

**“WHO BEWITCHED US?” AN ANALYSIS OF THE UJAMAA POLICY IN  
TANZANIA, IN COMPARISON WITH THE POLICY OF THE SAEMAUL  
MOVEMENT IN KOREA**

**By**

**Daniel Lucas Machunda**

**THESIS**

Submitted to  
KDI School of Public Policy and Management  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

**MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY**

2010

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
**MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY**

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Approval as of November, 2010

## ABSTRACT

### **“WHO BEWITCHED US?” AN ANALYSIS OF THE UJAMAA POLICY IN TANZANIA, IN COMPARISON WITH THE POLICY OF THE SAEMAUL MOVEMENT IN KOREA**

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This thesis examines the Ujamaa policy in Tanzania, which was adopted immediately after independence and was initially implemented after the announcement of the Arusha Declaration in 1967. The paper will explore whether the Ujamaa policy was a success or failure in attaining its policy goals, in comparison with the Saemaul movement policy in Korea as a success story. It will also discuss “ Policy Implementation and Policy Failure”, so as to grasp the reality of what happened after the adoption of the Ujamaa policy in Tanzania, and contrast it with the success behind the Saemaul movement policy in Korea, which is said to be the foundation of the Korean development miracle. In that respect, this thesis will attempt to discern some possible reasons why the Ujamaa policy in Tanzania, has largely been a failure in attaining its economic policy goals, in comparison with the Saemaul movement policy in Korea as a model case. The study will also explore the central question: **“Who bewitched the Tanzanians?”** as the Ujamaa policy failed to achieve economic goals despite the fact that it was able to bring about social and political change to Tanzanian society, by drawing lessons from the Saemaul movement policy in Korea.

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**With gratitude to the Almighty God, this thesis is dedicated to:  
My parents Mr. and Mrs. Lucas Joseph Machunda  
Always I love you**

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## Chapter I: Introduction

There has been a great deal of debates with strong arguments on why most African countries are still underdeveloped despite the potential resources they have and the progressive policies they have adopted since they attained political independence in the 1960s. A typical case can be seen in Tanzania, which adopted a broad-ranging initiative for socio-economic development known as the Ujamaa<sup>1</sup> policy immediately after its independence, as a way forward toward the creation of a self- sustaining economy under the slogan of Africanization<sup>2</sup>.

History tells us that by the 1950s and 1960s, the comparative level of development between certain African countries and Asian countries like Korea was almost identical, and indeed, African countries sometimes seemed to be better off than some Asian countries. As Haggard<sup>3</sup> et al, have indicated, “When a student protest in April 1960 finally put an end to the Syngman Rhee government, Korea was in a dismal state. It was an aid-dependent country whose per capita income was one of the lowest in the world (page 43)”<sup>4</sup>. Nevertheless, some Third World countries, especially in Asia, have been so successful in their economic pursuits that they have moved out of the “developing country” classification into a more appropriate “industrializing nation” category (Turner et. al, 1993). The question here, therefore, is why most African countries like Tanzania have remained underdeveloped while other countries like Korea have managed to become industrialized nations?

This question is what composes the central discussion in this thesis, which seeks to answer why the Ujamaa policy did not manage to transform the Tanzanian rural sector from a peasant

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<sup>1</sup> Ujamaa is a Swahili word meaning family hood or communal.

<sup>2</sup> The process of recruiting Africans into civil/public service immediately after independence was done by most of African nations.

<sup>3</sup> See Turner et al 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Also Kyong-Dong Kim, put that historically Korea has been an agrarian society with much of its social structural and cultural ramifications.

economy to a modernized and industrialized economy, in contrast to what the Saemaul movement did for Korea. “Who bewitched us?” is a question which mirrors that posed by Saint Paul in his letter to the Galatians in the Holy Bible when he was bothered by the intransigence and sluggishness of the Galatians in accepting the word of God: “ You foolish Galatians! ‘Who bewitched you?’ Before your very eyes Jesus Christ was clearly portrayed as crucified” (Galatians 3:1).

Is the **Ujamaa village policy** in Tanzania, which was adopted in 1967 following the announcement of the **Arusha Declaration**<sup>5</sup>, a success or failure in creating a socialist society and bringing socio- economic development to Tanzania? In order to argue on this, one must look back at the history and consider the motives behind the adoption of the Ujamaa village policy in Tanzania, as pronounced by the late president Julius Kambarage Nyerere<sup>6</sup>: “*Ujamaa villages are intended to be socialist organizations created by the people, and governed by those who live and work in them. They cannot be created from outside, or governed from outside. No one can be forced into an Ujamaa village, and no official at any level can go and tell the members of Ujamaa village what should do together, and what they should continue to do as individuals farmers*” ( Nyerere,1967).

On this note, the intention of the Ujamaa village policy was to create a *Socialist African Society, a Self- reliant one, by enhancing human freedom and unity and achieving socio- economic development* through equal distribution of wealth while also ensuring that there would be no room for parasitism (Ibhawoh and Dibua; 2003).

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<sup>5</sup> Arusha is one of the cities in Tanzania, a place where the Ujamaa policy was inaugurated.

<sup>6</sup> The late Julius Kambarage Nyerere was the first president and father of nation of Tanzania, he is also called ‘Mwalimu’ meaning teacher.

Nevertheless, despite these loft goals, it is now painfully obvious that in terms of economics, the Ujamaa village policy failed to transform the Tanzanian rural sector from a peasant economy into a mechanized and industrialized society. According to Umma Lele (1984:159), between 1971 and 1981, per capita income declined nearly by half (Pambazuka News: 2009). Moreover, Colin Legun<sup>7</sup> put that from 1980 onwards; there has been a serious downfall of Tanzania's economic performance, marking an inferior record to the average for African low- income countries on all the main indicators. On the other hand, the policy did succeed in bringing about some degree of social and political development in Tanzanian society by imbuing it with a higher sense of *equality, freedom, political stability, non- racism, non- ethnocentrism, non- regionalism and national unity* (Hirschler: 2004; Wangwe: 2005).The analysis of the Ujamaa policy will be accomplished by paying attention to various schools of thought such as the Marxist-leftist, Right- wing, and Liberal leftist<sup>8</sup>.

Furthermore, this analysis on why the Ujamaa village policy failed to bring about economic transformation in Tanzania will involve comparisons with the Saemaul Movement policy in Korea and the Korean Development Experience. The Saemaul movement policy appears similar to the Ujamaa policy in terms of policy goals. However, unlike the Ujamaa policy, the “Saemaul Movement policy enabled to transform the Korea's rural sector which comprised about 75% of the country's population in 1970s to an industrialized society leaving the rural sector with a population of 11.6% in 1994” ( Park, Jin-Hwan;1998).

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<sup>7</sup> Colin Legun is an author of “The Nyerere Year: A Preliminary Balance Sheet” as Edited by Michael Hodd in the book Tanzania after Nyerere, 1988.

<sup>8</sup> See in [www.allafrica.com/stories](http://www.allafrica.com/stories).

Established by the late President Park Chung- Hee in the 1970s, the Saemaul Movement policy laid the foundation for Korean industrialization and rural transformation. It intended to improve grassroots democracy through motivating villagers, local government and community leaders to work together in improving the community welfare (Park, Jin- Hwan; 1998). In a speech at a conference of the provincial governors on April 22, 1970, Park unveiled his plan: “if we can create and cultivate the spirit of self- reliance and independence and hard work, I believe that all rural villages can be turned into beautiful and prosperous places to live in.....we may call such drive the Saemaul Undong” (Turner et al: 1993; pg.75).

This study seeks to draw the lessons learnt from the success story of the Saemaul movement and see to what extent this can be used as a model for establishing new pragmatic policies for developing countries like Tanzania. It is possible that those lessons could then be applied to enable such developing countries to transform themselves from agrarian, peasant societies into more modern and industrial ones. At the same time, this paper intends to provide an alert to policy makers on the importance of not repeating the previous mistakes as they develop their policy options vis-à-vis economic development. The hypothesis is that the poor design and implementation of the Ujamaa policy itself played a very important role in its failure to achieve economic goals.

