DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA

By

LACEY, Kim

THESIS

Submitted to

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

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ABSTRACT

DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA

By

Kim Y. Lacey

Public attitudes toward immigrants have been a topic that has received the most attention in many political and social science disciplines in recent years. There are various theoretical and empirical studies to explain what determines anti-immigration attitudes. In this study, I review the relevant literature and suggest various factors that influence the formation of the public's immigration attitude in South Korea's case.

While most of the previous literature either focuses on just one or two determinants that are likely to have an impact on public attitudes toward immigration or chooses a political/economic approach over a social/cultural approach (or vice versa), I bring those determinants together to examine the overall impact. The aim of this study is to check the validity of some of the findings from the West in South Korea's context and to fill the existing gap by testing the additional determinants that have not yet been studied in this country through a survey specifically designed for this paper.

This study analyzes the correlation between each determinant and public's attitude toward immigration by running a logit model based on the responses from 1,000 survey participants in South Korea. I find that satisfaction with one's life has a positive correlation with a favorable attitude toward immigration in general, and the high correlation remained even when immigrants' occupation or country of origin differed. The finding is significant because it has not been included as a determinant in most immigration-related studies. Some of the determinants already proven in other countries were also verified in this study, such as belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes, education level, and assimilation efforts. Furthermore, this study reveals how the public reacts differently when a specific immigrant group is suggested in comparison to when asked about "immigration" in general.

Keywords: immigration; public attitudes; logit analysis; South Korea

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Introduction

South Korea (hereafter referred to as simply "Korea") saw a drastic increase in immigrants'[1] inflow over just the past two decades. Accordingly, the governments at both national and local levels have been trying various policy measures, some successful while others not, in order to accommodate immigrants and to help them become members of society. However, despite the rapidly growing population of foreign residents, there is still a prevalent thought in Korean society that the nation is homogeneous with unique cultural and ethnic heritage. Some, while acknowledging this demographical change in society, insist that the incoming outsiders are a burden and disruption to Korea. This kind of opposition to immigration is anything but rare though, as the recent events around the world will attest, especially in relation to changing public attitudes toward immigration. Though many in the past used to believe that countries would evolve into one multicultural society as we became more civilized, that seems not to be the case. Strong nationalism is unexpectedly being resurrected and many countries that once had an open door immigration policy are now thinking of closing the door bit by bit, as we recently have confirmed by the result of the latest U.S. Presidential election, Brexit, as well as similar phenomena happening in many parts of Europe and Australia.

Characteristics of Immigration to Korea

According to the official data released by the Korean Immigration Service, there are more than 2 million foreign nationals residing in Korea as of March, 2017 (Ministry of Justice, 2017). This number includes both short-term and long-term residents, such as students and trainees, white- and blue- collar workers, businessmen and investors, and "foreign brides." The total population

[1] In this paper, I use the term "immigrant" to include all foreign-born nationals who are residing in Korea regardless of their current citizenship status to accommodate the unique immigrant history of Korea. This is mainly to include many "foreign brides" who came to Korea for marriage and may have become naturalized but are often seen as outsiders, as I will explain more in detail later in this paper.

of South Korea from the World Bank's 2015 data is estimated to be around 50.62 million. In other words, around 4% of Korea's total population is currently comprised of foreigners. This is quite a change considering the fact that in less than three decades, the percentage of foreigners grew from 0.1% to 4% of the nation's population (Moon, 2015).

Even though immigration restriction in Korea is considered to be not as strict compared to some other Asian countries, such as Japan, and despite the rapid growth in number of immigrants, the Korean government's immigration policy is still highly selective if we look at most European or North American countries. Moreover, Korea's social and economic problems – namely, urbanization, the education bubble[2], and low fertility rate – gave rise to a unique immigrant composition as follows: 1) foreign workers with low skills[3] and 2) foreign brides. Both groups mainly come from developing countries in Asia, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As for the workers, the Korean government is currently employing a system called "Employment Permit System (EPS)", which was improved from a previous system called the Industrial and Technical Training Program (ITTP) established in 1992. ITTP had many problems of exploitation and abuse of foreign workers mainly because it was not a comprehensive government policy but rather a scheme managed by the Korean Federation of Small and Business (KFSB) to use cheaper foreign workers (Seol, 2005). Consequently, EPS was designed to improve foreign workers' status from mere "trainees" to proper "employees" and to guarantee appropriate working conditions and rights for them. EPS allows workers from 15 Southeast and Central Asian countries to work in Korea for up to three years with a possible extension of two years (EPS, 2010). The program operates through bilateral government-to-government memoranda of understanding (MOU). The

[2] Increase in education spending not contributing to the accumulation of human capital

[3] In Korean, the word (외국인 노동자) often implies low-skilled low-wage laborers mainly from China or Southeast Asian countries.

vast majority of foreign workers in Korea, whether through EPS or not, work in the so-called 3D industries: dangerous, dirty, and difficult. Since Korea has one of the highest college graduate rates in the world, these kinds of low-paying and strenuous jobs face serious labor deficit, which is being partially mitigated by foreign workers. The significance of this will be examined further in a later part of the paper.

The second unique group of immigrants, foreign brides, is made up by women mostly from developing countries. They come to Korea to get married to Korean men who cannot find a Korean wife. This kind of phenomenon has been happening due to the rapid urbanization in Korea from economic development since the 1970s. The men tend to be much older than the women and live in rural areas with mid- to lower- incomes. The foreign brides come to Korea through match-making agencies or brokers. As of 2015, there were over 300,000 foreign spouses in Korea, about 83% of which were foreign brides (Korean Statistical Informational Service, 2015). Unlike other groups of immigrants who tend to be temporary and short-term residents, most foreign brides reside in Korea permanently, bear, and raise children in their respective multicultural families, so it is important to note their distinctive position in Korean society. Even though about 70 percent of total naturalizations were by foreign spouses between the early 2000s and 2012 (IOM, 2014), discrimination and domestic/social tensions are some of the obstacles they often face due to physical and cultural differences. The hardship caused by discrimination often trickles down to affect their children as well.

There were numerous problems concerning foreign brides' well-being especially in the earlier years, ranging from conflicts with in-laws due to cultural differences and language barriers, to domestic abuse and violence by Korean husbands. At one point, murders and suicides of foreign brides were happening so frequently that diplomats from the Philippines and Vietnam

officially voiced their concern to the Korean government while the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a Diplomatic Note in 2011 banning its women from marrying a foreign national aged 50 or older with a monthly income of less than USD 2,500, followed by the Vietnamese authorities' similar measure to protect young Vietnamese women (IOM, 2013). Fortunately, these kinds of incidents were increasingly made public by advocate groups and media; since then, many Koreans have been active in improving the living conditions of multicultural families, and the government has also started a few initiatives at both the local and national levels to raise awareness and to provide support not only to foreign brides but to members in multicultural families as a whole. Consequently, divorce rates have been reduced significantly in the past decade and multicultural family support/advocacy NGOs can now be found in all major cities in Korea.

Research Purpose

The main goal of this paper is to identify what determines people's attitudes toward immigration in Korea, and to what extent. In the following section, I will first introduce the leading theories and past research findings to identify the influential factors, including but not limited to sociocultural and economic ones. Some determinants may be obvious and easy to measure (one's household income, age, education level, etc.), while others intangible and abstract (national-/self-identity, perceived threat, etc.). After providing a structured summary of the main theories and empirical evidence, I will move on to examine Korea's case. Since most of the prominent studies have been conducted in the West with a much longer history of immigration, there is a limited number of scholarly work available in English that is specific to the country's immigration situation. Moreover, while KGSS (Korean General Social Survey), which is conducted annually to cover various social issues in the country, can be useful for grasping the overall social

atmosphere and general opinion of the public, it suffers from the fact that it does not cover immigration-related topics nor public attitudes in depth. Other reports and data posed a similar problem as well. Consequently, I decided to design my own survey with the specific goal of identifying determinants of public attitudes toward immigration in South Korea. With the survey results, this paper builds on existing work such as publications by IOM (International Organization for Migration) Korea, Asan Institute, and reports and data from various ministries and government institutions of Korea, to fill in unidentified determinants in regards to the public's attitude formation for immigration. I believe the findings will contribute to the literature on immigration, especially for countries with an immigrant history and background similar to that of South Korea.

