

**A STUDY OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEACE KEEPING OPERATION
IN LEBANON
Focusing on Analysis of Latent Threats in the Region**

By

KIM, Hyoung Kook

THESIS

Submitted to
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Approval as of November 19, 2007

Supervisor AHN, Byung Joon _____

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEACE KEEPING OPERATION IN LEBANON : Focusing on Analysis of Latent Threats in the region

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The South Korean troops as part of UNIFIL(the United Nations Interim Forces In Lebanon) began its mission by taking over the operational control of its mandate area from an Italian battalion as of midnight on Aug. 11.

This is the second overseas dispatch of combat troops composed of an “Infantry Battalion” after the first overseas dispatch to East Timor as a member of UN Peacekeeping Force. But unlike case of East Timor, dispatching combat troops to Lebanon has special meanings because the South Korea can show its national power in the global society as a responsible member of UN.

On the other hand, guaranteeing the security of the South Korean troops should be prior so as to not only keep a reputation which has been built up through several PKOs(Peace Keeping Operations) but also complete its mission successfully. Situation in the region seems to be not good due to never-ending tension between Israel and Arab countries around Lebanon, and two bomb attacks against UNIFIL soldiers make PKO in Lebanon more difficult.

This paper will focus on latent threats in Lebanon by examining geopolitical aspect so as to suggest better ways to help the South Korean troops and UNIFIL complete its mission.

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I . Introduction

A. Background

UNIFIL(The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) was originally created on March 19, 1978, but its mandate and strength were reinforced by UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on Aug. 2006 after 34 days of the Israel-Hezbollah war — “2006 second Lebanon war” — to confirm Israeli troops’ withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and help the Government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area.

The South Korean government started to discuss sending its troops to Lebanon by request of UN Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown at the meeting of troop-contributing countries in New York, August 17, 2006.

The South Korean government sent on-site inspection group to Lebanon to check the situation and conditions in the region related with deployment of its troops during Oct. 16 to 19. Finally, it concluded that there was no problem in deployment in regard with operational environment, condition of activity and combat support. Now deployment of 350 soldiers in southern Lebanon has been completed, the South Korean troops as part of UNIFIL began its mission by taking over the operational control of its mandate area from

an Italian battalion as of midnight on Aug. 11¹

This is the second overseas dispatch of combat troops composed of an “**Infantry Battalion**” after the first overseas dispatch to East Timor as a member of UN Peacekeeping Force. But unlike case of East Timor, dispatching combat troops to Lebanon has special meanings due to particularity of the region.

Lebanon is regarded as one of the most unstable areas in the Middle East due to its never-ending conflicts. This country has been suffering from not only armed clashes between Lebanese government and Islamic militants in the present but also 15 year-civil war in the past.

Except for religious, ideological fact which caused several conflicts in the Lebanese history, geopolitical fact that Israel, supported by U.S., is located below, Syria, Lebanon’s Arab protector, also supported by Iran, is located above is accelerating the tension between the West and the Islamic community. To make matters worse, the incident that UNIFIL soldiers were killed by car bomb, detonated by unknown terrorist, shows that even to Peacekeeping troops, security is not guaranteed, therefore, importance and sensitivity of the mission is more emphasized in this dispatch of the South Korean troops to Lebanon. So my thesis started with the question of how this geopolitical aspect will affect the PKO mission in Lebanon as part of UNIFIL and also what the South Korean Government can

¹ The Korean Government, “Passing the bill on the troops dispatch as part of UNIFIL”, 4 Dec. 2006

obtain through sending troops to this unstable area. In addition, my interest in this thesis is to seek a successful way to carry out Peacekeeping Operation in Lebanon by analyzing latent threats in recent Lebanese situation and limitation in implementing PKO

B. Purpose of Study

The paper is organized as follows. The first section deals with overview of UN Peacekeeping Operation and history of UNIFIL including its limitation and criticism. The second section describes transitional procedure and features of the South Korean Peacekeeping Operation. The third section clarifies latent threats, which is creating in Lebanon, to the mission of UNIFIL. The final section deals with suggestions of countermeasures to these threats and consideration of international contribution and national interests which were derived from the South Korean PKO in Lebanon.

The purpose of my paper is to take a closer look at factors as an obstacle to the South Korean troops and UNIFIL, and suggest thereby the better way for them to accomplish PKO mission in Lebanon. I also will attempt to outline the international contribution and national interest by dispatching troops to Lebanon as a responsible member of international society.

C. Scope and Methodology of Study

When it comes to United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, the span of time I hope to cover is limited from the first mission in 1948-UNTSO — ongoing mission in the Middle

East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements — to the recent mission, UNMIT in Timor-Leste in 2006. On the other hand, when it comes to the South Korean PKO, the span of time is limited from the first mission, UNISOM in Somalia 1993 to the most recent point in time when the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNIFIL on Aug. 24, 2007 by another year until Aug. 31, 2008.

I have referred to web sites, special reports, documents of UN Department of PKO, several research institutions related to UN PKO, and also foreign countries' policies of overseas dispatch as troop contributors to UN PKO. In addition, I also have quoted reports and articles of the press to catch up with real-time situation in Lebanon.

II. Analysis of UN Peace Keeping Operation and UNIFIL

Before we embark upon the South Korean PKO in Lebanon, in this chapter, we will examine and analyze what the UN PKO and UNIFIL are. Especially UNIFIL, which is closely related with the South Korean troops in Lebanon, will be deeply examined

A. Overview of UN PKO

Peacekeeping, as defined by the United Nations, is "a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace." Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they may have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development².

UN PKO is divided into three types according to its mission: Observer Mission, Peacekeeping Force and Mixed PKO. Observer Mission is composed of unarmed military officers who monitor armistice agreement and mediate between parties to a dispute. Peacekeeping Force(PKF) is armed troops which is organized by contributing countries to UN, it carries out PKO under the command of UN. PKF is generally armed with small weapons for the purpose of defense, and troops aren't permitted in using its force except

² "Definition of Peacekeeping Operation," <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKO>>

for self-defense. Mixed PKO appeared as operation of civil sector became more important after the Cold War. Mixed PKO is composed of soldiers, civilian police officers, and other civilian personnel from NGO. Besides military mission of PKO, role of civil experts is very crucial in civil parts of supporting election to establish new government, returning displaced people, providing administrative assistance.

United Nations peacekeeping was initially developed during the Cold War as a mean of resolving conflicts between states by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, to areas where warring parties were in need of a neutral party to observe the peace process.

Peacekeepers could be called in when the major international powers — the five permanent members of the Security Council — tasked the UN with bringing closure to conflicts threatening regional stability and international peace and security. These included a number of so-called “proxy wars” waged by client states of the superpowers.

After the Cold War, international society began to have more frequent regional conflicts, which had been suppressed by global system of “the Cold War,” as diverse apples of discord, appeared. Furthermore, Russia Federation and United States were unwilling to intervene in these kind of regional conflicts which didn’t affect their national interest. Therefore, UN Peacekeeping Operation became more active to resolve frequent regional conflicts after the Cold War.

61 Peacekeeping Operations in total have been deployed from UNTSO(United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) calling for halt in Arab-Israeli war on June 29, 1948 to UNMIT(United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) to support East Timor Government in consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance on August 2006, among them 46 operations has been completed 15 operations are now under ways.³

From this point, I will deal with UN Peacekeeping Operations in detail according to stages defined by distinguished period.

For 40 years from 1948 to 1989, 18 Peacekeeping Operations had been established, whereas from the end of the Cold War in 1989⁴ to the present as many as 43 operations were newly established. It shows directly that rapid spread of ethnic, religious, territorial, natural resources conflicts throughout the world after the Cold War which eventually resulted in rapid increase of UN Peacekeeping Operation.

1. History of operation

UN Peacekeeping Operation has several processes of transition in the history of 59 years and five stages as follows are classified generally: the initial stage (1948~1955), the active stage(1956~1967), the declining stage(1968~1978), the stagnant

³ "UN PKO fact sheet," <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm> >

⁴ The **Malta Summit** was a meeting between U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which took place between December 2-3 1989, just a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush declared the Cold War officially over at a summit meeting in Malta.

stage(1979~1989) and the transition stage(up to the present from 1990).

1) The Initial Stage(1948~1955)

On 29 May 1948, the Security Council, in resolution 50, called for a cessation of hostilities in Palestine⁵ and decided that the truce should be supervised by the UN Mediator, with the assistance of a group of military observers. After the first group of military observers as UNTSO(UN Truce Supervision Organization) arrived in the region in June 1948. UNTSO military observers remained to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which were for many years the main basis of the uneasy truce in the whole area. UNTSO's activities still are spread over territory within five States, and therefore it has relations with five host countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic.