### **Theoretical Framework and Literature Review**

This study explores why the Ujamaa policy failed to bring about socioeconomic development in Tanzanian society despite of some socio-economic improvement in its earlier time of

implementation<sup>9</sup>. The study has been done in comparison with the Saemaul movement policy in Korea, which most of the literature considers successful in bringing about socioeconomic development to Korean society, hence creating a foundation for Korea's industrial development. In so doing, the discussion will rely on a review of some of the principal literature relevant to public policy: rural development and modernization; and the agricultural revolution and industrialization. Ujamaa and Saemaul are two sister public policies from different countries, Tanzania and Korea. These two policies appear similar in terms of policy contents (i.e. objectives and goals), and indeed they were adopted and implemented at almost the same time. The main question which this study seeks to answer is why the Ujamaa policy was unsuccessful while the Saemaul movement policy succeeded in bringing about socioeconomic development in Korea.

It is said that simply having a policy is not the issue, but what matters is the implementation and outcomes of that particular policy to the targeted society or group of people. This has been an issue in many developing countries which have been suffering from unsuccessful policies in their development marathons. Policy implementations have been a major problem of many developing countries primarily because their policies are considered to have failed despite their worthy contents and noble intentions. A typical example of this is the Ujamaa policy in Tanzania, which was adopted in 1967.

As observed by Thomas A. Birkland in the book, "*An Introduction to the Policy Process*", "It is important to understand policy implementation because it is a key feature of policy process, and learning from implementation problems can foster learning about better ways to structure

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<sup>9</sup> Colin Legun portrays that up to 1977 the GDP growth per head, inflation and the balance of payment, Tanzania had a better record than the average for low- income African countries.

policies to ensure that they have the effects that designers of these policies seek” (Birkland: 2005:181). Birkland further acknowledges that there were few studies on policy implementation in the 1960s and 1970s, and as a result, the studies that did pertain to the field were rather narrow and did not create a more generalizable theory that could be applied to and tested with other cases.

Moreover, David Weimer and Aidan R. Vining stress that there are three factors influencing the likelihood of successful policy implementation: the logic of the policy and its intended outcomes; the nature of the cooperation it requires; and the availability of skillful and committed people to manage its implementation(Weimer and Vining: 2005). The question is: Why have some countries succeeded while others have not? This is the challenging question facing many developing countries, especially in Africa, concerning why they have lagged behind in terms of socio-economic development compared to Asian countries like Korea even though the level of development in each region was almost the same in the 1950s and 1960s<sup>10</sup>. John E. Turner et al assert: “Some Third World countries, especially in Asia have been so successful in their economic pursuits that they have moved out of the ‘developing country’ classification into a more appropriate “industrializing nation” category (Turner et al, 1993).

It would seem imperative, therefore, that developing countries like Tanzania evaluate their policies so that they can learn the lessons from policy failures. As Nicholas Stern and Joseph E. Stiglitz<sup>11</sup> contend, “Policies are evaluated not only in terms of their direct impact on outcomes in particular individual incomes, but also in terms of their impact on opportunities and the extent to which individuals take charge of their own lives”(Stern and Stiglitz:1997). In line with the

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<sup>10</sup> Korean GDP per capita in 1960 was 100 USD, 1970 was 280 USD; SMU: 2009.

<sup>11</sup> Nicholas Stern and Joseph E. Stiglitz are authors of the article “ A Framework for a Development Strategy in a Market Economy” published in the book Development Strategy and Management of the Market Economy, Vol. 1; 1997.

studies already discussed, Birkland (2005) reported that most books dealing with policy implementation describe policy failures. The simple reason for this, he says, comes from the old saying, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. That is why this study is interested to learn from policy failures as well as from successes, and the critical question to ask ourselves in that regard is why a particular policy is considered to be a failure or a success. In the case of the Ujamaa policy, one can argue that the policy was a failure as it did not transform the Tanzanian rural sector from a peasant economy to modernized or developed economy.

If the Ujamaa policy was unsuccessful, if not an outright failure, one might yet argue that the policy did manage to create social integration such as peace, stability and justice, human dignity, detribalization, religious tolerance, national consciousness and creation of some vital social services infrastructures. Helen Ingran and Dean Mann in the book “An introduction to the Policy Process” by Birkland, provide us with a number of useful ways to think about policy failures. They argue that “success and failure are slippery concepts, often highly subjective and reflective of an individual’s goals, perception of need, and perhaps even psychological disposition toward life”. In other words, failure is perhaps in the eye of the beholder, and the beholder’s vision is affected by his or her immediate perception of the policy question (Birkland, 2005; 190). Other reasons for the policy failure as illustrated by Ingram and Mann give us a number of explanations as follows:

- (i) **Alternative to policies tried.** Specifically, a policy may be considered a failure in terms of the “do-nothing” option and the likelihood that other options would have been more or less successful. For instance, immediately after gaining independence in the 1960s, many African countries tried various economic policies to bring economic development to their people. Tanzania under the leadership of the Mwalimu Nyerere



invoked economic policies which aimed to raise the living standard of all Tanzanians (Kamuzora in Pambazuka News: 2009).

(ii) **The impact of changing circumstances.** This concerns what the policy intends to bring about to that particular society. For instance, a policy against illegal immigrants will almost certainly be considered a failure if there are still thousands of people coming across the border illegally every day. It was the case to the Ujamaa policy that there were some circumstantial interference which hampered the attainment of policy goals and objectives. Such interference includes the Collapse of the East African Community (EAC)<sup>12</sup> in 1977 and severe drought hit Tanzania in 1974<sup>13</sup>.

(iii) **The relationship of one policy to another.** This concerns the interrelatedness of certain policies, and the extent to which these relationships must be taken into account. For example, the Ujamaa policy aimed at creating a socialist Tanzanian society, as opposed to a capitalistic one, which seeks to build its happy society on the exploitation of man by man (Nyerere: 1968). Therefore, such kind of policy relationship may affect its success. As Ibhawoh and Dibua have put it, as a way of teaching Tanzania a lesson and preventing other African countries from following her example, Western countries and the International financial institutions which they controlled, were bent on ensuring the failure of Ujamaa (Ibhawoh and Dibua: 2003).

(iv) **The boundary question.** This deals with how the political boundaries between states can influence policy success. For instance, Tanzania adopted the Ujamaa policy in 1967, while her closest neighbors were Kenya, which was practicing a capitalist economic

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<sup>12</sup> It necessitated building of new infrastructures such as civil aviation and central service for posts and telegraphs and all other facilities that were jointly enjoyed by the community.

<sup>13</sup> Despite generous overseas food aid, the government spent Tsh 640 million in foreign exchange to import more food.

system, and Uganda, which was under a dictatorship for sometimes and had a mixed economy (Coulson, 1985:41 quoted in Ibhawoh and Dibua: 2003).

(v) **Excessive policy demands which arise when people expect too much from policies.**

For instance, the central objective of Ujamaa was the attainment of a self-reliant socialist nation which would ensure the material well-being of its people. Such excessive demands may be very difficult to attain at once, thus leading to the perception that the policy has been relatively unsuccessful or even an utter failure.

(vi) **Realizable policy expectations.** Policies sometimes fail when they go beyond what we

know we can achieve now. The stated purpose of a policy may not be the actual purpose; the goals may be more symbolic than substantive. For example, the Tanzanian government set goals of ensuring that every village have access to safe water supplies within 400 meters of every household by 1991. This meant water supplies to one million people every year, but the capacity was to supply to only 400,000 people annually due to lack of financial and raw material resources (Hodd: 1988).

