

**AGAINST ALL ODDS:
DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN KYRGYZSTAN**

By

Cholpon Alymbekova

THESIS

Submitted to
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY

2012

**AGAINST ALL ODDS:
DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN KYRGYZSTAN**

By

Cholpon Alymbekova

THESIS

Submitted to
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY

2012

Professor Park, Hun Joo

**AGAINST ALL ODDS:
DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN KYRGYZSTAN**

By

Cholpon Alymbekova

THESIS

Submitted to
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY

Committee in charge:

Professor Park Hun Joo, Supervisor



Professor Kim, Dong-Young



Professor Ahn, Byung-Joon



Approval as of May, 2012

ABSTRACT

AGAINST ALL ODDS: DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN KYRGYZSTAN

By

Cholpon Alymbekova

This paper attempts to demonstrate that democratic transformation in Kyrgyzstan is the natural outgrowth of a number of factors that make Kyrgyzstan a special case in Central Asia and a participant in the Fourth Wave of democracy. The prospect of a stable democratic Kyrgyzstan is promising, as essential elements of democracy are present within the culture but the role of external forces might not always be encouraging its further development. While discussing what makes democracy fragile, this paper will reveal that a successful transformation has been achieved thanks to the strength of internal factors committed to the removal of the authoritarian regime and despite a number of external factors that have created obstacles for democracy, making the struggle even more difficult.

Copyright by
Alymbekova Cholpon Samakovna
2012

Dedicated to those who sacrificed their lives for the Democracy in Kyrgyzstan so the future generation can have brighter future and first female President of Central Asia,

Roza Otunbaeva.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kyrgyzstan for giving me a wonderful opportunity to be able to contribute to expanding democracy in my country. I also want to acknowledge and thank Ainura Sulaimanova whose for helping me in critical approach in analyzing this paper has been a driving force during the writing process. I'm grateful Cholpon Chargynova for her moral support and great friendship. I also would like to express my deep gratitude to the Professors of KDI School of Public Policy and Management that have sharpened my understanding of the current world. Most of all Im thankful to my parents for helping me to reach my dreams and make my contribution to the democratic development in Kyrgyzstan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----------|
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| II. LITERATURE REVIEW | 4 |
| A. Role of elections in Kyrgyz democracy | 4 |
| B. Parliamentary system vs. Presidential system | 6 |
| C. Third and Fourth Waves of Democracy | 8 |
| III. ROLE OF INTERNAL FACTORS HAVING AN IMPACT ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN KYRGYZSTAN | 13 |
| A. Leadership | 14 |
| B. Socio-Cultural Factors | 19 |
| IV. ROLE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEMOCRACY IN KYRGYZSTAN | 22 |
| A. Central Asian States' Influence | 23 |
| B. China | 23 |
| C. Russia | 24 |
| D. USA and West | 25 |
| E. Impact of External Media | 28 |
| F. Internal and External Factors Brought Together | 29 |
| V. CONCLUSION | 31 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 33 |

*It would be a terrible loss if the richer and older democracies did not make serious efforts
– a loss to themselves as well as to peoples of the struggling democracies.*

Russett

I.INTRODUCTION

The year 2011 marks the twentieth anniversary of Kyrgyzstan's independence since collapse of Soviet Union. Two decades of experimenting with democracy amid various attempts to manipulate democracy by authoritarian presidents into a more restrictive model have shown that the autocratic system is not sustainable as it has been in other Central Asian states. Since gaining its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has undergone two revolutions: the Tulip Revolution of March 2005 and popular the Second Revolution in April 2010. The occurrence of the second political upheaval proves that authoritarian regime in Kyrgyzstan cannot be tolerated by the citizens of Kyrgyz Republic. Once proclaimed the "Island of Democracy" (International Crisis Group, 2001), Kyrgyz democracy today is still at the fledgling stage. Surrounded by Central Asia's authoritarian states and the juggernaut of China, Kyrgyzstan, the smallest of these states has been and continues to be remarkable for its strong will for freedom. In analyzing the current situation, one can make the objective and obvious assumption that it will take more time to see Kyrgyzstan develop into a mature democracy. As opposed to Middle Eastern countries such as Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, where one can witness the clashes of people and authorities, Kyrgyzstan stands out as a reasonably smooth and relatively peaceful transition of democracy among the emerging democracies. Tunisia and Kyrgyzstan had roughly the same number of

civilian deaths, and Egypt slightly more, but Libya is different from all these because the effort to remove Gaddafi has led to a bloody war.

Kyrgyzstan, initially considered by many as an “Island of Democracy” and stability after the collapse of the Soviet Union, could no longer be characterized as such by 2001 (International Crisis Group, 2001). Two main factors led to the deviation of Kyrgyz authorities from a democratic course. First, as soon as Russia recovered from the ashes of Soviet Union, its interest in the Central Asian region reappeared after several years of silence. Second, as the war on terrorism became a global concern, Kyrgyzstan, because of its location, became one of the important strategic players.

One of the greatest controversies in this field is whether it is the internal or external forces that make the Kyrgyz democracy fragile or strong, and what the basic conditions are for democracy that are present in the country. This paper will show which of the ingredients are there, what’s strong, what’s weak, and what needs external support? Despite the challenges Kyrgyzstan has faced and will be facing, the path of Kyrgyz democracy has been brighter than before and it will create a ripple affect to its neighboring countries. Eventually it will become shining beacon of democracy in Central Asia.

Research Design

Research methods and methodological tools

This research will be conducted through a comparative study with the accent on case study. In order to answer the research question and test the hypothesis of the given study, qualitative research will be conducted that is mainly based on secondary sources and will not include questionnaires and interviews.

Limitations of the Study and Methodological Challenges

There are also factors that might hinder the validity and reliability of the study such as the subjective nature of government sources that sometimes are tempted to praise and overestimate achievements of the democratic transformation in Kyrgyzstan. There are not many sources that discuss Kyrgyz politics and some information might not be accessible as the Central Election Committee, for example, might restrict such information. Outcomes might be limited as they will be mostly based on secondary sources.

Possible Outcomes: the given paper will contribute to the debate of the emerging role and influences of internal and external factors and processes in shaping new political regimes, i.e. democracy in third-world countries. Most importantly, it will help in understanding the process of shaping democracy in Kyrgyz Republic, and what factors hinder or foster that process.

Data Collection

This paper will heavily rely on qualitative method of analysis. As a Program Development officer for National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) I have gathered information from interaction with Parliamentarians, different political parties, interim President, current President, NGOs, civil societies, International Organizations etc. The timeline established from start to end of my information gathering 2007-2012 it is critical to see the changes that has been made from pre to post Second Revolution.

