


Rally Around Which Flag?: Investigation of the Impact of Sanctions on the Rally Around the Flag Effects Using Focused Group Discussion with North Korean Defectors

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Introduction

Despite the focused and concerted efforts, why has sanctions against North Korea been ineffective in forcing Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programs? On the surface, the sanctions against North Korea seem to have had all the elements for success. First, the sanctions received broad international support. Since the first United Nations Security Council resolution against North Korea in 2006, the international community has imposed sanctions to condemn its missile and nuclear tests. Second, the sanctions were also of high intensity and of broad scope. Initially, before 2016 the UN resolutions were defined narrowly around the missiles and nuclear programs. Throughout 2016 and 2017, however, after North Korea conducted its 4th nuclear test on 6 January 2016 and launched a ballistic missile on 7 February 2016, the sanction expanded in scope to curb the financial capability of the regime by installing trade bans, restricting access to foreign financial institutions, as well as prohibiting employment of North Korean workers abroad. Third, the US was even able to coerce China - previously considered as the greatest loophole in the sanctions regime - to partake in the sanction drive against North Korea by imposing secondary sanctions in 2016. Forth, the sanctions also seem to make the intended negative impact on the North Korean economy: in 2017 and 2018, the North Korean economy experienced overall GNI growth rates of -3.5% and -4.1%, respectively, with the sectors such as mining which were direct targets of the sanctions growing at rates of -11.0% and -17.8% (Bank of Korea Statistics n.d.). However, despite such detrimental economic impact of sanctions, the international community is yet to witness the North Korean state giving up its nuclear arms.

In this paper, we examine a one important channel of sanction failure that has only recently started to attract some attention – the rally around the flag effect (Galtung 1967). A key

mechanism through which a sanction may work is the economic woes inflicted encouraging the public to pressure the target state to change its policies so that the sanction would be lifted. But when the sanction actually backfires and strengthens public support towards the target state or its policies after the sanctions - i.e. when the public rallies around the flag instead of blaming the state - the intended outcome of the sanctions become difficult to materialize (Grossman, Manekin, and Margalit 2018). However, the empirical evidence around under what conditions such rally around the flag effect materializes, let alone whether such effects exist seem to be mixed at best (Alexseev and Hale 2020; Frye 2019; Grossman, Manekin, and Margalit 2018; Seitz and Zazzaro 2019).

In order to investigate the workings of the rally around the flag effect, we engage in a novel qualitative in-depth survey of a sample of recent North Korean defectors using focus group discussions (FGDs). To preview the four main findings emerge from our analysis: first, contrary to conventional expectations, we find that North Koreans are aware of the sender of the sanctions but do not have full information about why they were imposed. Second, we show that economic hardship due to the sanctions does not seem to have an impact on the public's support towards the regime of Kim Jong Un (KJU). Third, the support for the socialist system and support for nuclear arms development seem to go hand in hand. Fourth, the lack of trust towards the regime of Kim Jong Un seems to have a dampening effect on the effectiveness of the state's propaganda in rallying people around the North Korean regime.

This research makes a number of important contributions. First, we add insights to the literature on sanction effectiveness by studying a critical case of North Korea. According to Google Trends, the top five frequently appearing countries as related search terms with the search term

"economic sanctions" were Russia, Iran, North Korea, South Africa, and Venezuela. Yet existing empirical research disproportionately focuses on the Russian case.ⁱⁱ One possible reason for this may be due to data availability. For example, due to the regime's closed and secretive nature (Kim 2016), evaluating the shifts of public opinion in North Korea due to sanctions - a crucial component in understanding the effectiveness of sanctions - has been empirically challenging. By leveraging the novel sample of the recent North Korean defectors, we overcome such challenges and add an important case analysis to the broader discussion of sanctions effectiveness.

Second, we also provide an important data point for better understanding the important yet understudied case of North Korea more generally. Due to the security challenges that North Korea imposes not only in the neighboring regions but around the world, understanding the security dynamics related to North Korea has been a prominent issue for both academics and policymakers (Cha and Kang 2003). Not only does it host the fourth largest conventional military force in the world, it also poses a realistic nuclear threat (Albert, 2020).ⁱⁱⁱ However, because of the reclusive nature of the regime and the subsequent lack of data, theoretical expectations about North Korea varied widely from the 'madman' theory (Perry 1990; Segal 1991) - that North Korean actions are simply unpredictable at best - to the contrasting 'rational actor' arguments - that assuming rationality we may be better able to understand North Korean

ⁱⁱ For example, out of the four recent empirical works related to sanctions and rally around the flag effects (Grossman et al. 2018; Frye 2019; Seitz and Zazzaro 2019; Alexseev and Hale 2020), all but one (Grossman et al. 2018) studies the case of Russia.