The other operation, UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), set up in 1949 was deployed in January of that year to supervise the ceasefire agreed between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir since renewed hostilities in 1971.

During this period, main mission was supervision of armistice agreement by

⁵ In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a plan for the partition of Palestine, providing for the creation of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international status. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States. On 14 May 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its mandate over Palestine and the State of Israel was proclaimed. On the following day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against Israel.

unarmed military observers and UNTSO, UNMOGIP were established under the purpose of early resolution of conflict generated from the process of decolonization after WW II, but missions are not completed until now.

2) The Active Stage(1956~1967)

During this period, 8 operations in total were carried out: 4 of them were Peacekeeping Force, 4 of them were Observer Missions. Especially as the first PKF, UNEF(UN Emergency Force) in November 1956, which were dispatched to the Suez Canal Zone occupied by Israeli, British and French troops after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company over the protest of France and the United Kingdom in July 1956, became a successful starting point, which aroused international interest and growing demand of UNPKF, by securing, supervising the cessation of hostilities and serving as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces, but UNEF was thought to offer cause of conflict between the Security Council and the General Assembly.⁶

ONUC(UN Operation in the Congo) in July 1960, which was followed by the successful UNEF, became a good example of showing how difficult the missions of UN PKF in a state of civil war were. ONUC was established to ensure the

⁶ The Security Council discussed the matter of attack on the Suez Canal on 31 October, but no decision could be adopted, owing to the vetoes of France and the United Kingdom, then, the matter was referred to the General Assembly, which met in emergency special session from 1 to 10 November. The Assembly established the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.

withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries.

Because ONUC was dispatched under the situation that national function was paralyzed, it suffered from failure in carrying out the original mission and then massive fatalities of UN military personnel made UN use “Enforcement Action” in Peace Keeping Operation exceptionally, this is the reason to be said that ONUC was a failed example by some people.

Meanwhile, UNSF(UN Security Force in West New Guinea) in 1962, UNFICYP(UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) in 1964 were successfully completed as a buffer to reduce hostilities. During same period, 4 observe missions were established.⁷

On the other hand, controversy heated up over matters related with PKO, especially dissenting opinions about legality of PKF, authority of “PKO

⁷ UNOGIL(UN Observation Group In Lebanon) in 1958, UNYOM(UN Yemen Observation Mission) in 1963, UNIPOM(UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission) in 1965 and DOMREP(Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic) in 1965.

establishment” between the Security Council and the General Assembly, scope of Secretary-General’s role, source of finance raised, and these issues became a obstacle to development of PKO.⁸

3) The Declining Stage(1968~1978)

UN Peacekeeping Operation had declined for 10 years from 1968 to 1978.

During this time, only 3 operations established.

When Egypt in the Suez Canal sector and Syria in the Golan Heights attacked Israeli positions, the Security Council, by resolution 338 of 22 October and resolution 340 of 25 October 1973, demanded an immediate and complete ceasefire and the return of the parties to the positions they had occupied, UNEF II was established with a strength of up to 7,000 men for an initial period of six months, was stationed in the Egyptian-Israel sector.

The dispatch of the new peacekeeping operation effectively brought the crisis to an end and later UNEF II made a great contribution in Camp David Accords⁹ on September 17, 1978, which led directly to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty¹⁰. Now UNEF II is highly appreciated as one of the most successful PKO

⁸ Kim, Yeol-Soo, *Conflict Management through International Organization*(Seoul:Orem,2000),pp60~105

⁹ The **Camp David Accords** were signed by Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September 17, 1978, following twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David.

¹⁰ Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed in Washington, DC, United States, on March 26, 1979, following the Camp David Accords. The main features of the treaty were the mutual recognition of each country by the other, the cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the withdrawal by Israel of its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai Peninsula which Israel had captured during the 1967 Six-Day War.

in history. Also UNDOF(UN Disengagement Force), which established in 1974 following the agreed disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights, continues to supervise the implementation of the agreement and maintain ceasefire successfully.

On the other hand, UNIFIL(UN Interim Force in Lebanon), which was established to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1978, became another example to show difficulties related with PKO. UNIFIL faced many difficulties from initial operation owing to setting up excessive missions such as restoration of lawful order, perfect withdrawal of Israeli forces and restoration of Lebanon Government sovereignty.

Especially, UNIFIL was stuck by several complex problems: limited conditions under the circumstance that Lebanon Government lost its ruling power completely while anti-government group became powerful, lack of cooperation among permanent members of the UN Security Council, Peace Keeping Forces' restrictive use of force under severe armed clashes.

4) The Stagnant stage (1979~1988)

No mission had been established for 10 years after UNIFIL in 1978. The reason was not that there was no international conflict but that failure of UNIFIL exercised a bad effect upon PKO, also at that time, unstable international relation

under the structure of the Second Cold War¹¹ caused UN to lose its political willingness regarding sense of purpose and peacekeeping. Above all, the Second Cold War made two superpowers' antagonistic relation worse, so UN Peacekeeping Operation couldn't be established as the Security Council permanent members used their veto powers according to their own national interest.

5) The Transition Stage (1989~the present)

After Gorbachev announced an agenda of rapid reform(*perestroika* and *glasnost*) in the mid-1980s, the Cold War structure began to collapse, and then cooperative mood was created among the Security Council permanent members. Consequently, it was a good opportunity for UN to execute PKO more actively, 47 operations has been established up to now.

During this period there has been not only quantitative increase but also qualitative revolution in the sphere, depth of PKO.

2. Analysis of UN PKO development

As above, development of UN PKO through five stages can be analyzed in quantitative change and qualitative change. The former means number of PKO,

¹¹ **The Second Cold War** (1979-1985) discusses the period between the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader in 1985. It was marked with a change in Western policy of Détente to more confrontation against the Soviets.

operation area, participant countries and personnel, on the other hand, the latter means change of conflict management strategy and purpose related with PKO.

1) The Quantitative change.

The characteristic according to “Cold War” era and “post-Cold War” era are as follows.

First, in terms of the number, merely 18 operations were established during the Cold War era, while 43 operations have been established after the end of the Cold War. It shows rapid increase in PKO after the end of the Cold War.

Second, the area of operation during the Cold War was mainly Middle-Eastern nations, while that of the post-Cold War was mainly African nations. It shows concern of PKO is transferred from regional conflict in the Middle-East to internal affairs in African nations.

Third, UN used to intervene in conflict between states during the Cold War, while it mainly has intervened in internal conflict after the Cold war.

Fourth, super powers including Permanent 5 Members, Japan and Germany began to participate in PKO more actively in the post-Cold War.

Fifth, members of PKO were mainly composed of military personnel during the Cold War, on the other hand, diverse participants such as police, NGO, election monitoring agents are remarkable characteristic after the Cold war.

2) The Qualitative Change

During the Cold War, UN intervened in conflicts between countries as already mentioned. In other word, it intervened in issue of restoring borderline which was recognized officially rather than issue of justification about territory under dispute. It means that UN tried to maintain the *status-quo* restoring previous borderline. This point has a thread connection of “*Conflict Settlement Strategy*” which means facilitating a compromise of ongoing conflict as a mediator by coaxing the armistice agreement, cease-fire agreement rather than eliminating the root of conflict. Accordingly, Conflict Settlement Strategy of UN materialized as Peace Keeping, that is, UN executed its operations by monitoring foreign military forces’ withdrawal, establishing buffer zone, operating observation post to monitor armistice within narrow concept of “Peace Keeping” under the purpose of maintaining “status-quo” with the strategy of “conflict settlement”

On the other hand, in the post-Cold War era UN mainly intervened in internal conflict of specific nation. UN has been supporting countries under trouble for the sake of military, social, political integration to solve internal conflict caused by tribal, religious quarrel and scramble for political power. In other words, after the end of the Cold War, UN has intervened in internal conflict to solve the core

of the problem in pursuit of “*Peaceful Change*¹²” by establishing a peaceful unified government. To accomplish peaceful change, UN adopted “*Conflict Resolution Strategy*” which means providing all the parties to a dispute with reasonable benefit and eliminating the root of conflict to terminate a violent hostility in the long run. Also Conflict Resolution Strategy of UN materialized as “Peace Building,” and also focused on operations of “Peace Building” compared to operations of “Peace Keeping” under the purpose of maintaining status-quo during the Cold War.

Briefly, qualitative changes in PKO can be shown as below.