Data for the literature review and the empirical part of this paper will be retrieved mostly from secondary sources such as scholarly articles, dissertations, and journals.

II.LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to answer the question of what makes Kyrgyz democracy fragile, First, I have reviewed the literature that defines democracy, i.e. procedural, deliberative, and substantive democracy. Second, I turned my attention to the question of why democracy can exist in some countries and cannot exist in others. Third, the literature I researched discussed the cultural and social factors that play a role in the institutionalization of democracy. I have outlined elections as one of the major driving force in the first revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March of 2005 (also known as the “Tulip Revolution”). Thus, this paper reflects the importance of elections and their role in establishing either a democracy or authoritarianism.

There has been no country in the modern world that has achieved democracy without the struggle. Democracy is born as the result of debates, disputes, and fights of people to constitute a system that satisfies all stakeholders. As the Kyrgyz proverb says “*талаштан тактык жаралат*” – “clarity comes out of struggle”.

A. Role of elections in Kyrgyz democracy

The Minimalist conception of democracy has been held by Schumpeter to be a system where, as the result of competitive elections, rulers are chosen. Thinking within the frames of this minimalist conception of democracy, Adam Przeworski, argued: “Almost all normatively desirable aspects of political, and sometimes even of social and economic, life are credited as intrinsic to democracy: representation, accountability, equality, participation, justice, dignity, rationality, security, freedom,..the list goes on”(Dahl 1993, 13).

By defending the minimalist concept of democracy, Przeworski states that the mere possibility of being able to change government can avoid violence as it allows the people to

overthrow governments peacefully (Dahl 1993, 13). If one applies these arguments in analyzing the revolutions of March 2005 and April 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, it can be seen that the minimum concept of democracy was absent in society in both cases. There was not even a slim possibility of changing the government through democratic means. People had no choice but to dethrone the governments twice by using violence as a means. Although the March 2005 Tulip Revolution was essentially bloodless, the Second Revolution of April 2010 resulted in the loss of 87 Kyrgyz citizens and hundreds wounded.

According to Przeworski, democracy is an agreement with probabilities e and $(1-e)$, where e stands for being elected. Such an agreement is not possible in the dictatorial contract (Dahl 1993, 14).

Such an agreement assumes that once a decision is made through voting, those who lose must accept an opinion contrary to theirs. This requires flexibility and tolerance for the results. By participating voluntarily in the voting process, people agree that whatever the outcome of the decision process is, it is to be followed. "In the end, the miracle of democracy is that conflicting political forces obey the results of voting. People who have guns obey those without them. Incumbents risk their control of governmental offices by holding elections" (Dahl 1993, 16).

The logic of this statement is persuasive enough, that truly it is a miracle that conflicting political forces would discipline themselves to accept the results of an election and, afterwards, the decision-making of an opponent. However, most authoritarian states have come to use elections as a mask to cover their brutal regime. The claim of Przeworski that democracy is more likely to survive when no single force dominates politics completely and permanently should help to reveal these pseudo-democracies. It is important to indicate that competition should be open, transparent and fair. It has been noted by the author as well that this miracle of democracy doesn't work under all conditions. When the incumbent ruler

realizes that the chances of being re-elected are e and $(1-e)$, there is a strong temptation to manipulate the results. This has become the pattern in the Central Asian countries, where the quality and the way of elections needs to be carefully observed. It has become frequent routine for 'elitists' to manipulate governmental resources, in order to influence the outcome of elections into their favor.

Concerning the survival of democracies, Dahl points out two major factors. The first is that democracies tend to fail when one party controls a large share of seats in legislature. This statement proves to be true in empirical terms when applied to the Central Asian states. As a result of the collapse of Soviet Union, a number of political parties were immediately created in Kyrgyzstan, opening the way for a number of leaders to compete for power, though elections were not held using a party list. The single mandate system allowed for those who wanted run for Parliament seats individually or and party name. Individual had an option to be elected in Parliament without joining a political party.

In 2007 President Kurmanbek Bakiev had a referendum to replace single mandate system to the elections by party system list in order to bring his 'Puppet' party, so he dissolved the Parliament in the middle of its session and announced the new election. By having the 'Puppet' Parliamentarians as majority, President gained the full control of the legislative branch. One-party control methods are often practiced in the Post-Soviet countries such as Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Tajikistan, where so far the leaders have been successful maintaining it, nonetheless, in the case of Kyrgyzstan it proved to be unviable.

B. Parliamentary system vs. Presidential system

After the second revolution that took place on April 7, 2010, Kyrgyzstan switched from a strong Presidential system to a primarily Parliamentary system. What impact does this have on democratic transformation in Kyrgyzstan? Along with Adam Przeworski, Juan Linz

and Scott Mainwaring have articulated that democracy depends on political systems, including parliamentary vs. presidential ones. All three lean towards a parliamentary system when mentioning strong democracy. Particularly, Przeworski states that parliamentary democracies are more durable than pure presidential ones (Dahl 1993, 16). The case of Kyrgyzstan can serve as evidence for the above-stated arguments. The first two presidents of Kyrgyzstan have personalized power -- thus, the transition to a parliamentary system is an attempt to prevent the same thing from occurring for the third time and has created a positive condition for the further strengthening of democracy.

One of the reasons presidential systems can be less democratic than parliamentary ones is that autocratic presidents rarely leave office because they are defeated in elections (Dahl 1993, 16). The Post-Soviet states model is a perfect example to illustrate this statement. Presidents of CIS countries, having personalized their power, eliminate the strongest competitors by various methods: using force or reducing fair competition through the use of state resources. Therefore, it created an image for voters where they don't see any apparent alternatives to the current president as their ruler.

A parliamentary system includes a variety of political parties, providing an opportunity for the newcomers to enter the political arena and challenge the incumbent. Such a system supports the statement that "...democracy lasts when it offers an opportunity to the conflicting forces to advance their interests within the institutional framework" (Dahl 1993, 16). In Kyrgyzstan, when the political opposition and the majority of voters were not able to deliver their interests to the authorities within the institutional framework, there was no other way left but to riot, which has twice led to mass uprisings. A presidential system makes it difficult to negotiate the interests of conflicting forces while a parliamentary system is an institutional framework that lends itself to various parties addressing different concerns of voters, making a mass uprising less likely. The parliamentary system provides a level playing field with

agreed-upon rules for political forces to fight within the institution, and not in the streets.

