

**EXPLORING RELATIONSHIP AMONG RESIDENT DISSATISFACTION,
COMPLAINTS AND REWARD IN THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT:
LOCALLY UNWANTED LAND USE DEVELOPMENT**

By

Kyung Bok Lee

THESIS

Submitted to
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY

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ABSTRACT

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This study examines the effects of distributive, procedural, interactional justice on resident's satisfactions for the development of locally unwanted land use (LULU) that does not meet expectation. Government provides public facilities in the form of urban development project in order to support regional residents' life. For the development of locally unwanted land use (LULU) as urban development project managed by government to support regional residents' quality of life, degree of satisfaction may differ based on how it is preceded in terms of implementing the project in the residential area. For this development plan, residents were allowed to receive government's reward or were given a partial subsidy on new locally unwanted land use development.

This study explored residents' satisfaction by applying justice dimension on locally unwanted land use (LULU) development. In particular, this study proposed the research question as follows; i) How negative perception in distributive justice affects resident's dissatisfaction; ii) How negative perception in procedural justice affects resident's dissatisfaction; iii) How negative perception in interactional justice affects resident's dissatisfaction; iv) How resident's dissatisfaction effect to complaints intention; v) How (What) the high intensity of complaining behavior effect to resident's decision against locally unwanted land use (LULU) development; vi) What will government reward to resident's mind toward to locally unwanted land use (LULU) development; and vii) What will government reward that lead to satisfactory and public confidence level to the residents on the locally unwanted land use (LULU) development; Moreover, this study examines resident dissatisfaction on government unwanted public development plan by applying different rewards.

To measure the findings, this paper conducted surveys, and applied statistical analysis using chi-square, factor, and regression. The result indicated that government rewards negatively affected resident attitudes toward the locally unwanted public development. This study provides the both theoretical and public policy implementation on the urban development plan.

Keywords: Urban Development, Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU), Justice, Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, Reward.

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Dedicated to Marcella EunDuk Choi

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I. Introduction

Urban development planning plays a crucial role in settling a possibly small town to one of the major cities in the area. There is a political and technical aspect on maximizing on utilization of land and the structure of the urban environment. There are various plans to be made in order to enforce the growth of a city or an area. The concept of sustainable urban development is a complex activity that requires a set of complementary approaches and appropriate strategies incorporating aspects such as: attractiveness of cities, support for innovation, job creation, and development disparities within cities, governance and funding of urban regeneration (Tenea D., Stan M.I., Vintilă D. 2013). While promoting a positive outcome from the process of the planning, there are some plans that might not be the ideal for the residents in the area such as applying the locally unwanted land use in developing areas.

The practical definition of sustainable development leads to new socioeconomic and environmental requirements imposed to urban ecosystems on which cities adapt through a process of adjustment and remodeling aimed to improve living conditions in a city, named urban regeneration, in which housing policies play a critical role (Petrisor A. I. 2010). The purpose of locally unwanted land use (LULU) plan is waste management. Urban development policy is essential to the appropriate planning by both national government and regional government regarding needs and wants, but developments often make little progress due to opposition from the residents who live in government development area. In case of derelict land include waste water treatment facility, garbage incineration plant, crematorium facility, highways, low-rent housing, and hazardous facilities. The projects create political tension, for as a society we want them, but as individuals - and often as communities – we do not want them close to us. They are locally unwanted land uses, or LULUs (Popper 1985).

While are different types of waste that will come to locally unwanted land use for

decomposition, part of urban development planning is to practice and exercise on how to minimize any disposals to eventually improve economics efficiency, impact on health of residents through recycling and proper management. Hence, it is inevitable to build a locally unwanted facility in order to proceed with urban development plan for a greater outcome in the area. Opposition arguments, after the initial angry phase, usually express three specific concerns: the perceived threat to property values, personal security, and neighborhood amenity (Dear 1992). Also there may be disadvantage in residing area where locally unwanted land use (LULU) is being located, such as diminishing property value in the area. Government subsidy or compensation can recover the residents' property values, as with reward for depreciation on homes near locally unwanted land use. Sometime resident want to have unwanted land use development in their community. For instance, location of locally unwanted land use development often decided through competitive bidding schemes for sufficient government reward (Inhaber 1992), where locally unwanted land use impact can be accepted and relevant to adequate compensation levels (Popper 1992).

By Considering the Cost of the implement strategy to decrease its event has been a significant key to many quality improvement programs. General perception of public can be easily understood that a quality of life is more important than well-structured materials' well-being. Considering the environment in the urban development, it is worthwhile to study on residents' dissatisfaction in case under this type of circumstances. It is necessary to investigate on residents expectations in government's program in the locally unwanted land use in the development area, and predict residents' responsive behavior based on the act from the government. This study posits that each individual's responses to a various conflicted situations are perceived justice. Perceived justice has very wide boundary of its meaning, particularly three dimension of justice: distributive justice, interactional justice, and

procedural Justice (Alexander and Ruderman 1987; Bies and Shapiro 1987; Clemmer and Schneider 1996).

Blodgett et al., (1993) mentioned that interactional justice concentrates on the way of behaving how the complainant was treated whereas the perceived fairness of the policies and procedures implanted by government. This development was proceed either with mutual understanding and respect between government and residents, and was able to take care of the residents' decision making or, alternatively, residents were asked more government's supports on this public facility development. Subjects were asked to read seven hypothetical scenarios of locally unwanted land use development being moved forward in your town, and asked residents how they feel about this particular type of public development and what type of government support they seek that would satisfy them.

The purpose of this study is to further examine the linkage between perceived justice and post complaint behavior of residents in the area as consumers. More specially, this study will access the effects of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on residents' negative perspectives and supporting of negative intentions. This will also investigate the residents' perception on the several factors of locally unwanted land use development which affect to the resident's dissatisfaction, and measure their dissatisfaction on the justice created by the government. This study is interesting in that we explored the effect of justice; this way, we can verify the relevant to importance of justice that could change residents' perception by the government evaluating their dissatisfaction.

By considering the impact of each dimension of justice on post complaint behavior of residents in the development area, government can concentrates more on the negative viewpoint of complaint management. This research will help the government to develop more effective and cost efficient methods for resolving resident' dissatisfaction, which will turn out

with higher levels of efficiency. In other words, this research is to examine what aspects of resident is important to residents when they are making a decision on locally unwanted land use development, how much the resident is dissatisfied with government policy or development plan, how the resident's perception is influenced by the dissatisfaction, and how much the government's monetary/non-monetary rewards are differed by the residents dissatisfaction and judgment.

In the development area of locally unwanted land use (LULU), the government's role is to understand the current status of the residents and how the government's policy (i.e. monetary rewards, subsidies) can influence residents' dissatisfaction into something positive. This study will set the residents' dissatisfaction as a center of the investigation, and how the three justices can influence their perception. Furthermore, this study also examines whether the residents' dissatisfaction contribute to the improvement of the government rewards as post-factor.

The following research questions will be investigated:

1. How negative perception in distributive justice affects resident's dissatisfaction?
2. How negative perception in procedural justice affects resident's dissatisfaction?
3. How negative perception in interactional justice affects resident's dissatisfaction?
4. What the effects of residents' dissatisfaction effect to complaints intention?
5. How (What) the high intensity of willingness complaints effect to resident's decision against locally unwanted land use (LULU) development?
6. How (What) the high intensity of actual complaints effect to resident's decision against locally unwanted land use (LULU) development?
7. What will the government monetary reward do to resident's mind toward to government

locally unwanted land use (LULU) development?

8. What will the government non-monetary reward do to resident's mind toward to government locally unwanted land use (LULU) development?
9. What affects a reward that lead to satisfactory & confidence level to the residents on the locally unwanted land use (LULU) development?

Procedures from government development plan are assessed by residents' perception and their own interests; hence, the residents' behavior is decided according to their own experiences based on their expectation level of government rewards. The resident dissatisfaction and satisfaction are subject to assessment on the government rewards, and it may influence the government's monetary/non-monetary rewards. This study will figure out the correlation between the resident dissatisfaction and government development policy and reward, and how it was proved by many previous researches in various fields.

II. Literature Review

Numerous studies have attempted to find and explore the correlation between dissatisfaction and reward as well as dissatisfaction and justice including the effectiveness of non-monetary reward. This paper studied various theories and models that support residents' dissatisfaction related studies reviewed in chapter III which could applied on residents' dissatisfaction related studies. It reviewed many of diverse satisfaction, justice and reward related academic journals and text books, particularly for measuring resident' dissatisfaction level. Urban development and redevelopment projects are continuously driving and these projects will continue on for years. Locally unwanted land use must be part of this development project to give the area a function and provide convenient community.

Furthermore, analyzing the importance of applying distributive, procedural, and interactional justice in these development projects are essential in order to conclude what can give the most dissatisfaction on residents in the area, and how it will lead the government into effectively proceed with the projects. Another crucial factor that comes into play would be the type of reward that can either promote or discourage residents' satisfaction, and how they change their behavior afterwards.

2.1 Urban Development Plan

Urban planning (urban, merged urban regions, regional, city, and town planning) is a technical and political process concerned with the use of land and design of the urban environment (Taylor 2007). Urban development including a major infrastructure such as airport, harbor, road and water networks. Urban planning and urban development provide a development of necessity for communities. Furthermore, government must consider diverse technical strategies including urban design, landscape architecture and policy implication and recommendation to fulfill community needs.

The concept of sustainable urban development is a complex activity that requires a set of complementary approaches and appropriate strategies incorporating aspects such as: attractiveness of cities, support for innovation, job creation, development disparities within cities, governance and funding of urban regeneration (Tenea D., Stan M.I., Vintilă D. 2013). Purely coming from the concept point of view, the idea of sustainable urban development is an attractive proposes for a long term benefit in potential growth in living standard and possible profit from incoming tourists. Example for Romania mentioned above is a perfect case of launching such development for everyone to enjoy as defined the territory of Romania as “part of the national wealth enjoyed by all citizens, including the management of development processes by activities of landscaping, urban planning or sustainable urban

development of central and local public authorities” (Tenea D., Stan M.I., Vintilă D. 2013).

“Successful and sustainable development of urban areas requires strong local and regional partnerships” (Critchley P. 2004). For this to occur, continuous communication between residents and local and regional governments is needed so that implementation of integrating the new developments into existing infrastructure that can transform the area for people’s anticipated future. Cities offer both source and the solution to challenges in sustainability in urbanized world (Grimm et al. 2008; Rees & Wakermagel 1996; Tan, Wang & Sia 2013).

Urban development policy and implications have started restructuring due to urban environment in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Bramley & Power 2009; Dickinson 2005; Krueger & Buckingham 2012). Government realized the importance of inner city re-development than continuous urban expansion in suburbs area.

Urban development strategies based on higher urban density are frequently demand to support environmental sustainability. Moreover, these development strategies focused on the cost-efficiency of infrastructure networks such as waste collection & recycling facilities, water & sewer network system and electrical distribution system. Government and urban planners considered to give multi-function in various infrastructure systems for communities and cost-efficiency. Accordingly, waste process heat from industry and power plants can be used for space-heating in dense urban developments; and use of motor vehicles can be reduced by facilitating walking, cycling, and public transportation in denser urban areas (Holden & Norland 2005; Kenworthy 2006; Van der Waals 2000). This can be more efficient in cities with higher density because of the potential of growth in sustainability by implementing creative options that can be less environmentally damaging, and it is possible because of the structure of urbanized areas leave a lot to be desired in terms of the application of the planning for sustainability.

However, the potential of the compact city policy to contribute to environmental sustainability is actually very limited when the environmental impact of consumption is considered (Holden & Norland 2005; Neuman 2005; Van der Waals 2000). There are other factors including less economically hence costly, intensive research and planning which the time given to complete is uncertain, and sustainability strategy may shift to more corporate focus and its commitment to the plan. High density urban development has the opportunity to positively impact urban sustainability. New urban development policy promotes to decrease car dependency, to increase the potential for spontaneous interaction and to create the sense of community in neighborhoods (Burton 2000; Nasar & Julian 1995; Talen 1999). This greatly increases the quality of life that the individual or groups in the developed areas receive basic needs and create a good quality of life. In a broader sense, success in environmental sustainability will lead to an open and accountable structure in governance toward communities.