Table 1 : Qualitative change in PKO

Period	Purpose	Strategy	Main operation
The Cold War	Status quo	Conflict settlement	Peace Keeping
The Post Cold War	Peaceful change	Conflict resolution	Peace Building

3. Types of PKO

UN PKO with these kind of change above shows correlations in detail according to period and purpose as below (table 2)

¹² Generally “peaceful change” means change of fundamental norm or value for the purpose of eliminating cause of conflict by the roots, and focuses on purpose management, change and breaking of present state. Oh, Ki-Pyoung, Present International Organization Political Theory, (Seoul: Beom-mun Sa, 1992), pp.207~208

Table 2 : Correlation according to features

Period	Complexity	Generation	Feature	Purpose	Contents
The Cold War	Simplicity (traditional)	The First generation	Political	Peace Making	Inducing negotiation
			Military	Peace Keeping	Preventing conflict proliferation Increasing possibility of Peace Making
The Post Cold War	Complexity (expansive)	The Second generation	Political	Preventive Diplomacy	Preventing conflict
			Economic + Social	Peace Building	Disarmament Humanitarian supports Electoral support & monitoring Reestablishment of governmental organization Supporting social and economic development
		The Third generation	Military	Peace Enforcement	Obtaining peace by enforcement

UN Peacekeeping Operation has developed through various types according to the purpose

1) Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive Diplomacy means diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and to stop conflict from growing into war. But in case that this peaceful diplomatic efforts don't gain any result, dispatching UN Peacekeeping Forces into area of dispute can be one of ways to stop conflict from growing into war.

There are four stages of the conflict: Conversation, Polarization, Individualization and Destruction. When UN intervenes after the last stage of destruction, the worst, it seems to be impossible to resolve the conflict, therefore,

at the stage of conversation, the initial stage, it seems desirable for UN to intervene and settle. At least before the stage of destruction, chance of cooperation between warring parties can rebuild their confidence, prevent loss of life and property and deter spread of conflict. In the same manner, UN has to intervene in early stage of conflict to prevent loss of sources and minimize expense account. In this regard, UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment Force) in 1995 was one of successful operations dispatched before stage of destruction.

2) Peace Making

Peace Making is an activity which leads warring parties to a negotiation table according to UN Charter VI—Pacific settlement of disputes. Peace Making includes the armistice agreement or the peace accord between warring parties. Peace Making is accomplished by either conflict settlement through armistice agreement or conflict resolution through peace accord.

3) Peace Keeping

Peace Keeping seems infeasible under the condition of ongoing conflict, so deriving armistice agreement or peace accord through Peace Making should be a previous condition to guarantee Peace Keeping. Therefore UN carried out Peace Keeping Operations to make parties to a dispute observe their mutual agreement. The concrete ways of Peace Keeping are monitoring armistice and deploying the

armed forces in buffer zone.

Cases of monitoring armistice and withdrawal of foreign forces, creating buffer zone were shown in most Peace Keeping Operations during the Cold War. Therefore, monitoring armistice and withdrawal of foreign forces, creating buffer zone were considered as traditional mission of UN PKO, called the first-generation PKO.

After the end of the Cold War, this type of the first-generation PKO was continued. Actually, the most PKO carried out function of Peace Keeping.

4) Peace Building

Peace Building was considered as one type of PKO to support successful Peace Making and Peace Keeping. Peace Building is mainly divided into Disarmament of parties to a dispute, Humanitarian Support, Electoral Assistance, Other support.

Disarmament of parties is an activity which monitors and verifies status of observing an agreement among parties to a dispute, that is, the first step of eliminating hostilities and building confidence is the armistice agreement and the first step of fulfilling peace accord is establishing military confidence through disarmament.

Humanitarian support includes protection and assistance of refugees, relief

activities. UNHCR(UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees) is in charge of supporting refugees, UNICEF(UN Children's Fund) is in charge of relief activities, furthermore, UN forces also support repatriation of refugees, relief activities by providing security and convoy.

Electoral assistance was a new characteristic of PKO after the end of Cold War. Elections as a result of peace accord have been a vital part of democratic transitions and the decolonization process. Establishing a legal government through election is not a settlement of dispute for maintenance of the status-quo but a resolution of dispute for peaceful change through Peace-building.

5) Peace Enforcement

This is a physical way of UN when settling peace is turned out to be infeasible. Collective security, shown up in Korean War and Gulf War, is considered as "Active Enforcement," while Peace Enforcement, type of PKO, is considered as "Passive Enforcement."

UN has deployed various types of Peace Enforcement Operations by the Security Council Resolution according to UN charter chapter VII—*Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression*, there are three types of Peace Enforcement Operations. First, peace enforcement, which is transformed from existing Peacekeeping Operation, as it was enlarged

and extended in the middle of operation such as UNPROFOR¹³. Second, mission of peace enforcement was given from the beginning such as UNIKOM(UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission). Third, peace enforcement by committing UNITAF(Multi-national Force) which is separate from PKO such as *Operation Restore Hope*¹⁴ in Somalia after UNOSOM was suspended.

B. Overview of UNIFIL

The United Nations Interim Force(UNIFIL) in Lebanon was created by the United Nations, with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 425 and 426 on March 19, 1978, to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and help the Government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area. The first UNIFIL troops arrived in the area on March 23, 1978; these troops were reassigned from other UN peacekeeping operations in the area — UNEF(UN Emergency Force) and UNDOF(UN Disengagement Observer Force Zone).

During the 1982 Lebanon War¹⁵, UNIFIL's function was mainly to provide humanitarian

¹³ United Nations Protection Force Initially established in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. UNPROFOR's mandate was to ensure that the three "United Nations Protected Areas" (UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack.

¹⁴ Code-name of the **UN intervention in Somalia**, UN sanctioned United States military operation from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. The operation planned to avert a growing humanitarian disaster in the increasingly lawless Republic of Somalia, which was suffering from severe famine, general chaos, and domination by a number of warlords following the collapse of Siad Barre's military government.

¹⁵ *The 1982 Lebanon War*, called by Israel the Operation Peace of the Galilee, and later also known in Israel as the First Lebanon War, began June 6, 1982, when the Israel Defense Forces invaded southern Lebanon. The Government of Israel ordered the invasion as a response to the assassination attempt against Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov by the Abu Nidal Organization.

aid. Beginning in 1985, Israel scaled back its permanent positions in Lebanon, although this process was punctuated by brief invasions and bombings, as in *Operation Accountability* in 1993 and *Operation Grapes of Wrath* in 1996. In 1999, Israel undertook a full withdrawal, which concluded in 2000 and enabled UNIFIL to resume its military tasks. The Lebanese government claims that the *Shebaa farms*¹⁶ area is Lebanese territory, although the UN considers it to be outside Lebanon's border.

After the end of 34 days war between Hezbollah and Israeli Defense Forces in summer of 2006, The UN Security Council has extended UNIFIL's mandate until August 31, 2007,

1. UNIFIL's Mandate in Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006

- 1) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- 2) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
- 3) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- 4) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;

¹⁶ *The Shebaa Farms* is a small area of disputed ownership located on the border between Lebanon and the Golan Heights. Israel captured the Shebaa Farms concurrent to capturing the Golan Heights from Syria in 1967 during the Six Day War.

5) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;

6) Assist the government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14
Recent mandating resolution is United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701
August 11, 2006

2. Troop status

Authorized personnel in Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006 is 15,000 troops, supported by international and local civilian staff, meanwhile, current status on June 30, 2007 is 13,286 military personnel, supported by some 241 international civilian and 379 local civilian staff.

UNIFIL is currently led by Italian Major-General Claudio Graziano.

3. Reinforcement and Current operation

Following the cease-fire, the UNIFIL was supposed to receive vast reinforcement, up to 15 000 men, and heavy equipment. France is committed to increase her complement from 400 to 2 000 men and send *Leclerc* heavy tanks and AMX 30 AuF1 self-propelled artillery, in addition to the forces deployed in Operation Baliste¹⁷. Italy will send 3000 troops.

¹⁷ *Opération Baliste* is the codename for the French aeronaval operation off Lebanon aiming at securing citizens of the European Union, since July 2006, in the context of the 2006 Lebanon War.

UNIFIL is currently primarily deployed along the United Nations-drawn Blue Line¹⁸ dividing Israel and the disputed Golan Heights and southern Lebanon. Its activities have focused on monitoring military activity between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) with the aim of reducing tensions and allaying continuing low-level armed conflict and operate alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL has also played an important role in clearing landmines, assisting displaced persons, and providing humanitarian assistance in this underdeveloped region.

After the 2006 conflict the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF) was established to end the Israeli sea blockade of Lebanese ports and to assist the Lebanese Navy preventing arms proliferation to Hezbollah. In October 2006 the German Navy assumed the lead of the MTF and is since contributing the major part of the force. The MTF consists of about five frigates and ten smaller patrol vessels. It is cooperating with the Lebanese Navy.