Larry Diamond goes further than Adam Przeworski's minimalist conception of electoral democracy. Diamond's criticism of Schumpeterian conceptions is that they do not devote much attention nor incorporate into the full measure of democracy the levels of freedom of speech, press and assembly (Dahl 1993, 33). Diamond brings up a concept by Terry Karl, the "fallacy of electoralism" that can result from Schumpeterian's way of analyzing democracy. "This flawed conception of democracy privileges elections over other dimensions of democracy and ignores the degree to which multiparty elections (even if they are competitive and uncertain in outcome) may exclude significant portions of the population from contesting for power or advancing and defending their interests, or may leave significant arenas of decision making beyond the control of electoral officials" (Dahl 1993, 34). A contrary argument would be, assuming a healthy political environment that involves fair and free competition, multiparty elections would see competing parties doing their best to address the interests of voters. On the other hand, as Przeworski has articulated, those who lose this time might have a chance to win next time in competitive elections by working and expanding their electorate in between elections.

C. Third and Fourth Waves of Democracy

Once the struggle for democracy begins, it spreads, as it comes from the people and only certain conditions can stop its escalation. Those conditions were described in Larry Diamond's recent publication, "The Spirit of Democracy," and include the tyranny of a government, and oil-rich countries (Diamond, 2008.) In addition to those two conditions, other factors that may impede democratic growth such as cultural factors and the lack of economic development have not proven to be viable arguments. The only real barrier to the development of democracy is the passage of time. It takes years for a "true democracy"—a

phrase coined by President John F. Kennedy -- to be established. “Changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European Union, the USA and the Soviet Union” (Dahl 1993, 93) were a key factor in the democratic development of Kyrgyzstan in the early 1990’s, as part of the third-wave of democracy. However, this did not lead to the establishment of strong democracy in the country. This can be explained by another factor indicated by Samuel Huntington that contributed to the transition away from democracy during the first and second reverse waves, “the weakness of democratic values among key elite groups and the general public” (Dahl 1993, 93). The collapse of Soviet Union meant a new beginning for the country, and the democratic path was chosen as a way to declare sovereignty and recover from the economic collapse. But this democratic path chosen by the elites was somewhat blurry to the general public, which did not have a clear understanding of what democracy entails. Right after the collapse of Soviet Union, democratic institutions were weak. Despite the fact that people embraced the freedom, the subsequent economic crisis in the country, shortages of food, the extremely high rate of unemployment, the rise of criminal structures with corruption and bribery prospering, and the lack of entrepreneurial skills all led to a nostalgic mood into the population. In the Soviet time, education, healthcare, housing, and jobs were all provided by the government and after the collapse of the union, the state did not have the institutions and facilities in place so that the transformation from communism to democracy would not be as painful.

Those nostalgic about the Soviet times and government were reluctant to give up the all-providing dictatorship for a fragile democracy. One of the major obstacles for democratization was indicated as the virtual absence of experiences in democracy in most countries that remained authoritarian (Huntington 1993, 295). This argument is still applicable to the post-soviet countries that have not succeeded in establishing democracy. However, in case of Kyrgyzstan, this argument may not be as applicable, as it is hard to claim

that there was a virtual absence of experience with democracy. Looking at the culture that shapes the behavior of society within the state, one sees numbers of democratic features that were present in the nomadic culture of the Kyrgyz people. The traditions and customs of the nomadic tribes are discussed in the “internal analysis section” of this paper.

Huntington examines the influence of culture upon the development of democracy. The author refers to Islamic and Confucianist cultures as serious obstacles to democratic development (Huntington 1993, 310). Neither of these cultures had been fully adopted by the nomads that existed in the territory of the current Kyrgyzstan. Confucianism was not present and does not have any signs of influence on the culture of the Kyrgyz people. Despite being considered an Islamic state, Kyrgyzstan practices a very modest type of religion, with none of the restrictions of Shari'ah law. Islam became the dominant religion for all the Kyrgyz clans in the nineteenth century and was brought to the territory of Kyrgyzstan by the Kokand Khanate, centered in Uzbekistan (Dukenbaev et al. 2003, 16). Thus, a mostly nomadic culture has prevailed in the traditions and the daily life of the residents of this country mixed with Islamic beliefs that haven't been fully adopted. The end of nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth century were marked by the struggle of the Kyrgyz tribes against Russian occupation with the establishment of a Kyrgyz Socialist Soviet Republic as a full member of the USSR in 1936 (Dukenbaev et al. 2003, 17).

The occurrence of the fourth wave was predicted by Huntington in the beginning of twenty-first century (Dahl 1993, 98). This soon proved to be prescient, as 2004 and 2005 were marked by the “Color Revolutions” taking place in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. The fourth wave of democracy is expected to be successful in Kyrgyzstan as all the necessary pre-conditions explained by Larry Diamond such as the elite and general public having strong democratic values exists. Even though the 2005 Tulip Revolution resulted in the appearance of another autocrat leader Bakiev, it signaled the population that it was capable of changing

the oppressive government at any given time. The April 7, 2010 Revolution which may or may not be successful, does provide a good precedent to any leader to behave within the democratic framework. .

In his book “The Third Wave,” Huntington discusses how authoritarian states have been using an argument that in order to establish democracy there must first be economic development (Huntington, 1993). However, as Barber argues, “Capitalism nurtures individual liberty and prizes productivity and entrepreneurship but left to its own devices neglects equality and places profits before people and products before jobs” (Barber 2003, xxi). While China experienced economic development, the gap between poor and rich is wide, and individuals have little space to stand up for their human rights. Therefore other factors besides economic development that favor democracy outweigh the argument that in order for democracy to be established, there is a need for economic development first. “Countries do not have to be rich to be democratic, but they do have to cultivate the spirit of democracy” (Diamond 2008, 79). In other words, how can economic development be achieved in a poor country where the ruling elite are interested in accumulating its own wealth? Authoritarian regimes in Kyrgyzstan prevented economic development, leaving no space for civilians to participate in free and fair markets. Thus, Kyrgyzstan needs a democracy that would allow liberalizing and establishing a market system. Huntington has stated “economic development makes democracy possible, political leadership makes it real” (Huntington 1993, 316).

After having reviewed the concept of democracy under the guidance of known scholars such as Schumpeter, Dahl, Diamond, John Stuart Mill, Kant and others, this paper will proceed to the analysis of a “true democracy” - the concept defined by U.S. President John F. Kennedy. “The true democracy, living and growing and inspiring, puts its faith in the people—faith that people will not simply elect men who will exercise their conscientious judgment – faith that people will not condemn those whose devotion to principle leads them

to unpopular courses, but will reward courage, respect, honor and ultimately recognize right”
(Kennedy 1956, 223).

