bangladeshi children.

Under the Memorandum of understanding's agreement which is co authorized by UNICEF, the International Labor Organization and the Bangladeshi Garment Manufacturer and Exporter Association, Bangladeshi children can leave the factories and go to school for three hours a day, six day a week(Agreement)

Under the terms of the agreement, four fundamental key provisions were formulated, The removal of all under-age workers—those below 14—within a period of four months; no further hiring of under-age children; The placement of those children removed from the garment factories in appropriate educational programmer with monthly stipend; The offer of the children's jobs to qualified adult family members. In addition, the M.O.U also provides the children's, families 300 taka a month. And the wage paid to the children is about the same amount than adult 500 to 600 taka a month (Agreement). (US $ 1=42.450Taka, in that current year)

At that time, the $1.3 million, export oriented garments industries, which employed around 300,000 children, decided to stop employing them and offer an education program for some of the working children.

The Government and groups like the International Labor Organization and UNICEF have also made some attempts to stop child labor in hazardous professions. But some factory owners - all of them members of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers' and Exporters' Association (BGMEA) - reacted precipitously to the

boycott menace by dismissing all their child workers on the spot, thereby attracting criticism for making a bad situation worse by denying poor families access to an important source of income.

However, ILO - IPEC was among those who urged a more comprehensive approach to the problem, to include the rehabilitation of the child workers through regular education and the provision of alternative earning opportunities for the affected families. The outcome was an agreement signed by the Government, BGMEA, IPEC and UNICEF in 1995 to combine in a systematic operation on an unprecedented scale: nothing less than the phasing out of child labour from the entire garment manufacturing industry in a controlled and humane manner. Central elements of the program are rehabilitation of the 10,500 children involved and income support for their families.

Any comprehensive program, designed to eliminate child labor, should address on a priority basis the most intolerable forms of child labor. In 1995 the Ministry of Labor and Manpower in collaboration with UNICEF undertook a study, entitled "Hazardous Child Labor in Bangladesh" to identify the hazardous economic activities involving children. This study identified the following 27 economic activities as hazardous:

Automobile workshop worker

Battery re-charging shop worker

Bedding manufacturing worker

Blacksmith

Brick/stone crushing

Car painting/metal furniture painting/spray painting works

Child prostitution

Construction

Dyeing workshop worker

Electric mechanic

Engineering workshop worker

Goldsmith's assistant

Hotel/Mess cook

Laundry boy

Porter

Printing press worker

Rickshaw/rickshaw van puller

Saw mill worker

Small soap factory worker (crude process)

Sweeper

Scavenger (waste pickers)

Tannery factory worker

Tempo/truck/bus helper/unlicensed tempo driver

Welding worker

Shrimp processing factory worker (processing by hand)

Vulcanizing workshop assistant

Vangari (splinter/waste collectors and processors).

The hazards, associated with these activities, were largely due to: exposure to flames, working with electricity, exposure to harmful chemical substances, carcinogens, neurotoxins, gases, fumes and organic dust, handling garbage, high-speed machinery, inappropriate hand tools, sharp equipment, extreme heat or cold, insufficient light, heavy loads, continuous working with ice and water without gloves and stressful working conditions. In many cases the children were found working without adequate safety measures; they did not use gloves, protective shields and masks. When personal protective equipment did not fit children, they had to use alternative devices that did not provide real protection, such as handkerchiefs to cover their nose and mouth.

The activities and workplaces that were discovered to be most hazardous included bedding manufacturing shops, blacksmiths', making bricks or stone chips,

printing press, welding, scavenging, plastic and rubber factories, shrimp processing, engineering workshops and bidi (kind of cigarette) factories.

The study names 27 economic activities considered hazardous for children, saying poverty is the most important factor responsible for child labor in Bangladesh, where 55million people live below the poverty line.

8.1 *Organizations working with child workers*:

The plight of child workers in Bangladesh attracted the attention of quite a few philanthropists from both home and abroad. They initiated programs in the non-government sector to promote welfare of the working children. The most notable of them, a New Zealander, Mr. L.N. Cheyne, on his visit to war-ravaged Bangladesh in 1972, was particularly moved by the miseries of the child workers in Dhaka; subsequently he founded an international NGO, Underprivileged Children's Educational Programs (UCEP), as a beacon of hope for working children. UCEP, from a modest beginning as a provider of general education on a limited scale in Dhaka, has by now emerged as the leading national NGO promoting the cause of child workers in Bangladesh. UCEP pursues "an integrated strategy of human resources development, incorporating general education, followed by skill training and employment placement services" (Masum 1999). UCEP currently operates 30 general schools, 3 technical schools, 5 para-trade training centers and has a total enrolment

of around 22,000. Each school operates three shifts, each of two and half-hour' duration to allow the working children to pursue education while working.

Some other notable NGOs working with child workers include Shoishab-Bangladesh and Ahsania Mission.