Sustainability is the most important factor for conceptual framework of urban development, and urban planning. Therefore, urban development policy and plan can be useful methods create or maintain sustainable urban environment (Grimm et al. 2008; Holden & Norland 2005; Musakwa & Van Niekerk 2013). It always provides the steady economic growth that will meet the needs in present without negatively affecting the future generations.

2.1.1 Locally Unwanted Land Use Development

Despite of the necessity and usefulness to society that LULU offers to the area, it is common that residents and neighbors object to the facility being installed in their “backyard.” However, government can overcome these obstacles from resident by providing counterparts to balance the developed area with something more people-friendly and eye-pleasing features. Irwon-dong Maru Park in Korea and Niagara Park in Canada display great examples on

benefiting both local residents' enjoyment of public facilities while government can take advantage of the land to implement LULU in the area.



Location	Application	Original Function
		
Irwon-dong Maru Park, Korea	Sports Park	Wastewater Treatment Facility
		
Seoul Memorial Park, Korea	Parks, Gallery, Cafeterias	Crematorium Facility
		
Pango Clean Tower, Korea	Natural Park, Library, Observatory	Garbage Incineration Plant
		
Osaka Disposal Plant, Japan	Experience Space, Park	Garbage Incineration Plant
		
Niagara Park, Canada	Natural Park	Hydroelectric Power Plant

Table II-1. Case of Locally Unwanted Land Use Development with Government Non-monetary Rewards
Supplementary development for community (Refer to Online Resources).

Locally unwanted land use indicates the usage of land that could be useful to society, but there can be objections coming from the residents in the area it is being built in. While providing a community needs, such as power plants, dumps, prisons, roads, etc., the unwanted development projects occur amid tension to residents who live in that development area. Residents know well enough about what that particular development project. Residents even know how much that unwanted development project is important facility for their community. But as individuals, they do not want that kind of facilities near their houses. We call those facilities or development plans the locally unwanted land uses, or LULUs (Popper 1985). Frank Popper (1981) mentioned “Locally Unwanted Land Use” (LULU) to describe unwanted development projects that create residents opposition, such as crematorium facility, unsanitary waste incineration facility or waste water treatment facility. Initially, the “unwanted” term bring the assumption that opposition of the residents in public facility development area from the risk of public health threat and to the environment. Lately, the locally unwanted land use reference has expanded to highways, large scale mall, prison and facilities for low-income residents (Dear 1992; Susskind 1990). Informing and involving the public is usual for LULU such as public hearing, informational meetings to bring residents’ participation to communicate with the government. If they are able to identify and resolve any concerns at early stage, there can be a mutual outcome for residents and the government.

In core of every locally unwanted land use development contain huge negative externalities. Locally unwanted land development projects may include transportation infrastructures, waste treatment facilities or power production facilities. All facilities mentioned above produce noisy, danger, nasty smell and pollution. It may offend its residents because of such intrinsic features as its technologies or occupants. Or it may offend its consequences – increased traffic, industrial byproducts, or the problems its mismanagement

could create (Popper 1985). Following their negative externalities, LULU usually decreases residential property values surrounding them. In some cases, values may go down upon the news of LULU's entering in the area; lengthy construction period will leave the area undesirable to reside. However, none of the studies on real estate transactions in the vicinity of human service facilities has demonstrated a property value decline that could clearly be linked to the facility (Dear and Taylor 1982). Although the relationship between house prices to the planning of LULU can be complex, there are various options to compensate the residents where LULU is either in construction or operation.

The central problem the legislation addressed was the familiar resistance of almost any community to the presence of a hazardous waste facility nearby, a resistance characterized as the NIMBY (for Not In My Back Yard) or LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) problem and known to obstruct development of many facilities, both public and private (O'Hare and Sanderson 1993). Environmentalists come into play when it comes to this problem because of the safety issues among residents from having LULU nearby, and accuse government (or developer) of anything that can be environmentally damaging to the area. Environmentalists are concerned with output of locally unwanted land use. Especially, environmentalists are defending the residents who opposed to the LULUs against the larger group of consumers who benefit from their output (Popper 1985). However, locally unwanted land use development have been failed, changed or delayed for years because of environmentalists. If government built too small, too late, or in insufficient numbers; made too difficult, disputable, or expensive to manage these LULUs that eventually create anti-environmentalist sentiment among political moderates and conservatives (Popper 1985). Instead of environmentalists failed attempts to oppose proposed or operating LULUs in blind sights, they need negotiate to find the middle ground that can satisfy residents and

environmentalist and national/regional goals. Locally unwanted land use developments have become critical social problems. Waste water treatment facility, waste incineration facility and crematorium facility are evident of LULU developments. Residents generally accepted such developments by their needs. But LULU developments encounter strong opposition when it actually comes to the local community. LULU can be considered the same as NYMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome. Some people are simply averse to living near facilities perceived as threatening (Amour 1991).

This paper reviewed many of diverse urban development related academic journals and text books that particularly for Locally Unwanted Land Use. Table II-2 shows a summary of diverse researches regarding Locally Unwanted Land Use. Previous studies on the topic of Locally Unwanted Land Use have explored various issues such as the effect of Locally Unwanted Land Use development as table II-2 shows.

Year	Author	Title	Major Issue of Study
1981	Popper	Siting LULUs. Planning	Risk to human health and to the environment
1985	Pitney Jr.	Bile Barrel Politics: Siting Unwanted Facilities	LULU siting planning can cause pain and anger to local residents. He named "Bile Barrel" to LULU policies
1987	Morell	Siting and the Politics of Equity, in Lake,	Distrust of government, Cause Imbalance of Cost-benefit, Depreciation of property value, Deprecation of local image, Cause inconvenience to residents, Cause traffic congestion
1990	Susskind & Ozawa	Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector: The Planner as Mediator.	Provide an example of how LULU siting can be managed as a negotiation
1990	Stamato	Planning and politics: a winning strategy	High level of intervention approach to local residents and officials
1992	Dear	Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome	Depreciation of property value, Distrust of government
1992	Inhaber	Of LULUs, NIMBYs, and NIMTOOs	Sufficient rewards and compensation can be resolution for LULU siting issue
1993	Weisberg	One city's approach to NIMBY: how New York City developed a fair share siting process	An equitable LULU distribution process mat obviate the need for financial incentives or compensation
1993	O'Hare & Sanderson	Facility Siting and Compensation: Lessons From the Massachusetts Experience.	Resident's negative reaction comes from depreciation of their property value and unwanted sharing
1994	Petters & Eduljee	Environmental impact Assessment for Waste Treatment and Disposal Facilities	Cause Imbalance of Cost-benefit

Table II-2. Summary of Previous Study on Locally Unwanted Land Use Development (Extended from Choi & Lee 2010)

This paper reviewed many of diverse urban development related academic journals and text books that particularly for Locally Unwanted Land Use. Table II-2 shows a summary of diverse researches regarding Locally Unwanted Land Use. Previous studies on the topic of

Locally Unwanted Land Use have explored various issues such as the effect of Locally Unwanted Land Use development as table II-2 shows.

This illustrates that, instead of whether to proceed with LULU development or not, issues mentioned below are more complex in terms of overseeing different perspectives to satisfy both parties: local residents and the government. Conflict begins when both parties attempt to find solutions to convince resident to allow LULU development with condensation while overcoming the potential long term issues that can affect the area that LULU is being implemented on. This is why it is important to analyze from various studies to come to terms with how government can give the highest level of satisfaction to the resident and lead them to be more faithful to the government by providing what is essential necessity for them.

2.2 Justice

Overall perception of Justice

The fact that the dimensions of justice are independent is generally accepted. Distributive, procedural and interactional justices define overall perceptions of justice on complaints. Greenberg and McCarty (1990) pointed out those giving instructive, informative notes when evaluating a performance with poor review without explanation is more acceptable. According to Lind and Tyler (1988), studied in social psychology has proven that if interested parties do not receive any outcome what residents expected. This study has proven that estimation of procedural fairness affected by the suitability with resident decision making procedures are explained and by the manner in which the focal party is treated during the conflict resolution process (Bies and Moag 1986; Tyler and Bies 1989).

2.2.1 Distributive Justice

Distributive Justice has played a pivotal role in theory of justice in term of equity. Blau (1964) and Adams (1965) defined that the distributive justice has its origin in social exchange theory, which enhances the function of equity in following exchanges. The equity principle defines a fair exchange as one in which each party to an exchange receives an outcome in proportion to one's contribution to the exchange (Messick and Cook 1983). Therefore, according to Messick and Cook (1983), the general purpose of distributive justice is not only distributing thing to people, but also helping people to do fair exchanges so that can contribute to one's proportion of exchanges in equity. Deutsch (1985) suggested that the function of distributive justice is not only the role of equity in exchange and sharing, but there are others applied to this rule: need and equality. This indicates that distributive justice is design for people to share or exchange to each other in an equal manner for their own benefits. Moreover, Distributive justice issues are pervasive throughout society, existing in all situations where individuals or groups enter into exchanges (Deutsch 1985).

Theoretically, distributive justice is very closely related to people's dissatisfaction since it aims to the people's equity and equality in sharing and exchanges. Thus, if distributive justice is not working properly on fair distribution, it would effects on people's dissatisfaction. Even when systematically distributive justice results in even distribution to the residents for compensation, a problem might arise when, in this case, residents' expectations are not met with the government compensation provided. There is considerable evidence indicating that equity evaluation influence customer satisfaction, perceived services quality, and repurchase intensions (Fisk and Coney 1982; Mowen and Grov 1983; Oliver and DeSarbo 1988; Oliver and Swan 1989; Huppertz, Arenson, and Evans 1978).

In other words, distributive justice can influence to people's dissatisfaction by how it

evaluated based on the process of the distributive justice being implemented. It has three important elements to determine the value that reflects equity, equality, and need in the process of residents' interaction with the government and perceive the intention as to how distributive justice implemented can be beneficial to the residents (see table II-3). The researches done in the past support the importance of influential effect of distributive justice in residents' aspect of LULU implementation by the government.

Distributive Justice	Definition	Dependent Variable(s)	Representative Research
Equity	Provision of outcomes proportional to inputs to an exchange	Satisfaction, repurchase intention, word of mouth	Goodwin and Ross (1992) Oliver and Desarbo (1988) Oliver and Swan (1989)
Equality	Equal outcomes regardless of contributions to an exchange	Satisfaction, social harmony	Greenberg (1990a) Deutsch (1985)
Need	Outcome based on requirements regardless of contributions	Satisfaction	Deutsch (1985)

Table II-3. Definition of Justice Elements and Associated Research (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekar 1998)

2.2.2 Procedural Justice

In defining warnings, it may be useful to begin with the suggestion that dictionary defines “procedural justice is the idea of fairness in the processes that resolve dispute and allocate resources”. According to Thibaut and Walker, Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the policies, procedures, and criteria used by decision makers in arriving at the outcome of a dispute or negotiation (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Lind and Tyler 1988; Alexander and Ruderman 1987).

Procedural justice considers the equity and the fairness of the procedure are significant factors when residents make a decision on LULUs. And procedural justice can compare with distributive justice. Seen from fairness factor's point of view, Leventhal,

Karuz, and Fry (1980) mentioned. “Fair procedures are consistent, unbiased and impartial, representative of all parties’ interests, and are based on accurate information and on ethical standards.” (Leventhal, Karuz, and Fry 1980). Fair procedures also allow focal parties to provide input into the decision (Greenberg and Folger 1983; Goodwin and Ross 1922). Government’s successful decision and implementation of the plan will depend on the fair procedure of job performance.

Sometimes, the governmental work have shown procedural justice in specific part of their role where fairness and justice are needed. Moreover, Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) proved that legislative setting has provided the crucial factors of procedural justice (Barrett-Howard and Tyler 1986; Folger and Konovsky 1989; Tyler 1987). Procedural justice seems to be a simple concept, main point that appears especially related to resident’s complaints is feedback speed with which the discord is resolved (Hart et al. 1990; Kelley et al. 1993; Clemmer and Schneider 1996).

