

Implementing Comprehensive Citizen Security Strategies in Ecuador



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	1
Introduction	2
Development Challenge: Reducing Crime and Violence	2
Delivery Challenges.....	5
Tracing the Implementation Process	6
Conclusions and Lessons Learned	13
Annexes	14
References	17

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Abstract

Controlling crime, violence and insecurity is a great challenge in many parts of the developing world. By 2008, Ecuador had seen a worrisome increase in its rate of violent crimes, most emblematically the homicide rate that reached 18.9 per 100,000 inhabitants. The government demonstrated a weak capacity to prevent and react to crimes and other risks, as well as little capacity for joint work among institutions to cope with the worsening crime rate. Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean – the most violent region in the world – have experienced high rates of insecurity due to violent crime.

However, Ecuador dramatically reduced this level of violence. By 2016, homicides had fallen to 5 per 100,000 inhabitants, and seven of the crimes that most affect citizen security had decreased. Several innovative measures contributed to the remarkable change in the country. The state expanded the use of technology, including video surveillance in cities and transports, and the gathering and use of statistical data to allow georeferencing of hot spots, in order to better allocate resources for crime prevention and to respond to other threats. Another element was the creation of the SYS-ECU-911, a system for national coordination among public agencies, as well as with private organizations and NGOs that receive and meet the needs of citizens; SYS-ECU-911 enabled organizations to better deal with emergencies reported by citizens dialing 911, and siting security infrastructure where needed by citizens. The SYS-ECU-911 has optimized the response time to respond to emergencies. Last, but not least, the government adopted policies and public actions based on certified data, with its Government by Results system to meet objectives, analysis of hot spots to prevent risks, and

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decentralization policies to bring its responses closer to citizens and their ground-level realities. This enabled public security institutions to work in accordance with the realities of each zone, which improved public perception of the government's efforts to combat crime, address emergencies, and advance integrated security.

Professor Taejong Kim

Introduction

In 2008, Ecuador was facing a crisis of crime and insecurity. Homicide rates had climbed steadily over the preceding decade, reaching an alarming 18.9 per 100,000 citizens. Facing this challenge, the government of Ecuador dramatically revamped its strategy to tackle crime and insecurity, and was able to slash the homicide rate to 5 per 100,000 by 2016. Ecuador began to attract major attention as a model for successful implementation of an Integrated Security System (SIS) in developing countries plagued by violence, crime and insecurity.

This case study examines how the government of Ecuador implemented a series of security reforms to create a more integrated institutional response to crime and violence. These included reforms to the institution management system; de-concentration and de-centralization policies; the use of more advanced technologies for communication, video surveillance and analysis of hot spots; the creation of offices for criminal investigation and capacity training; and, particularly, the introduction of SIS ECU 911 (a national system to coordinate emergency for emergency response) and measures to increase citizen participation.

This set of reforms was shaped in part by the overarching idea of “seguridad integral”—comprehensive citizen security—which appeared in Ecuador's new Constitution of 2008.¹ In the years prior to 2008, Ecuador's justice and police agencies had engaged in processes of institutional strengthening, building up physical infrastructure and personnel, and pursuing individual institutional objectives. But these efforts were hampered by lack of coordination. In an attempt to tackle this problem, and recognizing

the grave crisis in public safety, the government made improving public security a priority. To reach this priority, the government planned to integrate² the duties of each institution (public, private and NGOs) to involved the public safety into one framework. This allowed policies to be coordinated and focused not only on crime, but also on responses to all kinds of threats and emergencies, as well as preventive actions.

This case study examines how Ecuador implemented reforms for comprehensive citizen security. It draws on the experiences of the author, on original research, and on the voices of a number of other stakeholders in Ecuador's reform process to examine some aspects of how this was accomplished.

Development Challenge: Reducing Crime and Violence

Insecurity is the result of a combination of multiple factors, from drug trafficking and organized crime, through weak judicial and police systems, to the lack of opportunities and support for those young people living in disadvantaged communities. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), have the unenviable distinction of being the most violent region in the world, with 23.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012, compared to 9.7, 4.4, 2.7 and 2.9 for Africa, North America, Asia and Europe, respectively. LAC represents only 8% of the world's population, but 37% of homicides worldwide (Chioda, 2017).

Like many countries in Latin America, Ecuador in 2008 faced levels of endemic violence and pronounced insecurity, particularly as measured by the homicide rate.³ In Ecuador, this figure nearly tripled between 1980 and 2008, from 6.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants to 18.9 in 2008.⁴ Over 60 percent of homicides were committed with firearms (Data retrieved from: Hemispheric


1 The term “Integral Security” or “Integrated Security” was introduced in the Ecuadorean Constitution (Clause 8 of Article 3) in 2008 for the first time, with the following clause: “Guaranteeing its inhabitants the right to a culture of peace, to integral security and to live in a democratic society free of corruption.” This definition will be explained more in detail below.