4. RoE (Rules of Engagement) in UN Resolution 1701, paragraph 12

“Acting in support of a request from the government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces

¹⁸ Specific map about blue line and UNIFIL zone boundary is shown at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:BlueLine2.jpg>

and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”

According to rules of engagement, UNIFIL commanders have sufficient authority to act forcefully when confronted with hostile activity of any kind, All UNIFIL personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defense. In addition, the use of force beyond self-defense may be applied to ensure that UNIFIL's area of operations. Even though UNIFIL could resort to the "use of force beyond self-defense," RoE did not give details on the means which will be used.

on August 21, 2007 the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNIFIL by another year—In a unanimous vote, Council members agreed to extend UNIFIL until 31 August 2008—and called on all parties in the region to play their part to turn 2006 cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah into a permanent ceasefire and a more durable

solution.

C. Controversy over reinforcement of RoE(Rules of Engagement)

According to the RoE in Resolution 1701, UNIFIL is not tied up operationally by the whims of the Lebanese cabinet, or even the Lebanese army. Should an attack occur, UNIFIL has the full right to hunt down the culprits, and no one is allowed to flaunt any form of weapons toward UNIFIL. But the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan seemed to be unsatisfied with this RoE regarding the fact that it did not spell out the operational procedures of UNIFIL, so he recommended that the rules of engagement of the enhanced UNIFIL force to be deployed in Lebanon should include opening fire on Hezbollah where necessary on the end of Aug. 2006,. But that trial has been yet to come true until now, due to opposition of troop contribution countries.

On the other hand, Critics said that Anan's recommendation was anything more than political window dressing. Also they doubt this would inspire many countries to join in, unless they do so to ensure Hezbollah wasn't seriously confronted.

Experts of international relation insists stronger mandate and RoE should be necessary, emphasizing that observer-peacekeepers such as UNIFIL are not as effective when the conflict is between a nation-state and a rebel group that isn't accountable to the U.N. Between Israel and Lebanon in the past, UNIFIL worked perfectly well. Between Israel and Hezbollah, sitting in Lebanon, it didn't work at all.

They say it's clear the U.N. force in Lebanon will be expected to do more than merely observe, and also mentioned "...That is, military engagement to back up the ceasefire and to disarm Hezbollah. as learned in Somalia, some people have pointed out very specifically, "you can't disarm unless you're prepared for combat, because people with arms, some of them, are going to resist. And so you have to be in an enforcement position, with an enforcement mandate and enforcement rules of engagement."¹⁹

D. Debate over UNIFIL presence and neutrality²⁰

UNIFIL has fallen out of favor with both Israel and Hezbollah. Israel has criticized the force for, among other things, maintaining a dialogue with Hezbollah, which it views as a terrorist organization, for treating Israeli and Hezbollah ceasefire breaches, equally, while Israel views its over-flights as less severe than Hezbollah shelling. UNIFIL was accused of complicity in the fatal abduction of IDF soldiers in October 2000, and Israel further blamed it for obstructing its investigation by denying the existence of and then refusing to supply videos for several months afterwards.

Prior to the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict of July 2006, Israel had been lobbying for UNIFIL to either take a more active role vis-a-vis Hezbollah²¹ or to step out of the region

¹⁹ Carolyn Weaver, "Experts Provide Their Perspectives on the UN Force Mandate in Lebanon," Voice of America News, 30 Aug. 2006

²⁰ Haaretz, "Israel accuses UN of collaborating with Hezbollah," 28 Oct. 2006

Lori Lowenthal Marcus. "What did you do in the war, UNIFIL?," Weekly Standard, 4 Sept. 2006

²¹ For example, preventing Hezbollah from stationing near UNIFIL posts to fire at the IDF (Israeli Defensive Force) and into northern Israel, because IDF's bombing Hezbollah's position can cause damage of UNIFIL's personnel and equipments

— thereby voiding the Lebanese government's excuse for not deploying Lebanese Armed Forces along the border.

UNIFIL also came under criticism during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict for broadcasting detailed reports of Israeli troop movements on their website which "could have exposed Israeli soldiers to grave danger", while making no such reports about Hezbollah. Hezbollah supporters have accused UNIFIL of siding with Israel, especially since the passage of Resolution 1701 which they view as one-sided. On October 16, 2006 a leading Lebanese Shi'ite Muslim scholar, Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, declared that the UN force had "come to protect Israel, not Lebanon".

III. Analysis of ROK Forces' Peace Keeping Operation(in Lebanon)

Even though the South Korea has a short history in acting as a member of UN after joining UN in 1991, it has been trying to enhance its status in international society by participating in various kinds of UN operations for the global peace and security. Especially after the end of the Cold War, Korea has been participating in Peace keeping Operation which had a sharp increase of demand, and 14 years has passed since Korea sent its troops to Somalia as PKF in June 1993.

Recently, the South Korean troops as part of UNIFIL started its mission in Southern Lebanon after long process of dispatch. It will make status of the South Korea elevate in international society.

In this chapter, the present condition and characteristics of the South Korean PKO will be examined.

A. Overview of ROK Forces' UN Peace Keeping Operation

1. Status of Korea's PKO

Table 3 : History of the South Korean PKO

Area		Type of dispatch	Number (No. of man-days)	Period
Current operation	UNOMIG (Georgia)	Observer	7 (74)	94.10.6~
	UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan)		9 (116)	94.11.8~
	UNMIL (Liberia)		2 (8)	03.10.18~
	UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Military advisor	2 (4)	03.7.6~
	UNMIS (Sudan)	Observer	4 (16)	05.11.25~
	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	Infantry battalion	350	07.8~
Past operation	MINURSO (Western Sahara)	Military medics	(542)	94.8.9 ~06.5.17
	UNOSOM (Somalia)	Military engineers	(516)	93.7.30 ~94.3.18
	UNAVEM (Angola)		(600)	95.10.5 ~96.12.23
	UNTAET (East Timor)	Infantry battalion	(3328)	99.10.4 ~03.10.23
	UNFICYP (Cyprus)	CMO	(1)	02.1.4 ~03.12.23
	ONUB (Burundi)	Observer	(4)	04.9.15 ~06.12.11

Data source : Ministry of National Defense "UN PKO education data" (2007.6.15)

Activity of the South Korean PKO will be examined according to terms as follows

1) The first-term

The time when the South Korea began joining PKO at the first time corresponded with the time when PKO hit a record high in number and volume due to collapse of the Cold War. Because racial and religious conflicts which caused civil war increased and the big powers refused to involve in these conflicts with the collapse of the Cold War, explosive increase of PKO was inevitable.

At the end of June 1993, 252 military engineers of ROK Armed Forces began its mission of PKO in Somalia (UNOSOM II), they supported not only PKF by paving the road and repairing bridges but also the local people by rebuilding infrastructures in the region.

Successively, 198 military engineers were dispatched in Angola (UNAVEM III) in October 1995. They supported PKF and also provided humanitarian aid to local civilians. Apart from military engineers, military medics composed of 42 members were dispatched to the West Sahara (MINRUSO) in September 1994 and they provided medical service of high quality to PKF and civilians. During the same period, Military Observers with the mission of monitoring armistice status and patrolling were dispatched to Georgia (UNOMIG) in October 1994

and India/Pakistan (UNMOGIP) on November same year. The South Korean Government also sent 6 civilian observers to Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1994 and 2 civilian police were sent to Somalia (UNOSOM II) in 1996. when it comes to participation as high ranking officials in UN, Han Seung-joo, the former foreign minister was a SRSG(Special Representative to the Secretary General) to UNFICYP (Cyprus), General Ahn, Choong-joo served as CMO(Chief Military Observer) in UNMOGIP(India/Pakistan) from April 1997, General Hwang Jin-ha served as the U.N. force's commander in UNFICYP

Meanwhile, in 1995 the South Korean government notified its participation in UNSAS²²(United Nations Standby Arrangements System) as level 1 with the scale of 800 military personnel. At the same time, South Korean government had examined the bill which included the process to simplify or omit approval by National Assembly when dispatching combatants with the mission of PKO but this bill was failed in being enacted.

During this period, Korean government started to systematize processes to join PKO effectively, one of its efforts was setting up educational system, the South

²² *The United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System* (UNSAS) is based on conditional commitments by Member States of specified resources within the agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. The resources agreed-upon remain on "stand-by" in their home country, where necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to prepare them to fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines. Stand-by resources are used exclusively for peacekeeping.