Based on this statement, procedural justice can reflect people’s dissatisfaction through their complaints. This dissatisfaction can give influence to focal group decision making, which may confront and interfere with the government’s project for the implementation of locally unwanted land use development. A number of studies have cited the negative emotional states and resulting dissatisfaction caused by the perceived unfairness of waiting too long in service situations (Katz, Larson, and Larson 1991; Venkatesan and Anderson 1985). When government has failed to achieve a development project through procedural justice, its result could give a bad influence to resident’s dissatisfaction within development area; hence, the overall outlook of the process can be considered as a “failure” in residents’ perspective.

Procedural Justice	Definition	Dependent Variable(s)	Representative Research
Process Control	Freedom to communicate views on a decision process	Satisfaction, commitment	Goodwin and Ross (1992) Kanfer et al. (1987) Lind and Tyler (1988)
Decision Control	Extent to which a person is free to accept or reject a decision outcome	Satisfaction, relationship investment	Brett (1986) Heide and John (1992)
Accessibility	Ease of engaging a process	Satisfaction	Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault (1990) Bowen and Lawler (1995)
Time/Speed	Perceived amount of time taken to complete a procedure	Anger, uncertainty, satisfaction, service quality	Fisk and Coney (1982) Maister (1985) Taylor (1994)
Flexibility	Adaptability of procedures to reflect individual circumstances	Market orientation, satisfaction	Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault (1990) Narver and Slater (1990)

Table II-4. Definition of Justice Elements and Associated Research (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekar 1998)

2.2.3 Interactional Justice

Interactional Justice refers to the manner in which people are treated during the conflict resolution process; for example, with courtesy and respect or rudely (Bies and Moag 1986; Bies and Shapiro 1987). Bies and Moag claim that how much important of person's attitude in conflict resolution process. People can easily dissatisfy with government official's attitudes depends on how the government approach to cooperate with people's dissatisfaction.

A previous study (Bies and Moag 1986) has dealt with various case studies such as job performance assessment, service encounter which verified some factors relevant with interactional justice for instance honesty. Clemmer (1993) conducted study with following factors courteous, kindness, meticulous, attractiveness, truthfulness and compassion, confidence by Parasuraman et al. (1985) and endeavor (Mohr 1991), concern and explicitness (Ulrich 1984). The most important factor of resident complaint is acceptance of blame (Goodwin and Ross, 1989) and proposing of an apology (Goodwin and Ross 1992; Bies and Shapiro 1987; Folkes 1984).

Government may need to offer an apology to people (residents) when they have treated people with lack of courtesy and respect. An apology can be a kind of reward or compensation to residents. Because Jacoby and Jaccard (1981) mentioned that communication is used in relation to the resolution of resident's complaints as a key factor. Interactional justice affects to resident's understanding on LULUSs. When the services do not provide sufficient communications, conflicts are created from residents' complaining that can grow quite rapidly. These ties to procedural justice where everything need to be transparent in order to properly communicate with residents, and notify them on a regular basis.

Limited empirical research has investigated the concept of international justice in a marketing context (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1991). Overall, interactional justice has proven that fair interpersonal treatment contributes to satisfaction with service encounters (Bitner et al. 1990; Tyler 1987), improved assessment of complaint handling (Goodwin and Ross 1989, 1992), improve the service quality assessment (Parasuraman et al. 1985), and attractive to repurchase intentions (Blodgett and Tax 1993). Government can also concentrate their efforts on complaints by residents who are dissatisfied with government's actions and attitude as it can be an easy fix as government need a right tone and action used to convince resident if they want to proceed with something in their way.

Interactional Justice	Definition	Dependent Variables	Representative Research
Explanation/Causal Account	Provision of reason for a failure	Attributions for failure, satisfaction, fairness	Bies and Shapiro (1987) Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault (1990)
Honesty	Perceived veracity of information provided	Satisfaction (complaint handling)	Goodwin and Ross (1989)
Politeness	Well-mannered, courteous behavior	Complaint evaluation, repurchase intention, satisfaction	Blodgett, Hill, and Tax (1997) Clemmer (1988) Goodwin and Ross (1989)
Effort	Amount of positive energy put into resolving a problem	Anger, satisfaction, trust	Folkes (1984). Mohr and Bitner (1995)
Empathy	Provision of caring, individual attention	Service quality, satisfaction	Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry (1988)

Table II-5. Definition of Justice Elements and Associated Research (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekar 1998)

2.3 Satisfaction

2.3.1 Consumer Satisfaction

Consumer satisfaction is central to the marketing concept (Anderson, Fornall, and Lehmann 1992). With evidence of strategic links between satisfaction and overall firm performance (Anderson, Fornall, and Lehmann 1992), it is easy to understand mission statement in concept of satisfaction, reward programs that target satisfaction as a goal and resident communications that announce reward for satisfaction accomplishment (Fournier and Mick 1999).

Government can find people's satisfaction through consumer satisfaction model. The outcome will reflect people's satisfaction as well as government performance. Moreover, government can predict the level of people's satisfaction on future development plan and minimize any potential conflicts.

A study on satisfaction has been proportional to increasing its importance. Overarching comparison standards (CS) paradigm has applied in many studies in the past years. CS paradigm has used widely on evaluation of performance for customer perceptions on products, compare performance and standard of products, and then form summary satisfaction judgments (Oliver 1989). These factors can be taken into an account by overseeing the process of the government's planning on satisfying residents' needs in exchange of its development plan.

It is very important on how the government manages residents in development area. People would compare government policies with previous or similar plans. Result will be influenced by people's trustworthiness towards the government based on the past experience and current status of government's priority.

2.3.2 Consumer Dissatisfaction

The popular view of confirmation/disconfirmation of presumption satisfaction standards is the essential determinant of satisfaction (Erevelles and Leavitt 1992; Oliver 1996). This comparison standards (CS) Paradigm proposed that confirmed standards lead to moderate satisfaction, exceeded standards lead to high satisfaction, and underachieved standards lead to dissatisfaction (Fournier and Mick 1999). In past studies, there are many features that were included to measure the positively balanced aspects of subjects' involvement to satisfy customers.

A few CS paradigm researchers have gone beyond these cognitively toned model formulations to consider the affective nature of satisfaction (Oliver 1996; Westbrook 1987). Oliver (1989) suggested five different types of satisfaction: i) contentment with major effect of acceptance, ii) pleasurable which is a positive reinforcement state that involves the evocation of a positive, iii) well-liked experience and a primary effect of happiness, iv) relief which is a negative reinforcement state occurring when an aversive state is removed, v) novelty with expectations of the unexpected that yield a primary effect of either delight or outrage as occurs when the product performs outside the range of expectations. The result of practical examination was more stingy structure than Oliver's original proposed (Oliver 1996). CS paradigm, however, contains a lack of level of residents' satisfaction in an emotional aspects and further study hopefully would act as a corrective role and take that into consideration.

Miller (1976) discusses "a model of the consumer satisfaction process" which suggests sorting out different types of expectations brought to the purchase/consumption situation and which conceives of satisfaction latitudes. Satisfaction is created from the interaction level expectation of future status of the project and evaluation of the finished project. Instead of

asking the consumer simply what he or she “expects” of a product or service in order to measure or predict satisfaction, the researcher should explicitly measure (at least be aware of) “types” of expectations the consumer might use as comparison standards for performance evaluations: The ideal, the expected, the minimum tolerable, and the deserved may reflect separate distinct levels of performance expectations for a given consumer (Hempel and Rosenberg 1976). Based on Miller’s theory, the degree of satisfaction of residents can differ depends on what type of compensation it is willing to provide although CS paradigm can still affect the relation accordingly to Oliver’s suggestion mentioned above.

In a simplified manner, the satisfaction process may be described as a servo-mechanistic system, somewhat like that suggested by Howard and Sheth (1969). The individual brings to the purchase/consumption situation a set of expectations, which are a function of his past history as well as of the current situation. The set of expectations is not fixed but is modified by active information search and by selective biases in perception and retention (by the residents of the government in this case). There is evidence, in fact that expectations themselves influence the perception of the outcome (Engel, Kollat, and Blackwell 1973; Olshavsky and Miller 1972). Expectations are determined through various factors done through processes such as information selection, rationalization, characteristics of individual, and etc.

Due to this reason, we can conclude the reactional behavior resulted from expectations and evaluation performance shift both ways. This is why there are differences in the system of expectancies among residents based on the factors mentioned above. When an the residents’ evaluation of performance and their set of expectations have interacted, residents are likely to feel “satisfied” if they perceives that the outcome is equal to or superior to the expectation, and dissatisfied if it perceives that the outcome is less than expected.

2.3.3 Complaining Behavior

Dissatisfaction is on the opposite side of satisfaction which relevant to discomfort feelings or actions, such as resident's complaining behaviors (Oliver 1997). Based on the definition of locally unwanted land use (LULU), and how people's perception of NIMBY towards LULU can cause dilemma when LULU comes as a project of urban development in the area. The dilemma can be create by the influence of environmentalists on residents of where locally LULU is nearby, and teach them to bluntly say no by just looking LULU's negative externalities.

In attempt to remedy dissatisfaction, the most studied consequence of CS is complaint behavior. The intensity of complaint behavior was often hypothesized to be directly proportional to the degree of dissatisfaction (Bearden and Teel 1983). When development is being criticized, depends on the degree of dissatisfaction, the outrage of residents can act out in protests to support against it to the point where no growth is desired in the area.

However, Significant evidence posits that complaining behavior is not only expression of the intension of resident's dissatisfaction but of some elements such as resident's perception of the attribution of dissatisfaction, resident's expectation on government rewards, cost efficiency of unwanted land use development project (Day 1984 and Singh and Howell 1985). This study can explain a large number of dissatisfied residents do not complain (Day 1984) although there are different type of complainers, and that determines the type of behaviour they choose to react to complain.

Previous research explored the relationship from dissatisfaction to complaining behavior and it suggests applying defensive marketing to handle complaints by dissatisfied residents (Chu, Gerstner, and Hess 1998) and to handle the relationship between residents and

government by examining constraints (Ping 1993). However the defensive marketing is structured, understanding the motivation of people's complaining behavior can accomplish to attain the "happy medium" of the unique circumstances of urban development and/or application of LULU in the area.

Many previous studies examine the correlation between resident's dissatisfaction and complaining behavior but not many studies examine this relationship in LULU development area. Residents need to categorize into two groups; i) residents who have intensity of willingness to complain, ii) residents who have intensity of actual complaints. This study examines how the dissatisfaction from LULU development affects to the intensity of resident's complaints.

2.4 Reward

It is more and more obvious that reward can relieve the dissatisfaction on locally unwanted land use development project. Main viewpoint on value sensitivity which explains the difference in feeling of how important of something (Hsee 1996, 1998; Hsee et al. 1999, 2009). A reward reflects the resident's dissatisfaction and it often moderate the resident's dissatisfaction. Residents can involve with number of crucial values which symbolize the level of resident's internal feelings (Diester and Nieder 2007; Rubinsten et al. 2002). Resident's conflicts occur when individual-resident sharing the limited resource with other neighbors, therefore government need to regenerating sustainable resource to resolve resident's conflicts (platt 1973).

Research so far either collects only an overall measure of both forms of intrinsic motivation or looks at situations that may not be readily generalizable to business contexts within firms, such as, blood donations or the voluntary contribution to public goods (Costa-i-Font et al. 2011; Reeson and Tisdell 2008). Besides potentially leading to unintended framing

effects due to an artificial framing of studies when testing only monetary rewards (Liebig et al. 2006; Melles 2001), this focus of extant work interferes with our ability to judge the pros and cons of monetary and non-monetary, affiliative rewards with respect to the crowding-out phenomenon.

Since it has become the most widely used frame for studying the crowding-out phenomenon in psychological literature that ‘yielded more than 400 empirical publications since the early 1980s’ (Gagne’ et al. 2010), it seems particularly suited to the present research question as it allows linking our work to prior findings, thus providing for a way to achieve cumulative growth in our knowledge on the interplay of rewards and motivation in influencing effort.