ⁱⁱⁱ <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/north-koreas-military-capabilities>

behavior (Cha and Kang 2005; Kang 1995). Even scholars who commonly believe that North Korean policies are highly calculated differ in their projections of North Korea's future, with some predicting that North Korea will collapse soon (Cha 2012; Cha and Anderson 2012), while others arguing that the regime will maintain its stability (Lankov 2013). Our qualitative data collection provides a valuable addition

Third, methodologically, by conducting in-depth qualitative analyses at the micro-level we are able to uncover possible causal mechanisms through which the claimed rally around the flag effects may manifest and generate testable hypotheses that simple average treatment effects based on experimental designs cannot uncover (Levy Paluck 2010). Growing research shows that in-depth qualitative studies, especially when the population of interests is difficult to access due to the given political climate or the sensitivity of the subject matter, can help generate some theoretical expectations where informed prior is relatively absent (Cohen and Arieli 2011; Khoury n.d.; Romano 2006). Our work reinforces this development by engaging with the hard-to-reach and sensitive sample of recent defectors, and uncover some new insights and expectations that can help update our understanding about an important policy issue, namely, the effectiveness of sanctions.

Finally, we also make contributions to the study of authoritarian systems, and in particular the personalistic authoritarian regimes (Geddes 2003; Weeks 2012, 2014). Existing research shows that personalistic authoritarian systems, such as the regime in North Korea, are the most worrisome kind of all, as they are more likely to pursue nuclear weapon development (Way and Weeks 2013), refuse international cooperation (Mattes and Rodríguez 2015), and engage in international conflict (Weeks 2014). Yet, recent advances in both theoretical and empirical

research in authoritarian audience costs show that public opinion and domestic support may play a crucial role in shaping not only foreign policy decisions (Weeks 2008; Weiss 2013) but also may present important constraints on regime legitimacy that may be critical for regime survival (Wilson 2005). However, much of the above stated theoretical expectations and associated empirical evidence are often drawn from cross-national comparisons, perhaps due also to data access and availability challenges. By directly examining the extent of public opinion changes in one such regime at the micro level with nuanced details stemming from the in-depth nature of our qualitative evidence, we provide a better glimpse into the inner workings of an otherwise closed system and help inform the discussions on the role of public opinion in authoritarian regimes more generally.

Theoretical Framework

A large body of literature has examined the impact of economic sanctions on political attitudes in the target country (Wilson, 2005; Sompser, 2013; Guriev and Treisman, 2015; Sperling, 2015; Grossman et al., 2018; Frye, 2019; Seitz and Zazzaro, 2019). When it comes to whether sanctions produce a rally-round-the-flag effect, which constitutes the focus of our paper, past literature offers mixed results. In particular, some authors argue that regime skeptics are likely to rally around the flag and support their government in the face of sanctions (Baum, 2002; Greene and Robertson, 2014), but other authors contend that the opposite holds (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Moreover, sanctions have detrimental economic ramifications and induce (or increase) economic hardship among the general population, which should invite opposition to the targeted regime (Brooks, 2002), especially among those more severely affected by the economic downturn. Finally, there seem to be differential effects of sanctions on political attitudes in

democracies versus autocracies. More specifically, Grauvogel & von Soest (2014) show that sanctions strengthen authoritarian rule if the regime manages to incorporate their existence into its legitimation strategy, while Hendrickson and Park (2019) demonstrate that economic sanctions help targeted autocratic leaders to extend their stay in power but exert no discernible political effects on targeted leaders in democracies.

In this paper, we explore qualitatively how North Koreans' political attitudes in general and their support towards Kim Jong Un's regime in particular might have been affected by the heightened sanctions of 2016–2017 against North Korea. In doing so, we attempt to shed light on the factors determining the emergence or not of a public rally around the North Korean regime in response to the sanctions in question (at least among North Korean defectors). Furthermore, our work offers important insights into what kinds of political attitudes (and changes thereof) one should be looking at in order to gauge the effectiveness of the sanctions against North Korea.

On the methodological front, the identification of a possible rally effect of sanctions poses challenges. Relying on a public opinion survey in the aftermath of sanctions is clearly inappropriate as any observed changes in political attitudes might be actually due not to the sanctions but to some other unobserved economic or political shock(s). In an ideal setting, one would randomly assign individuals to be subjected, or not, to sanctions in order to test for the sanctions' effectiveness or for their impact on political attitudes. This is, however, both unethical and infeasible (Frye, 2019). A feasible alternative is a survey experiment in which one can exogenously shape participants' information sets and investigate how exposure to various types

of information (“priming”) regarding the sanctions shapes the participants’ attitudes towards (i) the sanctioning and the sanctioned countries; and (ii) the policies that the target country is being sanctioned for. But before embarking upon a survey experiment with North Korean defectors, it is important to assess in advance whether there is enough variation in their rallying (or not) around the North Korean regime and thereby whether conducting such an experiment is meaningful. This work takes a first step in this direction by employing focus group discussion analysis.