8.2 *UCEP Project Performances at a Glance*[16] *(July – December 1998)*

Table – 3

Indicators	
No. of Schools/Training Centers:	
General Schools (each school runs 3 shifts a day)	30
Technical Schools (each school runs 2 shifts a day)	3
Para-trade Training Centers (each centre runs 2 shifts a day)	5
No. of Students:	
General Schools	20018
Technical Schools	1288
Para-trade Training Centers	254

[16] http://www.cwa.tnet.co.th/booklet/Bangladesh.htm

New Admission:

General Schools	2740
Technical Schools	722
Para-trade Training Centers	209

Gender Ratio (Male : Female):

General Schools	51:49
Technical Schools	68:32
Para-trade Training Centers	61:39

Attendance Rate (percent):

General Schools	92.13
Technical Schools	95.70
Para-trade Training Centers	92.50

Dropout Rate (percent):

General Schools	4.42
Technical Schools	2.65

Para-trade Training Centers	1.00
Graduation (Number):	
General Schools (Grade-V)	2342
General Schools (Grade-VIII)	1539
Technical Schools	577
Para-trade Training Centers	142
Rate of Placement in Job (percent of graduates):	
Technical Schools	95.50
Para-trade Training Centers	56.00
Man-days covered in Staff Training:	1842
Total No. of Employees (as of 31 December 1998):	797
Total Expenses (in Million Taka):	44.87
Cost per Student per Day (in Taka):	
General Schools	6.62
Technical Schools	53.78

Chapter - 9

DIFFERENT COMMENTS ON CHILD LABOR ELIMINATION OF BANGLADESH

"A model of learning and earning should be introduced so that we can take measures in conformity to the pragmatic socio-economic conditions of the country to stop child labor," says Dr Hamidul Haq, Chairperson of the leading child rights platform Bangladesh Shishu Adhikar Forum.

Leading child rights activist advocate Salma also suggests limiting the sectors where children may work in Bangladesh. "Bangladesh is an agricultural country, with most families dependent on farming. Children can do light work such as weeding, watering in the field, and carrying crops home," she notes.

Children may also be engaged as part time workers in non hazardous factories such as food and garments. Girls could undertake light domestic work such as cooking, house decoration, cleaning, watering and gardening," Ali adds.

But the president of human rights Journalists' Organization, Khairuzzaman Kamal, emphasizes, "Poverty is no excuse for not eliminating child labor, especially since poverty is the root of most problems in Bangladesh," Adds kamal, a member of the Shishu Adhiker (Child Rights) Forum, "Child labor can't be eliminated for good not even with the combined forces of the government NGOS and donors. It needs the participation of adults." Minister for Labor and Manpower Manuela Aman says, "We

are doing our best (to eradicate child labor) but this is a poverty issue[17]."

Chapter - 10

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Child labor is not a new phenomenon in the world and the society. Its existence was felt since the inception of society and nationhood. Economy is underlined as on of the prime reasons for child labor. As the world went under many reforms, wars and natural disasters, so the field for child labor has been created all over the world. It fell into the vicious cycle, especially in third world countries, where possibility of coming out of the situation is very difficult. Bangladesh is not out of the situation.

Child labor is a sheer reality in Bangladesh. Children are engaged in hazardous jobs, working under most unhygienic conditions. Yet the prevailing socio-economic conditions do not permit outright elimination of child labor over night. Experiences indicate that the elimination of child labor from one particular industry may culminate in an increase in child labor in another. Moreover, it is not possible to force the child workers to attend full time school since the lost income is critical to the survival of their families. Citing example of garments sector of Bangladesh we see that being one of the world's leading garment exporters, the situation captured

[17] Daily Star, a daily news paper, Dhaka, 12 N0vember, 2004

little international attention until 1992, when the US introduced legislation to ban the importation of goods made using child labour. As a result, garment employers dismissed about three-quarters of all children employed in the industry. With no access to education and few skills, the children had few alternatives to escape their crushing poverty. Many went looking for new jobs in stone-crushing, street hustling and prostitution - all more hazardous and exploitative than garment making. Having felt the gravity of the situation the UNICEF and the IPEC program of the International Labour Organization (ILO) began talks with industry leaders to find a solution. Side by side the government begun to work out with ILO under which three NGOS have been deployed to train, educate and provide finances to 20,000 children in Dhaka. A similar program has begun for 5000 children in hazardous professions outside of Dhaka. The project has been on for two years and will continue for another three. "If these yield positive results, we plan to set a15 year deadline to eliminate child labor by implementing such initiatives," says Aman.

On the other hand existing legislation is antiquated and fragmented and deals only with children working in the formal sector. There is no single code or law dealing with this area. An intimate cooperation between the Ministry of Labour and Employment and the ILO's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) is recommended to review the existing child labour laws with a view to

removing anomalies, fixing a uniform minimum age for admission to work at 14 years (18 years for hazardous occupations), and prohibiting the employment of children in hazardous operations in shops and other establishments.