2.4.1 Monetary Reward

Some studies point to the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation by monetary rewards also in a business context (Fessler 2003; Weibel et al. 2010), whereas others fail to find such a link (Cadsby et al. 2007; Van Herpen et al. 2005). Much of the research in management and organizational control on rewards is inspired by economics – and especially principal-agent theory – and considers monetary rewards an effective and efficient means for fostering work effort (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Baker 2002).

The provision of rewards is a central element of organizational control systems (Anthony and Govindarajan 2006; Flamholtz et al. 1985; Malmi and Brown 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede 2012; Otely 1999) and management accountants are more involved than ever in the design of reward systems (Wolf 2011). This is where the government feels it as an option to compensate the residents in exchange of locally unwanted land use development. This option might have been kept as one as most researchers have focused on monetary rewards, and especially on performance-contingent monetary rewards such as bonuses (Baker

2002; Bouwens and van Lent 2006; Holmstrom 1979). Non-monetary, affiliative rewards – signals of appreciation and recognition by peers or superiors linked to a strengthening of social ties – receive little attention, even though these rewards are prevalent in business (Foss 2007; Frey 2007; Frey and Neckermann 2006).

On the counterpart, researchers disagree over the usefulness of monetary rewards for fostering work effort. Many scholars in our field – inspired by economics – consider monetary rewards both effective and efficient (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Bouwens and van Lent 2006; Kunz and Pfaff 2002). An increasing number of scholars claim, based on findings in psychology and education research, that monetary rewards simply substitute internal motivation with external motivation without necessarily increasing employees' overall willingness to work (Frey and Jegen 2001; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Weibel et al. 2010). According to this statement, the government might use this method to numb the potential dissatisfaction from residents; however, this also argues that it might not be a feasible solution in the long run.

2.4.2 Non-Monetary Reward

Deci (1971) also suggested that non-monetary, affiliative rewards should not shift the locus of causality, and hence, result in the net effect on effort corresponding to the gross effect. If this were to hold true, then non-monetary affiliative rewards would be a highly attractive means for fostering employees' willingness to exert work effort. The findings thus support Deci's (1971) suggestion that not all types of rewards exhibit the same relations with motivation and work effort. Hence, both research and practice stand to gain from taking the 'low-cost' non-monetary, affiliative rewards more into account when studying and designing organizational control systems. Based on Deci's theory, the government can subsidize to contribute to the community rather than individuals in the area as a cost-effective solution.

Previous study has shown that directly consumable, primary reinforcers show steeper temporal dis-counting than conditioned reinforcers such as money (Odum and Rainaud 2003). Rachlin, Raineri & Cross (1991) posits that monetary reward decrease possibility of resident's dissatisfaction towards LULU development. There are a certain conditions monetary reward shall moderate resident's internal motivation in cognitive social psychology. Previous research Lepper and Green (1978), Deci (1975), Deci and Ryan (1985) defined "the hidden cost of reward" for this cost.

2.4.3 Reward as a Mediator

Hardin (1968) posit that over-consumption of limited resources occur critical threat to people who passing over this truths. To support Hardin's point of view, Birjulin et al. (1993) stated that the dilemma arise when individual residents claim high compensations in limited sources. Birjulin, Smith, Bell (1993) mentioned that individual residents earn immediate benefit but, when all residents decide to claim higher government compensation, the action results in long term depletion of the resource because government can able to support residents with only a limited resources. In this statement, we can assume residents, as farmers in above theory, who feel more deserving of receiving excessive reward from the government out of their self-centeredness. Platt (1973) used a behavioristic approach to explain these situations, in which short term positive benefits for the individual are pitted against long term negative consequences for the group. Previous studies treated this issue under limited environment, because there were not many influence variables, for example confirmation and perceived level and competition.

There are three potential motives which influence to harvesting behavior in common –dilemma behavior: firstly, residents have intention to maximize the reward or to successfully

compete with others. Secondly, to claim the reward in responsible manner that will bring public benefits. Lastly, to conform to implicit group norms regarding appropriate harvesting behavior (Messick et al. 1983).

A number of commons dilemma studies have demonstrated the influence of competition on harvesting behavior (Baird 1982; Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee 1977; Luce & Raiffa 1957; Rosenbaum 1980). Rosebaum (1980) stated that residents tend to respond when others are perceived as competitive and Dawes et al. (1977) mentioned that when residents beside other neighbors to act competitively. This would apply to residents' compromising with the government in terms of allowing them to proceed with their plan on locally unwanted land use development. Based on the number of residents in the area, comparing the level of compensation would be highly likely as well as seeking a solution for oneself to receive more perks if possible. Empirical evidence of such an effect – commonly termed a 'crowding-out' of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic rewards (Frey 1997) – in work settings is still scarce (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Kunz and Pfaff 2002) and conflicting (Cadsby et al. 2007; Weibel et al. 2010).

This literature distinguishes human motivation according to its perceived source, the 'locus of causality', along a spectrum ranging from internal to an individual to external to that individual, such as joy, personal norms or to external pressure (Adler and Chen 2011; deCharms 1968; Frey 1997; Heider 1958; Kreps 1997). In addition, following the groundbreaking study by Deci (1971), work from this line of thought considers monetary rewards to influence the perceived locus of causality. Deci (1971) suggested that monetary rewards – if applied to a task that provides for task-related ('intrinsic') motivation – reduce this motivation's impact on work effort. This implies the method, and the type the government provides to the residents as rewards, the effect of residents' attitude can change which could

result in different perspectives of the government. That attitude may contain a satisfaction/dissatisfaction based on what and how government provided rewards.

Bickel & Marsh (2001) examine that drug abusers discount their drug of abuse more steeply than they discount money. Moreover, Odum & Rainaud (2003) stated that result of their study reflect the drug abusers and property of rewards. According to Odum & Rainaud's theory, if the government intends to use reward as a mediator, it should not be delayed in any sense otherwise the drawback on the level of residents' satisfaction will be significant.

III. Theoretical Background

3.1 Customer Satisfaction Theory

3.1.1 Contrast Theory

The contrast theory is that when the product performance does not meet the customer's expectation, the difference between the expectation and the outcome affects customer to exaggerate the disparity. (Engel and Blackwell 1982; Howard and Sheth 1969; Cardozo 1965) Yi (1989) explained that "individuals may shift their evaluations away from expectations if their expectations are inconsistent with reality."

According to the contrast theory, if the disparity is occurred by customers' perception between the expectation and the real product performance, the customers tend to evaluate the product away from the expectation. In other words, the disparity from high expectation with the poor product performance causes the understatement on the product, whereas the disparity from low expectation with the good product performance causes the overstatement on the product. The perception of product performance are enforced by the positive disconfirmation, and lowered by negative disconfirmation (Yi 1989).

3.1.2 Assimilation-Contrast Theory

Sherif and Hovland (1961) defined that there are level of acceptance and refusal in one's perception in the assimilation-contrast theory. Consumer only accepts when the difference between their expectation and performance is in their understanding degree, consumers have intention to assimilate the product rating face to their expectations (Yi 1990). Consumer's high expectation leads more favorite ratings on product quality, whereas low expectations lead to less favorable ratings. Nonetheless, consumers refuse when the difference between their expectation and performance is very large then a contrast effect occurs and one's perceived difference (Anderson 1973).

Oliver (1977) mentioned that expectation and disconfirmation are separately relevant to the post-exposure rating in Assimilation Theory. The possibility that these findings may be moderated by another variable as predicted by assimilation-contrast theory could not be addressed because the latitude of acceptance of the subjects was unknown. Ideally, an intra-subject analysis across a number of confirmation and disconfirmation experiences would be preferred. An individual's latitude of acceptance across experiences may be presumed invariant (as opposed to the latitude of acceptance across subjects), the boundaries of the acceptance region could be used to moderate the analysis. Assimilation would be presumed to hold within this boundary and contrast effects without.

In particular, research supporting the assimilation effect suggested that communication sharing something in common with members of an audience (e.g., views, values, lifestyles) were frequently judged to be similar or "just like me" (Oliver 1996). This perceived similarity facilitated communicator effectiveness, as the audience would assimilate the communicator's viewpoints into its own (Hart and Diehl 1994). Thus, the assimilation framework, like dissonance theory, Clary and Tesser (1983) emphasize hesitate on one's

acknowledge difference in hold position. It depends on one's capability to explain obvious difference. Satisfaction researchers were, not unexpectedly, taken with this interpretation as it complemented assimilation theory nicely and provided for an unambiguous test of which of the two theoretical interpretations would dominate satisfaction decisions (Oliver 1996).

The assimilation versus contrast controversy was fueled by a number of early studies, which appeared to support either an assimilation interpretation (Olshavsky and Miller 1972; Anderson 1973; Olson and Dover 1979). A study of Anderson (1973) is particularly instructive in this regard, as it tested assimilation against contrast and even provided a rationale for the operation of both in different situations. Specifically, Anderson argued that assimilation would hold when performance was similar to expectations, or close enough so that the consumer could view it as similar. Customers magnify the discrepancies between his expectation and actual product when customer receive product less worthy than customer expected.

3.1.2 Dissonance Theory

As originally described by Festinger, dissonance is a psychologically uncomfortable tension state (Festinger 1976). The dissonance theory states the dissonance theory states that dissonant can become psychological tension to residents. Dissonance and restore consistency will decreased by this psychological uncomfortable tension. Festinger (1957) mentioned that change customer's behavior and attitudes or contorted perceptions.

Writers have described it as "a negative toned affective state with drive-like properties" (Gerard and White 1983), and still others have viewed it as undifferentiated arousal "that is labeled and experienced as a negative (locally unwanted land use development) state if the individual attributes the arousal to his or her attitude-discrepant behavior" (Elkin and Leippe 1986). A number of authors use the general term anxiety, which

would seem to encompass both negative affect and arousal. Festinger (1957) mentioned that disconfirmed expectancy occur a dissonance and uncomfortable feelings regarding the cognitive dissonance theory. Person who receives dissonant ideas which decrease his/her psychological discomfort by changing or distorting (Yi 1990). Perhaps the more general phrase inconsistency-induced psychological discomfort is most suitable for the present context because the task taken is that dissonance start with tiny concern and expands over the purchase intention of customer (Oliver 1996).

Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance might lead one to predict the opposite effect. Dissonance theory would imply to customer who expect a high quality product and received a low quality product would perceive the difference and experience cognitive dissonance (Dissonance is aroused in this case because receiving a low-value product is not consistent with having expected a high-value product. Dissonance affect to its decrease which could be achieved by modifying the perceived differences (Cardozo 1965).

Dissonance may be reduced by decreasing the perceived disparity between expectation and reward, but it cannot be reduced by magnifying the disparity. Thus, under conditions of high effort, dissonance reduction processes would tend to decrease the differences in product evaluation between customers who were disappointed and those who were not. The expenditure of effort itself may produce a perceived disparity between effort expended and product received, whether customers obtained what they expected or less than they expected. Caldozo (1965) studied when customers make little effort to get a product, he/she can get low quality product than what they expected. Subjects in the low effort, high expectation condition had no reason to reduce the disparity between the expensive products they saw in the catalog and the inexpensive products they received. In fact, they were free to magnify the disparity. Evaluations of the product were lower in the low effort, high

expectation condition than in the high effort, high expectation condition because contrast processes were free to operate in the former condition, but were partially blocked in the latter. In addition, Cardozo (1965) finds that one possible method to reconcile the difference between expectation and product would be to raise the evaluation of the product received (Cardozo 1965).

The dissonance theory and the assimilation theory have common impact on anticipations (Yi 1990). Customer perceptions on products attributes can be influenced by their expectations and it can explain with the dissonance theory (Olson and Dover 1979). Nonetheless, many scholars failed to prove the dissonance effect (Cohen and Goldberg 1979). Yi (1990) stated that it is very difficult to prove that how disconfirmation creates dissonance. Festinger (1957) posits four scenarios which can cause dissonance. i) wiliness, ii) potential to disconfirmation, iii) unchangeable commitment towards the product, iv) incident of disconfirmation. Marginal expectations affect by product user comments and customer commitments. It is not quite clear that these factors meet in typical experiments. However, some previous studies are not quite clear due to given subjects. Yi (1990) pointed that clear evidence of disconfirmation is the necessary condition for the dissonance effect.