(vii) **Accurate theory of causation:** the causal theory concerning what causes a problem

and how particular responses would alleviate that problem. In this regard, a policy will fail if it is not based on sound causal theory. If may consider the example of Tanzania and Korea, one may argue that these countries were underdeveloped in the 1960s because of the colonial impact they experienced. This is why most countries opted to follow the advice of the dependence theorists who argued that Third World countries should “delink” from the capitalist world system. Indeed in his own words

Nyerere himself asserted that, “no underdeveloped country can afford to be anything but socialist” (Nyerere, 1961:2; quoted in Ibhawoh and Dibua: 2003).

(viii) **Choice of effective policy tools.** Policy tools are methods through which government seeks policy objectives such as laws, services, money, taxes, etc. (Birkland 2005; 174-175). The choice of ineffective tools will likely yield failure; nevertheless, the choice of tools is often a function of compromise or ideological predisposition. For instance, the Ujamaa policy was implemented through various policy tools such as nationalization and villagization policies, the objectives of which objectives were never fully realized. The government of Tanzania has since come to acknowledge that “these organizations have exhibited pervasive patterns of inefficiency”. Indeed there was a fair amount of mismanagement and corruption, according to a study made by the Tanzanian government (Ibhawoh and Dibua: 2003).

(ix) **The vagaries of implementation.** This concerns the problems inherent in policy implementation which can contribute to policy failure. For example, the Ujamaa policy was implemented with a “villagization” program/scheme. Despite initial enthusiasm and early successes, the Ujamaa villagization scheme soon ran into difficulties, as people become increasingly reluctant to join Ujamaa villages. Many of these operations turned out to be failures since local peasants, suspicious of official motives and fearing the nationalization of their land, hence refused to cooperate (Ibhawoh and Dibua; 2003 vol.8 no 1).

(x) **Failure of political institutions.** Policy failure is simply a symptom of more profound ailments within our political institutions, such as the breakdown in the power of political parties or the devolution of authority from congressional leaders to

committees and subcommittees (Birkland: 2005). For instance, whereas the Ujamaa policy was adopted while Tanzania was under a one-party system in which the business of the parliament was overshadowed by the party, the Saemaul movement policy was adopted at the time when Korea was under military rule and all state organs were under executive branch.

To sum up this literature review on public policy, it is important to learn from policy failures so that we can learn from mistakes. This study provides an alert to policy makers to learn from these failures, and to apply that understanding to effecting more successful policy changes. As Julius K. Nyerere indicated in one of his speeches, “Doing a mistake is not a mistake, but repeating the same mistake is a mistake”. Therefore, like any other developing country, Tanzania has the opportunity to learn from the previous policy failures so that it may come up with some sort of policy changes resulting from its understanding of these failures and what caused them.

### **Agricultural Strategy and Rural Development**

The two policies, Ujamaa and Saemaul, both put great emphasis on rural development and agricultural modernization. This kind of emphasis is linked to the fact that at the time of adoption of these policies, most of the people in these countries were living in rural areas in which their main economic activity was agriculture. A large African nation, Tanzania, at independence was a very agrarian country, with about 95% of the population residing in rural areas; as such the government put special emphasis on rural development with a view toward changing the quality of life in the rural areas for the better (Wangwe :2005). In fact, it is quite obvious that rural development and agricultural modernization should form the foundation for development in any country whose economic backbone depends on agriculture. This can be seen by looking at the

reality of development experiences among many countries in the world such as Britain, which achieved its industrial revolution through the enclosure system between the 17<sup>th</sup> century and the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Through the agricultural revolution, Britain achieved a massive increase in agricultural productivity and net output, leading to an increase in population and the growth of its workforce, and ultimately giving rise to the Industrial Revolution (The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 13, 1768, 15 Ed).

In the case of Korea, her industrialization took place as a result of rural development which was achieved through the adoption and implementation of the Saemaul movement policy from 1970s to 1980s. The rural sector – which has always been highly dominated by the agricultural economy or the practice of cultivating the soil, harvesting crops and raising livestock – has played a crucial role in the industrial development of those countries whose economic mainstay is agriculture (The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 13, 1768, 15 Ed). According to Turner et al (1993;9), in order to upgrade the standard of living for the population and to become more competitive in the international arena, Korea's leaders, especially since the 1960s, have consistently emphasized the dual process of modernization and development<sup>14</sup>. As such, in an attempt to bring the agrarian population into the national plan, the leadership instituted the Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement) (Turner, 1993:9).

In this respect, we can say that the principle objective behind the adoption of these two policies was to create a self-reliant economy by transforming the rural sector from a peasant economy to a more modernized agricultural sector while moving toward industrialization. In that regard, Ibhawoh and Dibua reveal that Ujamaa, as outlined in the Arusha Declaration document, was

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<sup>14</sup> About 80 percent of people in Korean rural sector in 1960s were living *Chogajips* and used candle lamps; SUCTI: 2009.

essentially an agenda for achieving self-reliance through government control of the economy (Ibhawah and Dibua :2003). They then go further by explaining that the Declaration proclaimed that “gifts and loans will endanger our independence”, and that such gifts “have the effect of weakening and distorting our own efforts” (Ibhawah and Dibua :2003). In the same vein, the Declaration stressed the need to de-emphasize Tanzania’s dependence on international financial capital for development, essentially arguing that “it is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that our country is poor”. The alternative proposed was agriculture, which was considered “the basis of development”. (Ibhawah and Dibua: 2003; Wangwe: 2005).

In the case of Korea, the story is more or less the same, as Turner et al (1993; 14) describes that President Park, Chung Hee instituted the Saemaul movement to promote a more efficient agricultural industry and to improve the quality of life in the villages. The authors assert that President Park did so by fostering community spirit and raising the level of self-esteem among the village dwellers, hoping to spur productivity and thus make possible a better life. In a speech at a conference of the provincial governors on April 22, 1970, President Park unveiled his plan, stating, “If we can create and cultivate the spirit of self-reliance and independence and work hard, I believe that all rural villages can be turned into beautiful and prosperous places to live in....we may call such a drive the Saemaul Undong” (Turner 1993; 75-6).

Likewise, there is a great deal of literature concerning whether the legacy of Ujamaa as a development strategy was a success or a failure. Ibhawah and Dibua describe that the quest to answer this question has attracted the attention of several scholars who basically fall into opposing schools of thought (Raikes, 1975; Ergas, 1980; Freyhold, 1979; Hyden, 1980; Coulson, 1985; Yeager, 1989; Green, 1995). Those who consider Ujamaa a failure tend to conclude that

Nyerere's idealism was detrimental to the country's development, as he left his country poorer than it would have been under a less utopian-minded leadership. They stress that the Ujamaa policies were unmitigated failures and that under Nyerere, Tanzania's economic progress was distorted and resources wasted in the "slavish adherence to ideology, "giving rise to a marginalized rural sector and a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy (Nursey-Bray, 1980).

In contrast, the proponents of Ujamaa, while conceding that the economic achievements of the program were quite modest, point to significant successes in social welfare terms such as the provision of health and educational facilities; a movement towards greater social equality in income distribution; the maintenance of political stability; and the achievement of a substantial degree of harmony between the country's ethnic groups. They further emphasize that quite apart from the criterion of economic performance, it is necessary to examine the extent of social progress, which attended Nyerere's development strategy (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003).