Korean government sent military officers to Northern European United Nations Training Corps in 1993 and also sent military officers and relevant government officials to Pearson Peace keeping Centre in Canada 1995. Furthermore, it designated Joint Staff College as an educational institution for military observers and staffs in 1995, also Special Warfare Command Training Corps began to take charge of training troops which was supposed to go abroad as PKF. With these kind of efforts to set up educational system, it made another effort to establish a close relationship with UN by sending military officers to DPKO²³ from 1995 to 1998.

At the end of this term, especially until August 1999, PKO was diminished internationally due to both failures of PKO in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Herzegovina and budget problem in PKO which exceeded regular UN budget over three times, therefore it was inevitable for UN to reduce number and volume of PKO at the lowest level.

2) The second-term

The time when the South Korea sent its combat(infantry) troops abroad for the first time corresponded with the time when UN PKO became active again,

²³ The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), its mission is to plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations, so that they can effectively fulfill their mandates under the overall authority of the Security Council and General Assembly, and under the command vested in the Secretary-General.

deployment of UNMIK(UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) in June 1999 and UNTAET(UN Transitional Administration in East Timor) in Oct. 1999 revitalized UN PKO.

During this term, the South Korea started making every effort to expand its influence in the decision-making process of UN PKO actively along with dispatching combat troops and increase of sharing the cost of UN PKO. Furthermore, the South Korean Mission to the United Nations tried to exercise its influences by insisting that countries which contributed its troops to UN PKO should have a certain role in decision-making process of the Security Council. The South Korean Mission to UN not only demanded that UN should design a system to satisfy interests of big contributors to UN PKO but also tried to participate in various discussions related with PKO including the Security Council and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operation as a troops contributor and top financial provider. As a result of these effort, in April 1998 a Korean diplomat was designated as a Assistant Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations at the United Nations with specific responsibilities for personnel, finance, and logistical support which were necessary to mount and sustain UN field-based peace operations world-wide.

2. Characteristics of the South Korean PKO Policies

The South Korean UN PKO from 1993 has a distinguished development in spite of short history. Characteristics of Korean PKO are as follows.

First, PKO is generally carried out by participation of military troops, civilian police, election judges, IGO²⁴, NGO etc. But the South Korean participation in PKO was mainly based on military personnel. Until now, beyond military personnel Korea sent only 7 civilian policemen and small number of judges and engineers.

Second, the South Korean government mainly dispatched combat support troops — military engineers and medics instead of combat troops — and military observers, that is, except in the case of East Timor, the South Korea has never dispatched its troops to the mission, which required combat troops, such as disarmament of warring parties, providing security for humanitarian aid and convoy. In the same way, when it comes to dispatch of military engineers even though UN requested combat engineers for the mission of clearing mines, the South Korean government refused UN request. Instead, it sent construction engineers. It shows that the South Korean government avoided high-risk PKO intentionally and considered safety when dispatching.

²⁴ Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO) such as the United Nations, the European Community or the World Trade Organization, with sovereign states or other IGOs as members. Their scope and aims are most usually in the public interest but may also have been created with an specific purpose.

Third, areas where Korean troops were dispatched were located in African Continent in general. The reason why Korea chose these African countries can be inferred that these African countries has rarely something to do with national interest of the South Korea, so it thought dispatching troops to these countries would not damage its national interest.

B. Process of dispatching the South Korean troops to Lebanon

On August last year, the South Korean government accepted the UN request to send peacekeeping forces to Lebanon by the UN resolution 1701. Government source said that the South Korean government examined and decided dispatching troops to Lebanon very carefully for the sake of contribution to peace policy in the Middle-East through active joining in UN resolution and it also considered the fact of poor ranking No. 80 in troop contribution to PKO in spite of ranking No. 10 in providers of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping budget²⁵.

On Oct. 2006 the government inspection team which was composed of working-level officials from the Defense Ministry, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Ministry examined situation in the south Lebanon, and then on Nov. 28 bill of dispatching troops as part of UNIFIL was passed in a cabinet council, in Dec. the bill was approved in “the Assembly’s Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee” and plenary session. Then

²⁵ “main contributors to UN in troops and finance,” <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>>
<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/financing.html>>

cooperation related with installation of facilities, reimbursement etc. was done through Korean staff and cooperation officers who were sent to command of UNIFIL. Successively on Feb. 2007 the first on-site inspection team led by Maj. Gen. Park Jeong-i, the military operation chief at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was sent to discuss the South Korean troops' mandates, area of responsibility, organization of personnel and equipment, and also to get essential information about situation in the region, plan of operations, rules of engagement.

The second on-site inspection team checked the process of building garrison and finally discussed logistics, equipment, details of education before dispatching. In addition, preparation for dispatching was advanced by organizing Dispatching Preparation Corps in advance so as to develop operation plan, SOP, civil military operation plan for local population²⁶. Meanwhile, byname of Korean troop as part of UNIFIL was named "*Dongmyeong*" which means bright light from the east literally: troops sent from eastern area (Korea) will hope bright future and peace. The advance team of 61 of South Korea's 350 members Dongmyeong Unit arrived at Tyre in July 7 2007. Main forces were deployed to Tyre on July 19.

After completing the final test of its readiness to fulfill its mission successfully by UNIFIL Command, Dongmyeong Unit started to carry out real mission by taking over the operational control of its mandate area from an Italian battalion as of midnight on Aug. 11.

²⁶ "Special Report about Dispatch of troops to Lebanon," National Defense Journal, July 2007

IV. Latent threats in the region to the South Korean troops and UNIFIL

As I mentioned at previous chapter, UNIFIL's mission seems to be limited in implementation due to not only internal problems in its system but also unstable situation in the area of operation. Relation and connection among Israel, Syria, Iran and Hezbollah around Lebanon is deteriorating security situation in the region threatening the presence of UNIFIL.

In this chapter, we shall now proceed to examine latent threats in Lebanon which can disturb activity of UNIFIL, in order to suggest better way to complete mission of PKO successfully. I have analyzed three kinds of threats as bellows: Presence of Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda's terrorist threat to UNIFIL, Possibility of resuming war.

A. Presence and latent hostility of Hezbollah

Hezbollah, which sparked 2006 Lebanon War, is a creature of 15years the Lebanese Civil War. Hezbollah means "party of God" literally as a Shi'a Islamic political and paramilitary organization based in Lebanon.

Hezbollah has popular support in Shi'a Lebanese society. In addition, Hezbollah receives arms, training, and financial support from Iran and has "operated with Syria's blessing" since the end of the Civil War. Hezbollah, which started only with a militia, has grown to an organization which has seats in the Lebanese government, a radio and a

satellite television station, and programs for social development. Since 1992 the organization has been headed by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, its Secretary-General.

It has been accused of the 1983 Beirut the USMC barracks bombing that killed over 300 American and French peacekeeping troops. Six countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, officially list Hezbollah or its external security arm as a terrorist organization. But most in the Arab and Muslim worlds regard Hezbollah as a legitimate resistance movement. Goal of Hezbollah is to expel western countries including Israel from Lebanon and to establish Islamic state²⁷.

The problem is that though Lebanese government officially stated its position to cooperate with war on terror of the West, it has been reluctant to disarm and disband militant groups in Lebanon such as Hezbollah, PIJ(Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine), PFLP-GC(Popular Front Liberation of Palestine), ANO(Abu Nidal Organization), Al-Qaeda. Even during the War between Israel and Hezbollah, on July 31, 2006, Lebanese President Emile Lahoud declared his full support for Hezbollah as "complementary to the Lebanese army."²⁸ Furthermore, after the end of the War in spite of enacting UNSC Resolution 1701, the Lebanese government stated that they would not disarm Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah's attitude toward the South Korean troops in south Lebanon looks friendly until now. In an interview with Yon-hap News, the South Korea media on

²⁷ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah>

²⁸ Brown, Matt. "[UN diplomacy may not end conflict: Lebanese President](#)", August, 11, 2006

Jan. 23, a member of parliament who were belonged to Hezbollah political apparatus said “we(Hezbollah) are prepared to cooperate under the condition that Korean troop will carry out its mission to protect Lebanon with Lebanese army from Israeli aggression.” Also he mentioned that Hezbollah would welcome Korean troop and there would be no problem in Korean troop’s dispatch to Tyre.

According to the Israeli military intelligence, Hezbollah, with the assistance of Iran and Syria, continues to amass thousands of rockets and other sophisticated weaponry, rebuilding its arsenal up to the level before last summer’s war with Israel. Top U.N. officials have concluded that the Syrian-Lebanese border is being used to smuggle arms to Hezbollah and that the terrorist group is reconstructing fortifications throughout Lebanon.

Despite its mandate, UNIFIL is not patrolling the villages of southern Lebanon, allowing Hezbollah to use these unmonitored areas in smuggling weapons. But U.N. mandate does not allow UNIFIL to deploy along the border with Syria without a request from the Lebanese government which has yet to make such a request. Therefore, Israeli government is criticizing the lack of U.N. enforcement of the embargo on supplying Hezbollah with weapons.