3.2 Equity Theory

Previous research in CS has been influenced by equity theory (e.g., Fisk and Young 1985; Mowen and Grove 1983; Swan and Mercer 1982; and Swan and Oliver 1985).

Individuals compare the level of compensation with their neighbors who are in community in the equity theory (Adams 1963). Yi (1990) mentioned that individual comparison is based on level of equity, which consumer find what they received and others have received.

Previous study in equity theory examine customer dissatisfactions through disconfirmation of equity expectations (Fisk and Young 1985). Inequity and disconfirmation

affect to one's satisfaction (Swan and Oliver 1985). Swan and Mercer (1982) found that the equity theory may be complementary to the effects of disconfirmation. If customer dissatisfied with their experience of either negative or positive inequity. They would express their dissatisfaction at the high level of negative inequity. Inequity cannot satisfy individual's satisfaction, differ from equity theory prediction. Individuals may consider positive inequity as fair occasion or satisfaction. Therefore, CS paradigm can be explained by equity theory. Nonetheless, it may need supplementary modifications.

According to equity theory (Adams 1963; Hatfield, Walster, and Berscheid 1978; Homans 1961), individuals are sensitive not only to absolute amounts of reward but also to the ratio of input to output, in which under-benefit is defined as a proportionally lesser ratio of output to input, whereas over-benefit is a proportionally greater ratio of output to input.

3.3 Justice Theory

3.3.1 Perceived Justice

Perceived justice refers to the degree whether an individual feels fair or not in an exchange relationship. Such perceived justice is a component of justice theory by Adams (1963) and is evaluated by the two principles, balance and correctness (Sheppard et al., 1992). Balance indicates a process which an individual compares his/her input and output to the other's under the same situation, and thus one would feel imbalanced in terms of the justice when his/her input exceeds the output, compared to the other individuals' under the same situation. Furthermore, correctness is a concept on whether an outcome/ output is right or wrong, and, to some extent, includes moral judgment related to the accurate outcome/ output. For example, when a laundry damages clothes through his carelessness and blames for the clothing quality not himself, the owner/ customer considers such damage is due to his carelessness and sees his blame as incorrect and unfair. Balance and correctness do not

always coincide; but both are crucial factors decisive to the level of individual perception on the justice. Hence, a consumer views a situation as fair or not, based on principle, either balance or correctness (Maxham III, 1998).

Oliver (1996) categorizes three types on the individuals based on the perceived justice; with a case of service failure, 1) the one who prefers to receive less; 2) the one who prefers fairness; and 3) the one who prefers to have more. He also states that the one who prefers to have more in service failure are more sensitive to the justice.

3.3.2 Distributive Justice

Distributive justice explains the level of justice through outcome/output which one would receive (Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1990; Gilliland, 1993). Consumers compare a product or service of a company to the similar or identical one of another company, thus distributive justice refers to the justice which a consumer perceives on the outcome of service recovery. The foundation of distributive justice theory is social exchange theory, which focuses fairness on the outcome/input ratios in the result of exchanges (Adams, 1963). This explains justice in exchanges and encompasses various distributive rules, including contribution, equality and needs rules; however, Goodwin and Ross (1992) argued most consumers prefer greater rewards than less regardless of such rules. Hence, any consumer who perceives unfair on the service failure will demand reward and compensation. He would judge whether such reward and compensation are fair or not, comparing his input/outcome ratio to the relevant comparison. He will be satisfied only if he is rewarded enough. For instance of tangible rewards, when a salesperson in a shopping mall causes inconvenience to a customer, s/he gives a discount coupon as the effort for service recovery; or when a consumer exchanges a product due to its poor quality, the salesman rewards the consumer

with small amount of money for transportation. In case of which a consumer perceives the reward is fair compared to his/her loss and inconvenience, you can refer this to distributive justice. The more tangible rewards given by a service provider for service failure, the higher level of satisfaction on service failure recovery as the level of distributive justice perceived by a customer increases. Other studies show that customers expects various forms of monetary rewards for the inconvenience caused due to service failure, however the degree and details of rewards vary according the circumstances (Bitner, 1990; Gilly and Geld, 1982).

3.3.3 Procedural Justice

Procedural justice is defined as a standard applicable in a process of solving a problem (Goodwin and Ross, 1992), justice of a method to obtain an outcome (Greenberg, 1990), and fairness perceived in a process to correct service failure (Mattila and Mount, 2003). To sum up, procedural justice denotes a process to yield an outcome, or more precisely an assessment over policies and procedures used to produce an outcome (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Greenberg and McCarty, 1990). Thibaut and Walker (1975) state that people do consider an outcome important but also have a great interest in procedural justice for the outcome. Lind and Tyler (1988) explained procedural justice with an example of traffic offenders in the court of Chicago; when their cases were dismissed without trial, the traffic offenders were often angry and dissatisfied though the outcome was favorable to them (no fine, no records or else). Distributive procedure cannot explain this, however procedural justice does that the court caused dissatisfaction of the offenders since it did not meet the standard of appropriate trial process. Tyler(1994) points out factors that can influence on the perceived justice in a process of service recovery are neutrality in decision making process, trust on a service provider, respect for customers, and information provided to customers in

service failure and recovery. Johnston (1995) said that customers/consumers desire to know what caused service failure during the process of service recovery. What makes procedural justice important in a process of service failure recovery is that customers would not perceive the process as fair if they were mistreated or hurt their pride, and thus they would not be satisfied.

3.3.4 Interactional Justice

Interactional justice is fairness perceived on the attitudes towards customers and interaction experienced in the service recovery process, namely the degree customers feel that they were fairly treated by an employee (Mattila and Mount 2003; Bies and Moag, 1986; Bies and Shapiro, 1987; and Blodgett et al., 1997). Existing studies say that interactional justice stresses on inter-relational procedures while procedural justice does on structural procedures in general. (Greenberg and McCarty 1990). That is, interactional justice is fairness relate to humanistic side of the other party (employee, seller, etc.), which can explain why customers see a certain case as unfair despite a positive outcome and procedural justice at present during the service failure recovery. (Bies and Shapiro 1987). For example, though a customer received a full refund (distributive justice) due to service failure and the refund process was prompt (procedural justice), if the employee served the customer with a long face and haughty attitude, the customer would be satisfied with the outcome, but not with the employee's attitude (interactional justice).

Various studies deal with interactional justice; Bies and Moag (1986) regards the justice as the degree of courtesy, attention, honesty and rudeness, and Clemmer (1993) as honesty, kindness and sensitivity; and Parasuraman et al. (1985) states that sympathy and confidence have a major impact on satisfaction. Goodwin and Ross(1992) defines interactional justice as

apologies, which is a crucial means to countervail rude or inappropriate behavior. Therefore, it is critical in failure recovery to sincerely apologize for the failure, even if a service provider cannot offer a typical reward. What's more, numerous studies conclude that interactional justice displays a positive relationship to satisfaction (Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault, 1990; and Blodgett et al., 1997).

3.4 Monetary Reward Incentive Model

Measurement of performance intends to influence on decision making and organizational behavior and motivate individuals and an organization to enhance their performance. And, rewards are a representative means to utilize to improve their performance (Milgram and Roberts, 1992). In other words, the higher expectancy between performance standards and one's own effort; the higher instrumentality between achievement result and incentive; and the higher value the incentive is to an employee, the higher effects of the monetary incentive, such as bonus. "Understanding the cognitive processes affected by monetary incentives and setting up compensation plans that target these processes can reduce these costs. Such plans likely will have the most positive effects on effort and performance (Cho, 2013)."

Nonetheless, rewards do not continue to guarantee higher performance. Kohn (1993) argue that rewards only lead temporary compliance, not continual changes in attitudes and behavior. Especially reward system can be a trigger factor which distorts measurement of performance. Monetary reward work well as a means of motivation when the expectation grows out of fair assessment on performance (Leonard, Beauvais and Scholl, 1999), it can however induce distorted strategic responsiveness from earning management (Weitzman, 1980).

3.5 Complaint Handling Framework

In private sector, many firms need to restructure their organization to adjust to customer's satisfaction (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekar 1998). And firms shall implement strategies that they learned from their service failures in order to reorganize the services reliability by customer monitoring (Hart, Heskett and Sasser 1990). Residents' complaints data can use as a foundation of complaint management. This data base can be used to correct the problems from residents by government LULU development (Lovelock 1994). Relevantly, the concept correlates to residents' complaining behavior from dissatisfaction of being aware what the government is planning: Locally Unwanted Land Use development.

Resident's complaints caused directly from the government LULU development because they are only feedback that provide the organization with an opportunity to recover effectively from the residents' dissatisfaction. This study examines the relationships in shaded area in figure III-3. Tax, Brown and Chandrashekar (1998) mentioned that factors that link satisfaction with complaint handling include both the direct effects and two-way interactions between the three justice concepts. Satisfaction with complaint handling is positioned as the mediator between the perceived justice evaluations and the relationship variables (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekar 1998). Previous experience with the government's LULU development plan is proposed to moderate the influence of satisfaction with complaint handling on both trust and commitment.




Figure III-1. A Framework for Examining Complaint Handling Relationships, (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekar 1998)

IV. Hypothesis Development

Oliver (1997) explained the level of difference of probability of occurrence by how predictive expectation such as disconfirmation of expectation or expectancy disconfirmation affects on consumer satisfaction. This study address that resident’ perceptions of justice vary in the community, where government development is needed for locally unwanted land use development, based on the situational behavior from the government and how residents respond. As shown in the proposed model (Figure IV-1), this study was set up to determine how justice experienced during the government’s attempted implementation of locally unwanted land use in the development area, and how dissatisfaction gets affected based on what government offer as compensation. Contrast theory explains the correlation between as well as resident’s expectation and actual outcome, and it explains resident’s dissatisfaction (Engel and Blackwell 1982; Howard and Sheth 1969; Cardozo 1965).

This study covers how residents perceived government reward, and how government delivered LULU development in local community affects the justice factors such as identified equality effort and response timing. Moreover, this study examines the relationship among residents dissatisfaction, cause of resident complaints resident’s complaining behavior, how it affects the behavior on the government, and how it ultimately affects the area for the implementation.




Figure IV-1. Proposed Model of Justice, Dissatisfaction, Complaining Behavior & Government Reward for Locally Unwanted Land Use Development (Modified from Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997 and Oliver 1980)

4.1 A Basic Framework of This Study

4.1.1 Effects of Distributive Justice on Resident Dissatisfaction

Perceived justice can be divided into three, and one of them being distributive justice (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997). Blodgett, Hill, and Tax (1997) consider that perception of distributive justice depends on one's complaining which mirrors his/her feelings. There are two important factors in distributive justice which are need and equality. When individuals received the same outcome regarding distribution of equality demands (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997). Moreover, distributive justice has correlation with exchange theory; numbers of marketing researches are focused on proper distributive rules as equity and need (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997).

There should be fairness in distribution, satisfying both rules that distributive justice applies, in terms of administration processing of the policy and reward compensation when it comes to government's service to residents for locally unwanted land use development. When there is inadequacy in distributive justice of government's policy and planning in locally unwanted land use development area, there is likely an increase in residents' dissatisfaction and complaints. Furthermore, because it is possible for residents to oppose to the government's policy, distributive justice plays an essential role to each individual in the development area. Based on the consideration this study hypothesized the effects of distributive justice on dissatisfaction.

H1: Negative perception in distributive justice from government's implementation of LULU affects increased level of dissatisfaction.