2 Government institutions for public safety under the integrated security system include joint work among related agencies such as the National Police under the Ministry of the Interior, the State Attorney General Office, Courts, and the Public Defender's Office under the Judiciary Council, the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Religious Affairs, the Armed Forces, Firefighters, and Red Cross, and others. Integrated security covers all security issues in Ecuador and its main goal is to protect the public from all types of threats. This paper, however, mainly focuses on how Ecuador reduced crime rates (especially the homicide rate), a more urgent task in much of Latin America.

3 The homicide rate is a key indicator to gauge a country's level of violence and insecurity (CHIODA 2016). The homicide rate is not the only one, it is one of the parameters that allows to determine the level of violence that a state faces, since Using the homicide rate as a core indicator provides more complete, comparable and accurate information; it can allow for the identification of the intensity of violence, those who are at risk, motivations, modality, geography, and trends.


4 Data retrieved from INEC - National Institute of Statistics and Census ('80-'00), National Police of Ecuador and State Attorney General ('01-'08).

Figure 1. Homicide Rate in Ecuador (1980-2010)



Source: Author's elaboration based on data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (1980-2000) and State Attorney General (2001-10).

Figure 2. Homicide Rate in Ecuador and homicides by firearms (1980-2012)



Source: Author's elaboration based on data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (1980-2000), State Attorney General (2001-12), PNVB 2013-2017.

Security Observatory).⁵ According to the Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (Secretariat for Planning and Development; SENPLADES) organized crime, such as drug trafficking and others, was on the rise, while criminal organizations and street gangs were proliferating (SENPLADES, 2013–2017).

The majority of these homicides – over 60 percent – were committed with firearms, a rate of 10.2 in 2007, which increased to 12.6 in 2009. The trends in a wide variety of crimes, both common crime and organized crime, all pointed up, including theft drug trafficking, hijacking, kidnapping, homicide, and human trafficking, as well as various violations of human rights (SENPLADES, 2013–2017).

The country was also facing a significant growth in the rate of complaints, in crimes against property (robbery, theft, animal rustling);⁶ from the year 1995 they passed 320 complaints per 100,000 inhabitants, 471.5 in 1999, and reaching in 2007 a rate of 515.75 complaints; thus, thefts increased by 30 percent during the period from 2000 to 2007.

Daniel Pontón, a Quito-based analyst who has worked extensively on themes related to crime, sums up the situation thusly:

“In summary, since the return to democracy in 1979, there have been three facts that we could highlight in matters of public security: a) sustained growth in the indicators of violence, crime, and citizen security; b) transformation in the government’s priority or agenda on security, ranging from the anti-subversive struggle of the 1980s to the control of drug trafficking and related activities from the early 2000s; and c) a recurrent crisis and institutional illegitimacy (police, prison, and justice) lacking the public’s confidence” (Pontón, 2009).

Introducing reforms

In an attempt to overhaul the public security sector, the government of Ecuador began to introduce a series of reforms, beginning in 2008. These reforms took place in a larger context of drafting a new national constitution.

Bolstering public safety management was a major area for reforms, so the new constitution, promulgated in 2008, included the term “seguridad integral”—comprehensive citizen security—for the first time in Ecuadorian history.

Ecuador’s comprehensive citizen security model takes a holistic approach, including a wide variety of potential harms and threats, including issues affecting public welfare, economic development, and the natural environment.⁷ The government of Ecuador saw a need to focus on a model of comprehensive citizen security that would include, but not be limited to, public security measures to reduce crime and violence.

Based on this new concept, both traditional and non-traditional public institutions began to cooperate among themselves by meeting and sharing information and data for one mission: provide better public safety. Through joint work on security matters, the government also began to focus on preventive measures, an important aspect in improving public safety.

For example, the new Public Security Law (2009), established a Public Security Council to convene multiple institutions to deal with public security issues.⁸ Its main function was to advise the President of the Republic on policies, plans, strategies, procedures, prevention measures and interventions related to public safety.

Working with the council, the government took several measures to address the problem of homicides with firearms. It mandated a permit regime to control firearms, and strengthened penalties for carrying a firearm without a permit. These actions played an important role in breaking the trend line of violence in Ecuador since finally, the homicide rate began to reverse.⁹

⁷ The spectrum of threats included in this idea is quite expansive, encompassing a broad set of potential harms to human welfare. “Among the new threats to human security or emerging threats are: extreme poverty, inequality and social exclusion, natural disasters, infectious diseases, conflicts of identity: ethnic, religious, cultural and regional, citizen insecurity, uncontrolled migration, transnational organized crime (including drug trafficking and related crimes, money laundering, arms smuggling, and human trafficking), fuel trafficking, trafficking of cultural and natural heritage, kidnapping, extortion, as well as violence, crime, insecurity, traffic accidents, drug and alcohol consumption, etc.” Cited by the National Comprehensive Security Plan (SENPLADES, 2013–2017).