Literature Review

Determinants Found in Previous Research in the West

No definite consensus has been reached as to what causes natives to view immigration positively or negatively in academics or among policy makers. To make matters more complicated, attitudes tend to shift often; thus, establishing a precise reason for anti-immigration does not neatly fit into a box. That is probably why there are so many different approaches in attempting to identify what influences immigration attitudes. Most research focuses on individual and household characteristics in relation to attitudes (*see* Citrin et al., 1997; Fetzer, 2000; Schildkraut, 2005; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004) via economic or social approaches. While the former approach frequently relates how an individual views his or her economic stability and prospects to explain immigration attitudes, the latter takes a closer look at cultural responses

toward newcomers. I believe that both material and symbolic concerns are at work in shaping attitudes toward immigration. So here I will lay out some interesting findings and well-known conclusions on immigration attitudes that I intend to compare and contrast with the results from my own findings for Korea's case.

Economic factors. There are two broad categories for economic approaches: fiscal burdens and market competition. Fiscal burden, simply put, emphasizes the extra pressure put on natives due to immigration (e.g. increased burdens of welfare services and social benefits to cover immigrants). The argument goes that the fear of having to pay more tax for various infrastructures and services arises among natives, which often becomes catalysts of opposition to immigration (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005; Quillian, 1995). This fiscal impact on host countries' public finance is a widely debated topic for governments as well. Though not uniformly confirmed by the literature, most studies suggest that immigrants are more likely to rely on/consume welfare services than natives in most European countries, at least until assimilation, compared to in the US or Canada (Baker & Benjamin, 1995; Borjas & Trejo, 1991; Büchel & Frick, 2005; Gustman & Steinmeier, 2000; Hansen & Lofstrom, 2003; Kerr & Kerr, 2011). Nevertheless, this should not be simplified to "immigrants=fiscal burdens." Numerous empirical studies examined whether taxes paid by immigrants over their lifetime cover the host country's public goods and welfare services and many conclude that the total impact, positive or negative, is minor[4] in most countries (Kerr & Kerr, 2011; Lee & Miller, 2000; Moscarola, 2001; Storesletten, 2003). Variations are bound to appear due to differences in welfare policies and structures

[4] After taking into account the various assumptions made by different studies on immigration's fiscal impact, Rowthorn (2008) reviewed and concluded that in developed countries, the net impact was less than 1% of the host country's GDP.

across countries, not to mention different characteristics of immigrant groups (e.g. young refugees vs. middle-aged skilled workers).

The second approach, referred to as "labor market competition theory," states that natives perceive more threat from immigrant workers of similar skill level due to job competition. In addition, some argue that growth of labor supply would negatively affect natives' average wage. These predictions would work under a standard labor supply-demand framework in a closed economy (Borjas, 2003; Borjas et al., 1996; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001); however, estimating and evaluating displacement effects are more challenging in reality as so many variables are involved. Consequently, numerous empirical studies have been conducted by scholars to understand the issue better. The consensus seems to be that immigration has little to no impact on native wages in both the US and the UK (Dustmann et al., 2008; Friedberg & Hunt, 1995; Longhi et al., 2005; Okkerse, 2008). Small wage elasticity was also seen in European countries despite large immigrant inflows. Brücker and Jahn's analysis (2011), for instance, demonstrates that a 1% increase of labor force through immigration reduced wages by just 0.1% in Germany. The effect of employment displacement also saw little evidence, though there is some evidence that points to possibilities of employment displacement in Europe being higher than in the US (Longhi et al., 2006).

Despite the above findings, the general public often views immigration as an economic threat and the media's negative portrayals do not help either. Interestingly though, recent studies show that personal material self-interest does not significantly affect how natives feel about immigration (Card et al., 2011; Citrin et al., 1997; Dancygier & Donelly, 2013; Hainmueller et al., 2015; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Iyengar et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2012). It has been proven that workers of all industries,

regardless of their skills or income levels, express more support for high-skilled immigrant workers. High-skilled natives should show objection to immigrants with high skills due to heightened competition according to the market competition claim, so why don't they? We cannot simply rule out economic self-interest as one of the factors that shape the public's attitudes, since high-skilled immigrants do not just represent "competition." They are also perceived as relatively a small threat to society with higher education levels and economic stability (therefore, fewer burdens). The possibility lies in that the public looks past the heightened competition by high-skilled immigrants, not because economic self-interest does not matter but because positive effects outweigh the negative ones. Another explanation can be attributed to the higher level of income and education of natives engaged in high-skilled jobs, both of which were repeatedly proven to be linked to less restrictionist attitudes toward immigrants as I will elaborate in the following section.

Sociocultural factors. Various studies have examined sociocultural determinants for a public's views on immigration. The more educated the respondents are, the more emphasis they put on cultural diversity and they are also more likely to view immigration's economic impacts positively (Card et al., 2011; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Citrin et al., 1997; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010). On the other hand, lack of education and misperceived threats seem to play an important role in shaping natives' attitudes toward immigration. For instance, stereotypes and prejudice for immigrant group(s) result in animus toward immigration (Citrin et al., 1997; Stephan et al., 1999). Burns and Gimpel (2000) consider that economic hardship may further influence stereotypical thinking, while Valentino et al. (2012) examines the media's role in reinforcing the feeling of aversion. In US and European countries, the majority of respondents who oppose immigration overestimated the number of immigrants in the country,

which demonstrates that perception of immigration inflows matter (Citrin & Sides, 2008; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Moreover, when culturally threatening cues are given, such as "immigrants who do not speak the language/are not expected to fit in well with the culture", they bring out stronger oppositions than economic cues (Sniderman et al., 2004). Natives who have had interactions or direct contact with immigrants, on the other hand, are less likely to expel immigrants (McLaren, 2003; Ellison et al., 2011), as often described in literature on "contact theory".

As for identity-related determinants, natives who take an ethno-cultural *jus sanguinis* view versus civic *jus soli* conceptions for national identity are more supportive of restricting immigration (Kim & Park, 2013; Schildkraut, 2005; Wright et al., 2012). Accordingly, people who do not adhere clearly to either an ethnic or civic model often hold the most welcoming attitudes toward immigrants (Medrano & Koenig, 2005). As Benedict Anderson wrote in his famous book, *Imagined Communities* (1983), people view their nation as a single community where they are connected to other members by common values. These values can be shared ethnicity, language, and history, but also civic ideology as in the case of the United States. However, this notion is not inherent for a nation but rather like an invention, as the name suggests. Since nationalism plays an important role in determining people's views on immigration, some countries are trying to redefine conceptions of citizenship through education and integration policies.

The common thread we seem to find in previous findings is that when natives (mis)perceive threats, they are more likely to oppose immigration. It can be a threat to a nation's economy, society, and culture; a threat to people's identity and concept of unified community; or an actual physical threat. In addition, the degrees to which a country responds

to these threats differ as demonstrated by a study by Iyengar et al. (2013). While sociotropic economic concerns proved to be especially influential in the US and UK, cultural concerns are just as influential in Korea and Japan (possibly due to the traditional homogeneous nature of the nations). Thus, the perception that immigrants will violate the meaning of what it means to be Japanese or Korean brings out hostility toward immigration since immigrants bring a distinctive language, culture, and religion to the dominant culture of the nation.