For Korea, much of the literature contends that the country's development cannot be separated from the achievement of the Saemaul movement which was adopted during President Park's regime<sup>15</sup>. Under Park's leadership, Korea mustered a great leap forward, becoming a member of the "gang of four" (along with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) - with one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Several demographic factors helped to make this possible. In particular the population has a high level of ethnic homogeneity, and the people, diligent in work habits, tend to take pride in their homeland and want it to move forward. Since 1945, national leaders in Korea have emphasized the expansion of education, with the result that the literacy

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<sup>15</sup> Kyong dong Kim has put it clearly in the book "Man and Society in Korea's Economic Growth; Sociological Studies," Seoul National University Press, 1985.

rate is high, the labor force is well trained, and the pool of managerial talent is large (Turner et al, 1993; 48)

## **Chapter II: The Ujamaa Policy in Tanzania**

### **2.1 The Historical Background of the Ujamaa policy in Tanzania**

The Ujamaa policy in Tanzania was a concept formed under the leadership of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere. The overarching goal was to lay the foundation for social and economic development in Tanzania just after it gained independence from Britain in 1961. In 1967, President Nyerere published his development blueprint, entitled the Arusha Declaration, in which he formed the basis of African Socialism (Ibhawah and Dibua: 2003; Wangwe: 2005). From 1967 onwards, Tanzania adopted a policy of socialism and self-reliance which was promulgated in the Arusha Declaration (Wangwe; 2003). Ujamaa comes from the Swahili word for “extended family” or “family-hood” and is distinguished by several key characteristics- namely that a person becomes a person “through the people or community”. Nyerere, therefore, used Ujamaa as the basis for a national development project, translating the Ujamaa concept into a political-economic management model through several means. The Tanzanian government (known then as Tanganyika) under President Nyerere declared that there were three main development problems, namely poverty, disease and ignorance. At that time, the majority of citizenry were living in rural areas; - therefore, the first phase government had to invoke economic policies which aimed to raise the living standard of all Tanzanians (Kamuzora in Pambazuka News: 2009).



## **2.2 Policy Tools Adopted To Achieve the Goals of the Ujamaa Policy**

### **(i) One Party system.**

For the purpose of nation building through the attainment of solidarity and cohesion of newly independent Tanzania (Tanganyika), the ruling party TANU, in January 1963 decided to change the constitution of Tanganyika so that the nation legally became what it already in fact was, a one-party state (Wangwe; 2005). Under that regime, the ruling party set out to generate national unity, guided by its goals and an ideology which championed the equality of human beings, as well as notion of justice and accountability to the people. The party controlled all organs of the state as well as all major societal organizations (workers, youth, women, farmers' cooperatives), (Wangwe; 2005).

### **(ii) Education policy and Programs.**

The government used the public school curriculum as a tool for nation building. The curriculum stressed common Tanzania's common history, culture, and values, while inculcating students with a strong sense of national and Pan-African identity (Court 1984 in Wangwe; 2005). Political education was also included in the curriculum to inspire Pan-Africanism and the socialist political philosophy adopted by President Nyerere with a particular emphasis on Tanzanian national identity. In keeping this philosophy, a policy of education for self-reliance was formulated in order to ensure that education was in line with the principles outlined in the Arusha Declaration (Wangwe; 2005). Likewise, TANU Youth League branches in schools were mandated to ensure that the students and teachers were in line with the ideals of Tanzania's socialist thinking (Hyden, 1980 in Wangwe; 2005).

(iii) Nationalization.

The nationalization of the commanding heights of the Tanzanian economy was central to the implementation of Ujamaa. For the purpose of the nationalization exercise, economic activities were grouped into three categories: - those in which the state had a major share and controlled power, those in which private firms could invest with or state participation; and those in which these firms could invest independently of state participation (Ibhawon and Dibua, 2003). Immediately following the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration, the Nyerere regime announced the nationalization of all banks and large industrial enterprises including large-scale agricultural processing industries. Also announced was the nationalization of part of the trade sector along with a 60% nationalization of the dominant sisal industry (Arkaide, 1973; 37 in Ibhawon and Dibua; 2003).

(iv) National Service and Promotion of a People's Militia.

National Service was an initiative towards social integration and was mainly aimed at integrating educated groups into society by instilling within them the spirit of nation building. In tandem with this, the "People's Militia" as articulated in the TANU guidelines of 1972, was a response to the dangers of a potential wedge between the army and the people, as had been exhibited by coups in other parts of Africa (Wangwe; 2005). Indeed, the adoption of national service and promotion of the people's militia was largely triggered by the coup in neighboring Uganda led by Idd Amin in 1972.

(v) Villagization and Social integration.

To ensure the place of agriculture as a viable substitute for international financial capital, the Arusha Declaration emphasized the goal of rural development, specifying that education, investment programs and political thought should be adapted more to the needs of the rural areas. While the policy of nationalization was adopted for the industrial and financial sectors, the Ujamaa villagization scheme (ujamaa vijijini) was adopted for the rural sector.

Indeed, villagization was a central goal of Ujamaa (Ibhawon and Dibua, 2003). According to the policy statement of Ujamaa vijijini –“Socialism and Rural Development”- the aim of the scheme was to initiate the transformation of rural society to create rural economic and communities where people would live together for the good of all” (Nyerere, 1968:337). The rationale behind the development of Ujamaa villages was to have people establish residence around a common service center, as opposed to living on scattered homestead plots and land farmed by cooperative groups rather than by individual farmers. Most of these villages were created in 1974, at which time 60% of the population was relocated (Wangwe; 2005). In August 1975, the Law on the registration of villages, recognition of Ujamaa villages and government villages was passed.

**Table to show number of established villages and their population from 1969 – 1974**

	Dec 1969	1970	1971	1972	March 1973	Jan 1974
Villages	650	1,965	4,484	5,556	5,628	5008
Members	300,000	531,200	1,545,240	1,980,862	2,028,164	2,560,472

Source: Development of Ujamaa villages, Prime Minister’s office, June 1975.

(vi) Priority on Rural Development.

In the first five years of independence, the government adopted the Transformation approach recommended by the World Bank (Nyerere; 1967:183 in Shivji). This was an experiment involving the creation of model farmers who were settled in a village and provided with technology and a managerial cadre (Shivji in Pambazuka News; 2009). At that time, the country was very rural with about 90% of the population residing in rural areas; - therefore, the government put emphasis on rural development Tanzania with a view toward changing the quality of life in the rural areas. For instance, between the year 1976 and 1982 at least every village had a primary school, 90% of villages had at least one cooperative shop, and 31% - 40% of the total population in villages have either a dispensary or a health centre (Legun in Hodd; 1988).

(vii) Use of slogans in development.

To emphasize social development as a means of promoting social integration, Slogans were coined in Swahili in order to permeate through society. For example, slogans such as Uhuru ni Kazi (freedom is work) were quite effective in promoting the self- help spirit: - Mtu ni Afya (life is health) raised consciousness towards health care and community health in particular; and, Siasa ni Kilimo (politics is agriculture) managed to mobilize politicians to promote agricultural development in their campaigns (Wangwe, 2005).

### **2.3 The outcomes of the Ujamaa Policy**

Many literatures have provided a discussion on whether the **Ujamaa village policy** in Tanzania, was a success or failure in creating a socialist society and bringing socio- economic development to Tanzania. Indeed, to be perfectly candid, it is difficult to say yes or no on either of these two. However, for the sake of this paper, the outcomes of every policy tool adopted for the purpose of attaining the Ujamaa goals and objectives will be examined. Let us see what the Ujamaa policy failed to achieve:

- (i) The exploitation and domination of the poor peasantry by the bureaucrats and rich capitalist farmers.

The nationalized sisal industry did not have the capacity to dispose effective and efficiently of “the means of production and its social product” - Structural changes like over-bureaucratization and centralization affected by nationalization created opportunities for increased corruption, inefficiency and resources dissipation (Bolton, 1985:156). In fact, as some scholars have postulated, what the policy of nationalization did end up achieving so effectively was to give rise to “state bureaucratic capitalism”- the use of capital by a managerial elite in a manner which entirely conforms to the ethos, values and dynamics of private capital (Shivji, 1974; 85-90). Lofchie (1984:160) further clarifies that even the government of United Republic of Tanzania had to acknowledge that “these organizations have exhibited pervasive patterns of inefficiency”.