We test four main hypotheses:

- 1) North Koreans are aware of the sender of the sanctions and of why they were imposed.
- 2) North Koreans (non-elites) have been generally hit economically by the sanctions.
- 3) The rally effect with respect to the regime of Kim Jong Un is less pronounced for those that have experienced economic hardship due to the sanctions.
- 4) The rally effect with respect to the regime of Kim Jong Un is more pronounced for those that support the socialist system.

Data and Methods

To explore the existence of the rally effect, we gathered data from three rounds of focus group discussions of five to six North Korean defectors residing in South Korea and supplemented them with written questionnaires. Considering the potentially sensitive nature of agreeing to participate in the discussions and revealing their opinions, we submitted our research proposal in advance and obtained approval from the relevant institutional review board (IRB) maintained by the Korea National Institute for Bioethics Policy. Moreover, we exerted efforts as described in

our proposal to make sure that no personally identifiable information is collected and the collected de-identified data were securely stored. The recruited participants were recruited with the help of Hankook Research and an association of North Korean Defectors during the period of June 2020 to August 2020. Because we wanted to focus on the rally effect of the heightened sanctions of 2016 and 2017, we attempted to recruit those that left North Korea after 2016. We based the recruitment on specific socioeconomic characteristics such as age, sex, education level, occupation in North Korea to get diverse perspectives. We also made sure that in every FGD there was at least one person from a non-border region, including Pyongyang. The occupational, gender, and regional distributions of the recruits are described below.

Table 1. Distribution of the Group Characteristics

Groups	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
Occupation	Public administrator (1), driver (1), chicken farm worker (1), unemployed (2), farmer (1)	Driver (2), foreign laborer in russia (1), fisherman (1), forest and conservation worker (1)	Farmer (1), nurse (1), manager at national heritage site (1), librarian (1), knitting work at home (1), sewer (1)
Gender	3 males 3 females	All males	All females
Region	Yanggang (1), North Hamgyeong (3), South Pyeongan (1), Pyongyang (1)	Yanggang (3), North Hamgyeong (1), Pyongyang (1)	Yanggang (2), North Hamgyeong (1), South Hamheiyong (1), North Pyeongan (1), Pyongyang (1)

The FGD typically lasted about two hours: the discussants were asked to fill out a 15-20 minute written questionnaire (see appendix) followed by a 100 minutes of group discussion led by a moderator. The pre-fill written questionnaire was designed to ensure that the participants can be primed to think about their life back in North Korea and the issues related to sanctions, as well as allowing them enough time and mental space to engage in later discussions following standard practices often employed in FGDs. All participants received 100,000 KRW (approximately 88 USD) for their time.

Using North Korean defectors as the subjects of the FGD is not without limitation in exploring the rally effect. By September 2020 there were 33,718 defectors living in South Korea, which is only about 0.13% of the estimated North Korean population of 25.55 million. More than 80% of the defectors are from the bordered region facing China and are women. Given that the defectors had decided to leave North Korea in the first place they are more likely to be anti-regime. The usual harrowing escape routes through multiple countries that take on average three years as well as the difficult adjustment process in South Korea mean that the defectors are also more likely to have experienced trauma and violence than the typical North Korean (Jeon et al. 2008).

That said, arguably the North Korean defectors also provide a "hard test" for any expectations about the rally around the flag effects: these are people who have chosen to leave North Korea often risking great uncertainty of successful exit and real danger for punishment not only themselves but also their loved ones if the exit attempt fails. In fact, results from a previous large scale South Korean government survey of North Korean defectors show that the top ranked reasons for defections included lack of food (22.9%), anti-regime (23.6%), pursuit of better living standards for one's family (12.4%), reunion with family members who already defected

(9.7%), pursuit of higher earnings (10.2%), and threat from the regime (6.5%). While we cannot take these responses at the face value due to interviewer demand effects or desirability bias, we can reasonably still assume that the population of North Korean defectors, are more likely to be much more anti-regime compared to any typical North Koreans and as such, the rally effect due to sanctions, if observed in the defectors, could be considered as the lower bound.