Studies on South Korea's Case

There have been some studies that covered certain determinants for public attitudes toward immigration in Korea in the past. However, because the data used are heavily based on the results from general world surveys, such as the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), European Social Survey (ESS) and the General Social Survey (GSS), it is quite difficult to draw any valuable conclusion on detailed attitude formation from the broad findings. Such studies might have their own merits, but when it comes to immigration and public attitudes, country-specific factors play an important role, which should not be generalized or overlooked. Even when a Korean-specific survey module called the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) was developed by the Survey Research Center of Sung Kyun Kwan University, it narrowly focused on the correlation of national identity and attitudes toward migration with most of the determinants limited to demographic information. Kim & Park (2013) nevertheless found an interesting result on social distance toward different foreign immigrant groups, which I am verifying in this paper as well.

A number of government institutes in Korea occasionally carry out surveys and publish reports related to immigration as well. For example, the Korea Women's Development Institute (KWDI) has conducted studies on immigrants, especially focusing on women (Kim et al., 2011)

and multicultural families in Korea. Other institutes and governmental organizations increasingly are dealing with this important issue of immigration as the number of foreign residents keeps rising each year. However, there is a limitation to their studies, as the very nature of such institutes and organizations are to suggest policies to the government (See Seol et al., 2009). As a result, researchers have been more focused on institutional regulation and policies in general. While indispensable, these approaches taken by the majority of previous studies lack specificity in finding out how the *general public*'s attitudes are formed since not enough data exists to confirm each determinant's role. Moreover, most studies merely summarize the sample data without further conducting a quantitative data analysis and thus fail to become a true representation of the population of Korea.

It would not be wise to try to come up with policy suggestions for which we still lack understanding. Therefore this study aims to remedy this gap by examining each determinant of the public's attitudes toward immigration first, so that more in-depth research on migration, citizenship, as well as integration, can be conducted in the future. I designed this unique survey after thoroughly reviewing existing literature and examining prior research and survey data on public attitudes toward immigration. This study not only focuses on natives' characteristics but also includes varying characteristics of immigrants to have a more comprehensive idea of what determines natives' attitudes toward immigration. As stated earlier, this study has two main purposes: 1) To verify and/or to compare the latest results in Korea with other findings and 2) To fill in the missing parts from the previous studies by suggesting more control variables to test for their impact.

Hypotheses After Literature Review

This paper assumes the following hypotheses concerning determinants and how they affect a public's attitudes toward immigration.

- When a respondent has a misperceived notion about the number of immigrants in his/her country (overestimation), the person is more likely to oppose immigration.
- A respondent whose view on immigration is influenced by media is more likely to oppose immigration since media coverage on immigration often disproportionately depicts the negative sides, such as crimes committed by foreigners.
- Highly educated natives are more open to immigration, regardless of their current household income.
- A respondent who has the most flexible view on the concept of citizenship expresses the most welcoming attitude toward immigration.
- When a respondent feels that immigrants in the country are making an effort to fit into the society, he/she shows a more favorable attitude toward immigration.
- A respondent who believes in racial/ethnic stereotypes is more likely to oppose immigration.
- If a respondent has had a positive interaction/contact with a foreigner, he/she would be more open to immigration.

Methodology

Survey Design

The survey used was designed specifically for this paper to identify factors that shape the public's attitudes toward immigration in South Korea. There are 19 to 23 questions in total as

shown in Appendix1, comprised of 12 designed questions with 3 possible sub-questions and 7 demographic questions with a possible sub-question. Most questions ask citizens the degree which he or she (dis)agrees with a given statement. Each question was carefully contemplated, some based on previous research on immigration attitudes while others unique to this study. They are meant to contribute to understanding each determinant and its importance more in depth in the specific context of Korea.

Implementation

The target population is adults (19 years or older) residing in Korea, across the nation to mirror the population on key demographic attributes[5] through stratified quota sampling. The sample size is 1,000 via interviewer-administered telephone surveys (RDD method) conducted from October 31 to November 10, 2016 with the help of Economic Information and Education Center (EIEC) of the Korea Development Institute (KDI).

Featured Determinants (Control Variables)

*Descriptions will follow when necessary.

Perception of (legal & illegal) immigration inflows

:

Instead of just having a question on immigration inflows, I decided to divide it into two. So for this study, there will be 1) A question asking a respondent to estimate the percentage of immigrants in Korea's total population and 2) A following question that asks a respondent to estimate the percentage of illegal immigrants among immigrants.

Appraisal of assimilation efforts

Belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes

:

[5] For region, gender, and age with ±3.1% margin of error

To test this, I provide three common stereotypes one can encounter in Korea toward three different ethnic/racial groups: Chinese, Japanese, and African.

Influence of mass media

Direct contact experience with foreign residents

Ethnic vs. civic conception of citizenship
:
For this variable, I describe two groups and ask "which of the two do you consider to be more Korean?" The first one is a foreign national of Korean heritage and the second one is a naturalized Korean citizen of foreign origin. I provide real-life examples of famous athletes to facilitate understanding.

Immigrants' professional status and country of origin
:
Nine different immigrant groups are shown, divided by three countries of origin with three different occupations. Southeast Asia and China were chosen because most immigrants in Korea come from those regions. Eastern Europe was chosen in addition because even though the region is no better off than Korea economically, immigrants from this region seem to be regarded favorably in Korea possibly from their European appearances. For profession, manual laborer and foreign bride were chosen because they make up a large portion of immigrants in Korea as described in the introduction. Investor was added to see if differences would be observed from one's country of origin despite the positive economic association with the profession.

Donation/volunteer experience
:
This has not been studied much so I added this variable to this study. It does not seem unlikely to find a correlation since attitude on immigration may be affected by sympathy and generosity.

Satisfaction with life (rated from 0 to 100)
:

No research was found for this determinant, either, so I decided to include it to test the correlation and impact. My hypothesis is that the more a respondent is satisfied with his/her life, the more he/she is likely to show a favorable attitude toward immigration.

Demographic information (residential area, gender, age, education level, employment status, household income, religion and religiosity)

:

On top of the usual demographic information, this study has a sub-question called *religiosity* to see if following religious doctrines and considering oneself more religious would affect the respondent's attitude toward immigration.

Empirical Strategies

Hypotheses suggested by the existing literature and from my own argument are tested using the data from the survey result. This study employs logit regression analysis to see the correlation between each control variable and natives' positive attitudes on immigration and to estimate the impact of the determinants. Accordingly, the dependent variable in this paper is the public's attitude in the form of binary variables (0=negative attitude, 1=positive attitude). The logit model helps to see the effect of independent variables on the log odds to measure the relative probabilities of favorable immigration attitudes among natives in Korea. The independent variables in the logit model also have been turned into mostly binary responses for simpler interpretation of results. The specific logit model equation for estimation is as follows:

$$P\,(Y = 1) = \frac{e^{x\beta}}{1 + e^{x\beta}}$$

$$\text{where,} \quad x\beta = x_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2 + x_3\beta_3 + \cdots + x_k\beta_k + \varepsilon$$

- *Y* is the dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, the public's attitudes (positive=1, negative=0) will be examined from two different aspects: 1) toward immigration in

general, and 2) toward group-specific immigrants divided by countries of origin and occupations.

- P signifies the probability when the dependent variable Y takes the value of 1. It always has a value between 0 and 1.
- x_k represents the independent variables laid out earlier and β_k represents the coefficients for the independent variables, x_k. (ε indicates the error term.)