- (ii) The use of coercion to ensure mass villagization -from threats of forced transportation to short prison sentences under the pretext of tax arrears – militated against the effective operation of Ujamaa villages.

The villagization scheme despite of its good intentions and early successes soon ran into difficulties as people became increasingly reluctant to join Ujamaa villages. This situation prompted the use of force in some instances, (a method which the regime had previously condemned and resolved not to apply), and raised the cost of providing material incentives for villages. In the 1970s many operations were launched such as -“Operation Rufiji<sup>16</sup>; - Operation Dodoma; - Operation Chunya and Kigoma, all in which were aimed at relocating people by coercion if necessary. Ultimately, many of these operations turned out to be failures since local peasants, suspicious of official motives and fearing the nationalization of their land, hence refused to cooperate(Ibhawoh and Dibia ;2003).

- (iii) Creation of a bureaucratic bourgeois class.

The efforts of building Ujamaa villages were greatly constrained by bureaucrats who held out government aid as incentives to peasants to move into villages. Indeed, peasants come to perceive such “free goods” as substitutes for available labor resources rather than being complementary factors for increased production in their joint efforts. Promises of official assistance resulted in an over- dependence of the villages on government initiatives and incentives, leaving villages extremely vulnerable when the government assistance eventually stopped. However, perhaps the single most adverse limitation of the Ujamaa villagization

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<sup>16</sup> Rufiji, Dodoma, Chunya and Kigoma are names of places/towns where operation to move people to communal villages was done. It intended to make people work together and live in a place where social services delivery is furnished.

program was the practice which Shivji (1974<sup>17</sup>) and Rikes (1975<sup>18</sup>) have described as “Kulak Ujamaa”. This was the practice in which a number of rich peasants, having attained positions in Ujamaa village committees or forged links with local bureaucrats, began to use the village to further their own interests (Ibhawoh and Dibua; 2003).

(iv) Disbanding of cooperatives by establishing state-owned crop authorities.

These crop authorities monopolized output and input markets while, parallel markets developed, especially for food crops. “The disruption of agricultural markets through their over- reliance on bureaucratic parastatals and failure to adjust macroeconomic policies in a timely fashion contributed to the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s” (Wangwe, 2005). For example, during the social policy episode period of 1967-1985, the economy grew at an average rate of 2.8% with occasional ups and downs. The agricultural growth average was 2.35, which meant that the GDP growth during this episode exceeded the performance of the agricultural sector, which was the mainstay of the economy. Two important issues can be deduced from the above data; - first, the average growth of about 2.8% during this period was not enough to generate resources to finance the social sector-education and health in a sustainable manner. Second , the agricultural growth average of only about 2.3% implied that the majority of the poor in the rural areas were almost left out in the gross domestics product and the country’s foreign exchange earnings (Wangwe;2005).

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<sup>17</sup> Quoted from Ibhawoh and Dibua; Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa.

<sup>18</sup> Quoted from Ibhawoh and Dibua; Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa.

(v) Economic failure.

As Lofchie<sup>19</sup> (1988:144) has suggested, Tanzania had the highest rate of increase in domestic food production for the entire African continent during the decade of the 1960's. Likewise, Uma Lele<sup>20</sup> (1984:161) has indicated that by the end of W.W.I, the subsistence peasant agricultural sector began to commercialize; and in fact, export oriented crops are not only tea and coffee, but also tobacco, cotton, pyrethrum, oilseeds etc ([www.empereur.com](http://www.empereur.com)). However, the adoption of the Ujamaa policy undermined the efforts of Tanzanian farmers to become unified as a single political force or interest group, resulting in the failure of Tanzanian economy. For instance, since the beginning of the 1970s, Tanzania has consistently imported food in order to meet a persistence gap. As a matter of fact, between 1973 and 1974, Tanzania imported maize, rice and wheat for a total of 410,200 metric tons of grain, while producing only 58,100 metric tons. Furthermore, Uma Lele argues that the government should be blamed for the failure of Tanzanian economy, because Tanzania is one of the largest African recipients of foreign aid, having received USD 2.7 billion from 1971 to 1981<sup>21</sup>([www.empereur.com](http://www.empereur.com)).

On the other hand, most Africanists point out that the internal factors are not entirely to blame for the failure of the Ujamaa policy. In that regard Uma Lele<sup>22</sup> (1984:160), suggests the role of the following external factors as instrumental to the failure of Ujamaa:

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<sup>19</sup> See in [www.empereur.com](http://www.empereur.com), "Agricultural sector during and after Mwalimu Nyerere".

<sup>20</sup> See in [www.empereur.com](http://www.empereur.com), "Agricultural sector during and after Mwalimu Nyerere".

<sup>21</sup> Also Colin Legun put that Tanzania external finance (excluding technical assistance) was Tsh 1,400 million in 1974, Tsh 1,900 million in 1977, Tsh 3,500 million in 1981 and an estimated Tsh 3,200 million in 1982.

<sup>22</sup> See in [www.empereur.com](http://www.empereur.com), "Agricultural sector during and after Mwalimu Nyerere".



1. The oil crisis of the 1970s.
2. The collapse of export commodity prices (particularly coffee and sisal), due to the oil and dollar crises of the 1970s.
3. The onset of the war with Uganda in 1978-1979, which literally bled the young Tanzanian nation of valuable resources as the direct cost was over Tsh 4 billion (Hodd; 1988)
4. The drought of 1973-74.
5. The breakup of the East African Community in 1967<sup>23</sup>.

In addition, there are some political analysts that shed light on the Ujamaa policy as follows:

**The Marxist left saw the Ujamaa as insufficiently socialist and hopelessly naive, arguing that it:**

- i. Lacked an element of class warfare and the elimination of the "kulak" class of well-off farmers who would be likely to subvert it.
- ii. Did not put into the hands of government the means of production and so was really a form of capitalism.
- iii. Was based on a fuzzy-minded understanding of "socialism".
- iv. Gave rise to a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" -- bureaucrats who got wealthy because of their position.

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<sup>23</sup> See in [www.empereur.com](http://www.empereur.com).

**Right-wing critics criticized it for being too socialist, too government dominated, too unfriendly to private enterprise. These critics:**

- i. Saw socialism and the strong government role in the economy as highly inefficient, causing poverty.
- ii. Pointed out the plethora of highly inefficient parastatals.
- iii. Criticized the coercive nature of the villagization program.
- iv. Argued that Tanzania needed to downsize government while, privatizing everything possible.
- v. Expressed these kinds of opinions which, in later years, took hold as the IMF and World Bank came to support them.

**The Liberal left praised the idea of Ujamaa but criticized its application, noting that the program:**

- i. Seemed more realistic than emphases adopted elsewhere on industrialization in Africa.
- ii. Gave good emphasis to helping the common person.
- iii. Didn't really create self-reliance, though it did give a more balanced dependence.
- iv. Got lots of support from Scandinavian countries (so much that one source suggested Tanzania was in danger of falling under the Danish imperial yoke).
- v. Acknowledged that parastatals had been highly inefficient.
- vi. Argued that much of Tanzania's poverty arose from incredibly bad luck with war; to oust Idi Amin from Uganda and weather; devastating droughts in the 1970s<sup>24</sup> (Hodd; 1988).

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<sup>24</sup> See in [www.legacy.lclark.edu](http://www.legacy.lclark.edu).

## **2.4 The Legacy of the Ujamaa as a development paradigm.**

Despite the above factors as they pertain to the failure of the Ujamaa policy, there are still many things that the policy succeeded in bringing about in terms of the social, economic and political development of the country. The following are some legacies of the Ujamaa as a development paradigm;

### **1. Social protection.**

The policy made a significant contribution in the provision of basic services. This was achieved through the direct funding of services such as health, education and water, all of which are basic necessities to the population; and through then provision of subsidies on basic goods such as food. All these efforts provided some measure of social protection to the population (Wangwe; 2005).