Moreover, recent advances in systematic examination of standard qualitative research methodology suggests that beyond some threshold the number of interviews needed to reach data saturation for meta-themes can be reached much more easily than previously assumed. In particular, (Hagaman and Wutich 2017) show that respondent sizes ranging from 20 to 40 interviews is likely to be sufficient in uncovering the overall patterns and trends in the population of interests even in a cross-cultural study settings, and a sample size as small as 16 or fewer could be enough when the composition of the interview groups are relatively homogenous. Given such expectations, we are reasonably confident that we meet the sufficient bounds for extracting the desired information out of our discussion transcripts, given the relatively homogenous cultural and experiential backgrounds of our FGD participants.

Findings

Economic hardship due to sanctions

When the heightened UN sanctions and US secondary sanctions in 2016 and 2017 led China to partake in the sanction drive, participants recalled the living standards significantly deteriorating. Price of goods including gas and food in the market increased and rations stopped. Formal and

informal taxes (monetary, in-kind) collected by the government and the workplaces increased and many participants reported physical and mental distress to meet the day-to-day demands.

The perceived effect of sanctions based on income differed. For the very poor, participants said that "The people don't care. It's not like there'll be rice coming to me whether there are or there are not any sanctions." Some said it was becoming "harder for the normal people," and that "Nothing changes for the elites. They become even richer" because they keep collecting bribes as well as taxes from the workers.

The propaganda

In addition to the actual economic shock experienced by individuals, a key component that would shape public opinion would be the information one would gather regarding sanctions. The information control of the North Korean regime is considered to be extreme even in communist dictatorship standards (Lankov 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to wonder whether North Koreans know which states are sanctioning for what reason. To preview our findings, contrary to conventional belief that North Koreans do not know much about the substance of the sanctions, they actually possess much more information about various aspects of the sanctions regime, including the impact, extent, and the sender characteristics, to name a few.^{iv}

^{iv} Young Chung, "North Koreans Do Not Know the Contents of UN Sanctions Against North Korea", Radio Free Asia, 21 Mar 2016 (정영, "북 주민 유엔대북제재 내용 몰라" 자유아시아방송, https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/sanction-03212016145801.html)

According to the participants, the official source of information on sanctions were organized lectures and materials by the communist party in the military, at school, and at the workplace. National newspapers such as Rodongshinmun and chosun inmin shinmun regularly feature articles on sanctions. NK public TV provides related news but because of the unreliable electricity supply, not all have access. One external and prohibited source of information is Chinese news channels. Word of mouth in the blackmarket (jang-ma-dang) provided secondary information. Sometimes, the existence and the timing of sanctions were inferred by price changes of the goods in the blackmarket. From experience, some guessed that a sanction would naturally follow after the regime's missile launches.

The respondents recalled the regime saying that "We are suffering economically because of sanctions and we have to make weapons to stand against (the external forces)." Oftentimes in government organized lectures a working unit with a good practice was introduced for their self-sufficient activities in the face of economic hardship due to sanctions. KJU talked about national security as the key reason behind nuclear arms development. One interviewee recalled KJU saying in a party meeting that "the reason why I am making you work so hard and putting so much effort to develop nuclear weapons is because it is a way of protecting our country. I am so thankful that the people are with me putting their efforts. ... In the future, the people will realize (that this was the right thing to do) It is difficult now, but we have to overcome it."

Acknowledging the expensiveness of the nuclear weapons but professing the inevitability of

having one, the regime asked for the people's understanding in diverting resources towards weapons development.

All participants pointed to the US, South Korea and UN as senders of sanctions. Given that the state is the primary information provider on sanctions, it is not surprising that almost all of the participants thought that it was the socialist system that North Korea was being sanctioned for, rather than the nuclear weapons. One participant said:

"Americans imposed sanctions on us even before the nuclear weapons. They wanted us to do a regime change but we didn't. They want regime change and since we didn't listen, they started raising the nuclear issue."

Several participants believed that if the North Korean regime opened up its economy, then the US would not impose sanctions and that it would not care whether North Korea has nuclear arms or not. Few mentioned nuclear weapons as the key reason behind sanctions.

Public Opinion on nuclear weapons, sanctions and the senders

The respondents seemed to think that international sanctions on North Korea are unfair because having nuclear arms is a sovereign right of a country. Nuclear weapons are considered the only tool to protect the nation: "Say your household is weak so you are holding a knife. A robber came

in and you're holding the knife. The moment that you let the knife go, the robber will charge. So North Korea cannot let it go." Though some participants pointed out that "nuclear development in North Korea was entirely for sustaining its (political) regime and that there was no benefit accruing to the people," for some others, the arms protected the world's "only remaining" socialist system. Issue of fairness was pointed out: "If there are six countries including the US that have nuclear weapons, why are they sanctioning North Korea and not allowing North Korea to have it as well?"