⁸ The Public Safety Council was created per Article 6 of the Public Safety Law (September 2009). The Public Safety Council comprised the following members: President and Vice President, President of the National Assembly, President of the National Court of Justice, Coordinating Minister of Security, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Interior, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, General Commander of the National Police.

⁹ There are several studies that argue that one of the best policies to reduce homicides by firearm, is to control the possession of these, including UNODC:2013, CHIODA:2016, and the work of the Igarapé Institute. Manuel Eisner of the Igarapé Institute notes that “It is essential to build research capacity in low- and middle-income countries that can help to advance local knowledge on the causes of violence and effective ways to provide parenting support, change norms, reduce

⁵ <http://www.oas.org/dsp/Observatorio/database/regionsdetails.aspx?lang=es®ion=6>

⁶ Robbery is defined as a crime in which the property of others is stolen using force, or violence against people, while theft is taking the property of others without force or violence. Rustling (Abigeato) refers specifically to the theft of stock animals (ganado). Data compiled from the data base of Judicial Police (1995–2007).

The National Secretariat for Planning and Development¹⁰, a public institution for national planning, issued the National Plan for Good Living (2009-13). Each public institution has since been required to prepare an action plan per SENPLADES guidelines for outlining the nation's objectives. Thus the Reforming and Strengthening Justice Plan (2009-13) was launched to improve the Prosecutor's Office, Courts, and the Penitentiary System. In addition, the National Police of Ecuador had to restructure its previous plan (2004-14) and revised its strategic blueprint for modernization and comprehensive transformation (2010-14) (National Police, 2010), and the National Citizen Security Plan (2008). These plans supported the application of deconcentration and decentralization policies, to increase infrastructure and improve the services of institutions.

To achieve this objective, the central government first moved to strengthen the physical infrastructure of security institutions. It issued Emergency Decree No. 675 in October 2007, and the National Citizen Security Plan, in March 2008, which restarted the construction of several UPCs¹¹ (Community Police Units) in each zone; this project had been pending for several years, due to the lack of allocation of resources. In addition, the central government adopted several decrees, to transfer some functions of the National Police, such as traffic control, to local government, in order to focus the work of this institutions. And the decision was taken to gradually raise the number of law enforcement officers (national police) more than 40 percent and build more police stations (UPC) in each neighborhood across the country, and to raise the salaries of security agents had improved during these years.

Delivery Challenges

The pervasive effects of violence and public insecurity, and difficulty in addressing these effectively prior to 2008, according to policy implementers, stemmed largely from a lack of active participation of the central government in decision making and concrete political actions.

Government participation was hampered by a lack of easily accessible online data enabling them to act in a timely manner on matters of public security.¹² In addition, government institutions related to public security did not cooperate effectively among themselves. These institutions lacked technological capacity to use the most up-to-date analytical techniques (e.g., georeferenced data analysis, and hot spot analysis). One effect of these shortfalls in coordination and capacity was that Ecuadorian citizens could not receive a timely response in a criminal situation, and as a result public confidence in justice and security institutions was abysmal (INEC, 2011). The government also did not encourage people to participate in improving public safety.

As the government began to implement comprehensive citizen security reforms, it faced crucial delivery challenges. These included opposition from members of public security institutions who were opposed to the reforms, and the need to effectively engage stakeholders; significant obstacles collecting and deploying high-quality data and indicators; the need to better engage with citizens to understand their concerns; and the need to establish effective coordination across the many agencies and institutions involved in public security.

Opposition from public servants and members of public security agencies

As the National Assembly had launched the new Constitution in 2008, Public Security Law in 2009 and a new Public Service Law in 2010,¹³ to improve responses to violence and crime, and provide better treatment to public servants. All these changes were made through decrees and laws that were perceived as rushed. Due to this hurried attempt to establish a legal basis and begin implementation of security reforms, the reforms were not adequately assimilated across the bureaucracy. The central government and the National Assembly faced strong opposition from certain police, military and political groups, in part because these various changes were not previously socialized with officials and citizens. After the enactment of the Public Service Organic Law

harmful alcohol consumption, or impose better control over firearms". (Eisner, 2015)

10 SENPLADES was created by Presidential Decree No. 1372 of February 20, 2004, by merging multiple institutions into a unified technical body responsible for national planning. Article 255 of the Political Constitution of the Republic establishes that it is under the aegis of the Presidency of the Republic, with the participation of local governments and social organizations.

11 This objective was part of the "Strategic Plan for modernization and integral transformation of the Police (2004 - 2014)"

12 Author interview with Alex Tupisa. Tupisa is a Specialist in Criminal Policy. He works in the Office of the State Attorney General of Ecuador, and developed the Delitoscopio ("Crime-scope") System with georeferential analysis.