4.1.2 Effects of Procedural Justice on Resident Dissatisfaction

Based on the definition of procedural justice, in a study of service encounter incidents, Clemmer (1993) also identified flexibility, waiting time/responsiveness, and efficiency as dimensions of procedural justice. This definition matches a study by Blodgett, Hill, and Tax (1997) which considers perceived justice, classified into three, and procedural justice (e.g., process control, decision control, accessibility, timing/speed, and flexibility). These particular criteria reflect many concepts that also have been associated with residents' satisfaction and service quality (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985; Bitner et al. 1990, Hui and Bateson, 1991; Blogett, Hill, and Tax 1997). These factors are considered in terms of what can trigger residents' complaints and dissatisfaction on government's process of implementing policy in the development area.

Time loss is seen as both aggravating and expensive to the residents (Maister 1985). Waiting appears to be especially disconcerting when the customer is angry and uncertain to begin with, and believes that there is delay in government's implementation (Taylor 1994). It has potential to be a case of residents' complaint situation (Blogett, Hill, and Tax 1997). Hence, types of deficiency in the government's procedural action can result in different level of dissatisfaction.

There should be accuracy in procedural activities in government's policy in terms of administration processing of the policy and reward compensation as government's service to residents for locally unwanted land use development. When there is inadequacy in procedural justice of government's policy and planning in locally unwanted land use development area, there is likely an increase in residents' dissatisfaction and complaints. Furthermore, because it is possible for residents to oppose to the government's policy, procedural justice plays an essential role to each individual in the development area.

H2: Negative perception in procedural justice from government's implementation of LULU affects increased level of dissatisfaction.

4.1.3 Effects of Interactional Justice on Resident Dissatisfaction

Interaction or contingency theory assumes that no one-set of tools or processes is best in all circumstances. Out of three perceived justice, Interactional justice explains customer response regarding their complaining behaviors, and honest, politeness, empathy and effort are key components for this essential framework (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997).

The theory asserts that there is no one best way to design organizational communication systems because what is best for an organization, or a subunit within it, is a highly complex function of many variables. In addition, the theory emphasize the effect of one set of variables may be contingent upon the larger context in which they operate. The studies include Farace, Monge, and Russell (1977), DeSantics and Gallup (1987), Hiltz (1988), Hiltz and Johnson (1989), etc. According to Blogett, Hill, and Tax (1997), previous studies have identified a number of other elements associated with interactional justice, such as truthfulness, the provision of an explanation (Bies and Moag 1986), politeness, friendliness, sensitivity, interest, honesty (Clemmer 1993), empathy and assurance (Parasuraman et all. 1985), directness and concern (Ulrich 1984), and effort (Mohr 1991). These features play a key role in giving the government appropriate attitude towards the residents with hope of gaining their respect back in return.

With these features in check with the government, there should be active interactions between the government and residents in terms of administration processing of the policy and reward compensation when it comes to government's service to residents for locally

unwanted land use development. When there is lack of courtesy and respect in interactional justice of government's policy and planning in locally unwanted land use development area, there is likely an increase in residents' dissatisfaction and complaints. Furthermore, because it is possible for residents to oppose to the government's policy, distributive justice plays an essential role to each individual in the development area.

This hypothesis provides to signpost for the government service by addressing how much interactional communication is important to both residents and government representatives (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997; Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault, 1990; Solomon, Surprenant, Czepiel, and Gutman 1985).

H3: Negative perception in interactional justice from government's implementation of LULU affects increased level of dissatisfaction.

4.2 Effects of Dissatisfaction on Complaining Behavior

4.2.1 Effects of Residents' Intentions in Dissatisfaction towards the Government

Cho (2001) mentioned that satisfaction is the reverse side of dissatisfaction due to solution for feelings that related to discomfort such as residents' complaints (Oliver 1997). In previous study examines the correlation among satisfaction, dissatisfaction, trusty and ignorance in relationship (Ping 1993).

Previous research explains resident's complaining behavior as the procedure through dissatisfaction effects (residents or government representatives) or no response depends on the intention of complaining (Bearden and Teel 1983; Day and Landon 1977). Hirschman (1970) and Cho (2013) determines responses of dissatisfied residents as existence (opposing any government policies implemented), voice (protest against government for government's

faults and claim resident's expectation), also remain devotion (maintain trust toward to government).

If the government fails to provide adequate service/interaction according to the any one of the justices, an increase in residents' dissatisfaction will occur, and the increase dissatisfaction will affect complaints' intention. Depends on the degree and numbers of complaints towards the government, we can see the residents' perception on the government. When it comes to this circumstance, where complaints accumulated by the residents, the government needs to notice residents' growing negative perception and resolve the issue by measuring the level of their complaints.

H4: Resident dissatisfaction from government's implementation of LULU will have negative effect on complaints' intentions.

4.3 Effects of Complaining Behavior on Government Rewards

4.3.1 Effects of Residents' Willingness to Complain on Government Development Policy

On government's inadequacy in auctioning on the policy, it creates complaints among residents which results in increasing dissatisfaction and complaint's intention. In this case, government needs to consider a method to resolve the level of complaints and dissatisfaction. Rewards come in convenience on government's perspective, and providing such incentive will contribute to decrease in residents' complaints and dissatisfaction. Based on the level of residents' complaints, more opportunity for them to receive rewards will be likely.

H5a: The high intensity of willingness complaints from government's implementation of LULU will affect increased chance of getting rewards.

4.3.2 Effects of Complaints Resulting in getting Rewards from Government.

It will be important for future studies to further investigate in this matter using different situational types of complaints filed against government's LULU implementation. This displays strong preference of receiving a reward as compensation. Ultimately, based on this study, it is relevant to government's development policy government needs mutual understanding with residents by constant communication to find the "middle ground," to keep them away from dissatisfied.

Although this study proposes this outcome, the type that lead to satisfaction can be situational, and be dependent upon the initial subject to cooperation between the provider and recipients. Government may not be able to satisfy residents' complaints and dissatisfaction. When this occurs, residents can oppose to the government's development plan/policy.

This case is a case where the rewards, as a negative outcome of failed communication between the government and residents, come in order to compensate residents for locally unwanted land use development. The government needs to consider, if there is one specific type of reward leads to satisfaction, what type of reward would result a maximum level of residents' satisfaction.

H5b: The high intensity of actual complaints from government's implementation of LULU will affect increased chance of getting rewards.

4.4 Effects of Reward on Resident' Decision Making

4.4.1 Effects of Monetary Rewards to Residents towards the Locally Unwanted Land Use

If government provides monetary rewards, reward can be very effective source to

residents who expected for such compensations, because it is an invaluable reward. That is, money, is a generalized (conditioned) reinforce (in psychological terms), exchangeable for other primary and secondary reinforcers (Catania 1998; Skinner 1953). Accordingly, residents are disregard a monetary rewards less than non-monetary reward because dissimilar particular rewards such as money retains infrastructure or structures, despite of changeable resident's desire. If residents received a delayed monetary reward, it will fill up resident's needs and expectation.

In contrast, the utility of a specific, non-generalized reward may fluctuate (Catania 1998; Skinner 1953). Its utility is variable according to reward. Individuals usually tried avoid risks, nonetheless, and thus are likely to consider such a commodity to be worth less than one (i.e., money) whose utility does not fluctuate, even when both have the same mean utility (Estle, Green, Myerson, Holt 2007). This gives advantage of monetary rewards over other types.

Generally, when government development is being planned, monetary rewards are given to residents. However, this method does not always give them satisfaction. The government needs to consider the effectiveness of the usage of monetary rewards; and if so, amount needs to be considered to find out whether the amount of proportional to the level of satisfaction it would give to residents. There is also a possibility that residents might want different types of rewards.

H6a: Monetary rewards from government's implementation of LULU will affect to resident's decision making on government development policy.

4.4.2 Effects of Non-Monetary Rewards to Residents towards the Locally Unwanted Land Use

Kim, Shi, Srinivasan (2001) examined the reward type and its programs according to amount of government rewards or resident's expectation toward to government rewards. By governments view point, non-monetary reward is the most inefficient reward, because residents' expectation needs to meet with level of reward by government (Kim, Shi and Srinivasan 2001). Same applies to this study, that residents' desired reward may be something that they find more value in that is not a monetary type. To compensate this desire, government can offer non-monetary rewards to effectively create the maximum level of satisfaction.

According to study conducted by Kohls et al. (2009), based on their experimental observation, that monetary and social rewards had differential effects on response inhibition performance, need to be replicated. Blatter and Schultz (2006) found that person who expresses their discomfort feelings through verbal praise or certain actions has more powerful reward value compare to simple facial expression. Additionally, the results of Kunz and Linder's study (2012), it suggests that affiliative rewards exhibit a positive moderating effect on the relationship between enjoyment-based motivation and the willingness to exert work effort(Kunz, Linder 2012). In contrast, monetary rewards seem to crowd out norm-based motivation, while leaving the impact of enjoyment-based motivation on the willingness to exert work effort unaffected (Kunz, Linder 2012).

When government development is being planned, occasionally non-monetary rewards are given to residents. However, this method does not always give them satisfaction. The government needs to consider the effectiveness of the usage of non-monetary rewards; and if so, the type of non-monetary item needs to be considered to find out whether there is certain types that will increase the level of satisfaction it would give to residents. There is

also a possibility that residents might want different types of rewards.

H6b: Non-monetary rewards from government's implementation of LULU will affect to resident's decision making on government development policy.

4.4.3 Rewards that lead to Satisfactory & Confidence level to the Residents on the LULU development

Ma and Roese's research (2012) demonstrated that happiness is determined according to either relative or absolute depends on individual's earning (Diener et al. 1993; Easterlin 1974; Hsee, Hastie, and Chen 2008; Kahneman et al. 2004; Stutzer 2004. Previous study measured the level of happiness by examine the correlation between residents who received more compensations and residents who received less compensations, and it explains the affection of reward (Ma, Roese 2012).

This happiness does not restrict on the type of rewards as long as government and residents come to term to find the most feasible option by properly applying distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Upon successful in exchange of compensation with implementation of LULU, residents' perception will shift into positive side of the project because highest level of satisfaction will give residents the maximum tolerance of LULU. Better yet, it will boost the public confident of government's development plan of LULU in the area since the change of perception will result in their perceiving something positive for the society and for themselves.

From various surveys and investigations to reflect residents' needs and wants, government can make a sound decision to provide the best reward to residents. It is government's role that finding residents' absolute value in satisfaction can bring more effectiveness in implementing government development policy. This is not limited to either

monetary reward or non-monetary rewards, but rather, in this situation, whichever brings the most satisfaction would bring a better support from residents and community towards LULU as long as their suggestions are considered and acted upon. Highest level of satisfactory rewards, regardless of a type, is the one that can bring mutual understanding with residents by government's analysis on residents' behaviors and residents can fully support government's locally unwanted land use development plan this way.

This support will bring public confidence in order for the government to successful completion of LULU implantation while keeping residents' satisfaction by providing a type of reward to achieve it.

H7: The level of support to development will affect to public confidence toward Locally Unwanted Land Use development or plan.

Hypotheses

H1: Negative perception in distributive justice affects increased level of dissatisfaction.

H2: Negative perception in procedural justice affects increased level of dissatisfaction.

H3: Negative perception in interactional justice affects increased level of dissatisfaction.

H4: Resident dissatisfaction will have negative effect on complaints' intentions.

H5a: The high intensity of willingness complaints will affect increased chance of getting rewards.

H5b: The high intensity of actual complaints will affect increased chance of getting rewards.

H6a: Monetary rewards will affect to resident's decision making on government development policy.

H6b: Non-monetary rewards will affect to resident's decision making on government

development policy.

H7: The level of support the development will affect to public confidence toward Locally Unwanted Land Use development or plan.

V. Methodology

5.1 Data Collection

This study examines residents' behavior based on dissatisfaction from the effect of perceived justices: distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Further, this study investigates how government's development policy affected residents' behavior based on their previous experiences of dealing with government with LULU implementation as well as their general perception towards government's plan of placing LULU in their area. A survey was conducted to examine the following hypothesis from 16th to 23rd of September, 2014. Languages written for this survey are English and Korean; the purpose of this is that survey was distributed to KDI students and Korean residents who live in the development area. The request for survey was sent out via e-mail with a timeline. In 7 days, total numbers of participants are two hundred thirty six, and there are three different types of response from the survey. From all participants one hundred seventy seven of respondents have never experienced living in a development area, twelve respondents submitted incomplete survey that had to be discarded, and two hundred twenty four submitted the survey properly.