Thus it is not surprising that sentiments towards the sanction senders were not uniform. In the written questionnaire, when asked how their opinions about the senders - US, South Korea, China, Russia, and UN have changed after the economic sanctions, all answers - got worse, no change, got better - were present. Almost all participants noted that the sentiment towards the North Korean regime 'got worse' after the sanctions. In order for the state propaganda to work and to rally the people around the flag, credibility of the state is key. Trust towards the government ran thin among respondents. Failed currency reform of 2009 as well as the ineffectiveness of the socialist approach during times of economic difficulty seem to have contributed.

"Since they do not give us rice and wages though they ask us to work continuously, we have lost trust in the government by 90%."

"It was 2016 that the state lost trust completely. ... The government went through a currency reform in 2012 [the actual implementation year of the reform was 2009]... and asked people to bring in currency so it would be exchanged 100 to 1, and that Chinese and foreign currency will no longer be used. People were fooled and exchanged their money."

Contradicting information on the regime from the outside world through advancing technology and the increasing number of informants - the defectors - seem to have added to the erosion of trust as well.

"Since I was little my mom listened to South Korean radio programs and Chinese ones... my mom was very sensitive about them and did not buy into whatever the party was saying."

The rising level of corruption coupled with an ineffective socialist system also seemed to have led the participants to blame the regime rather than the senders of the sanctions for the economic distress they had to deal with. One participant lamented:

"Farming cannot happen because even if I work myself to the bones the benefits do not come to me. ... but since North Korea has a top down supply system without using one's

brain one can butter up the party official and share the supplied goods..."

"The party official's pocket, we previously called it the bribe but now it is legalized as

"homework." ... This is corruption. I have seen with my eyes. It is not the US or the

economic sanctions but the failure of the national socialist system [that led to economic distress.]"

Discussion and Concluding Results

In summary, through close engagement with recently defected North Koreans, we can report a number of key findings. First, North Koreans are aware of the identities of the sender of the sanctions. Yet, they do not have accurate or full information as to why sanctions were imposed in the first place. From our interviews, rather than the weapons and nuclear development as the core cause behind the initiation and continuation of the sanctions, the model respondent perception around the cause of sanction revolved around the external threat against the socialist system of North Korea.

Moreover, while the vast majority of the respondents reported experiencing economic hardship due to sanctions, this does not seem to have led to a rallying effect around KJU's regime. This may be puzzling given the fact that all interviewees, regardless of their socioeconomic as well as experiential backgrounds showed a strong antipathy against the North Korean regime. One potential answer to this puzzling disconnect between the anti-regime sentiment and the rally

around the flag effects could be found from the surprisingly high levels of support for - not the KJU regime - but the socialist system. Despite being arguably the most staunch critics of the North Korean regime, the defectors interviewed in our sample shared their opinions which suggested that they believe North Korea was being sanctioned because of its socialist system, and in order to protect the country from outside aggression, nuclear weapons are needed. In other words, the support for the socialist system is likely to have positively influenced one's support for nuclear arms development.

The antipathy against the KJU regime, on the other hand, seems to have stemmed, not from the dire economic consequences of the sanctions imposition, but rather from the rampant corruption and expropriation involving prevalence of bribery and extortion under KJU's watch. The resulting lack of trust and eroding legitimacy of the Kim regime, in turn, also seem to have a dampening effect on the effectiveness of the state's propaganda in rallying people around the KJU's regime. On top of this, the failure of economic policy reforms, especially highlighted by the failed currency reform in 2009, as well as increasing availability of information from the outside world, including Chinese news as well as Korean pop culture amplified such anti-regime sentiment and further accelerated the degradation of trust in the Kim regime.

These results from our study reveal an important gap in the literature. Whereas the previous theoretical expectations and empirical tests around the impact of sanctions and potential rally around the flag effects focused predominantly on rallying around the regime as the flag (Frye 2019), we see that there may be possible competing flags at play. For instance, despite the evident anti-regime sentiment against KJU as the leader or the dynastic regime of the Kim

family, even among the most conservative sample of North Korean defectors we were able to see that the rallying can still happen around other flags, including the notion of socialist regime, nuclear arms development, state sovereignty, or North Korean people or nation. In fact, (Grossman, Manekin, and Margalit 2018) document that in the context of Russia that the changes in attitudes toward the incumbent government and toward its contested policies were not always positively correlated. But moving beyond the simple disconnect between the attitudes towards the regime and its policies, our study highlights the possibility that even in the face of high level of mistrust against the regime, the longevity of the regime under sanctions could be still maintained as long as the regime may be able to strategically insulate itself from the broader context, while mobilizing people around some notion of other flags, such as socialism or support for nuclear arms development.