Having the precise understanding of democracy, its causes, conditions and obstacles, I proceed to analyzing the internal and external factors that have influenced democratic development in a positive or a negative way. As internal and external forces are equally important, the first analysis attempts to look at the domestic factors.

III. ROLE OF INTERNAL FACTORS HAVING AN IMPACT ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN KYRGYZSTAN

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan the smallest one among the other Central Asian states has been in dire need of foreign aid due to its lack of natural resources, compared to its neighbors: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. As a consequence, Kyrgyzstan took a more democratic and free market approach, carrying out deep economic reforms, followed by foreign aid that flowed into the country. (Lane 2003)

Table 1. **Total Aid flows to the CIS-7 (As a Percentage of Gross National Income)**

| | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | AVG |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Armenia | 7.6 | 18.3 | 10.1 | 7.5 | 11.3 | 11.2 | 11.0 |
| Azerbaijan | 4.9 | 3.1 | 4.7 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 2.8 | 3.6 |
| Georgia | 11.5 | 10.3 | 6.5 | 4.6 | 8.4 | 5.6 | 7.8 |
| Kyrgyz Rep. | 19.5 | 12.9 | 14.1 | 14.4 | 24.1 | 16.7 | 16.9 |
| Moldova | 2.2 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 4.6 |
| Tajikistan | 2.9 | 10.4 | 9.6 | 8.4 | 11.9 | 15.2 | 9.8 |
| Uzbekistan | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 1.0 |

Notes: Source is World Bank's *World Development Indicators* Online Database.

Source: Trinity College Dublin web resource

Table reports aggregate aid flows to the CIS-7 countries over 1995-2000.

Overall, aid flows have represented a considerable fraction of national incomes.

However, there has also been substantial cross-country variation: average aid flows ranged from only 1 percent of GDP for Uzbekistan to 16.9 percent for the Kyrgyz Republic (Lane 2003).

The government quickly realized that the primary means of receiving foreign aid was to move in the direction of openness, economic restructuring and democracy. Such policies would satisfy the expectations of major Western donor states. This led Kyrgyzstan to quickly become a “favorite child” of the international donor community, managing to get strong support from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan received substantial bilateral political and economic support from the United States of America, Germany, Switzerland, Japan and Turkey. As a result, Kyrgyzstan became one of the leading states for liberal political and economic reforms not just in Central Asia, but also in the entire CIS (Dukenbaev et al 2003, 29).

A. Leadership

The role of leadership is essential in promoting transparent government and maintaining democracy. As Huntington wrote, “One serious impediment to democratization is the absence or weakness of real commitment to democratic values among political leaders in Asia, Africa and the Middle East,” (Dahl 1993, 96) a statement clearly applicable in Kyrgyzstan’s case. Electoral manipulations were conducted and undemocratic constitutional amendments were proposed by President Akaev and Bakiev. The first constitution of the newly independent Kyrgyzstan was accepted in 1993. The 1993 Constitution of Kyrgyz Republic was more liberal and provided better conditions for the formation of a democratic society than did its Soviet predecessor (Dukenbaev et al 2003, 30). Even though the system of checks and balances was provided by the Constitution, the President was given the right to dissolve the Parliament and appoint key governmental officials that were more concerned with following the President’s order than the law. As Askat Dukenbaev and William W. Hansen wrote in their paper “Understanding Kyrgyz Politics,” this has gradually diminished

the political role of parliament. They point out the process of the gradual concentration of powers in President Akaev's hands through constitutional amendments in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2003 as well as his running for the presidency for the third time in 2000. Presidential elections of 2000 were criticized by International organizations, such as OSCE/ODIHR (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) headquartered in Warsaw and NDI (National Democratic Institute) headquartered in Washington DC. The press statement issued by the OSCE noted, "The Kyrgyz presidential election failed to comply with OSCE commitments for democratic elections, concluded by OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights" (OSCE, 2000.) The press statement by NDI made a similar comment: "Presidential elections, conducted in October of 2000, couldn't stop the cycle of problematic elections that have taken place lately in Kyrgyzstan" (NDI, 2000.) The final constitutional amendment initiated by President Akaev took place in 2003. NDI reported that the "nature of the constitutional changes put to a referendum vote on February 2 will not be conducive to democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan" (NDI, 2003).

Akaev had promised to propose amendments to satisfy the opposition. Despite this, the amendments turned out to be designed for the President's and his family's protection, providing immunity to his entire family after the end of his term, replacing the bicameral parliament with a unicameral body, abolishing party-list voting for parliament, and destroying proportional representation in favour of a single member majoritarian runoff system (NDI, 2003.) Such provisions demonstrate the President's desire to satisfy his personal interests and led to the reduction of parliamentary power. It is important to mention that manipulated referendum have been the commonly use tool of authoritarian presidents in Kyrgyzstan and the region. The changes proposed in the referendum provide a veneer of respectability for unilateral decisions taken by the president and may be perceived by the international community as more legitimate than individual presidential decrees though the

referendum process itself is carefully controlled and the results falsified as needed to support the authorities' positions. Parliamentary elections of 2005, designed to bring the daughter of the President, Bermet Akaeva, and his son, Aidar Akaev, to positions in power in parliament, which resulted in the Tulip Revolution of March 24. After the President and his family fled the country, Prime Minister, Kurmanbek Bakiev, was appointed the acting President. Mr. Bakiev won the Presidential elections of 2005, and his rule from 2005 to 2010 resulted in three elections: the October 2007 referendum that allowed Bakiev to make constitutional changes in order to dissolve the Parliament, the early parliamentary elections of December, 2007 that were the direct result of the referendum, and the early presidential elections of July, 2009. Among other reasons, the presidential elections of 2009 were held earlier than expected in order to prevent the opposition from being fully prepared to compete. As soon as President Bakiev was again confirmed as President, various structural reforms of the government began to take place.

In November 2009, President Bakiev appointed his son, Maxim Bakiev, as the head of a recently created body that stood above most levels of the government. In November 2009, Radio Liberty reported that "Maksim Bakiev heads the Central Agency for Development, Investment, and Innovation - a newly formed agency that will essentially run the sluggish Kyrgyz economy" (Pannier 2010). This again demonstrated that President Bakiev was following a similar path to Akaev, promoting his family interests, and thus the Tulip Revolution had not resulted in real democratic progress. According to the Freedom House report, "Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores" (Freedom House 2009) Bakiev's regime received worse scores than the government under President Akaev's rule.

The Electoral Process indicator shows that, in the first two years of Bakiev's regime, there was improvement but by 2008, it had regressed to the same level as during Akaev's regime.