Findings

One of the most interesting findings of this study is that while overall sentiments for immigration in general tend to be positive in Korea[6], they did not necessarily carry over to favorable attitudes toward specific immigrant groups. Discrepancies were found among immigrant groups from different countries, so singling out a country-specific group which is often associated with negative stereotypes appears to cause natives to take a less favorable stance compared to a generic concept of immigration, bringing out what I call a "group-negativity bias." The result is striking. While only 1 determinant, *belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes*, was found to have a negative correlation with the public's attitudes toward immigration in general, 2-4 determinants have negative correlations in case of the Chinese group (the variation comes from the immigrant's occupation) and 2-3 determinants for the Southeast Asian group, while no negatively correlated determinant was found in case of the East European group with the exception of manual laborers. This is understandable when we take into consideration the stigma attached to immigrant manual laborers in Korean society. The result demonstrates how a group-negativity bias influences public attitudes toward immigrants in Korea. People who believe in

[6] Contrary to findings by Iyengar et al. (2013)

common racial/ethnic stereotypes are found to be less likely to show favorable attitudes toward immigration in general and also toward five specific groups in the scenario. The negative impact is found to be the strongest for Chinese manual laborers and surprisingly also for Chinese investors[7]. One possible explanation is that as many local governments have relaxed their regulations for investors from abroad, some Chinese investors have shown merciless or unprecedented practices which have led to confrontations with locals at times, notably in Busan and Jeju. So there are grounds for a negative association to Chinese investors. East European investors were the only exception with no negative correlation found, since the region is not associated with any negative stereotypes in Korea. Based on our results, we can conclude that an immigrant's occupational status and economic status may not be such a strong predictor of evaluating immigrants at least in the case of Korea since other factors, such as country of origin, seem to carry as much weight, if not more.

As verified by many earlier pieces of research, *education level* has a high correlation with immigration attitudes in our study. However, that too failed to carry over to specific immigrant groups. While more educated people who completed high school or more showed more favorable attitudes toward immigration in general, no correlation was found for their attitudes for the Chinese immigrant group of all three professions, and a strong correlation was found only for investors in case of Southeast Asian and East European group. *Assimilation effort* proved to be a determinant that is strongly correlated with public's attitudes toward immigration, even in specific immigrant group settings. When we take a look at the coefficients, the public's attitudes are especially more likely to be favorable when they feel manual laborers or Southeast Asians are trying hard to fit into the Korean society, holding everything else constant. *Direct contact*

[7] This study also found that females and those who are employed are more likely to show unfavorable attitudes toward Chinese investors.

experience with foreign residents in Korea showed a positive correlation for immigration in general, but the correlation disappeared for most of the specific immigrant groups; a positive correlation was found only with manual laborers from Southeast Asia and foreign brides also from Southeast Asia for some reason. *Influence by mass media* did not show a correlation of statistical significance with attitude toward immigration in general contrary to my hypothesis. However, it did appear significant for attitude toward Southeast Asian manual laborers and Southeast Asian foreign brides. It shows that if a respondent's view on immigration is shaped by media, he/she is less likely to hold a favorable view toward the two aforementioned immigrant groups from Southeast Asia.

Some demographic information also brought interesting results. A negative correlation was found between *age* and favorable attitude toward Chinese immigrants and manual laborers from Eastern Europe. In other words, the older a respondent was the less he/she was likely to support any immigrant from China regardless of profession and manual laborers from Eastern Europe. People residing in Seoul and the areas nearby (Gyonggi and Incheon) are more likely to show favorable attitudes toward manual laborers from China and Eastern Europe and investors from Southeast Asia.

Satisfaction with life, though unique to this study, turned out to be an important determinant with a strong positive correlation to favorable attitudes toward immigration in general. Compared to many other determinants, the correlation still stayed strong in some group-specific cases when country of origin and occupation for immigrants were specified. Therefore, this study finds that the more satisfied a person is with his or her life, the probability of having a positive attitude toward immigration increases, ceteris paribus. As for *estimation of immigrants (legal and illegal)* no correlation was found between the public's attitudes and overestimation of

inflow of immigrants; therefore the claim by Citrin and Sides could not be verified in Korea's case. However, the additional question I added for estimating the percentage of illegal immigrants showed a strong correlation for certain specific immigrant groups. Those who overestimate the percentage of illegal immigrants out of the entire immigrant population in Korea are more likely to be against manual laborers from Eastern Europe and China, and investors from Southeast Asia and China.

Lastly, the study found the likelihood of falling under certain characteristics depending on how a person defines *Koreanness.* People who hold a flexible and broadest view of *Koreanness* (being Korean can be either by citizenship or by heritage) were more likely to hold favorable views toward immigration, volunteer and donate more, have higher satisfaction with life, and reside in or nearby Seoul. On the other hand, people who hold the strictest view of *Koreanness* (one has to have Korean heritage AND hold a citizenship) is more likely to overestimate the percentage of immigrants in the country. Those who choose heritage over citizenship for *Koreanness* are likely to be older, live outside of Seoul, and overestimate the percentage of immigrants in Korea. People who choose citizenship over heritage are likely to be younger and have a higher household income.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study examines the key factors of the public's attitudes toward immigration first by monitoring the existing literature, then through a survey designed and conducted specifically for this occasion to identify the determinants of attitudes of natives toward immigration in general and for specific immigrant groups in Korea divided by countries of origin and occupations. The results of the empirical analysis suggest some crucial findings.

First, results suggest that *belief in racial/ethnic stereotype*s strongly influences the public's attitudes toward immigrants, especially for groups from China and Southeast Asia. Variations are observed across professions at times, but belief in stereotypes proved to be a strong factor in Korea's case as well. *Assimilation effort* was another factor that consistently showed a high correlation in this study. The more immigrants were thought to be making efforts to adapt to the host society, the more favorable the public's views were likely to become. This finding is consistent with the literature (Citrin et al., 1997; Sniderman et al., 2004). This turns out especially to be true for immigrants from Southeast Asia. Lastly, *satisfaction with life* was observed to be positively correlated with favorable attitudes toward immigration. The extent varies for different immigrant groups, but in general when a person is satisfied with his/her life, he/she is more likely to hold a favorable view toward immigration.

Surprisingly, there were many variables that were specific only to certain immigrant groups. The group-negativity bias deserves more attention as to why people's reactions differed so much when a specific group of immigrant was described in comparison to their reactions to the generic word "immigration." I do not believe this phenomenon is unique to South Korea, so future research possibilities lie ahead in this area. Lastly, there have been some determinants that were proven to be influential in many previous studies but could not be verified of significance in this study. Overestimation of immigration inflows would be one of them. High education and income levels were not proven to be that highly correlated with immigration attitudes in Korea either, not quite meeting expectations from the hypothesis after the literature review.

Overall, I believe this paper provides the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of what influences the public's attitudes toward immigration and also toward specific immigrant groups in Korea's case. The research did a thorough review of existing literature to design each

survey question and, using the most recent data, conducted a quantitative analysis employing a logit model. Though many things are still left to be studied, I believe countries with a similar immigration history as Korea's can benefit from this study.

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TABLES

Table1. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Immigration (dummy 1=favorable)