### **2. Improvement of social services.**

Though not much can be said with concrete evidence about the poverty outcomes of the development policies during the Ujamaa period, the little available data indicate that there were improvements in several social indicators. In general, life expectancy at birth improved from 41 years in 1960 to 52 year in 1980. Also, infant mortality declined from 146 per 1,000 lives in 1960 to 120 per 1,000 in 1980 (Ndulu; 1994 in Wangwe: 2005). Considerable achievements were also recorded in school enrolment, adult education and health development. Perhaps the most remarkable achievement as indicated by Ndulu (1994) was the literacy rate, which was only about 33% in 1970 but by 1985 had gone up about 90% notably as a result of universal primary education intertwined with adult education programs (Wangwe:2005).

### 3. Political stability and national unity.

In spite of the wide agreement on the failure of President Nyerere's economic policies, several writers have identified Tanzania's most notable national achievement as its ability to create a strong sense of national identity among Tanzanians, coupled with the advances made in terms of social welfare. Indeed, few Sub-Saharan African countries achieved the level of national unification that Tanzania did under the leadership of President Nyerere. The Tanzanian mainland was largely spared the ethnic and regionalist politics that have proven so dysfunctional in Kenya, so catastrophic in Rwanda and Burundi, and so prevalent throughout the rest of the continent (Landau; 1998 in Ibhawoh and Dibua: 2003). Indeed, the legacy of stability which President Nyerere promoted in Tanzania enabled the country to remain one of the most stable in Africa. Moreover, Hirschler (2005) reveals and portrays that compared to the majority of countries in the south, Tanzania is still a very peaceful place; and surely, the foundations which have been laid in the Nyerere era are still effective and will not be destroyed easily (Hirschler : 2005).

### 4. The High Commitment to Equality.

The Ujamaa policy established a strong commitment to equality of all humankind, as well as a commitment to the establishment of social, economic and political institutions which would reflect and ensure this equality. For example, in the 1950s when arguing the case of Tanzanian (then Tanganyikan) independence, President Nyerere declared: "Our struggle has been, still is, and always will be a struggle for human rights ....Our position is based on the belief in the equality of human beings, in their rights and their duties as citizens" (Nyerere, 1966 in Pratt :)

## 5. Eradication of discrimination of humankind.

Ujamaa was founded on a philosophy of development that was based on three essentials namely freedom, equality and unity. President Nyerere's political values aimed at creating a society that would be free from any kind of discrimination of humankind. In one of his speeches to the national Assembly, the president declared: "Discrimination against people because of their colour is exactly what we have been fighting against. This is what we formed TANU for, and so soon, sir...some of my friends...are preaching discrimination as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitler and begin to glorify the race; we glorify human beings, sir, not color" (National Assembly Official Report; 1960 in Pratt: 2000). This achievement has grown firm as even in today's politics many Tanzanian of Asian origin have been elected as members of parliament notably Mr. Rostam Aziz(Igunga constituency); Mr. Mohamed Dewji (Singida urban constituency); Iddi Azan Zungu( Ilala constituency) to name a few(National Electoral Commission of Tanzania 2010).

## 6. Leadership Ethics improved.

President Nyerere wanted to place Tanzania on the road to a genuinely socialist society. To achieve this, a stringent leadership code was introduced to contain corruption and block the emergence of private economic activities by senior party and government leaders and officials. The idea was that the members of the new African elite would remain intimately integrated within Tanzanian society and willing to advance in material well being together with, rather than vastly ahead of ordinary Tanzanians(Pratt:2000).

**Table to show Tanzania Socio- Economic Performance from 1960 - 1985**

	Indicators/ Criteria	Performance and Year	Remarks
1.	Infant Mortality Rate(IMR)	225/1000 in 1962 161/1000 in 1967 152/1000 in 1978 137/1000 in 1984	The government embarked more investment in social services infrastructures.
2.	Crude Death Rate	22/1000 in 1987 17/1000 in 1978 13/1000 in 1982	Improved health care facility.
3.	Life expectance	35 in 1987 51 in 1984	Improved social services infrastructures.
4.	Literacy rate	33% in 1970 85% in 1985	At the time of independence only few children went to school at all and adult education had just begun, then the government decided to make education among of national priorities.
5.	Fully qualified doctors	12 in 1961 (one doctor for every 870,000 people) 782 in 1985 (one doctor for 26,000 people)	Improved human resources in public services.
6.	Hospitals	98 in 1960s 149 in 1980s	Improved health care facility.
7.	Rural health centers	22 in 1960s 239 in 1980s	Improved health care facility.
8.	Dispensaries	975 in 1960s 2,644 in 1980s	Improved health care facility.
9.	Primary school enrolment	500, 000 children in 1961 2,278,700 children in 1977 3,756,000 children in 1984	Improved primary schools infrastructures.
10.	Number of new entrants to secondary schools	8,628 in 1976 88,886 in 1981	Improved secondary school infrastructures.
11.	University population	3,106 in 1977 3,592 in 1982	Need for expanding university education enrolment.
12.	Teaching staff in university	490 in 1977 628 in 1982	Recruitment of more local teaching staffs at universities.

Source: Extracted from Colin Legun in Michael Hodd; 1988

## **Chapter III: The Policy of Saemaul Movement in Korea**

### **3.1 The Historical Background of the Saemaul Movement in Korea**

The Saemaul Movement, (*or saemaul undong, literally the New Village or Community Movement*), was a social -economical pragmatic policy initiated by Korean President Park, Chung-Hee in the 1970s. The ‘Saemaul Movement’ which is also referred to as the Korean model of rural development, played an important role for rural development during the 1970s. The movement was guided by the government, and it simultaneously induced villagers to mobilize resources as well as cooperate in the implementation of village development projects (Park Jin- Hwan: 1998). The basic objectives of the Saemaul movement were to increase the income of farmers while making their communities better places to live. The components of the “Saemaul spirit” were diligence, self-help and cooperation (Turner et al: 1993:76). It was indeed an integrated approach to Korean rural development. The program was both an economic and political cornerstone of rural Korean transformation. It was spearheaded by President Park, who came from a relatively impoverished rural background. Beyond that, President Park was intimately associated in both emotional and programmatic senses with -the program and provided personalized guidance to it, as he did with a number of his most important endeavours. The bureaucracy responded with alacrity to the interest of its leader (Park Jin- Hwan: 1998).

### **3.2 Policy Tools Used to Achieve the Goals of the Saemaul Movement.**

(1) Improvement of social services in all villages.

Soon after the initiation of the Saemaul movement nationally, the state of rural villages dramatically improved, living standards of farmers rose, and commercial production of Korean

agriculture increased. At first, government funds for the development of village infrastructure came mostly in the form of supplies such as cement (300 bags for each village) and steel wire for village projects. In the period of October 1970 and June 1971 the cost of cement alone amounted to eleven million dollars (Kyong dong Kim; 1986). Villagers contributed their efforts and land to the village (Park, Jin-Hwan; 1998). Priorities of Saemaul projects, assembled by local administration officers, in 1970 were as follows:

1. Village access roads to be straightened and widened.
2. Old bridges over streams to be constructed.
3. Village roads to be widened and straightened.
4. Sewage systems in the village areas to be improved.
5. Thatched roofs to be replaced by cement made of tiles.
6. Old fences of farm houses to be repaired.
7. Traditional wells for drinking water to be improved.
8. Village halls to be constructed.
9. Banks of brooks to be developed.
10. Feeder roads to fields to be developed.
11. Rural electrification to be speeded up.
12. Village -owned bath houses to be built.
13. Village -owned telephones to be installed.
14. Children's playgrounds to be constructed.
15. Washing places along riversides to be improved.
16. Planting of trees and flowers for beautification.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Saemaul Undong, 1974 (Park, Jin-Hwan; 1998)



Table 1: Social services development through Saemaul projects 1971-78.