According to the analyzed data from surveys that distribute to participants who are aware of the term Locally Unwanted Land Use and may have experiences with the government that led to complain/complaining behavior to express their dissatisfaction toward the plan. Stratified sampling has applied on this study to hand out the survey grounded on the percentage of participants with the consideration of gender, age, education, income, and

occupations. Two hundred twenty four respondents have completed the survey in appropriate ways, and its response rate of 94.9% (i.e., Forty seven respondents with experiences of dealing with government on LULU implementation and one hundred seventy seven respondents with hypothetical scenario of the government's LULU implementation in their area and how they feel about it).

A multi-item scale has applied successively on each questionnaire to measure specific elements from participations. The questionnaire consists of multiple stages based on knowing what LULU is, personal experiences with LULU, opinions based on the perception of LULU, and the interaction with government regarding LULU implementation in the area. Furthermore, Likert scales and semantic differential scales have applied on this study, higher number of scale indicating higher level of dissatisfaction, and yes/no questions. Scales by previous studies (Cho, 2013; Oliver, 1980; Oliver, 1997; Swan & Trawick, 1981; Westbrook, 1981) support to develop the items that serve the objectives of the present study.

After the review, judges select about 54 items that represent the major constructs, such as three dimensions of justice, dissatisfaction, willingness to complain/actual complaining behavior, government reward, and public confidence with effects of advanced government services. Pilot study was conducted to modify survey items.

In order to check construct reliability, this study measures Cronbach's alpha for multi-item scales for each of the constructs that serves as the basis for the questionnaire items. The applied *Cronbach's alpha* provided the construct reliability for multi-item scales of each construct. This study found that *Cronbach's alpha* for three justice dimensions in the case of locally unwanted land use development shows 0.87 (distributive justice), 0.82 (procedural justice), 0.87 (interactional justice), as well as 0.84 for (dissatisfaction). The study also found *Cronbach's alpha* of above 0.81 for willingness to complain, 0.94 for actual complaining

behavior, 0.65 for intention of getting government reward, and 0.93 for public confidence.

This study examined the effects of advanced services for the effects of dissatisfaction to willingness to complain/complaining behavior, willingness to complain/complaining behavior to repeat purchase behavior and getting government reward to public confidence. This study considers major effects of advanced services from the stage of dissatisfaction by considering overall dissatisfaction.

5.2 Development of Research Questionnaires

The structure of the questionnaire was based on research in part IV, where parts were made in order to investigate the residents' process of perception towards LULU. In the beginning, general questions were asked: "do you currently live in government development area," "what kind of experience do you have with government development," and etc. These questions are intended to check the information of whether participants are currently living in government development areas.

To evaluate the level of participants' awareness and perception of the subject, the survey questions are designed to check in 7 Likert scales, higher number being more dissatisfied. First question is to find out how important participants think of the government's LULU implementation in development area if it is being promoted in the area they live in. Not only determining their feelings towards the project, but we can also measure their expectation of compensating in exchange of government's LULU development plan that can leave clues to estimate their level of satisfaction.

Second question is to evaluate participants' satisfaction by measuring subordinate elements that represent the factors to result in their satisfaction. It was measured, again, in Likert scale from 1 to 7, 1 being very satisfied while 7 being very dissatisfied. In these elements, some had a strong effect on participants' satisfactions. Based on their responses, the

participants have to evaluate their satisfaction with Likert scale from 1 to 7 for specific elements on receiving rewards in compensation of government LULU development.

Lastly, question was asked for participant's overall satisfaction. In Likert scale, 1 indicates strongly satisfied and 7 indicating strongly dissatisfied. Based on their satisfaction level, the following question was asked if the reward is worth in exchange of supporting government's program in locally unwanted land use development in their area. This is also measured in Likert scale from 1 to 7 whether they are strongly satisfied with rewards they received. From this, we can determine the change of perception of government LULU development plan in correlation with their satisfaction level.

5.3 Data Analysis Tool

For the data analysis, the SPSS 11 program was used and the Excel program was also used to sort data. To test hypothesis, this research used the regression analysis and factor analysis. The factor analysis was used to identify the most influential factors to the customer satisfaction. And the defined the factors are tested by using regression analysis to ascertain the correlation with satisfaction. Above all, the reliability tests previously carried out as well.

VI. Data Analysis

6.1 Respondents Demographics

48.7% female and 51.3% male made up the two hundred and twenty four respondents. 51.2% were observed to be between the ages of 20-29 years old; 44.1% were deemed to be between the ages of 30-39 years old and 2.6% and 2.0% were in there 40s; and 50s respectfully. Of the population of respondents, 0.5% reported that their highest education level was a high school completion level, 4.1% possessed an associate's degree, and 69.9% and 25.5% had an undergraduate degree and a graduate degree respectfully. Annual incomes

reported by 34.6% of respondents stated that it was less than \$20,000, 40.4% between \$20,000 and \$40,000, 19.1% were between \$40,000 and \$60,000, and 5.9% were more than \$60,000. Those who identify as self-employed is about 3.1%, 7.2% were professionals, 2.6% were public officers, 4.1% were educators, 3.1% were housewives, 30.4% were students, 43.3% were office workers, and 6.2% were others.

6.2 Hypotheses Testing

Through applied factor analysis, to validate the constructs for justice dimensions, it is certain that the study validates the factors of justice dimensions, dissatisfaction, willingness to complain, complaining behavior, government rewards and public confidence. Furthermore, the most relevant data emerged through the use of principal components analyses as the extraction method and varimax rotation methods with Kaiser Normalization (Cho 2013).

The factor analysis results indicate that items represent the influential variables for locally unwanted land use development and give significant declined factors with Eigen values over 1.00. Table VI-1 below shows factor analysis results for the justice dimension with the case of residents' dissatisfaction toward Locally Unwanted Land Use development.

Items		Components		
Factors	Scale Items	1	2	3
DISTRIBUTIVE 14	I think that information about developing Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) provided by government is not reasonable.	.923		
DISTRIBUTIVE 15	I think that it is not fair to have Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development since many local residents do not prefer to have Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) in town.	.867		
DISTRIBUTIVE 16	I think that opinions were fairly treated by government representative or administration regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use development (LULU) issue.	.799		
DISTRIBUTIVE 17	I think the government is not distributing information and services to residents equally on Locally unwanted Land Use issue.	.780		
DISTRIBUTIVE 18	Overall, distributed services for my complaints offered by government representative do not meet my expectation for Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.	.681		
PROCEDURAL 21	I am often disappointed with delivery time with the government during the procedure of Locally Unwanted Land Use development.		.867	
PROCEDURAL 22	I don't think that my opinion of Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) plan is often well proceeded.		.780	
PROCEDURAL 23	I think that procedure to government plan of the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development should be improved.		.758	
PROCEDURAL 25	Overall, I think that procedure offered by the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development does not meet my expectation.		.746	
PROCEDURAL 26	I think that the overall procedure to receive feedback on my opinions from government		.690	

INTERACTIONAL 28	representative was unfair. It would be ideal if I could contact with government representative or administration anytime if I need to ask them about Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.			.913
INTERACTIONAL 29	I don't think that I could receive response about my questions on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) as soon as possible.			.894
INTERACTIONAL 30	Overall, I think that interaction with government representative or administration does not meet my expectation on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.			.877
INTERACTIONAL 31	Follow-up services on opinions were not fair due to infrequent interaction from government representative regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.			.788
INTERACTIONAL 32	I think that information and explanation about my opinions were not enough by public officer or government representative regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.			.611

Table VI-1. Component Matrix: the Case of Justice Dimension with Resident Dissatisfaction

Additionally, regression analyses have applied in this study as well as ANOVA (the analysis of variance). Table VI-2 below shows the regression analysis results which apply scores for the effects of types of justice to the dissatisfaction. The results of the ANOVA in the case of impacts based on residents, dissatisfaction find the models significant at the .01 level with $F = 28.582$ ($r\text{-square} = .131$), $F = 63.034$ ($r\text{-square} = .250$) and $F = 101.648$ ($r\text{-square} = .347$). According to the results of regression analyses verified that effects of justice dimension on dissatisfaction are all accepted (H1, H2 and H3).

Variable (Independent -> dependent)	Standardized Coefficient (t-value-Sig)
	Locally Unwanted Land Use Development
Distributive Justice-> Dissatisfaction (H1)	0.362 (5.346***)
Procedural Justice -> Dissatisfaction (H2)	0.500 (7.939***)
Interactional Justice -> Dissatisfaction (H3)	0.589 (10.082***)

*** Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table VI-2. Summary of the Effects of Justice Dimension to Dissatisfaction for Locally Unwanted Land Use Development

Applied to this study for measuring the impacts of residents' dissatisfaction on the willingness to complain and actual complaining behavior was regression analysis for Locally Unwanted Land Use development. As shown in table VI-3, this study demonstrates that effects of dissatisfaction on resident's complaint intention (H4), dissatisfaction on the willingness to complain and actual complaining behavior are significant (H5a, b) for Locally Unwanted Land Use development. The results of the analysis for the effects of dissatisfaction

to the willingness to complain find the models significant at the 0.01 level with $F = 81.280$ ($r\text{-square} = .302$) in the case of locally unwanted land use development. The results of the analysis for the effects of dissatisfaction to the actual complaining behavior prove that the models are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level with $F = 15.791$ ($r\text{-square} = .076$) in the case of locally unwanted land use development.

Variables (Independent -> dependent)	Standardized Coefficient (t-value-Sig)
	Locally Unwanted Land Use Development
Dissatisfaction -> Complaints (H 4)	0.514 (8.247 ***)
Dissatisfaction -> Willingness to Complain (H 5a)	0.549 (9.016 ***)
Dissatisfaction -> Complaining Behavior (H 5b)	0.276 (3.974 ***)
Resident Complaints -> Monetary Reward (H 6a)	0.239 (2.942 ***)
Resident Complaints -> Non-Monetary Reward (H 6b)	0.185 (2.564 ***)
Government Reward -> Public Confidence (H 7)	0.592 (8.788 ***)

*** Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed);** Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table VI-3. Summary of the Effects of Variables for Locally Unwanted Land Use Development

This study also applied regression analyses for the impacts of the complaining behavior to getting government monetary and non-monetary rewards for locally unwanted land use development (H6a~b). Overall, the results of the analysis for the effects of complaining behavior to getting monetary rewards found that the models are significant at the 0.01 level with $F = 8.653$ ($r\text{-square} = .057$) in the case of locally unwanted land use development. Overall, the results of the analysis for the effects of complaining behavior to getting non-monetary rewards found that the models are significant at the 0.01 level with $F = 6.575$ ($r\text{-square} = .034$) in the case of locally unwanted land use development. Therefore, the study accepted H6a~b. The table VI-3 also demonstrates the effects of government rewards to public confidence. The results of regression analysis for the effects of government rewards to public confidence indicate that the models are significant at the 0.01 level with $F = 53.839$ ($r\text{-square} = .224$) in the case of non-monetary rewards and $F = 77.223$ ($r\text{-square} = .351$) in the case of monetary rewards. Therefore, the study accepted H7.