VARIABLES	(1) Model1	(2) Model2	(3) Model3	(4) Model4	(5) Model5	(6) Model6	(7) Model7	(8) Model8	(9) Model9
q2	0.000852								
	(0.00258)								
q12	**0.00327*** **	**0.00337*** **	**0.00307*** **	**0.00314*** **	**0.00267*** **	**0.00327*** **	**0.00312*** **	**0.00323*** **	**0.00307*** **
	(0.000976)	**(0.000975)**	**(0.000985)**	**(0.000980)**	**(0.00100)**	**(0.000973)**	**(0.000977)**	**(0.000974)**	**(0.000978)**
sq1	-0.0321	-0.0275	-0.0166	-0.0303	-0.0380	-0.0313	-0.0324	-0.0300	-0.0320
	(0.0345)	(0.0344)	(0.0349)	(0.0346)	(0.0353)	(0.0343)	(0.0344)	(0.0344)	(0.0344)
sq2	-0.0600*	-0.0569	-0.0613*	-0.0430	-0.0371	-0.0568	-0.0420	-0.0586*	-0.0578
	(0.0361)	(0.0352)	(0.0357)	(0.0357)	(0.0365)	(0.0352)	(0.0360)	(0.0353)	(0.0353)
sq3	0.00166	0.00159	0.00131	0.00228*	0.00128	0.00158	0.00196	0.00188	0.00149
	(0.00130)	(0.00130)	(0.00132)	(0.00132)	(0.00134)	(0.00130)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00130)
sq4	**0.124****	**0.123****	**0.139****	**0.129****	**0.103***	**0.127****	**0.121****	**0.126****	**0.110***
	(0.0596)	**(0.0597)**	**(0.0589)**	**(0.0596)**	**(0.0627)**	**(0.0595)**	**(0.0599)**	**(0.0595)**	**(0.0612)**
sq5	-0.0237	-0.0289	-0.0308	-0.0267	-0.0297	-0.0261	-0.0229	-0.0214	-0.0321
	(0.0523)	(0.0526)	(0.0533)	(0.0527)	(0.0541)	(0.0524)	(0.0523)	(0.0523)	(0.0527)
sq6	0.00551	0.00483	-0.00377	-0.00222	0.00504	0.00413	0.00326	0.00158	-0.00166
	(0.0361)	(0.0360)	(0.0365)	(0.0363)	(0.0371)	(0.0360)	(0.0360)	(0.0360)	(0.0362)
sq7	0.0393	0.0400	0.0307	0.0459	0.0476	0.0403	0.0323	0.0408	0.0282
	(0.0356)	(0.0356)	(0.0361)	(0.0359)	(0.0366)	(0.0356)	(0.0358)	(0.0356)	(0.0361)
q3		-0.00146							
		(0.00102)							
q4			**0.178*** **						
			(0.0342)						
q5				**-0.148*** **					
				(0.0358)					
q6					**0.272*** **				
					(0.0358)				
q7						-0.0249			
						(0.0342)			
q8							**0.0857****		
							(0.0363)		
q9								-0.0720*	
								(0.0374)	
q11									0.0691*
									(0.0354)
Observations	867	867	867	867	867	867	867	867	867

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- q12, satisfaction with one's life appears to be strongly correlated with positive immigration attitude (p<0.01 in every category, counted as demographic information).
- q2 and q3, estimation of % of legal/illegal immigrants, did not show any correlation.
- Women show unfavorable attitudes at times, but the correlation is not statistically significant. (1=female in sq2)
- Higher education level (high school graduates and up) and favorable attitudes toward immigration have a positive relationship (p<0.05 in most cases)
- Age, one's employment status or income level did not have any significant relationship, contrary to my prediction (at least for the non-group-specific model)
- Other positive correlations found in: q4) those who think immigrants are trying hard to assimilate, q6) those who are in favor of having more immigrants from developed countries, and q8) those who had a direct contact experience with foreigners in Korea.
- A strong negative correlation found in q5) those who believe in racial/ethnic stereotypes.
- P<0.1 but worth mentioning: q9) those who believed in only heritage as a prerequisite for being a real Korean were opposed to immigration. (1=①, 0=②③④), and q11) those who are volunteering/donating.

Table2-1. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward East European immigrants of different professions

VARIABLES	(1) EE1	(2) EE2	(3) EE3
q12	-8.43e-05	0.000134	0.00129
	(0.000958)	(0.000896)	(0.000842)
sq1	**0.0747****	0.0602*	0.0517*
	(0.0340)	(0.0318)	(0.0304)
sq2	-0.0151	-0.0366	-0.0108
	(0.0361)	(0.0337)	(0.0323)
sq3	**-0.00376*****	-0.000880	-0.00166
	(0.00132)	(0.00124)	(0.00118)
sq4	0.0990	**0.173****	0.0423
	(0.0667)	**(0.0680)**	(0.0593)
sq5	-0.0712*	-0.0469	-0.00993
	(0.0379)	(0.0358)	(0.0344)
sq6	-0.0418	-0.0430	-0.0632*
	(0.0365)	(0.0344)	(0.0328)
sq7	-0.0323	0.00534	-0.0172
	(0.0355)	(0.0337)	(0.0318)
q3	**-0.00265*****		
	(0.000997)		
q4	**0.0986*****	**0.0707****	**0.0698****
	(0.0341)	**(0.0320)**	**(0.0304)**
q5	**-0.0980*****		-0.0587*
	(0.0348)		(0.0313)
q6	**0.137*****	**0.143*****	**0.109*****
	(0.0348)	**(0.0320)**	**(0.0311)**
q11		0.0547	
		(0.0334)	
q9			-0.0582*
			(0.0346)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table2-2. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Southeast Asian immigrants of different professions

VARIABLES	(1) SEA1	(2) SEA2	(3) SEA3
q12	0.000839	-0.000474	-7.34e-05
	(0.000971)	(0.000923)	(0.000914)
sq1	0.0191	**0.0746****	0.00713
	(0.0346)	**(0.0326)**	(0.0326)
sq2	-0.0311	-0.0513	-0.0218
	(0.0371)	(0.0345)	(0.0348)
sq3	-0.00192	-0.000752	0.000242
	(0.00135)	(0.00126)	(0.00127)
sq4	0.0178	**0.174****	0.0878
	(0.0659)	**(0.0678)**	(0.0665)
sq5	-0.0214	-0.00154	-0.0311
	(0.0393)	(0.0368)	(0.0365)
sq6	-0.0409	-0.0246	-0.0517
	(0.0369)	(0.0350)	(0.0347)
sq7	-0.0234	0.00305	-0.0201
	(0.0366)	(0.0342)	(0.0341)
q4	**0.117*****	**0.127*****	**0.116*****
	(0.0343)	**(0.0324)**	**(0.0322)**
q5	**-0.124*****	**-0.0935*****	**-0.0842****
	(0.0350)	**(0.0332)**	**(0.0332)**
q6	**0.114*****	**0.125*****	**0.119*****
	(0.0359)	**(0.0334)**	**(0.0333)**
q7	**-0.0779****		**-0.0770****
	(0.0344)		**(0.0323)**
q8	0.0648*		0.0608*
	(0.0379)		(0.0357)
q9	-0.0405		**-0.0948****
	(0.0383)		**(0.0370)**
q11	0.0456		
	(0.0364)		
q3		**-0.00192****	
		(0.000950)	
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table2-3. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Chinese immigrants of different professions

VARIABLES	(1) CHN1	(2) CHN2	(3) CHN3
q12	0.00168*	0.00140	**0.00219****
	(0.000973)	(0.000997)	**(0.000985)**
sq1	**0.0841****	0.0422	0.0348
	(0.0349)	(0.0358)	(0.0353)
sq2	-0.0527	**-0.0926****	-0.0382
	(0.0366)	**(0.0375)**	(0.0372)
sq3	**-0.00410*****	**-0.00334****	**-0.00330****
	(0.00133)	**(0.00137)**	**(0.00136)**
sq4	0.0759	0.0692	-0.00159
	(0.0666)	(0.0676)	(0.0671)
sq5	0.000425	**-0.111*****	-0.00693
	(0.0395)	**(0.0405)**	(0.0399)
sq6	-0.0424	-0.0150	-0.0512
	(0.0366)	(0.0378)	(0.0374)
sq7	-0.00779	-0.0385	0.00695
	(0.0363)	(0.0371)	(0.0368)
q3	**-0.00304*****	**-0.00247****	-0.00196*
	(0.00106)	**(0.00106)**	(0.00104)
q4	**0.104*****	0.0603*	
	(0.0355)	(0.0363)	
q5	**-0.186*****	**-0.178*****	**-0.138*****
	(0.0358)	**(0.0361)**	**(0.0359)**
q6	0.0729*	0.0686*	0.0711*
	(0.0376)	(0.0382)	(0.0374)
q7			-0.0640*
			(0.0351)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tables 3-1. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Manual Laborers from different countries (by each variable plus demographic info)