Type of project	Target in 1970	Improved in 1971-78	Improved project per village
Village access and feeder roads	49,167 km	43,631 km	1,322 m
Internal village roads	26,266 km	42,220 km	1,279 m
Small bridges constructed	76,749 bridges	68,797 bridges	2.1 bridges

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, The Saemaul Movement in Park: 1998

(2) Self–help mechanism.

The Saemaulundong was a policy that emphasized the self–help approach as opposed to equal opportunity to equal outcome. It provided equal opportunity to people in all villages in the country instead of equal outcome. The policy helped those who help themselves. As Jwa and Yoon portray that, egalitarianism, the political view supporting equalization of outcomes, tends towards economic digression (Jwa and Yoon: 2004). The table below shows the classification of villages according to their efforts of implementing the Saemaul projects.

**Table 2: Comparison of Village Distribution by Development Level**

Year	Basic Level village (%)	Self- help Village (%)	Self –reliant Village (%)	Total
1972	53	40	7	100
1973	31	57	12	100
1974	11	60	29	100

Source: Saemaulundong Central Training Institute: 2009

(3) Construction of village halls and democratic decision making.

The Saemaul projects were implemented in a more democratic way. The villagers elected their leaders, selected the Saemaul projects to be implemented, held general meetings and discussed

issues in public in the village halls constructed countrywide. There were about 34,000 halls in 1978 which is equal to the number of villages in the country at that time. The government did not interrupt village's decisions or proposals rather it gave them guideline and technical assistance (Park, Jin-Hwan: 1998).

#### (4) Mental Change Approach.

The Saemaul movement was a mental change approach under the auspice of Saemaul spirit “**we can do spirit**” based on three major elements namely **Diligence, Self –help** and **Cooperation**. It also advocated on saving, helping each other and following rules. Some traditional proverbs were used to pass the message to people to change their mind. For diligence, some traditional proverbs coined to this were; “the early birds get the worm” and “big fortune is blessed by heaven, but small fortune comes from hard work”. Self –help was advocated using the following proverbs; “heaven helps those who help themselves”, “even a country cannot relieve poverty” and “you may lead a horse to the water, but you cannot make him drink”. And for cooperation spirit it emphasize that “two heads are better than one” or mathematically can be explain as  $1+1=2+\infty$  (infinity) or in other words you can say  $1+1>2$ . This kind of mental change was very successful as it changed the mind of the people from the habit of “**we can't do spirit**” to “**us can do spirit**” (Saemaulundong Central Training Institute: 2009).

#### (5) Initiation of Saemaul Training.

Immediately after starting implementing the Saemaul movement, the government initiated the Saemaul training Institute for productive farmers in January, 1972. There were many programs designed to train farmers depending on the need of the participants. For instance there were two weeks, one week, four day and three nights, and three days and two nights' programs. The

Korean government has developed this institute from Training Institute for productive farmers to Saemaul Leaders Training Institute and currently the Saemaulundong Central Training Institute(SCTI: 2009). Moreover, the government put much emphasis on vocational schools as a tool to push the agrarian economy into industrialized economy (Park, Jin-Hwan: 1998).

#### (6) Saemaul Education for high ranking officials

Since the objective of the training for local officials was to imbue them with a better understanding of the farmers' situation, local officials had to take the same curriculum that had been prepared for the training of village leaders. The local officials put on the same uniforms, ate the same food and stayed together in dormitories. At the end of the training program, officials in the central government came to agree that the Saemaul Movement training ought to be expanded, especially to the following three groups; (a) vice ministers and ministers (b) university professors and intellectuals; and (c) leaders in business and industry. Education for cabinet members was held during the last week of July 1974(Park, Jin-Hwan, 1998).

#### (7) The carrot and stick approach.

In order to attain the Saemaul goals, the government instituted measures to motivate those who performed well and punish those performed less. In the second year of implementation of the Saemaul projects, the government assisted only those villages in which villagers had participated actively in the first year. It supplied 500 bags of cement instead of the 300 bags of the first year; and 1,000 kg of steel wires per village, neglecting those villages in which villagers had responded less actively. This kind of punishment was initiated to induce greater participation among the villagers in the less active villages (Park, Jin-Hwan, 1998).

#### **(vi)The Legacy of the Saemaul Movement as a rural development policy.**

Even though the enthusiasm for the Saemaul movement has diminished, it has left important legacies -not only for the rural development but also for the national development of Korea. The Saemaul movement laid down the foundation of Korea's development as one of the four newly industrializing Asian economies (NIEs) that are distinguished from most other developing countries by their remarkable growth performance during the last three decades or so (Bon, Ho-Koo, 1991). Indeed it is an indispensable truth that the Saemaul movement succeeded as a social-economic development policy. The policy enabled the transformation of the Korean rural sector, which had comprised about 75% of the country's population in the 1970s, to an industrialized society, leaving the rural sector with a population of 11.6% by 1994(Park, Jin-Hwan;1998).

### **Chapter IV: Contrasting the Ujamaa policy and the Saemaul policy.**

#### **4.1 Similarities and differences of the two policies.**

As this thesis has set out to explain and portray the components of these two policies, we may find that the two policies have some similarities. In fact, the differences between these two policies come from the policy tools (the implementation strategies). This section will illustrate some similarities between these policies, specifically, both Ujamaa and Saemaul:

The implementation of these policies was mainly focused on improving the rural infrastructures as a key element of achieving economic development. Ujamaa and Saemaul enabled to equip villages with improved social services. Tanzania in 1980s for instance, at least every village had primary school, 90 percent had at least one cooperative shop, and 31 percent to 40 percent of the

total population in villages have either a dispensary or a health care. In Korea about 20 percent of villages had electricity in 1971 and more than 97 percent in 1980, a performance that is totally linked with the Saemaul movement (Joon Kyung Kim: 2009).

Another similarity dwells on the fact that both policies were centrally initiated and spearhead by the head of the government and states. For the Ujamaa policy, it was completely president Nyerere's thought and initiative of creating a socialist Tanzanian society. In that context, he deliberately devoted his efforts and pushed the implementation of Ujamaa in Tanzania. In Korea, President Park, Chung Hee initiated the Saemaulundong as a way forward of creating a better Korean society. He was personally involved in the implementation of this policy and influencing all leaders in different categories and people in the country to support his initiative.

The third similarity can be seen on the economic and political development of these two countries. For instance, one cannot account for Tanzania's economic and political development without considering the role played by the Ujamaa policy. It is the Ujamaa policy that enabled to create social cohesion and tolerance among people in Tanzania as a result Tanzania has remained peaceful country since independence in 1961 to present compared to some other African countries. It is an achievement which few African countries enjoy it. The same case to Korea, one cannot discuss the Korea's development experience without putting into consideration the role played by the Saemaulundong policy under President Park. It is the Seamaul movement that enables to transform the Korea's rural sector that was stricken by poverty in 1960s to modernized and industrialized society in the late 1980s<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup> Kyong dong Kim portrays that Saemaul undong has been a catalyst for social and economic change in Korea's rural communities.

Nevertheless, there are some differences between these two policies even though they have such similarities as outlined above. These differences are drawn from the strength of the Saemaul movement, which indeed had contributed to its success as a development paradigm adopted in Korea. This paper consider the strength of the Saemaul movement as lessons to be learned and be used as a model for establishing new pragmatic policies for developing countries like Tanzania.