VII. Conclusion

7.1 Discussion

The main purpose of this study is to explore resident perception towards locally unwanted land use development by determining justice dimension, dissatisfaction, willingness to complain, actual complaining behavior, intention of getting government reward, and public confidence. This study finds strategic relationship between residents and government's locally unwanted land use development with residents' dissatisfaction, willingness to complain, complaining behavior, intention of getting government reward, and public confidence of the subject. The result of the study finds that government's assisting with residents' need, by providing a satisfactory service in compensation of the lulu installment can enhance the relationship with residents as well as their opinions of locally unwanted land use development in their area. This study applied impact of monetary reward (Deci 1971), and non-monetary rewards such as park, art gallery, library, etc., to measure proposed relationships on locally unwanted land use. Additionally, this study uses urbanization as a base, and based on that concept, it examines the effects of that aspect focusing on implantation of locally unwanted land use development. The crucial relationships found in this study are: residents' dissatisfaction from justice dimensions of locally unwanted land use and willingness to complain and actual complaining behavior based on the level of their dissatisfaction, and the possibility of receiving rewards based on their willingness to complain and actual complaining behavior, and the effect to increase public confidence from receiving monetary and/or non-monetary rewards. Residents' dissatisfaction of locally unwanted land use illustrates significant results as an effect of their willingness to complain and complaining behavior toward the government of the project. Residents' willingness to complain and complaining behavior can be found as a result of their dissatisfaction as

previous studies has also found based on the private sector. Previous studies (e.g., Oliver 1997; Cho 2011; Day 1984) found the reluctance of dissatisfied residents in expressing their concerns and complain. Due to the lack of residents' filing complaints, they were not able to receive satisfactory action from the government that was expected from the residents (Messick et al. 1983). Further, this study finds that the effect of dissatisfaction to wiliness to complain and complaining behavior to locally unwanted land use is high. As a result of studying residents' dissatisfaction on wiliness to complain and willingness to complain behavior, they expressed a high level of expectation in receiving rewards. This behavior is due to their dissatisfaction of locally unwanted land use in their area, and this can be resolved once the reward meets their level of expectation. This result acts as an essential source of the fact that government reward contributes to the level of effects of dissatisfaction to the willingness to complain and complaining behavior. In addition, this study finds that the intention is the condition to residents' willingness to complain and complaining behavior. This study also finds that both monetary and non-monetary rewards are highly expected by the resident in compensation of locally unwanted land use development in their area. Therefore, the conflict can be resolved by providing either monetary or non-monetary rewards to meet residents' expectation, and the result of this study shows the effects of willingness to complain and complaining behavior on intention of getting a government rewards.

This study has academic implications. The result, firstly, investigated links with residents' dissatisfaction in the LULU development by applying justice dimension with concept of equity. Secondly, this study also explored the relationship based on residents' dissatisfaction. Third, this study analyze the correlation of residents' dissatisfaction and their expectation of whether monetary or non-monetary reward would be better suited for their

needs in order to settle with government's locally unwanted land use development. From this study, justice dimensions are found to have a high influence on residents' dissatisfaction to locally unwanted land use, and how it acts as motivation to their willingness to complain and actual complaining behavior. By applying the theoretical insights, as Cho (2013) stated that relationships between complaining behavior and public confidence on the government locally unwanted land use developments are fundamental for the strategic issues Relationship Management for residents in urban development area or LULU development area. In addition, this study suggests to Resident Relationship Management by proposing the importance of solutions to resident's dissatisfaction, which become a means of gaining residents' confidence in government LULU development (Cho 2013). Two types of categories were applied in order to classify residents' dissatisfaction: monetary and non-monetary. This study finds that residents have a preference slightly higher towards monetary reward over non-monetary rewards. When the expectation does not meet, their dissatisfaction will amplify (Fournier and Mick 1999) From this study, when implementing essential facility such as locally unwanted land use, receiving rewards is mandatory that government should focus on. As mentioned, to meet the expectation of having locally unwanted land use in their backyard, the expectation from residents is high regardless of the type of the reward. In particular, results of the study display how monetary reward and non-monetary reward is the important key to successfully manage relationships between resident's dissatisfaction and government urban development or LULU development plan (Cho 2013). In this case, government should consider providing sustainable local supporting program with the implantation of locally unwanted land use if, for example, residents prefer facility such as park, art gallery, museum, library, recreational center, as their need in the area.

This study has implications that investigated relationships on residents'

dissatisfaction towards the urban and LULU development by applying justice dimension with concept of equity. Moreover, this study addresses improved government compensations such as monetary or non-monetary reward, to explored correlation between resident's dissatisfaction and public confidence on the urban and LULU development.

A multivariate statistics was applied to this study, moreover cause and effect relationship in LULU development might need to be considered in future studies.

7.2 Limitation of Study

Despite of results obtained from this study, there are limitations imposed to this study. Firstly, the survey was conducted mainly in Korea with only Koreans because focus of this study is on locally unwanted land use (LULU) development in Korea. However, this study can also be applicable to cases in foreign countries in the future. Secondly (Firstly), size of sample was insufficient to standardize the residents' behavior in locally unwanted land use development area. Moreover, it was very difficult to find surveyors who have experience living in such development area or expertise knowledge. Lastly, it was not clearly classified to measure the difference between the effect of monetary and non-monetary rewards from government. Furthermore, resident's preference level on government rewards was not clearly found. Because there is difficulty finding people, who lived in urban developing area or lulu development area, to conduct survey for a better and detailed result. In order to find more detailed result of this study, the survey should be conducted in various regions including foreign countries in the future. This study applied only quantitative research results from surveys to examine resident' perception toward government locally unwanted land use (LULU) development. Nonetheless, qualitative research should consider conducting with residents in development area in the future. Finally, this study can be used as an application to consider urban development or LULU development related public policy issues in future

studies.

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Online Resources

<http://blog.naver.com/hjine5158?Redirect=Log&logNo=10148838624> image from website (e.g. naver image), Irwon-dong Maru Park, Korea (Last updated: 2012).

<http://blog.naver.com/pychea?Redirect=Log&logNo=10133419923> image from website (e.g. google image), Seoul Memorial Park, Korea (Last updated: 2012).

<http://blog.daum.net/blog/BlogTypeView.do?blogid=0DXnh&articleno=568&categoryId=7®dt=20140512165926> image from website (e.g. daum image), Pangyo Clean Tower, Korea (Last updated: 2014).

<http://blog.naver.com/chslkw?Redirect=Log&logNo=220089475954> image from website (e.g. naver image), Osaka Disposal Plant, Japan (Last updated: 2014).

<http://blog.daum.net/kieury/11297775> image from website (e.g. daum image), Niagara Park, Canada (Last updated: 2013).

Appendix

Justice, Dissatisfaction and Reward in Government Locally Unwanted Land Use Development

Please take 20 minute to answer the following questions. Your responses to this survey are strictly confidential and will not be revealed to anyone other than researchers. Participation in this survey must be voluntary. All data will also be kept anonymously. The intent of this work is academic research purposes only. No individual or organization will be identified in any analyses or reports connected to the survey data. Samples will be selected from the age group of 20-65. The researchers welcome any questions or comments concerning this survey or the research project. Your contribution is very important to provide better development policy & plan in Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development and decrease local resident's dissatisfaction and complaints. If you have any inquires on this survey. Please don't hesitate to contact 010-5414-3633 or klee44@nate.com. Thank you!


Location	Application	Original Function
		
Irwon-dong Maru Park, Korea	Sports Park	Wastewater Treatment Facility
		
Seoul Memorial Park, Korea	Parks, Gallery, Cafeterias	Crematorium Facility
		
Osaka Disposal Plant, Japan	Experience Space, Park	Garbage Incineration Plant



Figure 1. Case Image of Locally Unwanted Land Use with Supplementary Facility (spaces).

In Urban development or land-use planning, a locally unwanted land use (LULU) is a land use that is useful to society, but objectionable to its neighbors. LULUs can include power plants, waste incinerator, waste water treatment facility, crematorium and many other developments. Planning seeks to distribute and reduce the harm of LULUs by zoning, environmental laws, community participation, buffer areas, clustering, dispersing and other such devices. Thus planning tries to protect property and environmental values by finding sites and operating procedures that minimize the LULU's effects. LULUs always provide services a community needs, but few people want to live near them because of their externalities, real or perceived. Moreover, that community needs can be reflected by government rewards to decreasing resident's dissatisfaction. Thus, it gives motivation to residents to participate in Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Please answer the following questions based on your experience with Locally Unwanted Land Use Development.

1. Have you ever lived in urban development area? () Yes () No
2. Do you know if Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) exists in your area?
() Yes () No
3. Have you ever researched about Locally Unwanted Land (LULU) Use when or before it came to your town?
() Yes () No
4. How would feel if you found out the government is planning on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) in your town?

Very Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Dissatisfied

5. How much do you think that the government reward for Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) will give a satisfaction?

Very Unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Highly Likely

6. Overall, how much were you dissatisfied with government Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) Development projects?

Slightly Dissatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Dissatisfied

Please rate (v) your overall opinions about experiences with Locally Unwanted Land Use plan or development.

(Distributive Justice)

a. I think that the condition of Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development is in general not acceptable.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

b. I think that information about developing Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) provided by government is not reasonable.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

c. I think that it is not fair to have Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development since many local residents do not prefer to have Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) in town.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

d. I think that opinions were fairly treated by government representative or administration regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use development (LULU) issue.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

e. I think the government is not distributing information and services to residents equally on Locally unwanted Land Use issue.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

f. Overall, distributed services for my complaints offered by government representative does not meet my expectation for Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

(Procedural Justice)

a. I often hesitate to agree to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development plan due to the procedure.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

b. I am often disappointed with delivery time with the government during the procedure of Locally Unwanted Land Use development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

c. I don't think that my opinion of Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) plan is often well proceeded.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

d. I think that procedure to government plan of the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development should be improved.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

e. I concern about providing my personal information regarding Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) plan.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

f. Overall, I think that procedure offered by the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development does not meet my expectation.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

g. I think that the overall procedure to receive feedback on my opinions from government representative was unfair.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

(Interactional Justice)

a. It would be ideal if I could contact with government representative or administration anytime if I need to ask them about Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

b. I don't think that I could receive response about my questions on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) as soon as possible.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

c. Overall, I think that interaction with government representative or administration does not meet my expectation on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

d. Follow-up services on opinions were not fair due to infrequent interaction from government representative regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

e. I think that information and explanation about my opinions were not enough by public officer or government representative regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

f. How do I receive prompt answer/response from government representative to opinions significantly affect to my decision making to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

(Dissatisfaction) Please rate (v) your overall opinions/expectations about Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

a. I am dissatisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development as the plans do not meet my expectation.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

b. I am dissatisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development as time schedule of the development was not what I expect.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

c. I am not satisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development as I could not enjoy where I live after it was completed.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

d. Overall, I am dissatisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

(Willingness to complain) Please rate (v) your overall opinion about experiences from Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

(You may choose N/A if it is not applicable). Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

a. I was about to express my unpleasant feelings to government representative or administration about Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development, but I actually didn't do so.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

b. I regret that I didn't actually complain even though I wasn't satisfied with Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

c. I often do not actually complain when I feel that the perceived losses (e.g., property value) that might not be so well treated by Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

d. I reluctant to complain to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development since I don't want to waste my time and cost.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

e. I hesitate to complain to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development I don't want to encounter uncomfortable situations.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

(Complaining Behavior) Please rate (v) your overall opinion about experiences regarding your complaints to government representative of Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. If you'd never actually complained to government representative or administration. (your may choose N/A if it is not applicable).

a. I actually complained to government representative or administration that I am not satisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree N/A

b. I expressed my unpleasant feeling to government representative that Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development with believe that it make up more reward or compensation.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree N/A

c. I don't regret with my complaints as those service failures should be treated well.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree N/A

d. I will complain to all stakeholders and government representative till I get a satisfactory responses on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree N/A

(Resolution) Please rate (v) your overall opinions about experiences regarding your complaints and reaction from government representative or public officers.

(Reward – Monetary & Non-monetary)

(Non-monetary Reward)

a. Government non-monetary reward (Park, Culture Center, Public library, Nursing Home etc.) can resolve Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) conflict between government and residents.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

(Monetary Reward)

b. Government monetary reward can resolve Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) conflict between government and residents.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

(Reward)

c. I think that it is easy to get non-monetary reward when the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development comes to my town.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

d. I think that it is easy to get monetary reward when the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development comes to my town.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

e. I think that additional non-monetary rewards are needed for the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

f. I think that additional monetary rewards are needed for the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

(Public Confidence) Please rate (v) your overall opinions about experiences regarding locally unwanted land use development.

a. Resident's confidence level has increased by government rewards.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

b. I think that well resolved complaints caused by government reward will help improve public confidence.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

c. Overall, government reward will help increase trust in the field of locally unwanted land use development.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Demographic Information (Please select the closest answer for each question.)