13 Information retrieved from: National Citizen Security Plan (2008) and Public And State Security Law (2009)

in 2010 – which raised salaries but reduced bonuses, and established a new tenure scale for the national police – conflict erupted. Some stakeholders perceived this to be a misunderstanding – that the benefits of the law had not been explained and police officers feared that their salaries would be cut. Tension finally came to a boil with a mutiny or riot of police officers. The revolt was suppressed in a day by the armed forces and a group of police officers who opposed the protest (Carroll, 2010), but this incident showed that Ecuador had a long way to go to achieve integrated security, and would need to do more to bring relevant stakeholders on board.

Weak management in government and relevant institutions

Management was not based on achieving results, and public policies were developed without reference to data. Policy implementation was geared primarily toward responses to crime, not prevention.

Weakness in data and indicators

As security reforms were rolled out, there were clear problems caused by databases with bad indicators and problems in data reconciliation. Public institutions lacked the capacity to connect and share information across their systems and databases. Moreover, there was little capacity to perform data analysis or geo-reference crime hotspots.

Coordination and engagement

There was little cooperation among agencies, and limited attempt to engage members of the public. This resulted in weak inter-institutional work, and weak linkages between institutions and citizens.

Tracing the Implementation Process

Despite the government's initial campaign to reduce crime, the crime rate merely saw a marginal decline. The homicide rate for 2008 was 18.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, and by 2010 it had only decreased to 17.6. The institutions did not have adequate instruments or tools for administration to achieve results (results-oriented management), and institutions were overly centralized.

ICT infrastructure was weak, as was capacity to inform data analysis. Some agencies pursued individual goals and refused to share their work with others, or they did not have information to share. There were no offices dedicated to data analysis, or to the investigation of specific crimes, such as organized crime or homicides. The government decisions were implemented through presidential decrees and legislative changes that were unilaterally promulgated without input from public servants, which caused many officials to misinterpret or resist the government's actions.

To address the many delivery challenges that it faced, the Ecuadorian government began to revamp its approach to implementing security reforms starting in 2010.

Executive Decree No. 555, issued in November 2010, enabled the Government by Results Project¹⁴ by requiring all public institutions to focus on result-oriented activities. A major component of this project was the so-called Comprehensive Scorecard (CMI), which allowed the control, execution, and fulfillment of objectives of all institutions, and the central government conducted planning and management at the national level. This in turn enabled a number of other interventions to be implemented.

Implementing SIS-ECU-911

A central project under the new security model was the introduction of the Integrated Security Service, SIS-ECU-911, in 2011. This was a public agency, with physical offices as well as an online platform, which enables relevant institutions to cooperate, not only for the prevention and investigation of crime, but also to provide rapid response for other emergencies, such as natural disasters and accidents.

At the time of writing, SIS-ECU-911 had national coverage, and citizens can use the service 24-7 by just dialing 9-1-1 or pushing the emergency button in a bus, taxi, bank, hotel, and other public or private spaces. Moreover, surveillance cameras installed across the country allowed SIS-ECU-911 center staff to keep a constant eye on critical areas, such as hot spots for crime or natural disaster risk areas (SIS-ECU-911, 2015). For example, when an emergency situation is detected by video surveillance, operators can quickly dispatch police officers or rescue personnel, coordinating through the SYS-ECU-911 center. Officials from several institutions worked in the SIS-ECU-911 Center, including: Police National, Armed

¹⁴ Government by Results is the name of both a policy and a platform, adopted by all institutions. Retrieved from: <http://www.planificacion.gob.ec>

Forces, Fire Department, Ecuadorian Red Cross, Ministry of Public Health, Social Security, Metropolitan Transit Agency, and the National Transit Agency (which had a safe transportation kit installed in taxis and interprovincial buses). This mechanism aimed to control hot spots of crime in cities and on public transportation.¹⁵

Fausto Lincango,¹⁶ Coordinator of SIS-ECU-911, described multiple challenges that the system has helped address, including how to enable cooperation among several institutions, coordinate an emergency and optimize economic, logistical, and personnel resources. Prior to the introduction of SIS-ECU-911, citizens might have to dial several numbers to reach an agency that could help them, whereas now they only have to dial 911 in an emergency. Before, many patrols, ambulances, and firefighters, might respond to an emergency in an uncoordinated way, wasting resources. Prior to the institution of SIS-ECU-911, the institutions worked separately and resisted sharing information. The introduction of the SIS-ECU-911, however, has enabled greater coordination.

The SIS ECU 911 obtained an International Quality Certification from the European Association of Emergency Service Centers (EENA), indicating that the system is a benchmark and model to follow on an international scale. Ecuador was the first and only country in Latin America and the fifth in the world to receive this recognition. Representatives of several other countries have visited the facilities of ECU 911 to learn about their management model and emulate it in their territories. (SENPLADES, Report to the Nation (2007-2017), 2017)

De-concentration and Decentralization Policies: Social Security Services (2010-17)

To ensure better service across the country, the National Plan of Decentralization and De-concentration of the State was implemented to make government more accessible to citizens at the local level. The de-centralization and de-concentration policies were one part of national security planning, in which de-centralization implies the transfer of competencies and resources from the central government to local governments or institutions, while de-concentration distributes services from institutions and installs more offices to get the government closer

to citizens. This helped the government could better understand the people's needs and rapidly provide better security services. The plan was based on three administrative units - zones, districts, and circuits.¹⁷ This planning tool allowed all institutions to align their decentralization and de-concentration strategies with the geographical distribution of the central government (SENPLADES, 2009).