Besides, U.N. forces are limited to operations in southern Lebanon, allowing Hezbollah and other terrorists to operate freely north of the Litani River and in the Bekaa valley-located about 30 km east of Beirut, known as a training ground for many guerrilla

organizations from the past.

It is expected that as part of the renewal process or additional provision of UNIFIL's mandate, the United States should encourage the Security Council to expand and enhance UNIFIL's mandate to allow monitoring of the Lebanese –Syrian border in order to prevent Iran and Syria from rearming Hezbollah. The U.N. also should hold Syria and Iran accountable for violating Resolution 1701's arms embargo against Hezbollah through further sanctions on the two regimes. If the situation on the ground changes like above, it is going to be inevitable for the South Korean troops to take risky missions according to expanded and enhanced mandate from UN Security Council. Judging from characteristics and activities of Hezbollah until now, it will not abandon its ambition to fortify military strength against Israel. Therefore, if the expanded mandate is given to UNIFIL, physical conflict between UNIFIL, which should monitor weapon smuggling through the border, and Hezbollah, which will keep on rebuilding military strength at any cost, seems to be inevitable. It seems to be easy to predict that Hezbollah will change its friendly manner in the present into hostility against UNIFIL including the South Korean troops for its political and military purpose at any time.

B. Al-Qaeda's terrorist threat to UNIFIL

On Jun. 24, 2007 a roadside bomb targeting a Spanish convoy which was patrolling for UNIFIL exploded in Khiyam, southern Lebanon, leaving six UN peacekeepers dead

and three others wounded. This incident was the first time that UNIFIL has come under attack since it was reinforced last summer after the 2006 Lebanon War.

No one has claimed any responsibility for the attack, but the Lebanese authorities have pointed fingers at Fatah al-Islam²⁹, the al-Qaeda-inspired Palestinian terror group which is based in Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli. This information was based on revealing plots to attack the U.N. force extracted from Fatah al-Islam gunmen captured by Lebanese armed forces during fierce fighting at the northern Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared.

In fact, Israeli officials mentioned there have been warnings that peacekeepers would come under attack by terror groups in southern Lebanon, particularly al-Qaeda and Global Jihad before bomb attack against UNIFIL on June. Specifically the Head of the Research Division at Israeli Military Intelligence Brig.-Gen. Yossi Baidatz warned in December last year of increasing signs that Global Jihad elements were setting up a presence in Lebanon and were planning attacks against UNIFIL.

Those warnings became more serious after Fatah al-Islam, the al-Qaeda-inspired Palestinian terror group, began fighting Lebanese troops in northern Lebanon from May 20, 2007. The terrorists have threatened to take their battle outside northern Lebanon and other militant groups have issued Internet statements supporting Fatah al-Islam.

²⁹ "Lebanon Links UNIFIL attack to Nahr-al-Bared Stand off," www.naharnet.com, 26 Jun. 2007

In addition, al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahri, in videos broadcast in September last year, has denounced the reinforced UNIFIL urging al-Qaeda allies in Lebanon to fight Security Council Resolution 1701³⁰.

The second attack against UNIFIL occurred on July 16, a roadside blast damaged a Unifil vehicle near the southern city of Tyre. The Unifil vehicle damaged slightly was hit by an explosion near the Qasimiya bridge over the Litani river. Fortunately there were no casualties³¹.

Let us examine the main body of recent threat, Fatah al-Islam, and the most unstable factor in the recent Lebanese situation, conflict in Palestinian refugee camp.

1. Fatah al-Islam

Until May of this year, few people had heard of Fatah al Islam. Its true identity in fact remains controversial. While some observers point to its links with al-Qaeda, others, including Lebanese senior security officials, claim that it is no more than Damascus's latest invention to advance Syrian interests in Lebanon and derail the establishment of an international tribunal to deal with killers who assassinated the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri by car bomb attack³².

Fatah al Islam surfaced in northern Lebanon in 2006 when it publicly claimed to

³⁰ "Al-Qaeda will fight UN," *Agence France Presse*, 20 December 2006

³¹ <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/BB4F7925-1656-4BC7-8B1E-A1D3F551C3E9.htm>

³² The investigation into his assassination is still ongoing and it is conducted under the supervision of the United Nations and led by the independent investigator Serge Brammertz. It has been widely speculated that the Syrian government are linked to the assassination.

have split from the Syrian-based Fatah Intifada(a Palestinian militant faction, in other word, Palestinian National Liberation Movement - "Fatah"), itself a 1980s splinter of the more mainstream Fatah, led by the late Yasser Arafat. Its origins are Palestinian but the majority of its Arab fighters and cadres, who number anywhere from 500 to 900, come from Iraq. The group also has a sizable Lebanese constituency, evidenced by the high number of Lebanese that have been captured and killed in the ongoing battle within refugee camp with the Lebanese Army. Having been ousted from the neighboring Baddawi camp by rival Palestinian forces, Fatah al Islam now resides in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al Bared.

To claim that Fatah al-Islam is merely a Syrian tool is not only simplistic but counterproductive. With the wealth of information that has recently surfaced, Fatah al Islam's connections with al-Qaeda are verifiable and unmistakable. Three points stand out: one, it has repeatedly claimed to be inspired by al-Qaeda's worldview and ideology; two, it shares al-Qaeda's modus operandi; three, its leaders have long standing contacts with al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq and worldwide.

Spokesmen for Fatah al Islam claim that the group's only objective is to protect the Sunnis of Lebanon and to reform the Palestinian refugee camps according to the Islamic code. Their true ambition however, like al-Qaeda's, is to create an Islamic insurgent force to liberate Jerusalem and other Muslim lands from the infidels.

2. 2007 Lebanon Conflict between Lebanese armed forces and Fatah al-Islam

The 2007 Lebanon conflict began when fighting broke out between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces on May 20, 2007 in Nahr al-Bared, a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. Fierce combats started from fighting when Lebanese police made a raid on a house in Tripoli which was apparently being used by militants from Fatah al-Islam, and then Lebanese Army used fire support of tanks, artillery, attack helicopters to suppress Islamic fighters who resisted using booby-trapped building and strong position in refugee camp even firing portable rockets. It has been the most severe internal fighting since Lebanon's 1975–90 civil war. The conflict evolved mostly around the Siege of Nahr el-Bared, but minor clashes have also occurred in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon and several terrorist bombings took place in and around Lebanon's capital Beirut.

Historically, Palestinian refugee camps served as hotbed for various manifestations of Islamic militancy. Lebanon is home to more than 350,000 Palestinian refugees, some 215,000 of whom live in camps. As in many other Arab countries, Lebanese citizenship is unavailable to them, and many are banned from all but menial jobs in Lebanon, forcing them to mostly live off aid provided by the United Nations.

3. UNIFIL's anxieties about terrorist attack

Since its deployment, UNIFIL has publicly voiced concerns about a terrorist attack by al-Qaeda against its troops. These legitimate concerns have been reinforced by stern warnings issued by Lebanese, Israeli and Western officials about al-Qaeda's growing presence in Lebanon. For UNIFIL, the ongoing violent clashes between al-Qaeda inspired Islamic militants and the Lebanese Army have only heightened its sense of insecurity.

Concerned about the safety of their troops, UNIFIL commanders do not have the necessary intelligence resources to protect against a terrorist attack. Lacking clear authority to engage in counterterrorism or intelligence gathering activities, UNIFIL is forced to rely on the cooperation of a relatively weak Lebanese security apparatus whose competency is seriously hampered by the polarized political environment. Yet without solid data and objective threat assessments supplied by its host state, UNIFIL has only official reports which are largely unreliable, unfocused assessments from UN headquarters in New York.

Even though fighting in Nahr el-Bared refugee camp will be finished sooner or later, terrorist who are already spread widely in 12 Palestinian refugee camps will be threats to Lebanon government and UNIFIL. Lebanon government should not ignore the possibility that around 215,000 Palestinian refugees who already

become sick and tired of their fate and reality of no job, no hope in Lebanon are prepared for joining the terror group for money.

C. Possibility of resuming war

As we can see many conflicts in the Middle-East history around Israel and Arab countries, their antagonism especially among Israel, Syria and Iran probably seems to provoke war again.

1. New war of Israel vs. Hezbollah

34 days Israel-Hezbollah war was over by UN Resolution 1701 as a mediator on Aug. 14 leaving many casualties and victims. But both Israel and Hezbollah are not only unwilling to respect this Resolution³³, and they also have shown their own complaints to UNIFIL. The more serious problem is that both sides are preparing for resuming war.