These findings raise some immediate and important questions. For example, which type of flag is the most critical in shaping the overall rally effect - or the support for the regime? Moreover, what is the relationship among the flags? Under what circumstances can decoupling of the different flags, such as support for the regime and support for the nuclear weapons, can effectively take place? In addition, what are some individual level traits that make one more or less prone to the possible strategic manipulation of different flag identities? In future lines of research, directly testing the dynamics around multiple potential flags should be at the core of advancing this literature on sanctions and rally around the flag effects.

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Appendix 1: Written questionnaire pre-discussion (in Korean)

선생님의 기본 정보에 대해 여쭙겠습니다.

문0) 선생님의 성함은 어떻게 되십니까?

문1) 선생님의 성별은 무엇입니까? 1. 남자 2. 여자

문3) 선생님의 출생년도는 어떻게 되십니까? ____년도

(다음 장에 계속) 북한에 대한 경제 제재에 대해 여쭙겠습니다.

경제 제재란, "특정 국가에 가하는 경제적 압박"을 의미하며 무역 봉쇄, 재외 자산동결 등의 방식이 있습니다. 경제 제재는 국가 간의 경제적 갈등이나 정치, 군사, 사회적 문제로 인해 부과되는 경우가 많습니다.

문3) 경제 제재라는 말을 들어보신 적이 있으십니까?

1. 예 2. 아니오

문3-1) 언제 처음으로 '경제 제재'에 대해 들으셨습니까?

____년도 혹은 대략의 시기

문3-2) 어디서 처음으로 대북 경제 제재에 대해 들으셨습니까?

예) 남한/북한/제 3국(중국, 러시아 등)

문3-3) 누구로부터 처음으로 경제 제재에 대해 들으셨습니까?

예) (북한에서 처음 들은 경우) 정권, 언론, 당 관리자, 장마당(시장), 이웃 등

문4) 선생님께서는 북한이 왜 경제제재를 당했다고 생각하십니까?

문5) 북한에 대한 경제 제재는 어느 국가나 조직이 시작했다고 생각하십니까?

현재 북한 상황에 대한 선생님의 생각을 여쭙겠습니다.

문6) 북한이 현재 처한 경제적인 상황의 원인이 무엇이라고 생각하십니까?

문7) 북한 핵무기 개발을 두고 일부는 '동북아 지역과 북한을 둘러싼 위협 수준을 높였다'고, 다른 일부는 '주권국으로서 북한 고유의 권리' 혹은 '북한이 스스로를 지킬 수 있는 유일한 수단'이라고도 합니다. 선생님께서는 북한의 핵무기 개발에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까?

문8) 선생님께서는 북한이 핵무기를 폐기해야 한다고 생각하십니까?

북한에 대한 경제 제재로 인한 영향에 대해 여쭙겠습니다.

문9) 경제 제재가 북한에 미친 영향이 무엇이라고 생각하십니까?

문10) 경제 제재가 평범한 북한 주민들에게 미친 영향이 있었습니까?

무엇이었나요? 厂

문11) 선생님께서는 북한에 계실 때 경제적인 어려움을 겪으신 적이 있으십니까?

1. 예 2. 아니오

문11-1) 북한에 대한 경제 제재 때문에 선생님께서 경제적 어려움을 겪었다고
생각하시나요?

1. 그렇다 2. 아니다

문12) 북한에 대한 경제 제재의 강도가 과도하다고 생각하십니까, 약하다고
생각하십니까?

1. 과도하다 2. 적정하다 3. 약하다

문13) 북한에 대한 경제 제재 이후 다음 각각에 대한 생각이 변하셨습니까?

(문13-1~문13-6 각 주체에 대해 모두 응답해주세요.)

문 13-1) 미국에 대해

문 13-2) 남한에 대해

문 13-3) 중국에 대해

문 13-4) 러시아에 대해

문 13-5) UN에 대해 문

문 13-6) 북한 당국에 대해

1. 좋아졌다 2. 별 변화 없었다 3. 나빠졌다

선생님의 북한에서의 상태에 대해 여쭙겠습니다.

문14) 북한에서의 최종 학력은 어떻게 되십니까?

1. 소학교(인민학교) 3. 직업기술학교(기술고급중학교) 학 및 박사원
 2. 중학교(초급중, 고급중, 고등중학교 등) 4. 전문학교(고등전문학교) 6.
- 기타(자세히:_____)

문15) 북한에서의 출신 지역은 어떻게 되십니까?

1. 량강도 6. 평안북도
2. 함경북도 7. 평안남도
3. 함경남도 8. 황해북도
4. 강원도 9. 황해남도
5. 자강도 10. 평양시

문16) 북한에서의 소득수준을 가장 잘 설명한 것은 무엇인가요?