Following these new guidelines, police units in several circuits were built for the benefit of residents. The UPCs (police units) were established and resources allocated based on territorial ambit, population, and levels of crime and violence (SENPLADES, Report to the Nation (2007-2017), 2017). Similarly, the State Attorney General, Office of the Judiciary and SIS-ECU-911 also implemented de-concentration projects so that more people could access their services. These institutions installed more offices in the districts and SIS-ECU-911 located their centers in areas with 100 percent coverage.

The SIS-ECU-911 project aimed at providing integrated security services at the national level. As of 2017, SIS-ECU-911 had 15 centers (seven zonal, eight local, and one operations in Galapagos) across the country, providing services to nearly 16 million inhabitants in Ecuador's 24 provinces (SIS-ECU-911, 2015).

Technological Development

A problem that had repeatedly faced the government of Ecuador was a lack of useful data and indicators.¹⁸ For example, in 2010, President Correa instituted the Security and Justice Commission, which aimed to enable institutions to coordinate around security issues. There, one of the first challenges was to overcome inter-institutional disagreements, since the figures presented by each institution were different. In the absence of consolidated information, no governmental decisions on citizen security could be taken, and it was decided not to convene the Commission the commission again until this problem was solved.

To address this issue, the government developed technological and data analytics systems that would enable public security institutions to detect areas with the highest crime rates and use hotspot analysis based on

¹⁵ Data retrieved from State Attorney General ('16).

¹⁶ Interview with Mr. Fausto Lincango, Coordinator of SIS-ECU-911.

¹⁷ According to the National Plan for the Decentralization and De-concentration of the State, each zone comprises districts. A district that coincides with a canton is a basic unit for planning and public service provision. A circuit is the smallest unit, which corresponds to a parish. (SENPLADES, 2012).

¹⁸ Author interview with Alex Tupisa.

geo-referenced data. These three systems were developed in different institutions, in the Office of the Prosecutor, ECU-911 and National Police, respectively, and also developed at different times. All these systems enhanced the organizational capacity of these organizations and enabled the use of coordinated preventive strategies because the databases were interconnected to share information.

State Prosecutor's Office "Delitoscope" and Geoportal System

The challenges of consolidating and systematizing data to support the work of the Security and Justice Commission gave rise to the Delitoscope (Crime-scope) project. The data for this system was consolidated from the technical reports provided by the INEC (National Statistics and Census Institute). This data was combined with figures from the State Attorney General, as the official source of information on crime in Ecuador. This was achieved through the joint work of a technical team, with the support of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico (INEGI)¹⁹ and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).²⁰ The technicians of these institutions helped organize the statistical operation and certify the information that was being produced. Alex Tupisa, the architect of the Delitoscope system, reflected on the significance of this tool: "Before 2008, the National Government had not actively participated to adopt political decisions or actions to face violence and crime, since the decisions were taken by each state institution. In the absence of timely and reliable data, decisions were based on instinct more than experience, but not on precise data, which are consolidated with all the institutions involved. [State institutions] did not have data that are geo-referenced in real time [...], the institutions did not analyze hot spots, which had repercussions on the fact that citizens did not have a timely response, and crimes could not be avoided".

The Delitoscope initiative was presented at the 5th International Contest: "Good Practices in Criminal Analysis", held in the city of Santiago, Chile, by the Peace Citizen Foundation from July 26 to 28, 2016. This project won recognition as a good practice for the region, a merit that was delivered by the Attorney General of Chile to the Ecuadorian State Attorney General. Alex Tupisa recalls:

"In order to achieve these various recognitions, it has been necessary to travel to a path of very arduous work in order to achieve concrete results." This included coordination with other institutions and multilateral organizations, allowing ultimately for a geoportal system geo-referenced hot spot analysis, which could be used effectively by policymakers working on citizen security issues.²¹

National Police: DAVID System

The National Police, under the Ministry of the Interior, developed and used the David System,²² a technological platform for management and monitoring of each unit's activities through an online Comprehensive Scorecard. This allowed for the development of preventive strategies based on analysis of hot spots shareable in real time. This system has 50 variables, with 3 main factors including victim, victimizer and environment. This enabled the department to generate a criminogenic analysis, recognize problems and patterns, and then generate effective strategies.²³

National Police executive Tcrnl. Fausto Martínez Terán explained the significance of the system, saying, "From 2010, the National Police began to use diverse techniques through this new system, which overcame the difficulty of lack of consolidated information from each unit, and the [need to report] the Comprehensive Scorecard manually every month. Under the new system, however, information could be delivered in real time, which enabled us to develop strategies in less time."²⁴

Relatively granular and diverse data is also available through the system. It can evaluate revenues and registration information, in addition to geo-spatial data for hot spot analysis. Lieutenant Michael Balarezo explained that "in this way the police know what is happening in their territory, which allows them to intervene to reduce the violence and crime rate. Before, this tool was not available so the balanced scorecards were delivered in writing every month to make decisions. Likewise, they did not have the [Departamento de Análisis de Información del Delito (Department of Crime Information Analysis, or DAID)]."²⁵ The first iteration of this department was

21 Interview with Alex Tupisa.

22 The name of the system is taken from the story of David and Goliath; while the David system is a small tool, it is able to take on big problems.