The Civil Society indicator has been on a constant level since Akaev's times until 2009 when it declined from 4.50 to 4.75. The Independent Media indicator has the worst rating under Bakiev for the year 2009. The National Democratic Governance and Local Democratic Governance indicators showed the largest decline. The Democratic Governance indicator declines in 2009 from 6.00 to 6.50. And for the Local Democratic Governance Indicator, results are lower still, with the score declining from 5.75 to 6.50. During Akaev's rule, the Judicial Framework and Independence indicator dropped from 5.00 to 5.50 for years, but during the Bakiev years, the scores dropped from 5.50 to 6.00. Overall, the Democracy Score during Akaev's regime ranged from 5.08 to 5.64 and during the Bakiev regime from 5.68 to 6.04. Analyzing these numbers, it seems evident that Akaev started as a more democratic leader than Bakiev. Instead of bringing the expected positive democratic changes, Under Bakiev's regime strengthened his unpopular authoritarian rule. If there was a revolution under Akaev's rule with generally better scores, it should be expected that the worsening of the situation with Bakiev would have angered people even more and would lead to a similar popular action against him.

The characteristics of a leader outlined both by McClelland and James McGregor Burns are best represented in the democratic system of government. Burns has introduced the concept of transformational leadership, where a leader inspires followers and shares power and responsibilities. "Hence, I would call the protection and nourishing of happiness, for extending the opportunity to pursue happiness to all people, as the core agenda of transforming leadership," (Burnes 2003, 493). Thus, it's not a coincidence that so far it is the democratic system that stands out as the system with the most effective and efficient leadership.

On April 7, 2010, mass protests turned into bloodshed as President Bakiev failed to address the interests of his people and continued concentrating power and wealth in the hands

of his family. “Stimulating achievement motivation in others requires a different set of motive and a different set of skills than wanting achievement satisfaction for oneself” (McClelland 1970, 30). Bakiev’s achievement satisfaction for himself and his son prevented him from stimulating achievement in others. People lost confidence in Bakiev who not only failed to inspire people but raised pessimism and agony among the citizens. Under pressure, intimidation and sometimes under threat of murder, his political rivals disappeared and fled the country, leaving him increasingly powerful. David McClelland has taken into consideration that personal dominance may be effective in very small groups, but if a human leader wants to be effective in influencing large groups, he must rely on much more subtle and socialized forms of influence (McClelland 1970, 38-39). So far the most socialized forms of influence are presented by democratic states, where as in other types of government systems, human leaders are not quite as effective in influencing large groups in a positive way. Dictators and authoritarian rulers are often quite effective in socializing entire populations to their point of view – think of Hitler and Stalin. Without free expression, entire populations can be manipulated by propaganda of dictators. History have shown that most of tyrannical authoritarian leaders are often eliminated by a coup, assassination, and/or being hated by the people.

Speaking of leadership, it is necessary to note the importance of women and the roles they have played for the country. Over times, Kyrgyz society has been accepting of woman leadership. In the history of country, one of the brightest figures among all the leaders was Kurmanjan Datka. She was born into a nomadic family and is known as the "The Queen of the South" during 1916th. She was a stateswoman in Kyrgyzstan, recognized for her early confrontation over the occupation of the region by Russia. The Queen of the South” played an important role in saving the Kyrgyz people during the Russian invasion. Kurmanjan Datka demonstrated an extraordinary commitment to the rule of law by not saving her son from the

death penalty for a crime he had committed. She was a highly respected and influential figure until her death.

Not only has Women's leadership in the past been important, but current events also serve as evidence of the same pattern. As a result of the April 2010 Revolution, a woman, Roza Otunbaeva, was chosen as the leader of the government. Known as "Career Diplomat", Otunbaeva is the first female leader in Central Asia's post-Soviet history" (Bigg, 2010). The recent reaffirmation of Roza Otunbaeva as President in the June, 2010 referendum clearly shows that the role of women in political life is strong. Thus, internal forces in Kyrgyzstan are in favor of the equal participation of men and women in the government, which is one of the important conditions for democracy. Roza Otunbaeva can become a figure to fight corrupt institutions and help society establish a "true democracy". For all of her virtues, one of the reasons Roza Otunbaeva was chosen as the interim leader was that her male rivals saw her as a woman, and thus saw her as relatively harmless and no impediment to their own ambitions – they wouldn't have tolerated the elevation of a male rival to the post.

B. Socio-Cultural Factors

While we must put most responsibility on authoritarian leaders for standing as barriers to democratic development, it should be noted that others should also bear responsibility. Had the Constitutional Court rejected the attempts to manipulate the Constitution in 2007, or had the people themselves rejected the electoral fraud they were asked and even paid to engage in during elections, leaders would have had a much tougher time deceiving the people. Thus, this chapter proceeds to discuss the socio-cultural factors that play substantial roles in shaping democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Society shapes the behavior of individuals and maintains the boundaries within which the members take actions.

The sociological paradigm is an important tool in explaining the behaviors that

influence political and economic outcomes by using culture and society. Cultural importance has been used to justify antidemocratic policies pursued by various countries.

One of the frequent arguments used against democracy states that it is an arrangement exported from the West, an alien phenomenon for the society of those who oppose it (Huntington 1993, 299). Samuel Huntington has listed the evidences that are used to state that democracy is exclusively the Western cultural thesis, mainly showing that “since the early nineteenth century, most democratic countries have been Western countries” or European-settled and former British colonies. This argument is still used in most authoritarian and fragile democratic states, where the political culture of monarchy in Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and in the Middle East, serves as a barrier to freedom of speech and other political liberties.

Such argument could not be applied to Kyrgyzstan simply due to its nomadic social construction. As Dukenbaev and Hansen have argued, culture is among other factors that contributed to creation of the liberal political regime in Kyrgyzstan, in comparison to the other Central Asian states. In the opinion of John Anderson, there were aspects of a “tribal democracy,” such as the political equality of its members, the selection of a tribal leader through relatively competitive elections, tribal mobility and, the lack of effective and institutionalized mechanisms for coercive power (Dukenbaev et al. 2003, 28). These characteristics, which sustained a degree of debate and consultation in a tribe, would have been unthinkable in the settled oases to the west of modern Kyrgyzstan and have been embedded in the nomadic tribal culture for many centuries.