1. 저소득층 2. 중간 3. 고소득층

문17) 북한에서의 가장 주된 직업은 무엇이었습니까?

문18) 선생님이 북한에 계실 때, 북한 사회의 부패수준이 전반적으로 어느 정도라고 생각하셨나요? 현재 선생님께서 생각하시는 바가 아니라, 북한에 계실 때를 기준으로 응답해주세요.

1. 매우 부패했다고 생각했다 2. 부패한 편이라고 생각했다 3. 보통이라고 생각했다
4. 청렴한 편이라고 생각했다 5. 매우 청렴하다고 생각했다

문19) 선생님이 북한에 계실 때, 직무를 수행하는 공직자 등에게 금품, 향음이나 접대, 선물 등을 요구 나 제공한 경험이 얼마나 있습니까?

1. 자주 있었다 1. 가끔 있었다 3. 거의 없었다 1 전혀 없었다

문20) 이 경제난 때문에 사회주의 배급이 중단되고 생계의 어려움을 겪는 사람들이 늘어났을 때, 선생님의 사회주의 체제에 대한 믿음에 어떤 변화가 있었습니까?

1. 사회주의에 대한 심각한 회의감이 들었다.
2. 사회주의에 대한 약간의 회의감이 들었다
3. 사회주의를 믿고 싶은 마음이 더 컸다
4. 사회주의에 대한 신념에 전혀 변화가 없었다

선생님의 탈북 및 남한 입국과정에 대해 여쭙겠습니다.

문21) 탈북경로는 어떻게 되십니까? 최종 탈북만을 대상으로 하여 최종 남한 입국까지 북한에서 나온 지점, 제3국 국가명이나 도시 등을 차례로 기재해주세요.

문22) 북한에서 나온 후 남한에 입국하기까지 걸린 기간은 얼마나 되십니까?

총 ___년 ___개월

선생님의 남한에서의 상태에 대해 여쭙겠습니다.

문23) 대한민국의 현재 직업은 무엇입니까?

문24) 현재 대한민국에서 귀하의 소득 수준은 다음 중 어디에 해당된다고 생각하십니까?

1. 저소득층
2. 중간
3. 고소득층

Appendix 2: Focus group discussion guidelines for the moderator (in Korean)

Structure

Interview 진행 Flow : (120분 진행)

Session	Contents	Timing
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Warm-up : Introduction		5 mins
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Pre session	자기기업식 설문조사	15 mins
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Session1	경제 제재 인지 및 견해	40 mins
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Session2	경제 제재 전후 주요 행위자들에 대한 인식 변화	30 mins
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Session3	북한 핵개발에 대한 견해	20 mins
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epilogue	마무리	5 mins
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Detailed Breakdown

Wam-up:

Introduction 오프닝 및 진행자 소개

안녕하세요. 코로나 상황에도 먼 길 찾아주셔서 감사드립니다.

이번 토론회 진행하게 된 한국리서치 000이라고 합니다.

프로젝트의 소개

- 사전에 읽으신 동의서에서 확인하신 것처럼 오늘은 모신 6분의 선생님을 모시고 대북제재에 대한 생각들을 나눠보는 자리입니다. 국제사회의 대북제재가 북한주민과 북한사회에 어떤 영향을 줬는지를 알아보려고, 국제연구기관인 한국개발연구원(KDI)에서 실시하고 있습니다.

참석자 소개(가나다 순)

- 그럼, 진행에 앞서 먼저 참석하신 분들을 간단히 인사 나누시겠습니다.
- (참석자 명단을 보고 소속 및 이름 소개, 가나다순)

주의사항 설명

- 본격적인 진행에 앞서 주의사항 두 가지만 안내 드리겠습니다.
- 추후 보고서 작성을 위해 토론회 내용이 녹음(녹화)되는 것에 대해 양해 부탁드리며, 가급적 너무 작지 않은 목소리로 발언 부탁 드리겠습니다.
- 어떤 분이 어떤 말씀을 하셨는지 기록되는 것은 아니고 철저히 보호되니 자유로운 견해 들려주셨으면 좋겠습니다.
- 두번째로 핸드폰은 사용을 자제 부탁드립니다.

Session 설문조사 [20 mins]

문항 의미를 짚어주면서 응답자들이 스스로 기입할 수 있도록 안내

좌담회 주제와 같은 내용으로 시간이 너무 늘어지지 않도록 단답형식으로 진행

Session2 경제 제재 인지 및 견해 [40 mins]

PRE(5m)

- 작성해주신 내용들에 대해 좀 더 구체적으로 이야기 나눠보는 시간을 가지려고 합니다. 먼저 제재를 어느 연령대쯤에 경험하셨는지 궁금한데, 최종 탈북이 언제쯤이었고, 당시 연령대가 어떻게 되셨어요? 어떤 일을 하고 계신 상태였는지도 함께 말씀해주세요.