#### **4.2 Lessons from the Saemaul movement in Korea**

As we have seen above, the Saemaul Movement was largely successful in laying the foundation for Korea's economic development, while the Ujamaa policy achieved the social and political integration of Tanzanian society but failed in economic aspects as Tanzania has remained poor a country until now. This means that having a policy is not the issue; what matters is the implementation and outcomes of that policy. Taking the example of the Saemaul movement and its successes one may see as transferable to other countries especially to developing countries like Tanzania that are still engaged in a development marathon. There are about five lessons we can learn from the Saemaul movement as a policy model:

The Saemaul movement was a discriminatory policy, unlike the Ujamaa which emphasized on equality of all people and no room for discrimination. The policy focused on helping those who help themselves and did not pay attention on the philosophy of equal outcome. As Jwa and Yoon put that, "an economy that is not discriminatory is bound for failure and the Saemaulundong is a clear example of discrimination policy" (Jwa and Yoon: 2004). This kind of discrimination triggered competition among villages by pushing villagers with lower performance to exert more

efforts towards advancing to villages with higher performance in order to benefit from government support.

The second lesson comes from the fact that the Saemaul movement was not an egalitarian policy, unlike the Ujamaa policy which was completely an egalitarian policy. The Saemaul movement policy provided equal opportunity to all people but not equal outcome. For example, at the first year of implementation of the Saemaul projects, the government distributed 300 bags of cement to all villages in the country. But after the evaluation, the government supplied 500 bags of cement and one ton of steel to those villages which performed better. This strategy enabled to increase people's morale and motivated them to perform better. Jwa and Yoon portray that, "egalitarianism which is the political view supporting equalization of outcomes, tends towards economic digression". They further contend that a democracy seeking equal opportunity is compatible with the market economy, while one seeking equal outcome(egalitarianism) will cause economic digression(Jwa and Yoon:2004).

Another lesson is drawn from good implementation of Saemaul projects. As we have seen from the previous discussion, the Saemaul projects were implemented in a more democratic manner. Villagers were allowed to elected their leaders, choose priority projects to be implemented and make decision over their village affairs. This kind of approach developed a sense of ownership and belonging among the people in implementing projects as a result many projects were successful.

For the purpose of ensuring that the policy is successful, the Korean government established vocational training schools and training institutes. The vocational schools intended to transform the society from peasant agriculture practice to modern agricultural practice which included the

use of simple advanced technology. Therefore, vocational schools were used as tool to push the peasant agrarian economy to commercial and industrialize economy. Meanwhile, the training institutes established intended to accustom people especially leaders to adhere the government policies so as to facilitate implementation.

Moreover, the Saemaul movement gives us a lesson on good implementation strategy through carrot and stick approach. Immediately after the implementation of the Saemaul movement, the Korean government conducted a thorough evaluation in 1972 to all villages. The result of this evaluation showed that 16,000 villages had successfully implemented Saemaul projects and were marked as outstanding villages. In order to motivate them, the government provided additional 500 bags of cement, and one ton of steel to each outstanding village. The second evaluation was done in 1973 whereby 6,000 additional villages had successfully implemented projects without government support. In 1974 by considering the results of those two evaluations done by the government, villages were classified into three categories namely basic –level village, self –help village and self –reliant level village (SUCTI: 2009).

At the same time it should be noted that the implementation of the Saemaul undong recognized the family and kinship ties of the Korean society. This approach helped to bring compliance of the Saemaul’s directives and strategies as new system of grassroot democratic leadership had to be established. Unlike the Ujamaa was implemented at a time whereby family and kinship leadership and administration was abolished (Kyong Dong Kim; 1986). President Nyerere decided to abolish this system for the purpose of discouraging tribalism and nepotism. This decision affected the implementation of the Ujamaa policy as some local government officials failed to meet some challenges of different kinship and ethnic traditional leadership and administration.



Even though we have seen some lessons from the Saemaul movement, still the challenge is, “can these lessons be applicable in today’s democratic situation?” As we know that the Saemaul movement was implemented when Korea was under dictatorship authority of president Park Chung Hee. And also it should be noted that from the beginning president Park wanted to implement the Saemaul movement after took power in 1961, but he failed because of the difficult situation existed at that time until 1971 when he get succeed to implement it. Moreover, to ensure that his goals are attained, he changed the constitution in 1972 in which election for presidential post was abolished and remained only for parliament members. Today’s situation is different from that time of the Saemaul movement implementation, but we have a lot to learn from the Saemaulundong policy experience in understanding the public policy paradox. Having strong political commitment, focus and motivation; evaluation through carrot and stick approach; and we can do spirit are important elements for success. If developing countries like Tanzania apply these lessons, it will be possible for them to have big development changes and reach the level like that of Korea.

## **Chapter V: Conclusion**

In conclusion the evidence strongly indicates that the lessons we may glean from these two policies are very important in understanding the paradoxes of public policy. Taking the experience of the Saemaul Movement policy, it would seem that “implementation” is very important in the execution of any public policy. The Saemaul undong was a highly organized and well coordinated movement. As Hellen Ingram and Dean Maun in Birkland contends that success and failure of a public policy are slippery concepts, often highly subjective and reflective


of individual's goals, perception of need, and perhaps even psychological disposition towards life. The Ujamaa was not a completely failure, as the policy itself enabled Tanzania to achieve social and political development which all Tanzanians are proud of even today. The Ujamaa policy of president Nyerere has made Tanzania to remain a peaceful country on the troubled Africa continent. Until today, Tanzanians have very negative attitude towards conflicts and the multiparty politics has not yet changed the state power.

In terms of economic aspect, the Ujamaa policy failed to transform the country's economy as Tanzania remained to be among of the poor countries in the world despite of its potential resources. As we have seen from our discussion above, implementation was a major problem. With the lessons from the Saemaul movement, Tanzania like any other developing country has the opportunity to learn from the previous policy failures so that it may come up with some sort of policy changes resulting from understanding of these failures and what caused them. Today, Korea is an industrialized country as a result of many policies and factors but undoubtedly the Saemaul Movement contributed a lot to the national development. There is a certain proverb which indicates thus: **“Any successive mission has something to sacrifice”** (likewise these; 'No Retreat No Surrender', 'No Death, No Saints'). This can be said to be the underlying social rule or principle.

Indeed, during implementation of the Saemaul Movement, many people rose up resistance against the military rule and this ultimately led to the assassination of President Park, Chung-Hee (the founder of the Saemaul Movement) in 1979. Nevertheless, the Saemaul Movement has since some to be regarded as the first most important national event for the past 60 years in Korea, by 40.2% of Koreans surveyed by Chosun Daily News paper in 2008. This suggests persuasively that the contributions of the Saemaul Movement to Korean rural transformation and

industrialization will not be forgotten and indeed it provides important lessons to learn for developing countries like Tanzania.


Appendix 1: Pictures to show Korean rural society in the 1960s.



Source: Saemaulundong Central Training Institute: 2009.

Appendix 2: Pictures to show improved village infrastructures.

## Changed Roofs, Fences and Village roads



Source: Saemaulundong Central Training Institute: 2009.


Appendix 3: Pictures to show improved village infrastructures.

## New Bridges & Changed Village



Source: Saemaulundong Central Training Institute: 2009.

Appendix 4: Graph to show Korean Poverty Reduction (%) 1961- 1993



Source: Joon Kyung Kim; KDI School: 2009.

Appendix 5: The table to show Korean Economic Performance.

Indicator/ Criteria	1962	1992	1997	2007
<b>Economic Development</b>				
Per Capita GDP	\$ 87 (101st)	\$ 7,527	\$ 11176	\$20,014(24th)
Investment (%of GDP)	13.8	37.3	36.0	29.0
Export (% of GDP)	5.1	26.6	32.4	45.6
Import (% of GDP)	16.8	27.7	33.0	44.8
<b>Social Development</b>	<b>1962</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>2007</b>

Life Expectance at birth)	55	72	74	79
Infant mortality rate(per 1000 births)	90	8	5.8	-
<b>Education Development</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1980</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>
Years School	5.7	7.6	9.5	10.6
Middle school enrollment ratio (%)	51.2	95.1	98.2	99.1
High school enrollment ratio (%)	28.1	63.5	88.0	96.4
Tertiary school enrollment ratio	8.4	15.9	37.7	80.5

Source: Joon Kyung Kim; KDI School: 2009.

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