23 Interview with Tnt. Michael Balarezo, Head of the DAID at National Police of Santo Domingo in Ecuador.

24 Interview with Fausto Martínez Terán, Head of Operations Planning at National Police of Santo Domingo in Ecuador.

25 Interview with Tnt. Michael Balarezo, Head of DAID at National Police in Santo

19 Retrieved from <http://www.inegi.org.mx/>

20 Retrieved from <https://www.unodc.org/>

created in 2010 as the “Information Analysis Center; in 2011, it was transformed into the Office of Crime Analysis; and in 2016, it was again transformed to become the Departamento de Análisis de Información del Delito (Department of Crime Information Analysis).

Cooperation between Institutions and Citizen Participation

Cooperation with the community is an important component of comprehensive citizen security. Under the citizen security reforms, all institutions participated in committees in their areas, to learn from citizens what kind of risks and threats the community was facing. Subsequently the problems were dealt with in inter-institutional commissions.

National Police executive Carlos Raza²⁶ explained the importance of decentralizing public safety agencies. “Through the successful deconcentration and decentralization policy of the government, several police offices were built and distributed in each region of the country, and we came to realize what problems people faced. The information collected from residents is sent to the DAID to process it. Moreover, through cooperation with community leaders, police gained better access to residents, to address their problems and know their protection needs.” The UPC promoted community assemblies to involve the population. By 2016, 2,689 assemblies had been held and 123,343 citizen participants registered (SENPLADES, Report to the Nation (2007-2017), 2017).

One example of joint work and institutional cooperation, as well as consideration of citizens’ specific concerns, is the procedure followed by SIS-ECU-911 for deciding where to install a video surveillance camera exemplifies joint work and institutional cooperation. First, different commissions are convened with institutions such as the National Police, the Municipal Emseguridad Company, the Citizen Security Observatories of each District, personnel from the statistical area and the operative part. Secondly, they analyze the data of SIS-ECU-911, the State Attorney General and the National Police, to analyze the risks, the complaints of the victims of crimes, and the geographical references of the hot zones. They also consider the opinion of the citizens, who have requested the installation of cameras in their

neighborhoods, to improve citizen security. The Public Prosecutor’s Office has seen reduction of response times with the Automated Information System of the Judicial Function, SAIFJ, which facilitates sending videos (evidence) through the platform.²⁷

By enabling public institutions, as well as private citizens and NGOs, to work together, public security institutions were able to share information across platforms, to understand the problems that affect citizens, and analyze this information to inform policies or concrete actions to reduce the rates of crime and violence. For more information on the joint work of the institutions, see: Annex C: Stakeholder Map, and Annex D: Services Provided by ECU-911 Centers.

Financing Construction of Public Safety Centers

The SIS-ECU-911 project required a huge investment because of the need for several centers with state-of-the-art technologies and modern facilities in key regions. This was to allow public servants from a variety of institutions to work together in the interest of providing better security services to the public. In late 2010, the government secured funding from the Development Bank of China, and the China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC) built the SIS-ECU-911 centers.

Once the resources were available, the next step was to form a delegation of representatives of the Armed Forces of Ecuador, the National Police, the National Secretariat of Risk Management, the Ministry of Public Health and other governmental institutions to visit China. The delegation carried out this visit in order to learn from the implementation experiences of the Citizen Security System during the Beijing Olympics in 2008. From this field trip, the delegation learned from the Beijing system, which prepared its institutions to coordinate quick actions in a large city with a large population (SIS-ECU-911, 2015).

The delegation also visited other major cities, such as Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, and London, as well as several US states, in order to better understand how other countries manage integrated security or emergency centers. These experiences enabled participants to better understand the processes that would be required to create an integrated system for Ecuador, and to coordinate the relevant institutions.

Domingo.

26 Interview with Juan Carlos Raza, Offices against Crime, Santa Domingo.

27 Interview with Fausto Lincango, Director of SIS-ECU-911 in Quito

Establishment of Specialized Offices against Crime

To focus security activities, multiple specialized departments were established. Tcrnl. Fausto Martínez Terán, Chief of the Operations Police, characterized this move as enhancing police knowledge to carry out interventions. According to Martínez, these combined methodology, praxis, and knowledge for results. New departments were equipped with technological tools, capable of analyzing data, using robust research methodologies, technology, and surveillance.²⁸

The new specialized departments included investigative and data analysis units, some of which are described below.