Overestimation of illegal immigrant percentage

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	EE1	SEA1	CHN1
q3	**-0.00284*** **	-0.00127	**-0.00319*** **
	(0.000987)	(0.000994)	**(0.00103)**
q12	0.000631	**0.00189** **	**0.00228** **
	(0.000932)	**(0.000930)**	**(0.000955)**
sq1	**0.0678** **	0.0156	**0.0717** **
	(0.0335)	(0.0338)	**(0.0341)**
sq2	-0.0336	-0.0563	**-0.0720** **
	(0.0353)	(0.0353)	**(0.0355)**
sq3	**-0.00363*** **	-0.00196	**-0.00432*** **
	(0.00129)	(0.00128)	**(0.00130)**
sq4	0.102	0.0198	0.0720
	(0.0655)	(0.0638)	(0.0661)
sq5	-0.0679*	-0.00320	0.00529
	(0.0375)	(0.0381)	(0.0386)
sq6	-0.0327	-0.0226	-0.0270
	(0.0359)	(0.0359)	(0.0357)
sq7	-0.0334	-0.0158	-0.0106
	(0.0349)	(0.0351)	(0.0355)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Assimilation Effort

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	EE1	SEA1	CHN1
q4	**0.118*** **	**0.132*** **	**0.122*** **
	(0.0334)	**(0.0335)**	**(0.0345)**
q12	0.000252	0.00161*	0.00190**
	(0.000934)	(0.000936)	(0.000954)
sq1	**0.0708** **	0.0238	**0.0753** **
	(0.0336)	(0.0340)	**(0.0342)**
sq2	-0.0364	-0.0604*	-0.0744**
	(0.0354)	(0.0356)	(0.0356)
sq3	**-0.00375*** **	-0.00223*	**-0.00450*** **
	(0.00130)	(0.00130)	**(0.00130)**
sq4	0.115*	0.0307	0.0851
	(0.0663)	(0.0650)	(0.0650)
sq5	-0.0678*	-0.00603	0.00471
	(0.0376)	(0.0383)	(0.0386)
sq6	-0.0374	-0.0287	-0.0334
	(0.0360)	(0.0361)	(0.0358)
sq7	-0.0407	-0.0233	-0.0194
	(0.0350)	(0.0353)	(0.0355)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Belief in Racial/Ethnic Stereotypes

VARIABLES	(1) EE1	(2) SEA1	(3) CHN1
q5	**-0.110*** **	**-0.136*** **	**-0.193*** **
	(0.0341)	**(0.0342)**	**(0.0353)**
q12	0.000336	0.00167*	0.00186*
	(0.000933)	(0.000938)	(0.000960)
sq1	0.0624*	0.0141	**0.0673** **
	(0.0334)	(0.0339)	**(0.0343)**
sq2	-0.0216	-0.0427	-0.0524
	(0.0355)	(0.0357)	(0.0361)
sq3	**-0.00304** **	-0.00137	**-0.00344*** **
	(0.00130)	(0.00130)	**(0.00131)**
sq4	0.107	0.0241	0.0799
	(0.0657)	(0.0642)	(0.0657)
sq5	-0.0651*	-0.00319	0.00726
	(0.0375)	(0.0383)	(0.0390)
sq6	-0.0381	-0.0293	-0.0374
	(0.0359)	(0.0361)	(0.0362)
sq7	-0.0318	-0.0124	-0.00593
	(0.0350)	(0.0353)	(0.0358)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Thoughts on immigration influenced by the media

VARIABLES	(1) EE1	(2) SEA1	(3) CHN1
q7	-0.0378	**-0.0812** **	-0.0362
	(0.0335)	**(0.0336)**	(0.0339)
q12	0.000444	0.00177*	**0.00208** **
	(0.000928)	(0.000932)	**(0.000951)**
sq1	0.0600*	0.0115	0.0634*
	(0.0333)	(0.0338)	(0.0338)
sq2	-0.0330	-0.0563	**-0.0700** **
	(0.0352)	(0.0354)	**(0.0354)**
sq3	**-0.00355*** **	-0.00213*	**-0.00423*** **
	(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00129)
sq4	0.109*	0.0309	0.0799
	(0.0657)	(0.0646)	(0.0654)
sq5	-0.0655*	-0.00667	0.00720
	(0.0375)	(0.0382)	(0.0385)
sq6	-0.0337	-0.0249	-0.0278
	(0.0358)	(0.0360)	(0.0356)
sq7	-0.0326	-0.0114	-0.0114
	(0.0349)	(0.0352)	(0.0353)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Direct contact with foreigner in Korea

VARIABLES	(1) EE1	(2) SEA1	(3) CHN1
q8	0.0139	**0.0805****	0.0255
	(0.0365)	**(0.0368)**	(0.0368)
q12	0.000444	0.00165*	**0.00204****
	(0.000930)	(0.000934)	**(0.000954)**
sq1	0.0605*	0.0117	0.0636*
	(0.0333)	(0.0338)	(0.0338)
sq2	-0.0306	-0.0431	-0.0658*
	(0.0356)	(0.0359)	(0.0359)
sq3	**-0.00340*****	-0.00164	**-0.00405*****
	(0.00129)	(0.00129)	**(0.00130)**
sq4	0.104	0.0193	0.0751
	(0.0654)	(0.0640)	(0.0656)
sq5	-0.0648*	-0.0116	0.00704
	(0.0377)	(0.0384)	(0.0386)
sq6	-0.0327	-0.0225	-0.0269
	(0.0358)	(0.0359)	(0.0355)
sq7	-0.0363	-0.0239	-0.0154
	(0.0349)	(0.0352)	(0.0354)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tables 3-2. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Investors from different countries (by each variable plus demographic info)

Overestimation of illegal immigrant percentage

VARIABLES	(1) EE2	(2) SEA2	(3) CHN2
q3	-0.000812	**-0.00214****	**-0.00262****
	(0.000937)	**(0.000947)**	**(0.00104)**
q12	0.000863	0.000271	0.00191**
	(0.000877)	(0.000899)	(0.000973)
sq1	0.0586*	**0.0657****	0.0362
	(0.0317)	**(0.0323)**	(0.0350)
sq2	-0.0443	**-0.0673****	**-0.111*****
	(0.0334)	**(0.0339)**	**(0.0364)**
sq3	-0.000379	-0.000649	**-0.00369*****
	(0.00123)	(0.00124)	**(0.00134)**
sq4	**0.194*****	**0.170****	0.0680
	(0.0666)	**(0.0662)**	(0.0665)
sq5	-0.0398	0.000942	**-0.104*****
	(0.0355)	(0.0365)	**(0.0397)**
sq6	-0.0346	-0.0158	-0.00352
	(0.0341)	(0.0347)	(0.0370)
sq7	0.0146	0.00283	-0.0421
	(0.0332)	(0.0338)	(0.0363)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Assimilation Efforts

VARIABLES	(1) EE2	(2) SEA2	(3) CHN2
q4	**0.0868*** **	**0.144*** **	**0.0784** **
	(0.0317)	**(0.0319)**	**(0.0353)**
q12	0.000654	-0.000119	0.00163*
	(0.000879)	(0.000904)	(0.000972)
sq1	**0.0640** **	**0.0737** **	0.0371
	(0.0318)	**(0.0324)**	(0.0350)
sq2	-0.0465	**-0.0709** **	**-0.112*** **
	(0.0335)	**(0.0340)**	**(0.0364)**
sq3	-0.000520	-0.000844	**-0.00374*** **
	(0.00123)	(0.00125)	**(0.00134)**
sq4	**0.204*** **	**0.188*** **	0.0776
	(0.0671)	**(0.0672)**	(0.0662)
sq5	-0.0414	-0.000215	**-0.103*** **
	(0.0355)	(0.0366)	**(0.0397)**
sq6	-0.0383	-0.0224	-0.00739
	(0.0342)	(0.0348)	(0.0370)
sq7	0.00995	-0.00591	-0.0481
	(0.0332)	(0.0340)	(0.0363)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes

VARIABLES	(1) EE2	(2) SEA2	(3) CHN2
q5	-0.0226	**-0.104*** **	**-0.184*** **
	(0.0331)	**(0.0328)**	**(0.0357)**
q12	0.000790	1.95e-05	0.00155
	(0.000876)	(0.000902)	(0.000983)
sq1	0.0569*	0.0618*	0.0329
	(0.0317)	(0.0322)	(0.0353)
sq2	-0.0417	-0.0559	**-0.0938** **
	(0.0336)	(0.0341)	**(0.0370)**
sq3	-0.000248	-0.000124	**-0.00289** **
	(0.00124)	(0.00125)	**(0.00135)**
sq4	**0.195*** **	**0.175*** **	0.0749
	(0.0666)	**(0.0664)**	(0.0668)
sq5	-0.0387	0.00322	**-0.105*** **
	(0.0355)	(0.0365)	**(0.0402)**
sq6	-0.0357	-0.0204	-0.0127
	(0.0342)	(0.0347)	(0.0375)
sq7	0.0146	0.00442	-0.0382
	(0.0332)	(0.0338)	(0.0367)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tables 3-3. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Foreign Brides from different countries (by each variable plus demographic info)

Assimilation Efforts

VARIABLES	(1) EE3	(2) SEA3	(3) CHN3
q4	**0.0838*** **	**0.130*** **	0.0437
	(0.0302)	**(0.0317)**	(0.0350)
q12	**0.00166** **	0.000572	**0.00238** **
	(0.000834)	(0.000890)	**(0.000967)**
sq1	0.0530*	0.0104	0.0348
	(0.0304)	(0.0323)	(0.0348)
sq2	-0.0271	-0.0501	-0.0576
	(0.0321)	(0.0338)	(0.0363)
sq3	-0.00195*	-0.000255	**-0.00350*** **
	(0.00117)	(0.00124)	**(0.00133)**
sq4	0.0541	0.0894	0.000948
	(0.0604)	(0.0659)	(0.0663)
sq5	-0.0140	-0.0255	-0.000571
	(0.0344)	(0.0361)	(0.0393)
sq6	-0.0581*	-0.0434	-0.0440
	(0.0328)	(0.0344)	(0.0369)
sq7	-0.0228	-0.0269	-0.00697
	(0.0318)	(0.0336)	(0.0362)
Observations	868	868	868

Belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes

VARIABLES	(1) EE3	(2) SEA3	(3) CHN3
q5	**-0.0703** **	**-0.0984*** **	**-0.144*** **
	(0.0311)	**(0.0326)**	**(0.0356)**
q12	**0.00173** **	0.000682	**0.00230** **
	(0.000833)	(0.000890)	**(0.000974)**
sq1	0.0472	0.000474	0.0327
	(0.0304)	(0.0322)	(0.0350)
sq2	-0.0174	-0.0359	-0.0425
	(0.0322)	(0.0339)	(0.0369)
sq3	-0.00150	0.000434	**-0.00286** **
	(0.00118)	(0.00124)	**(0.00134)**
sq4	0.0495	0.0806	0.000738
	(0.0596)	(0.0648)	(0.0665)
sq5	-0.0128	-0.0224	-0.00111
	(0.0343)	(0.0360)	(0.0396)
sq6	-0.0583*	-0.0421	-0.0495
	(0.0328)	(0.0343)	(0.0372)
sq7	-0.0168	-0.0174	0.000125
	(0.0317)	(0.0335)	(0.0364)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Thoughts on immigration influenced by the media

VARIABLES	(1) EE3	(2) SEA3	(3) CHN3
q7	-0.0155	**-0.0806****	**-0.0683****
	(0.0305)	**(0.0319)**	**(0.0346)**
q12	**0.00179****	0.000741	**0.00241****
	(0.000831)	(0.000886)	**(0.000968)**
sq1	0.0461	-0.00144	0.0301
	(0.0304)	(0.0322)	(0.0347)
sq2	-0.0250	-0.0461	-0.0567
	(0.0321)	(0.0338)	(0.0364)
sq3	-0.00182	-0.000196	**-0.00359*****
	(0.00117)	(0.00124)	**(0.00133)**
sq4	0.0497	0.0885	0.00600
	(0.0598)	(0.0654)	(0.0665)
sq5	-0.0126	-0.0262	-0.00371
	(0.0345)	(0.0360)	(0.0394)
sq6	-0.0553*	-0.0396	-0.0438
	(0.0328)	(0.0343)	(0.0369)
sq7	-0.0177	-0.0153	-0.000544
	(0.0318)	(0.0335)	(0.0362)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Direct contact with foreigner in Korea

VARIABLES	(1) EE3	(2) SEA3	(3) CHN3
q8	0.00419	**0.0744****	0.0604
	(0.0332)	**(0.0355)**	(0.0376)
q12	**0.00180****	0.000644	**0.00233****
	(0.000834)	(0.000890)	**(0.000969)**
sq1	0.0463	-0.00115	0.0304
	(0.0304)	(0.0322)	(0.0347)
sq2	-0.0242	-0.0342	-0.0467
	(0.0325)	(0.0342)	(0.0369)
sq3	-0.00176	0.000275	**-0.00320****
	(0.00118)	(0.00124)	**(0.00133)**
sq4	0.0476	0.0766	-0.00360
	(0.0595)	(0.0647)	(0.0662)
sq5	-0.0122	-0.0302	-0.00657
	(0.0347)	(0.0362)	(0.0396)
sq6	-0.0549*	-0.0373	-0.0418
	(0.0328)	(0.0343)	(0.0368)
sq7	-0.0192	-0.0269	-0.0101
	(0.0319)	(0.0335)	(0.0363)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Emphasis on heritage for "Koreanness"

VARIABLES	(1) EE3	(2) SEA3	(3) CHN3
q9	-0.0677*	**-0.114*** **	-0.0542
	(0.0348)	**(0.0368)**	(0.0385)
q12	**0.00175** **	0.000707	**0.00241** **
	(0.000833)	(0.000890)	**(0.000966)**
sq1	0.0471	0.00126	0.0319
	(0.0304)	(0.0322)	(0.0347)
sq2	-0.0247	-0.0460	-0.0564
	(0.0320)	(0.0337)	(0.0364)
sq3	-0.00154	0.000427	**-0.00320** **
	(0.00117)	(0.00124)	**(0.00133)**
sq4	0.0495	0.0812	-0.000949
	(0.0597)	(0.0650)	(0.0662)
sq5	-0.00846	-0.0157	0.00334
	(0.0345)	(0.0362)	(0.0393)
sq6	-0.0584*	-0.0433	-0.0447
	(0.0329)	(0.0344)	(0.0368)
sq7	-0.0168	-0.0173	-0.00351
	(0.0318)	(0.0335)	(0.0361)
Observations	868	868	868

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDICES

Appendix1: Survey Questionnaire (English translation)

Survey on perception of foreign residents in Korea

Q1. How is your view on foreign residents in Korea?

*** Definition of foreign residents**
Foreigners residing in the country for a certain period of time, excluding tourists. Foreign manual laborers, professionals, trainees, foreign students, foreign brides, etc.

① Very favorable ☞ **Go to Q1-1**
② Favorable ☞ **Go to Q1-1**
③ Neither favorable nor unfavorable ☞ **Go to Q2**
④ Unfavorable ☞ **Go to Q1-2**
⑤ Very unfavorable ☞ **Go to Q1-2**

Q1-1. What is the biggest reason behind your favorable view toward foreign residents?

① They bring new ideas and diversity to the country.
② They are beneficial to Korea's economy.
③ They mitigate Korea's demographic problems, such as aging population and low fertility rate.
④ Other: _____

Q1-2. What is the biggest reason behind your unfavorable view toward foreign residents?

① They take away jobs from Korean citizens.
② They lack understanding of Korean culture (history/language…) and destroy unity of the nation.
③ They commit crimes and create various problems.
④ Other: _____

Q2. What percentage of Korea's total population is foreign-born in your estimation?