The Telegraph, the U.K. No.1 press reported that Hezbollah was paying exorbitant prices to buy up large areas from land owners on the northern bank of the Litani River in southern Lebanon, where its fighters were then fortifying positions and stock-piling missiles in anticipation of a second round of hostilities with Israel —

The northern bank of the Litani is within 16 kilometers of Israeli border

³³ On June 30, 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's fourth report on the implementation of SC Resolution 1701 fingered Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah for violating the ceasefire, but called the firing of rockets into Israel by unknown elements "the most serious breach of the cessation of hostilities since the end of the war." The report commended Israel on its restraint following this attack, and commended Lebanon for its continued efforts to disarm armed groups.

communities, which are well within the range of Hezbollah's replenished arsenal of Katyusha rockets. The strategic valleys and rugged hilltops on the northern bank, well suited to Hezbollah's brand of guerrilla fighting.

This was taking place, according to the report, just beyond the reach of UNIFIL patrols, the jurisdiction of the UN peacekeeping force sent to patrol south of the Litani as part of a cease-fire agreement.

Furthermore, in the speech to mark the first anniversary of the war, Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah said the guerrilla group would never be at peace with Israel and claimed the guerrilla group was ready to strike Israel again at any time.

From the view of Israeli government and Israeli Defense Force (IDF), Israel doesn't seem to just sit down and see the rebuilding of Hezbollah's fortified zone in south Lebanon, from which in summer of 2006 it launched its missile bombardment of northern Israel. According to the intelligence, Hezbollah is replenishing its stocks of missiles including Iranian-manufactured systems like the Fajr-3, with a 45-km range; the Fajr-5, with a range of some 75km which can strike Israel's northern port city of Haifa as proved in 2006 war. Some analysts believe that Hezbollah also has the more potent Zelzal-2 which has a claimed range of 200-400km bringing Tel Aviv — Israel's largest population centre — within its range and can be fitted with a

600kg high-explosive warhead³⁴.

On the other hand, Hamas in the Gaza strip is also creating a fortified zone and building up its stocks of missiles. Israel, therefore, faces missile attack on two fronts. When the Israel general staff decides the threat has become intolerable, it will strike.

Besides, the adoption of a tunnel strategy has allowed Hezbollah to wage asymmetric warfare against Israel's previously all-conquering armored forces. The tunnel system is also impervious to attack by the Israeli Air Force.

Since Israel's reason for existence is to provide a secure base for the Jewish people, and that of the IDF is to act as their shield and safeguard – functions that have been carried out with high success since 1948 – it is obvious that neither can tolerate a zone of invulnerability occupied by a sworn enemy located directly on Israel's northern border. It is therefore an easy prediction to foresee that the IDF will – at some time in the near future – reopen its offensive against Hezbollah in south Lebanon and will not cease until it has destroyed the underground system, even if, in the process, it inflicts heavy damage on the towns and villages of the region.

Destroying the underground military facilities may be straightforward, but it is likely to create diplomatic complexities, particularly with the UN. Entering south Lebanon risks provoking a clash with UNIFIL, the major part of whose strength is

³⁴ "Hezbollah's Rocket Strategy," www.jamestown.org

provided by France. It is unlikely that such a risk will deter Israel. When national survival is at risk, Israel behaves with extreme ruthlessness. It attacked an American communications ship during the Six-Day War because it objected to America listening in to its most secret signals.

2. New war of Israel vs. Syria

Sources said head of Syrian military intelligence has convinced Syrian President Bashar Assad that only war will bring Israel to negotiation table³⁵.

In detail, there are those who believe that General Asef Shawkat, the head of Syrian Intelligence, and the brother-in-law of Syrian President Bashar Assad, is pushing for a war with Israel. Israel's poor performance in the Second Lebanon War of 2006, and the relative weakness and military naivete of Israeli Prime Minister Olmert may embolden some in Syria's government that Syria might be able to force Israel to give up the Golan Height through force. Few believe that Israel could be pushed off the Heights, but a good showing by Syria, especially if they can inflict heavy casualties on Israel, may force Jerusalem to the bargaining table.

After all, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat launched the 1973 October War (alongside Syria), and did end up negotiating a return of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula from Israel. It is not inconceivable that Assad may be thinking along those same

³⁵ "Arab official: Syrian general mulling war with Israel," www.ynetnews.com, 14 Aug. 2007

lines. Also, Israel is eyeing military activities of Syria, and it can look at history as well, and see that an attack may be coming (or think that an attack is coming) and launch a pre-emptive strike ala 1967.

3. The Hezbollah-Iran-Syria Alliance

As I mentioned at previous part, dreadful missiles to attack Israeli northern territory which Hezbollah used in 2006 Lebanon war is Iranian version of missiles. Let us examine what for Iran has been providing military, financial supports to Hezbollah and what Syrian intentions are in supporting Hezbollah.

1) Iran's Assistance to Hezbollah

Iran has been supporting Hezbollah financially, militarily and ideologically.

Militarily, Iran helps train guerrilla fighters, and delivers and purchases weapons for Hezbollah³⁶. Financially, Iranian funding enables Hezbollah to offer social services to the local communities and run a media empire³⁷. Iran transfers nearly

³⁶ The elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard unit, the Qods Force, is responsible for training, arming, and providing Hezbollah intelligence on Israel and Captured Hezbollah militants have confessed that Iran runs training camps for Hezbollah and other militant groups within its borders, managed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, as well as other high-ranking Iranian officials - "*Hezbollah as a strategic arm of Iran,*" Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Sept. 8, 2006

Iran provides Hezbollah with technical assistance in weapons operation, weapons including long-range Fajr rockets, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, guns, rocket launchers and drone planes, many of which were used by Hezbollah during the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel conflict - "Iranian complicity in the present Lebanese crisis - July-Aug. 2006," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 15, 2006

³⁷ Iran finances Hezbollah's official television station, *Al-Manar*, which was founded in 1991 and broadcasts extremist Islamic and heavily anti-Western material

Monetary aid to Hezbollah from Iran actually increased after Israel's disengagement from Lebanon in 2000 - "*Hezbollah as a strategic arm of Iran,*" Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Sept. 8, 2006

\$100 million annually to Hezbollah through the Qods Force (The elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard unit), the Iranian Foreign Ministry, charities and its embassies in Damascus and Beirut. Ideologically, Iran and Hezbollah have similar shared goals and a vested effort to spread Islam and oppose the Western world.

2) The Iran-Syria Alliance

Both are labeled by the U.S. State Department as a “**state sponsor of terrorism.**” The two countries signed a "strategic cooperation" agreement in 2004 and in June 2006 finalized a mutual defense pact. Furthermore, Syria and Iran have intensified their strategic relationship as they have become more isolated from the West and antagonistic towards the United States in recent years³⁸.

Their relationship is not only a tactical "marriage of convenience." Iran and Syria have simultaneously deepened their economic, cultural and security ties over the past few years. Syria is a staunch supporter of Iran's nuclear program.

3) Mutual support for Hezbollah

In violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which demands there be "*No sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as*

³⁸ Yacoubian, Mona, "Syria's Alliance with Iran," United States Institute of Peace, May 2007

authorized by its government," Iran continues to supply arms to Hezbollah via a complicit Syria³⁹. During the Second Lebanon War, Iran shipped arms directly through Syria and with Syrian cooperation to the terrorist organization Hezbollah.

Syria and Iran share a deep mutual hostility toward Israel in accordance with their radical Islamic ideologies. Their support of Hezbollah in its recent conflict with Israel exemplifies this antagonism.

Syria has an interest in exploiting its assistance to Iran's proxy, Hezbollah, in order to destabilize Lebanon and reassert Syrian influence there since it withdrew militarily in 2005⁴⁰.

If Syria wages war against Israel, it is clear that Syria will use Hezbollah as an allied force, of course, Hezbollah will certainly resume its attack against Israel. Actually, Hezbollah is merely an agent of proxy war supported by Syria and Iran.

The big question hanging over an Israeli return to south Lebanon is whether that would provoke a war with Syria, Lebanon's Arab protector. The answer is quite possibly yes, but that such an extension of hostilities might prove welcome both to

³⁹ Shannon, Elaine and McGirk, Tim, "Iran and Syria Helping Hizballah Rearm," *Time Magazine*, Nov. 24, 2006

⁴⁰ Yacoubian, Mona, "Syria's Role in Lebanon," United States Institute of Peace, Nov. 2006,

Israel and to the United States, which regards Syria as Iran's advanced post on the Mediterranean shore.

If war breaks out, damage of UN personnel, equipment, facilities will seem to be inevitable between Hezbollah's rocket bombardment and Israeli Defense Force's air strikes and shelling like previous damages⁴¹ in 2006 war.