Department of Crime Information Analysis (DAID).

The first iteration of this department was created in 2010 as the “Information Analysis Center; in 2011, it was transformed into the Office of Crime Analysis; and in 2016 it was again transformed to become the Departamento de Análisis de Información del Delito (Department of Crime Information Analysis). This department carries out analysis of hot spots and criminal phenomena, and uses this information to recommend actions of prevention or reaction. Tnt. Michael Balarezo, an official of the DAID, described the office’s mission as identifying factors that generate insecurity, performing multidimensional analysis, collecting all criminological information from different systems, to advise strategies and actions, to prevent and reduce crime rates at the local and national levels, which is controlled through the Control of Integral Control (CMI). The police continuously monitored intentional homicides consisting of homicides, murders, femicides and hired killings; as well as crimes against property, people, homes, cars, economic units, goods, accessories and auto parts, motorcycles, and theft on road shafts and all type of crimes²⁹.

Anti-Crime Intelligence Unit (UIAD), responsible for directly investigating organized crime and dismantling criminal organizations. This department was created on March 2010, with the mission of planning, directing, organizing and controlling the intelligence system of the Judicial Police. According to Tcrnl. Edgar Vinuesa,

deputy director of UIAD, between its establishment and April 2018, the department managed to dismantle 320 criminal organizations, make 2,250 arrests, confiscate 673 firearms, seize 657 vehicles and 179 motorcycles; the unit also was able to seize some three tons of alkaloids and 2.5 million dollars.³⁰

National Directorate of Crimes against Life, Violent Deaths, Disappearances, Extortion and Kidnapping (DINASED),³¹ was regarded as an office with high capacity for solving criminal cases and responding to and preventing violence. Crnl. Cristian Peralta, head of DINASED-SD,³² described how the office was highly specialized, focusing on a specific subset of cases and cooperating with other departments of the Police. And when conflict or violence are present in certain sectors, hot-spot mapping enabled them to track this.

Institution of Certified Training

To raise overall capacity, the School of Prosecutors³³ has the mission of permanent training for prosecutors and other servants, all their training has planning, curricular meshes, post-training evaluation, level of student satisfaction focused on: professional utility, level of teacher performance, teaching strategies and content. In this way, the training processes are continuously improved.

In March 2017, the School received the ISO 9001:2015 certification, through the Bureau Veritas Ecuador, indicating that it has high quality standards in its manuals, process definition, risk management, optimization of time and resources. ISO 9001:2015, is an international standard that allows certification for management systems of quality, and is issued by the International Standards Organization.

Teodoro Barros Astudillo, former Chief of the Prosecutors School, explained that previously training was undervalued, some courses kept no records, no needs assessments were carried out, indicators were lacking, and there was little pedagogical or scientific training.³⁴ In order to reform the School of Prosecutors, strategies

28 Interview: Tcrnl. Fausto Martínez Terán, Chief of Operations Police Subzone.

29 Interview with Tnt. Michael Balarezo, an official of the DAID.

30 Data retrieved from: <https://www.ministeriointerior.gob.ec/la-unidad-de-inteligencia-antidelincuencial-celebra-su-octavo-aniversario-con-exitosos-resultados/>

31 DINASED was created by Ministerial Agreement, published in the Official Register No. 58 on August 14, 2013.

32 Interview with Crnl. Cristian Peralta, Head of DINASED subzone.

33 The School began its functions in 1997, as stipulated in the Organic Statute of Organizational Management by Processes.


34 Interview with Teodoro Barros Astudillo, Former Chief of the Prosecutors School.

were created to increase budget, put in place teacher evaluations, and to establish indicators. Among the indicators were: Total coverage, quality, relevance (need and priorities), equity (non-discrimination), technology (physical and face-to-face), budget distribution and communication of events. The School is one of the first institutions in Ecuador and in Latin America to obtain ISO 9001:2015 focused on risk prevention, quality delivery, needs assessment, and adequate trainers.

The National Police receive specialized and continuous training, in their Training School, and through the exchange of experiences with institutions and police abroad. In the case of the ECU-911, the United Kingdom Police Convention provided courses on criminal profiles, behavior, patterns, critical areas, and hot spots. A group of public officials with skills as trainers were selected, whose mission was to replicate the courses using a training of trainers model.

Findings³⁵


Figure 3. Homicide Rate in Ecuador (2000-16)



Source: Author's elaboration based on data from State Attorney General (2000-2016). Ecuador has the third-lowest homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean.


³⁵ Between 2006 and 2016, the homicide rate per 100 000 inhabitants it fell from 17.79 to 5.7, (Figure 3) the lowest in Ecuador in the last 36 years, only higher than those of Chile and Bolivia in the region (Figure 5). The rate of murders and homicides with firearms decreased from 11.7 per 100 000 inhabitants, in 2010, to 2.7 per 100 000 inhabitants in 2016. Between 2013 and 2016, 308.5 tons of drugs were seized, more than 44,000 firearms confiscated, and 3,911 criminal organizations dismantled, thanks to intelligence information. (SENPLADES, Report to the Nation (2007-2017), 2017)

Figure 4. Have you been a victim? Total LAC (2016)



Source: Latibarometro 2016.