Kyrgyz nomadic culture has long tradition of practicing democratic system and this is the same reason why even today, Kyrgyz people raise against the authoritarian rulers. The political system of the Kyrgyz nomad social structure contained events such as the “Sud Aksakalov”, court of the elders. The court consists of the oldest and wisest members of the

society with the duty of resolving public disputes in a participatory manner. Another important event of public participation in the Kyrgyz nomad culture is the “Kurultai,” a public assembly where leaders were granted power, appointed positions, and the most significant issues were discussed with the participation of the public at the event. Although Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan share a similar nomadic culture, Kazakstan being an oil-rich country, there are other factors that are barriers for democracy development there. There is one striking fact about over 23 countries whose economies are most dominated by oil today, not a single one of them practices true democracy (Diamond 2008, 74). Referring to culture, Huntington has pointed out “cultural traditions vary significantly in the extent to which their ...related behavior patterns are conducive to the development of democracy” (Huntington 1993, 293).

With the two previous presidents in Kyrgyzstan, society has not been demanding enough of high standards of ethics, while still somehow desiring it per se. Two regimes of authoritarianism have shown that to prevent from a leader to fall into the dark side of power, society has the responsibility to question and not to fear any coercion from that leader. Cultures themselves are not a barrier to the establishment of democracy, though authoritarian political leadership can distort that culture and manipulate it as a tool against democracy.

IV. ROLE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEMOCRACY IN KYRGYZSTAN

In the light of globalization, not only economical, but political conditions are influenced by the interests of superpower states. Kyrgyzstan has become the point where the interests of three superpowers countries converge, a remarkable situation for such a small and isolated country. The authoritarian regime that flourished after the Tulip Revolution of 2005 became increasingly brutal as the regime strengthened. According to Freedom House's democracy indicators for Kyrgyzstan have worsened every year after 2005.¹ One of the explanations for this regression is the unconditional international support, provided by various countries, to Bakiev and his regime. As Huntington has argued, "Obviously foreign actors may also overthrow democratic regimes or prevent countries that might otherwise become democratic from doing so" (Huntington 1993. 89). This statement is relevant in the case of Kyrgyzstan and helps explain why democracy was not established by the second President, who had come to power with a promise of real democratic reform. Foreign countries played a prominent role in giving him credibility to act undemocratically towards his own nation without fear of foreign repercussions.

The catalysts for the cause of Tulip Revolution, in March 2005, was the result of the first President, Askar Akaev, hoarding the state power and wealth within his family. As Askar Akaev and his family had to flee the country and seek asylum in Russia, ex-Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev became the second President. However, it took a year for the people to realize that Bakiev's policies and actions were no different from the previous president. Unfortunately, the support of the international community towards Bakiev's unpopular regime allowed him to remain confident in his authoritarian regime and prevented democratic development. When saying external forces or the international community, I refer

¹ See Table 1, page 4

to the strategically important partners that have an influence on the domestic and foreign politics of Kyrgyzstan. Specifically to the bordering Central Asian states, such as Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China, as well as the two superpowers, Russia and the United States, both of which have military bases in Kyrgyzstan.

A. Analysis of Central Asian States' Influence on Kyrgyz Democracy

Ever since the collapse of Soviet Union the satellite states had their first democratic election. However such practice was too great of challenge for the newly emerged independent states to conduct untainted election. In the hopes of starting fresh and elect uncorrupted leader, the temptation overwhelmed these leaders to become power mongers. As the result of rise of power mongers the Central Asian leaders of Kazakstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan became known for their authoritarian regime. Fearing that Kyrgyz democracy might have a spillover effect on them, those leaders were motivated to express and give their supports to Bakiev's authoritarian regime. By publicly acknowledging Bakiev as a democratically elected leader, it legitimized his authority in Kyrgyzstan as well as in the international stage. As the other Central Asian leaders mirrors each others political practices, the revolutions in Kyrgyzstan brings fears and possibility that such events can exist in the Central Asia. This notion quickly spread to fellow Central Asians, that one day, people in the Central Asia will rise against the tyranny of their authoritarian leaders as they hunger for true democratic reform.

B. China

Alongside the erosion of democracy in a number of strategic states, in recent years there has been a consolidation of dictatorship in authoritarian regimes. Opposition parties and civil society groups have been subjected to heightened repression and intimidation. In their obsession with survival, authoritarian regimes have carefully observed nearby

democratic transitions and derived lessons for preventing their replication at home (Diamond 2008, 83). In the case of China, for the last decade it has been supporting countries regardless of their political systems, as long as they traded with the China. Regarding the importance of Kyrgyzstan for China, reports say that “between 2004 and 2006, Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan tripled to 1.64 billion dollars” (Dujisin 2009). Kyrgyzstan serves as a main link to Eurasia, thus the support for Bakiev’s regime from China was significant. However, supporting democratic establishment would likely be more beneficial for China, as a free and less corrupted market would accelerate trade and allow for more entrepreneurs to engage in free market economy. .

C. Russia

According to Professor Anarudha Chenoy, Russia is a natural partner of Kyrgyzstan². Bakiev’s authoritarian leadership prevented a spillover effect for democracy after the Tulip Revolution for neighboring countries, including Russia. The demonstration effect or spillover has been explained by Huntington as an effect encouraging the spread of democracy in one country to another one (Huntington 1993, 100). Dujisin has articulated in the “New Great Game” article at Inter-Press Service Agency that “Following a meeting between Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev...in which Kyrgyzstan secured a two billion dollar package of loans and investments, Bakiev had ordered the U.S. to close its base.” (Dujisin 2009). Russia’s motive to support Bakiev was same as the neighboring countries as well as a desire to acquire a stronger position in the Central Asian region’s modern version of the “Great Game.” Alarmed that the Orange revolution in neighboring Ukraine and the other post-communist “color revolutions” might spread to Belarus, President Lukashenko, along with other post-Soviet autocrats and Russia,

² In order to see the full video interview please follow the link on youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOOVnyXu_Cw, April 18, 2010

spurred efforts to destroy the opposition's organization (Diamond 2008, 84).

The Shanghai Organization for Cooperation (SOC), an organization created and supported by autocrats in the Central Asia region, does not promote changes in political landscape in the Central Asia. The major focus of this organization is economic development, cooperation and cultural exchange, whereas the issues of human rights and democracy remain untouched. This provided confidence for Bakiev that not only did he have the support of the surrounding states, but he was doing the right thing. This could be referred to the "group think" syndrome, which made the President convinced that his authoritarian rule was the best way to govern. Looking at SOC leaders, Bakiev might have forgotten the cultural, economic, social, and historical nuances that made the people of Kyrgyzstan different from those in the neighboring countries. It is hoped that Russia may someday recognize that supporting an authoritarian regime in Kyrgyzstan will not succeed; for the second time in five years, citizens expressed their discontent with the "dark leaders" of pseudo-democracy and removed them from power. This is something Russia and other nearby countries should take consideration to while developing their foreign policy.