1) 경제제재에 대한 인지(5m)

- 선생님들께서는 이전에 경제 제재라는 말을 들어보신 적이 있으세요?
- 언제 처음으로 어디서, 누구에게서 들어보셨나요? 돌아가면서 좀 여쭙보겠습니다.

2) 경제제재 원인 인식(10m)

- 북한이 국제사회와 미국 등으로부터 오랜 시간 경제 제재를 당해 왔는데, 선생님들께서는 북한이 왜 그런 제재를 받았다고 생각하세요?
- 그럼 선생님들께서는 북한에 대해 제재를 시작한 국가나 조직이 누구라고 생각하세요?

3) 경제제재 영향(10m)

- 탈북한 지 꽤 오랜 시간이 되신 분들도 계시고, 얼마 되지 않으신 분들도 계시는데, 경제 제재가 북한에 어떤 영향을 줬다고 생각하시나요?
- 제재가 군부 등이 아닌 평범한 북한 주민들에게도 영향이 있었다고 생각하시나요?
- 그렇다면, 선생님의 개인 삶에는 어떤 영향이 있으셨어요?

4) 경제제재 평가(10m)

- 아까 북한이 000,000 등의 이유 때문에 제재를 받았다고 말씀 주셨는데, 북한이 제재를 받은 것이 정당하다고 생각하시나요?
- 수출금지, 금융거래 금지 등 다양한 제재가 있었는데, 그렇다면 이러한 북한에 대한 제재 수준이나 강도가 적당했다고 생각하세요? 과했다고 생각하세요?

Session 3 주요국 인식 변화 [30 mins]

대북 제재를 보시면서 북한 당국이나 주변국이나 국제사회에 대한 인상이 어떻게 바뀌었는지 여쭙고자 합니다.

1) 국제사회에 대한 인식 변화(15m)

- 우선 대북 제재 하면 국제사회 중에서 누가 먼저 떠오르세요(미국, UN, 중국 등)
- 제재가 시작되고 심해지면서 그 국가들에 대한 인상이 좋아지셨나요?
- 나빠지셨나요? 왜 그러셨어요?

** 구체적으로 풍부하게 확인

- (위에서 언급되지 않은 국가) 남한/UN/중국/러시아등에 대해서는 어떻게 생각하셨어요?

- 그밖에 더 중요하고 좋게 생각하게 된 국가나, 더 나쁘게 생각하게 된 다른 국가가 있을까요?

2) 북한 당국에 대한 인식 변화(15m)

- 제재를 경험하시면서 북한 정권에 대한 생각은 어떻게 달라지셨어요?

- 원래 호의가 있으셨는지, 비판적이었는지 제재를 경험하면서 달라진 바가 있는지 말씀해주세요.

- 달라졌다면 왜, 달라지지 않았다면 왜 그런 생각들을 하게 된 것 같으세요?

- 북한 당국이 제재에 잘 대응했다고 생각하시나요? 어떻게 대응했어야 할까요?

** 구체적으로 풍부하게 확인

Session 4 북한 핵개발에 대한 견해 [20 mins]

최근 안좋았던 상황도 있었는데, 북미 간 협상이나 북한의 핵폐기는 큰 진전이 없는 상황입니다.

- 선생님께서는 북한이 왜 핵무기를 개발한다고 생각하세요?

- 핵무기 개발에 대해 주변국에 위협이라는 북한에 대한 비난도 있지만,

주권국으로서 고유한 권리이고 핵무기를 갖고 있는 국가는 북한뿐만이 아니라는

옹호적인 의견도 있습니다. 선생님께서는 북한 핵무기 개발에 어떤 입장이신가요?

- 맞닿은 질문입니다만, 선생님께서는 북한이 핵무기를 포기해야 한다고
생각하십니까? 북한 경제를 위해 포기해야 한다, 주변국에 위협이 되므로 포기해야
한다, 아니다 경제 제재 해제 협상 생존이 담보될 때까지는 포기하면 안된다 등
다양한 의견들이 있는 것 같습니다.

- (추가) 선생님들 생각이 아닌 북한 사회 내부에 있는 주민들의 주된 여론은
무엇이라고 생각하시나요?

기타 추가 의견 및 마무리 [5 mins]

오늘 토론회는 어떠셨나요? 이 연구와 관련해 해주시고 싶은 조언도 좋습니다.

긴 시간 귀한 말씀 감사합니다. 조심히 돌아가세요.