Figure 5. Homicide Rate Total LAC (2016)



Source: Author's elaboration based on data from IGARAPÉ Institute 2016.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Taking into account the seriousness of violence and crime in Latin America and Caribbean, Ecuador's approach to comprehensive citizen security has important implications for other countries.

Paulina Duarte, Director of the Department of Public Security of the Organization of American States (OAS) speculated that it might be useful to implement the SIS ECU 911 on a continental scale, to unify efforts, strategies among stakeholders and accomplish comprehensive security. In her visit to the SIS ECU 911 in October of 2018 she said: "the Ecuadorian Emergency Service managed to implant its essence in the integrality, they managed to unite the technical with the political and with the operational and the union of these factors [enables] effective public policies and effective security."³⁶

Some of these lessons have to do with effectively using technical tools, while there is also a strong political component involved in bringing together the many stakeholders involved, all of whom may approach the problem of improving citizen security with their own particular interests and perspectives.

Strong Leadership and the Creation of Coordinating Mechanisms

To properly implement an integrated security system, the government needed to take strong and decisive action, because the interests of organizations were considerably entwined, and reform may face opposition. Creating the legal grounds for this was the first step toward launching reform because without a legal basis, getting all relevant institutions to work together is difficult. While enacting new laws or decrees, governments, as in this case, might face opposition. Yet such obstacles were overcome through careful negotiations. It was critical, in the case of the Ecuador, that the president took a strong interest in improving public safety. Strong and clear commitment from national leaders can be a powerful force to drive reform.

Building this legal basis for integral security was the first step toward enabling the participation of relevant institutions and technologies. A national platform was useful to exchange information on integrated security, as well as heighten citizen participation in order to better understand the needs of the public. Once the legal basis was established, and with strong support from the president, Ecuador set up several coordinating organizations including councils, commissions, and committees to allow relevant public institutions to jointly discuss a diversity of issues, including public safety. With reform being carried out at the national level, it was helpful for one organization to coordinate the entire procedure. And because many government entities were involved in public security, they needed a setting to discuss and share information.

Thus, the creation of mechanisms for stakeholders to effectively share ideas and strategies is helpful. The formation of a cross-governmental agency in charge of integrated security activities was crucial at the implementation level, as it allowed relevant organizations to cooperate for providing better public security, especially through preventive measures.

Government for Results

Public institutions should set objectives over the short, medium, and long term and implement, monitor, and evaluate them in cooperation with each other based on central government guidelines. Through an interconnected platform, all public agencies can share information without delay.

Building Staff Capacity via Training

To properly implement the ECU911 Integrated Security Service, continuous training of staff in new technologies was needed, as well as cooperation with other public security institutions. Staff from the ECU911 centers received training from British police. The School of Prosecutors, has the ISO 9001:2015 certification, providing quality training to justice officials. Police officers receive continuous training inside and outside the country.

Technological Development

To secure the innovative technologies required for planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating actions, the new platform was created with the


³⁶ Retrieved from: <http://www.ecu911.gob.ec/category/noticias/>; <http://www.ecu911.gob.ec/la-oea-tomara-como-referente-a-ecuador-para-disenar-protocolo-de-implentacion-del-9-1-1-a-nivel-continental/>.

assistance of bilateral and multilateral agencies. In Ecuador, the SIS-ECU-911 project received financial and technical aid from the Development Bank of China and Chinese corporations; the setup of the other platforms


like the David system and DAID's Government for Results system were financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Annexes


Annex A. Process Map



Annex B. Solutions Map



Annex C. Stakeholder Map



Annex D. Services Provided by ECU-911 Centers

- **Public Security** Crimes such as robbery and assault directly related to the National Police and the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights, and Cults. These institutions are coordinated by the Office of the Prosecutor.
- **Health Management** Health issues and relevant institutions handled by Ministry of Public Health, Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security (IESS), fire departments, Ecuadorian Red Cross and others
- **Transit and Mobility** Metropolitan Transit Agency in charge of transportation in the most populous cities, such as Quito. The National Police handles this service in areas with no decentralized traffic control.
- **Claims Management** Fire departments are in charge of this work, such as fire and rescue services
- **Risk Management** National Secretariat for Risk Management in charge of handling natural disasters like earthquakes and landslides through de-centralized autonomous governments
- **Military Service** Border control at national level carried out by the armed forces, whose actions are coordinated with SIS-ECU-911 centers and can deploy helicopters if necessary
- **Municipal Services** Four municipal companies - metropolitan police and metropolitan companies of electricity, public water, and sanitation - cooperate with ECU-911 centers. (SIS-ECU-911, 2015).

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