_____%

Q3. What percentage of foreign resident population are illegal immigrants in your estimation?

_____%

Q4. Do you think foreign residents in Korea try hard to assimilate to the society?

① Very much
② A little
③ Neutral
④ Not quite
⑤ Not at all

Q5. What do you think of sayings like "Japanese people act differently behind back.", "Africans are lazy and not punctual.", "Chinese people lack sense of hygiene.", or "Americans are violent."?

① Strongly agree
② Agree a little
③ Neither agree nor disagree
④ Disagree a little
⑤ Strongly disagree

Q6. What do you think of having more immigrants coming from developed countries?

① Strongly approve
② Approve a little
③ Neither approve nor disapprove
④ Disapprove a little
⑤ Strongly disapprove

Q7. Do you think your view on immigrants is influenced by TV, newspaper, and other media?

① Very much so ☞ **Go to Q7-1**
② A little ☞ **Go to Q7-1**
③ Neutral ☞ **Go to Q8**
④ Not quite ☞ **Go to Q8**
⑤ Not at all ☞ **Go to Q8**

Q7-1. How do they shape your view?

① Positively
② Negatively

Q8. Have you ever been in direct contact with a foreign resident in Korea?

① Yes ☞ **Go to Q8-1**

② No ☞ **Go to Q9**

Q8-1. How was your experience overall?

① Very positive

② A little positive

③ Neutral

④ A little negative

⑤ Very negative

Q9. Which of the following group do you consider to be "more Korean"?

a) A foreign national with Korean heritage
(e.g. famous golfer Lydia Ko)
b) A naturalized Korean citizen of foreign origin
(e.g. table tennis player Jihee Jeon, Yeseo Tang)

① a)

② b)

③ a) and b) are both equally Korean

④ Neither a) nor b) is Korean

Q10. Suppose the following groups of people are immigrating to Korea. Please rate your preference. (1=Very favorable, 6=Not favorable at all)

Occupation / Origin	Manual laborer	Investor	Foreign bride
Eastern Europe			
Southeast Asia			
China			

Q11. Are you currently volunteering or making a donation?

① Yes

② No

Q12. Rate your satisfaction with life

(0: Extremely dissatisfied - 100: Extremely satisfied)

_____%

Demographic Questions◀

sq1. Region	① Seoul	② Busan	③ Daegu	④ Incheon	⑤ Gwangju	⑥ Daejeon
	⑦ Ulsan	⑧ Sejong	⑨ Gyeonggi	⑩ Gangwon	⑪ Chungbuk	⑫ Chungnam
	⑬ Jeonbuk	⑭ Jeonnam	⑮ Gyeongbuk	⑯ Gyeongnam	⑰ Jeju	
sq2. Gender	Male	Female				
sq3. Age	Years old					

Other Demographic Questions

sq4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

① Less than middle school
② High School
③ College or above

sq5. What describes your current employment status best?

① Employed
② Seeking for job
③ Retired/Housewife
④ Student
⑤ Unemployed

sq6. What is your average monthly household income?
* Please include the bonus and other source of income.

① Below KRW 1,000,000
② Above KRW 1,000,000 up to KRW 2,000,000
③ Above KRW 2,000,000 up to KRW 3,000,000
④ Above KRW 3,000,000 up to KRW 4,000,000
⑤ Above KRW 4,000,000 up to KRW 5,000,000
⑥ Above KRW 5,000,000

sq7. Do you have a religion? If so, how do you identify yourself?

① No religion ☞ **End of survey**
② Protestant ☞ **Go to sq7-1**
③ Catholic ☞ **Go to sq7-1**
④ Buddhist ☞ **Go to sq7-1**
⑤ Other: _____ ☞ **Go to sq7-1**

sq7-1. Do you consider yourself more religious than others and try to follow doctrines?

① Very much
② A little
③ Average
④ Not quite
⑤ Not at all

※ Thank you for your participation.

Appendix2: Sample Summary Statistics

Demographic information

sq1. region	Frequency	Percentage	Accumulated (%)
① Seoul	200	20.0	20.0
② Busan	72	7.2	27.2
③ Daegu	52	5.2	32.4
④ Incheon	57	5.7	38.1
⑤ Gwangu	29	2.9	41.0
⑥ Daejeon	34	3.4	44.4
⑦ Ulsan	23	2.3	46.7
⑧ Sejong	3	.3	47.0
⑨ Gyeonggi	218	21.8	68.8
⑩ Gangwon	32	3.2	72.0
⑪ Chungbuk	32	3.2	75.2
⑫ Chungnam	40	4.0	79.2
⑬ Jeonbuk	36	3.6	82.8
⑭ Jeonnam	39	3.9	86.7
⑮ Gyeongbuk	58	5.8	92.5
⑯ Gyeongnam	63	6.3	98.8
⑰ Jeju	12	1.2	100.0
Total	1000	100.0	
sq2. gender			
① Male	504	50.4	50.4
② Female	496	49.6	100.0
Total	1000	100.0	
sq3. age			
① 20’s	178	17.8	17.8
② 30’s	202	20.2	38.0
③ 40’s	218	21.8	59.8
④ 50’s	188	18.8	78.6
⑤ 60 or above	214	21.4	100.0
Total	1000	100.0	

sq4. education level	Frequency	Percentage	Accumulated (%)
① Middle school or less	100	10.0	10.0
② High school	266	26.6	36.6
③ University or above	614	61.4	98.0
Didn't respond	20	2.0	100.0
Total	1000	100.0	
sq5. employment status			
① Employed	623	62.3	62.3
② Job searching	15	1.5	63.8
③Retiree /Housewife	215	21.5	85.3
④ Student	71	7.1	92.4
⑤ Unemployed	73	7.3	99.7
Didn't respond	3	.3	100.0
Total	1000	100.0	
sq6. income (1,000 KRW)			
① Under 1000	76	7.6	7.6
② ~ Up to 2000	72	7.2	14.8
③ ~ Up to 3000	129	12.9	27.7
④ ~ Up to 4000	178	17.8	45.5
⑤ ~ Up to 5000	141	14.1	59.6
⑥ More than 5000	283	28.3	87.9
Didn't respond	121	12.1	100.0
Total	1000	100.0	
sq7. religion			
① No religion	509	50.9	50.9
② Protestant	226	22.6	73.5
③ Catholic	114	11.4	84.9
④ Buddhist	147	14.7	99.6
⑤ Other	4	.4	100.0
Total	1000	100.0	

sq7-1. Do you consider yourself to be more religious and try to follow religious doctrines?

Religiosity	Frequency	Percentage	Accumulated (%)
① Strongly agree	15	1.5	3.1
② Agree	59	5.9	15.1
③ Neither agree nor disagree	216	21.6	59.1
④ Disagree	114	11.4	82.3
⑤ Strongly disagree	87	8.7	100.0
Total	491	49.1	
- No religion	509	50.9	
Total	1000	100.0	

Frequency distribution for main questions

Q1. How is your view on foreign residents in Korea?

	Frequency	Percentage	Accumulated (%)
① Very favorable	79	7.9	7.9
② Favorable	335	33.5	41.4
①+② Favorable	414	41.4	
③ Neither favorable nor unfavorable	482	48.2	89.6
④+⑤ Unfavorable	104	10.4	
④ Unfavorable	80	8.0	97.6
⑤ Very unfavorable	24	2.4	100.0
Total	1000	100.0	

Q1-1. What is the biggest reason behind your favorable view toward foreign residents?

	Frequency	Percentage	Accumulated (%)
① New ideas and diversity	135	13.5	32.6
②Beneficial to economy	179	17.9	75.8
③ Mitigate demographic problems	85	8.5	96.4
④ Others	15	1.5	100.0
Total	414	41.4	
- Responded ③+④+⑤ in Q1 (Neutral + Unfavorable)	586	58.6	
Total	1000	100.0	