D. USA and West

The inconsistent foreign policies of Western governments regarding democracy in the region have been reported by Dukenbaev and Hansen (Dukenbaev et al 2003, 28). This allowed the Kyrgyz ruling elite to come to the conclusion that in reality democracy was not a major concern of the West, and especially not of the United States. The United States has seemed far more interested in issues of stability, security and the protection of its narrow political, economic and military interests than in democracy *per se*. In fact, Kyrgyzstan, as well as its more authoritarian neighbors, continued receiving both political and economic support from Western countries in spite of their violations of human rights and democratic

governance (Dukenbaev et al 2003, 28). It is assumed that democratic states help other democracies to emerge, whereas the U.S. was seemingly indifferent. As the New York Times put it, “the American military installation...is a critical transit support center for United States operations in Afghanistan” (New York Times 2010) and thus the U.S. has chosen to ignore President Bakiev’s “brutal and corrupt ways,” for which he had been criticized by domestic actors. While the U.S. struggles to end its conflict in Afghanistan, it is necessary not to let radical elements of fundamentalists reorient themselves towards fragile Kyrgyzstan. Thus, it is equally important to promote democracy in Kyrgyzstan and stability in Afghanistan. It is not the matter of giving up interests in one country for the sake of another. A dissatisfied and oppressed population in Kyrgyzstan is vulnerable to the efforts of radical organizations seeking support to overthrow the government. A stable and democratic Kyrgyzstan is less vulnerable to the flow of radical forces.

As has been discussed earlier in this paper, the 2005 Tulip Revolution and the April 2010 Revolution, there were several major political events that took place where the U.S. did not stand up to defend the vanishing democracy. The U.S welcomed the visit of the corrupt Maxim Bakiev to the country for the discussion of future investments after the son of the President was appointed the head of the Central Agency for Development and Investments. Ironically, while Maxim Bakiev was on his way to Washington, D.C. to be feted by the U.S. Government, the Revolution of April 2010 took place and put an end to Bakiev’s regime.

The silence of the U.S towards the anti-democratic actions of President Bakiev and its eagerness “to triple the rent, to \$60 million” (New York Times 2010) of the Manas Air Base sent a strong signal to the Kyrgyz authorities that there would not be support for the political opposition nor criticism from U.S authorities towards the oppression that was taking place in the country. Therefore, Bakiev’s regime became harsh towards its own citizens and capitals were accumulated by Bakiev’s clan at the cost of crippling the national treasury.

After oppressing all of the political opponents, public discontent reached to its boiling point where revolts finally took place. Flattered and fattened by international support, the Bakiev authorities undervalued the power of the people that had granted them the power, forgetting that people could take it back at any time. Perhaps the passive reaction of the U.S. could be explained due to the Bush and Obama Administration's fixation on the war in Afghanistan, but that is no excuse for the lack of supporting democracy in their foreign policies, as the democracy of Kyrgyzstan was rapidly dismantled.

On September 20-22, at the 2010 Summit in U.N. headquarters in New York, President Barack Obama gave a speech that was marked by his passionate approach aimed at promoting democracy and development assistance. It was an important speech, as it gave the right signs to the fragile democracies that the U.S. would be there to stand with them and address those issues. However, while it provided hopes that America might have woken up and was able to take a firm stand on promoting democracy, the actions of the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan did not reflect these values and put a big question mark whether that promise would be kept.

While the West understands the importance of support for democratic development, contradictory policies of cooperating with authoritarian leader in the hope of improvement serve as barrier towards spreading democracy. As Przeworski has expressed the "...final point is not that democracy can be, needs to be, improved, but that it would be worth defending even if it could not be" (Dahl 1993, 17). This point needs be taken seriously by the Western states which are powerful enough to help to defend fragile democracies using economic and political tools and who have the moral imperative to do so.

As Benjamin Barber has commented, "And for the development aid its necessary not to leave the country half supported and half left out. In the increasingly interdependent world, it is not enough in a world to contemplate the nature and the fate of democracy exclusively

from a domestic perspective.” This articulation reflects the reality of Kyrgyzstan as well.

E. Impact of External Media

In the modern world media is considered to be the fourth power. As the International Crisis Group reported, superficial stability might look appealing to the West in an attempt to pursue interests related to the Afghan war. Though media control and harassment and political jailing and repression might have created an appearance of stability, ultimately it wasn't enough to control the growing anger in society (International Crisis Group 2010).

Mass media has had a big impact on the development of democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Since the Soviet times, Russian television has been the major entertainment tool. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia retained its television coverage in the region and with a variety of high-quality programs and world-wide news coverage, it remains popular in Kyrgyzstan. While Russian television propaganda targets the Russian population, it also works on the Kyrgyz population at the same time with the same impact. Putin appears as a President with excellent skills and often it can be heard in Kyrgyzstan that, “We need our own Putin. The Russian media interference in the 2010 parliamentary elections as well as Russian media's trashing of the Bakiev clan in the month leading to April 7 – hard to overstate the importance and generally pernicious effect of Russian media and propaganda though, at least once, the interests of Russia and democracy converged. On February 8, 2011 the newly established Kyrgyz government launched Kyrgyz television programs on the frequencies that had been previously been used for Russian broadcasts. This is an attempt to reduce the Russian media domination in the country and to increase the quality of the Kyrgyz media. Prioritizing National television over ORT (Public Radio Television) stirred harsh criticism from the Russian embassy in Bishkek. The embassy, however, did not specify which of the agreements had been violated (Marat 2011). The Russian reaction was negative

and expressed an expectation that Russian media would soon be back to its former position.

Western media has had its presence only on radio, but even radio programs were interfered and prohibited under the Bakiev's regime. NDI has supported the regular broadcast of political debate television programs on several Kyrgyz television stations since 1999. These programs have helped increase the public awareness of key national issues, such as constitutional reform, women's rights, and economic reforms (NDI).³ Those programs were shut down in 2008, a few months after the 2007's parliamentary elections. After the destruction of objective media, Kyrgyzstan was left without access to objective information, leading to a further deterioration of democracy.

After the April 7th, 2010 Revolution, The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, who's been working in Kyrgyzstan for more than a decades, quickly re-lunched television debates in both the Kyrgyz and Russian languages that had been shut down by the Bakiev's regime since 2007. These TV shows quickly gained popularity as people could watch politicians discussing questions in a live broadcast.