Besides that, government should immediately come forward to formulate a comprehensive National Plan of Action, aimed at gradual elimination of child labor from the country in not too distant a future. Such a plan of action should attach priority to a large-scale replication of the UCEP model of integrated human resources development for child workers and actively seek to put an immediate end to the most intolerable forms of child labor. I assume that the main motive for reducing the incidence of child labor is the promotion of human capital development which is the main constraints of Bangladesh like other poor countries due to economic development. I emphasized the analysis to an environment where pecuniary benefits from having children exist but are outweighed by the child rearing cost. Bangladesh has promulgated free compulsory education for all which shows the silver line of hope for a child labor free prosperous Bangladesh in near future. karec.web.unsw.edu.au/sub_news8.htm

Recommendations:

Following are recommended:

a. Besides other lines of activities, policy makers should put child labor

as a priority agenda and mobilize all its tools to turn the Govt. drive into a social campaign against child labor.

b. Child labor cannot be eradicated in one day as it has not been created in one day. Hence, a comprehensive plan should be formulated which should be implemented in time phases, like short term, mid term and long term basis.

c. Government should be ruthless in ensuring proper education and environment at their working places so long child labor is completely eradicated.

d. The goals/objectives of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) should be pursued strictly by the Govt. in order to reduce child labor in Bangladesh.

e. Media and the eminent personalities/institutions are to propagate the bad effects of child labors and motivate the parents accordingly. The politicians, media personalities, religious leaders/preachers, NGOs etc can be the fore-runners in this regard.

It is envisaged that if all the recommendations are brought to the cognizance of the people of all walks of life including, the Govt. machineries, NGOs, industrialists, parents, law makers and enforcers etc, days would not too far to if not eradicate but

reduce child labor, the curse of the society.

Annex A

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE CHILD LABOUR

PART – I

1. Personal Information

1.1 Name :

1.2 Age :

1.3 Sex :

1.4 Education :

1.5 Living Place :

1.6 Working Place :

2. Family Information

2.1 Mother : Education: Profession:

2.2 Father : Education: Profession:

2.3 Number of Family Members:

2.4 Number of Brothers and Sisters: Brothers ☐ Sisters ☐

2.5 Types of Family: Unique ☐ Joint ☐

2.6 Living Place of Family:

3. Working Environment

3.1 Name of the Institution/Working Place :

3.2 Types of the Working Place :

3.3 Types of the Work :

3.4 Duration of Work :

3.5 Wage: Cash ☐ Kind ☐

3.6 Wage Discrimination between Boy and Girl Workers: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.7 Nature of Payment: Daily ☐ Weekly ☐ Monthly ☐

3.8 Leisure: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.9 Day Off: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.10 Types of Job: Risky ☐ Hazardous ☐ None ☐

3.11 Medical Facilities: Cash ☐ Doctor/Medicine ☐ None ☐

3.12 Scope of Education: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.13 Type of Education Facilities (If yes): Organised by Employer ☐ Self ☐

3.14 Punishment: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.15 Types of Punishment (If Yes): Physical ☐ Financial ☐ Verbal ☐

3.16 Reward: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.17 Types of Punishment (If Yes): Physical ☐ Financial ☐ Verbal ☐

3.18 Abusement: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.19 Types of Abusement (If Yes): Verbal ☐ Physical ☐ Sexual ☐

3.20 Scope of Grievance: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.21 Recreation Arrangement: Yes ☐ No ☐

3.22 Types of Recreation (If Yes): Games ☐ Audio/Visual ☐ Both ☐

3.23 Job Satisfaction: Yes ☐ No ☐

4. Financial Support

4.1 Contribution to Family: Yes ☐ No ☐

4.2 Apportionment of Contribution: Partial ☐ Full ☐

4.3 Contribution by other Family Members: Yes ☐ No ☐

4.4 Savings: Yes ☐ No ☐

4.5 Types of Savings: Co-operative ☐ Bank ☐ Personal ☐

PART – II

FOR THE PARENTS

5. Reasons for Sending Your Child for Work:

5.1 Knowledge on Child's Nature of Work:

5.2 Contribution of your Child to the Family:

5.3 Education of your Child: Nil ☐ Primary ☐ Above Primary ☐

5.4 Reasons not Completing Minimum Education Level (If not above Primary):

5.5 Effect of Labour/Hardship on your Child:

5.6 Knowledge on Child Right: Yes ☐ No ☐

PART III

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE EMPLOYERS

6. What is the age limit to employ child in your organization?:

6.1 Recreation Facilities: yes ☐ - No ☐

6.2 Education Facilities by the employer for the Child workers: Yes ☐ No ☐

6.3 Provision of Punishment: Yes ☐ No ☐

6.4 Provision of Reward: Yes ☐ No ☐

6.5 Financial Encouragement: Salary Increase ☐ Bonus ☐ Both ☐

6.6 Medical Facilities in the Working Place: Yes ☐ No ☐

6.7 Laws on "Child Labour" is Adhered to: Yes ☐ No ☐

6.8 Impact of Child Labour in the Society: Good ☐ Bad ☐

6.9 Suggestions to Eradicate Child Labour:

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