⁴¹ On 25 July 2006 four UN peacekeepers from Austria, Canada, China and Finland were killed when an Israeli aerial bomb struck a UN observation post in southern Lebanon. According to the UN, the four had taken shelter in a bunker under the post. The area around the site was shelled a total of 14 times by Israeli artillery throughout the day despite communication via telephone between the UN liaison and the IDF. Later, a rescue team was also shelled as it tried to clear the rubble

V. Conclusion

A. Suggestions to avoid latent threats for the Korean Troops in Lebanon and UNIFIL

Hezbollah's confidence in its military strength to openly threaten Israel is derived from its huge stocks of rocket through smuggling, strong tunnel and bunkers as impregnable fortress, strong military and financial support from its allies — Iran, Syria.

Before going on with the aspect of countermeasures, reasons why the arms keep flowing into the region should be pointed out as follows.

One is an apparent lack of will on Beirut's part to confront Hezbollah or to enforce the internationally agreed embargo on weapons flowing into southern Lebanon. One expert said "The Lebanese government is suffering a severe political crisis due to parliamentary paralysis and fractious ethnic and religious tensions across the country and it does not want conflict with Hezbollah," he also mentioned Hezbollah moved its veto on action by the central government from the south of Lebanon back to the center — the capital — where it uses its political clout within the national parliament to counter every move by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Siniora can't appoint a government official in southern Lebanon without consulting Hezbollah.

Second problem lies in UNIFIL's relationship with the Lebanese army with whom it must cooperate, as required by its UN Resolution 1701. For example, UNIFIL's rules of

engagement forbid it to engage Hizbollah without coordinating first with the army. The fact that UNIFIL is forced to coordinate its activities with the Lebanese army causes a lot of problems, the initial problem is that the Lebanese army does not recognize the necessity of blocking arms flows or disarming Hizbollah. Thus, Lebanese soldiers stationed along the Syria-Lebanon border overlook or ignore each time Hizbollah smuggles arms into the region, that is, there is nothing for UNIFIL to do or intervene because there is no request from Lebanese army from the beginning.

The last problem is UNIFIL's operational limit: It has insufficient assets to patrol southern Lebanon's borders, and what assets it does have are concentrated inconsistently across its multi-national forces. In my view, UNIFIL's surveillance asset is too small to carry out effective monitoring to prevent arms smuggling across southern Lebanon's border with Syria.— currently UNIFIL has only four helicopters, used mainly for medical purposes.

No one will be opposed to the fact that smuggling weapons to Hizbollah should be stopped as one of reasons to prevent war from resuming. Hizbollah considerably amassed thousands of rockets and other sophisticated weaponry up to the level before 2006 war with Israel. Therefore, for the sake of preventing the current security circumstance in the region from being deteriorated, blocking this supply line is the most essential. But the problem is how? I would like to propose that UN should expand UNIFIL's mandate to stop

Hezbollah arms smuggling even including open fire on Hezbollah without cooperation with Lebanese army. Someone may raise an objection for the reason of escalating tension and even causing armed clash between UNIFIL and Hezbollah, or someone may think solution by diplomatic means such as special envoy visiting, working-level talks.

But as I mentioned above, it looks impossible that Iran and Syria as Hezbollah's wire-pullers who share a deep antagonism toward the West including international organization is going to accept that kind of diplomatic suggestions and means. It was Iran and Syria that ignored the Secretary- General Ban Ki-Moon's criticism in his semi-annual report. Therefore, first, present UNIFIL mandate should be expanded aggressively to stop Hezbollah arms smuggling and to block supply line physically. Second, with this expanded mandate UNIFIL should reinforce the surveillance asset such as reconnaissance plane, UAV, helicopters with night vision devices which can cover the Syria-Lebanon border.

From this point, I will try to suggest countermeasures against al-Qaeda terrorist threat. UNIFIL commander don't have the necessary intelligence resources to protect his troops against a terrorist attack. UNIFIL can only rely on relatively weak Lebanese security apparatus and unreliable, unfocussed assessments from UN H.Q in New York. So to secure UNIFIL, the following recommendations should be considered by the UN and participating sovereign nations in consultation and coordination with the Lebanese government including its security and military institutions:

First, contact with Syria with the intention of securing its cooperation in providing intelligence. It is clear that a long term solution to al-Qaeda's growing presence in Lebanon is extremely hard to attain without Syria's cooperation on the Syrian-Lebanese border. As a state sponsor of terrorism, it is certain that Syria has specific connections and credible information about al-Qaeda when Syria gives its support to Hamas, Islamic jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Hezbollah and extremist groups.

Second, Seeking the cooperation of Hezbollah, whose human and technical intelligence assets are essential to ensuring UNIFIL's security. As unpleasant or irrational it might seem to Western officials, it is a fact that Hezbollah's extensive intelligence repertoire in the South can considerably help UNIFIL avert a terrorist attack against it.

Third, Ensuring UNIFIL personnel's physical security by maximizing the distance between potential terrorists and inhabited UNIFIL buildings and barracks and by equipping UNIFIL personnel with intrusion detection systems, a mass notification system, automated entry control equipment, cargo inspection devices including under-vehicle inspection devices, modern communications equipment, delay and denial technology including fences, barriers and locks, explosives detection and explosive ordnance disposal devices including hand-held and static, and unattended ground sensors.

Finally, Earning the trust of local communities in the South for the purpose of securing their human intelligence cooperation. Ensure their protection and welfare and

convince them that UNIFIL's job is limited to monitoring the cease fire and keeping the peace, not disarming Hezbollah. This is directly related to countermeasure against "latent hostility of Hezbollah." The South Korean troops' medical service, educational program, several services for public welfare, which were turned out to be effective in the past PKO, will help local people have trust in presence of the South Korean troops and UNIFIL.

Hezbollah and local people are inseparably related to each other, Hezbollah has been standing on the strong collaboration and support from local people, therefore, from Hezbollah's point of view, its hostility against Korean troops which also stands on local people's support and trust will be certainly a matter not to be lightly handled.

B. Contribution to international society and national interest

The purpose of dispatching Korean troops to southern Lebanon is to provide a permanent stability and contribute for achievement of ultimate peace in the Middle East, Furthermore, dispatching is expected to help Korean international status and its strong national power be reconfirmed in global society.

1. International Noblesse Oblige

As mentioned above at chapter IV, it seems to be impossible to guarantee complete security of the South Korean troops. Even though it is told to be deployed to safe area near Tyre, it can't exclude the possibility to be exposed to danger. But

this reality can't injure meaning and justice of dispatching abroad for Peacekeeping. Attitude such as "now we are safe, that's all" regardless of other people's pain resulted from hostilities and clashes in remote area or irrespective of other nations' circumstance and condition is not a responsible manner that a nation, with the global top 10 economic strength and the top 10 provider of financial contribution to UN PKO, can choose.

The term "Noblesse Oblige" which primarily refer to public responsibilities of the rich, famous and powerful, notably to provide good examples of behavior or to exceed minimal standards of decency. This moral standard has to be expanded upto the international level above internal level. Advanced countries' contribution to PKO reflects their level of national power.

2. Pursuit of both justice and actual profit in overseas dispatch

Someone may ask back whether the policy to send the best soldiers abroad under recent unstable situation of the Korean peninsula due to North Korean nuclear test is reasonable or not. But North Korean asymmetric threat is not a problem of stability affected by number of sending soldiers but a problem to be resolved by cooperation based on the South Korea-U.S. alliance and political efforts of international level such as 6-party talks, summit talks.

Dispatching Korean troops to Lebanon can give a strong impression, that the

South Korea has a confidence in security, to international society in spite of the North Korean nuclear issue. Such reputation and fame of the South Korea in international society surely affect its national interest and profit. This is similar to case that the brand value of one specific Korean company, which is recognized as successful one in global market, elevates reliability and reputation of Korean economy in global market, later whole Korean company and Korean product will benefit from good reputation of Korean economy as a reliable one in the global market. Accordingly, interest and profit gained by imprinting the South Korea as a responsible member which supports international peace in international society is beyond level of economic profit.

Besides, dispatching troops to Lebanon is expected to have not only a meaning of joining UN resolution at the international level as a responsible member but also meaning of developing the South Korea-U.S. alliance further. The South Korean contribution abroad especially in the Middle Eastern area where U.S. has suffered from difficulties in executing its policies will help U.S. national interest. It shows that the South Korea and U.S. will go together at the international level out of Korean peninsula for dynamic and reciprocal alliance for the better future. Also, it is expected to be a basis of more equitable, sincere partner. It is the time to pursue both justice and actual profit in overseas dispatching.

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