F. Internal and External Factors Brought Together

As I have noted, Freedom House has indicators to determine the level of various freedoms that influence democracy. According to the latest report on Kyrgyzstan, factors that comprise democracy have declined in their level of freedom.⁴ As previously discussed under the "Leadership" Chapter, the table by Freedom House shows a high correlation among the units that comprised together reflect the level of democracy. The data shows the declining of levels of freedom in eight areas since the year 2000. Now, taking a look at the financial report, "Recent U.S. Contributions to the Kyrgyz Government and Economy" by the U.S.

³ Programs in with detailed description can be found at the official website of the National Democratic Institute, [Kyrgyzstan](http://www.ndi.org/kyrgyzstan), at <http://www.ndi.org/kyrgyzstan>

⁴See Table 1 at 4

Embassy in Kyrgyzstan, the amount of funding has been increasing.⁵ Thus, as democracy indicators have declined, funding, primarily to secure the future of the U.S. transit airbase, has increased.

⁵See the financial report at the official website of the US Embassy, Bishkek, Recent U.S. Contributions to the Kyrgyz Government and Economy at http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/tc_recent_contributions.html (visited 29, November 2011)

V. CONCLUSION

Despite being a small country located in the heart of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is a geopolitically important location for the superpowers. This paper has discussed that, after the Tulip Revolution in 2005, democracy has not fully developed, due to the lack of leadership and the interference from external forces. If Russian and neighboring countries' attitudes towards supporting an anti-democratic regime is understandable, the position of the U.S remaining silent about the brutal Bakiev's regime is bewildering. Yet, the question of whether the war in Afghanistan justifies the sacrifice of democracy in Kyrgyzstan is another important discussion topic to be analyzed in another paper, though it is in itself a false dilemma. Despite all the external manipulations, the people's commitment, in Kyrgyzstan, for democracy proved to be strong, as it was shown in the April, 2010 revolution. The will for democracy and freedom was irresistible. To achieve the true democracy, the citizens of Kyrgyzstan were ready to go to jail, suffer harassment, and even sacrifice their lives.

In the light of this struggle for equal rights, free and fair elections, and for participation in decision-making, the people of Kyrgyzstan are building off past precedents and developing a new culture of democracy. If people are protesting on their own, as they are today in a democratic Kyrgyzstan, it is a sign of life and progress. Depending on foreign powers to establish democracy is not enough for Kyrgyzstan. The two revolutions have demonstrated that the Kyrgyz people are ready and willing to continuously fight an autocratic system, until that autocrat and authoritarian system are removed. Bruce Russett argues that conditions affecting the success of democratization might come from internal factors; however the number of conditions from the outside might be important as well (Russett 2000). This statement happens to be true in the case of Kyrgyzstan. More favorable international conditions and the proper exercise of international pressure could have made a difference and

might have led to political change and progress without the bloody revolt of April, 2010. Nonetheless, the revolution took place and Kyrgyzstan is dealing with the growing pains of any new democracy – the inability of political leaders to form coalitions, the greed for power, the commitment to nationalistic views, and corruption. Much more has to be done in this great experiment. Be that as it may, there is still a great lesson for external forces that instability in Kyrgyzstan due to repression and authoritarianism might well have a spillover effect and fear of that should be greater than the fear of a democratic neighbor, fledgling in its democratic practice, but committed to democratic values through culture and temperament.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Barber R.B.. 2003. Strong democracy. *Participatory politics for a new age*. University of California Press.
2. Bigg C., “*Otunbaeva Inaugurated As Kyrgyz President*”, July 3 2010, <http://www.speroforum.com/a/35992/Otunbaeva-Inaugurated-As-Kyrgyz-President>
3. Burns J.M.. 2003 .Transforming Leadership: a New Pursuit of Happiness. *Atlantic Monthly*.
4. Dahl R, Shapiro I, and Cheibub J.A., 1993. *The Democracy Source Book*. The MIT Press.
5. Diamond, L. (2008). *The Spirit of Democracy*. New York: Times Books
6. Dujisin Z.. 2009. A New Great Game Begins. IPS News, September 2. <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48294>
7. Dukenbaev A. and W.W.Hansen, “*Understanding Politics of Kyrgyzstan*”, DEMSTAR Reseach Report #16, September 2003 www.demstar.dk
8. Freedom House Report on Kyrgyzstan. 2009. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/Kyrgyzstan-final1.pdf>
9. Huntington P.S..1993. *The Third Wave: democratization in the late twentieth century*. University of Oklahoma Press: Norman.
10. IFES Election Guide.2011. Kyrgyzstan. www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=117
11. International Crisis Group. 2001. Kyrgyzstan at Ten “Trouble in the Island of Democracy”, Asia report #22. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/022-kyrgyzstan-at-ten-trouble-in-the-island-of-democracy.aspx>
12. International Crisis Group. 2010. “*Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses*” Asia Briefing #102, April 27, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/B102-kyrgyzstan-a-hollow-regime-collapses.aspx>
13. Kennedy J.F.. 1956. *Profiles in Courage*. New York: Harpers and Brothers.
14. Lane P.R..2003. Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS) and Economics

- Department. *The International Community and the CIS-7**. March 10.
<http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/research/tep/2003/TEPNo3PL23.pdf>
15. Marat E. 2011. Major Russian TV Channel Sidelined in Kyrgyzstan. *Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 29*. February 10.
[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=37494&cHash=469dfbb80a9c4fb4eb3c56980f8a6816](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37494&cHash=469dfbb80a9c4fb4eb3c56980f8a6816)
 16. McClelland, D (1970) *Two faces of power*. *Journal of International Affairs*, 24 (1), pp 29–47
 17. Misha Japaridze. 2010. Manas Air Base (Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan). *New York Times*, April.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/t/transit_center_at_manas_kyrgyzstan/index.html
 18. National Democratic Institute. 2003. NDI statement following the February 2, 2003 Constitutional Referendum in Kyrgyzstan
www.ndi.org/files/1545_kg_statement_020403.pdf.
 19. *New York Times*. 2010. Name that revolution. April 10.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/opinion/10sat3.html>
 20. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 2000. Press Release “Kyrgyz presidential election fails international standards.”
<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/53043>
 21. Pannier B.. 2010. With First Son's New Role, Kyrgyz Government Remains A Family Affair. *Radio Liberty*, November 5. http://www.rferl.org/content/With_First_Sons_New_Role_Kyrgyz_Government_Remains_A_Family_Affair/1870575.html
 22. Russett, Bruce, and Harvey Starr. 2000. “*From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and Conflict in the International System*.” In *Handbook of War Studies*, 2nd ed., edited by Manus Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
 23. US Embassy, 2010 Bishkek. Recent U.S. Contributions to the Kyrgyz Government and Economy.
http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/tc_recent_contributions.html